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INTRODUCTION 
I. Occasion and Purpose 
In recent years, there has been renewed interest among 
contemporary ethicians in the natural law doctrine of St. 
Thomas Aquinas. However, a great deal of controversy has 
been generated (as we shall review shortly) as to what St. 
Thomas considers to be the basis or derivation of natural 
law. In an attempt, then, to clarify what in fact 
constitutes for St. Thomas the foundation of natural law, we 
undertake to study the question: Is natural law innate? In 
investigating whether natural law for St. Thomas is innate, 
we are led into the heart of his natural law doctrine 
inasmuch as it involves both his theory of human knowledge 
and his theory of human nature. Hence, the question, "Is 
natural law innate?" is at once determinate in focus, yet 
complex and broad in scope. The study of St. Thomas' notion 
of natural law precisely as innate is therefore of merit, 
not only for clarifying its derivation, but also for 
appreciating his natural law doctrine within the context of 
his Weltanschauung as a medieval theologian. 
Further, to better grasp the natural law doctrine of 
St. Thomas, and to better understand the precise manner in 
which natural law is (or is not) innate for St. Thomas, we 
will also undertake a comparative study of the innate 
2 
character of natural law according to St. Bonaventure. As a 
Catholic theologian of the thirteenth century, St. 
Bonaventure's theory of natural law accords with that of St. 
Thomas in many ways, of course. Nevertheless, St. 
Bonaventure has his own theological, metaphysical, and 
epistemological concerns and positions which are quite 
different from those of St. Thomas. Consequently, the 
natural law doctrine of St. Bonaventure is different in many 
respects from that of St. Thomas; indeed, their doctrinal 
differences come to bear directly on their respective 
understandings of natural law as innate. Put the other way 
around, their distinctive positions on natural law as innate 
reflect the manifold differences between their respective 
philosophical and theological commitments. Hence, the 
numerous contrasts which this comparative study reveals 
concerning the innate character of natural law is of service 
in illuminating not only each thinker's position on the 
derivation of natural law, but the unique character of their 
natural law doctrines as understood within their respective 
world-views. 
II. Review of Secondary Literature 
A survey of the secondary literature shows that no 
previous investigation on natural law precisely as innate 
has been carried out on either St. Bonaventure or St. 
Thomas. There are indeed many studies which, to some extent, 
deal with the natural law doctrines of these two 
3 
theologians. However, such studies are either general in 
scope and thus prove shallow in their analysis of natural 
law as innate, or else are inaccurate in their 
interpretations. Further, except for cursory historical 
treatments, no in-depth comparative study on the natural law 
doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas has been 
undertaken. Thus, our present endeavor offers an original 
and hopefully useful contribution to the field of 
scholarship on the subject of natural law. Let us next 
review briefly the more pertinent literature on natural law 
in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas as follows. 
III. Secondary Literature on St. Bonaventure 
Perhaps the most comprehensive and accurate exposition 
of Bonaventurean doctrine as a whole is given by Etienne 
Gilson in his La philosophie de saint Bonaventure. 1 In this 
work, he devotes a chapter to St. Bonaventure's moral 
philosophy and offers in this connection a general contrast 
between the "Christian Platonism" of St. Bonaventure and the 
"Christian Aristotelianism" of St. Thomas. 2 This contrast 
1 Etienne Gilson, La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure 
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1943). 
2 Ibid., 345-46, especially 345. For different 
perspectives concerning the Platonic and Aristotelian 
influences upon St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, see Patrice 
Robert, "St. Bonaventure, Defender of Christian Wisdom," 
Fransiscan Studies 3 (1943), 159-79; "Le probleme de la 
philosophie Bonaventurienne," Lavel Theologigue et 
Philosophigue 7 (1951), 9-58; Fernand Van Steenberghen, The 
Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century (New York: 
Nelson, 1955); Siger de Brabant d'apres ses oeuvres 
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in philosophical orientation is fundamental to understanding 
the two thinkers' different treatments of natural law. 
Nevertheless, such a general account leaves uncovered many 
important implications which need spelling out in light of 
the contemporary debate on natural law. 
Another excellent study on the thought of St. 
Bonaventure is presented by Efrem Bettoni in his book, St 
Bonaventure. 3 Set in a chapter dealing with the nature of 
man and human activity, Betonni gives a succinct account of 
the "ideal laws which we find within ourselves ... as part of 
our native endowment ... given by God. " 4 While well balanced 
in presentation, Bettoni's brief exposition provides no 
detailed analysis of natural law as such. 
John Quinn has provided an extensive exposition of St. 
Bonaventure's thought in The Historical Constitution of St. 
Bonaventures's Philosophy. 5 In this comprehensive study, 
Quinn often touches upon Bonaventure's notion of natural law 
ined1tes, 2 vols. (Coll. Les Philosophes Belges, XII-XIII, 
Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supeieur de Philosophie, 
1942). A review of the secondary literature on St. 
Bonaventure is offered by John F. Quinn, The Historical 
Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1973), 17-99, 
904-11. 
3 Efrem Bettoni, St. Bonaventure, trans. Angelus 
Gambatese (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1964) . 
4 Ibid., 95 and 98-99. 
5John F. Quinn, The Historical Constitution of St. 
Bonaventures's Philosophy (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1973). 
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in connection with his epistemology and doctrine of human 
nature; 6 but since, on these occasions, it is not the focus 
of discussion, natural law is treated in only a cursory 
manner. 
Quinn has also written two important articles which 
provide a solid overview on the ethical teachings of St. 
Bonaventure. In "The Moral Philosophy of St. Bonaventure," 
he sets out to see "how [St. Bonaventure] looks upon moral 
philosophy as a science of natural reason." 7 After locating 
moral philosophy within St. Bonaventure's division of 
sciences, Quinn presents a chronological summary of St. 
Bonaventure's main texts on moral matters. In this 
exposition, St. Bonaventure's notion of natural law is dealt 
with to some extent, but only indirectly. A more focused 
treatment on natural law is rather taken up in his article, 
"St. Bonaventure's Fundamental Conception of Natural Law." 8 
According to Quinn, Bonaventure himself never treats natural 
law for its own sake, but rather "refers to it only in 
connexion with other problems." 9 A complete account of 
Bonaventure's natural law doctrine, Quinn tells us, would 
6 Ibid., 326, 402-03, 609, 798, 802-03. 
7John F. Quinn, "The Moral Philosophy of St. 
Bonaventure, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5, (1974), 
40. 
8John F. Quinn, "St. Bonaventure's Fundamental 
Conception of Natural Law," .s....._ Bonaventura 1274-1974, III. 
Collegia S. Bonaventura. Grottaferrata (1972-1974), 571-98. 
9 Ibid., 572. 
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necessitate a handling of all texts where St. Bonaventure 
discusses natural law. Instead, Quinn narrows his own study 
to a "limited number of problems," in order simply to "grasp 
his fundamental conception of natural law. 1110 Thus, while 
Quinn presents a few important texts which deal with the 
innate character of natural law, he offers no further 
analysis of St. Bonaventure's notion of natural law 
precisely as innate. 
Lastly, in his article, "Note Sulla Legge Naturale in 
San Bonaventura," Gervasio Gestori acknowledges that 
Bonaventure's natural law doctrine has never been clearly 
mapped out, and that expositions of his doctrine have been 
limited to general treatments. Bonaventure himself, Gestori 
suggests, was evidently not much interested in the topic of 
natural law, or perhaps he was distracted with his 
responsibilities as General of the Franciscan order. 11 In 
any case, Gestori provides the reader with a useful 
10 Ibid. 
11Gestori, Gervasio. "Note Sulla Legge Naturale in San 
Bonaventura," La Scuola Cattolica 102 (1974), 50: "· .. per 
quanto ci risulta, il suo insegnamento sulla legge naturale 
non e stato ancora esposto adeguatamente, limitandosi di 
solito le trattazioni generali a fare qualche vago cenno, 
oltre il quale difficilmente si potevano collocare precisi 
contenuti critici. 
"A dire il vero, bisogna affermare subito che la 
riflessione bonaventuriana sull'argomento non e stata molto 
vasta, forse perche il tema non l'interessava o forse meglio 
perche fu ben presto distratto dallo studio con la nomina a 
generale dell'Ordine francescano." 
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bibliography on the subject of natural law12 and offers an 
historical account of various influences upon St. 
Bonaventure's own thought concerning natural law. 13 He also 
outlines in his article a few general points concerning the 
role which Bonaventure assigns to natural law with respect 
to conscience and synderesis. Here, the problem of the 
innate character of natural law is touched upon, but Gestori 
makes no attempt to explore the issue further. 14 Hence, 
further research remains to be undertaken regarding St. 
Bonaventure's notion of natural law precisely as innate. 
IV. Secondary Literature on St. Thomas 
One of the most concise, but thorough, studies on St. 
Thomas' natural law doctrine is offered by Walter Farrell in 
his book, The Natural Moral Law According to St. Thomas and 
Suarez. 15 Here, Farrell devotes a section of his final 
chapter to the consideration of the innate character of 
natural law. According to Farrell, "St. Thomas placed the 
essence of the Natural Moral law in ... three elements, namely 
the natural inclinations, the light of reason and the 
12 Ibid., 50. 
13 Ibid., 51-54. 
14 Ibid., 60, note 43: "La questione tocca qui un punto 
importante, che pero non puo essere risolto in questa sede, 
perche riguarda la concezione bonaventuriana della 
conoscenza intellecttiva e dell'origine delle idee." 
15Walter Farrell, The Natural Moral Law According to 
St. Thomas and Suarez (Ditchling: St. Dominic's Press, 
1930). 
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propositions of reason, taken in some way 
collectively .... " 16 "As regards the first two essential 
elements of this law--the natural inclinations and light of 
reason--there is no difficulty about their being strictly 
innate and this is the doctrine of St. Thomas." 17 Further, 
"St. Thomas says quite plainly that [the] first principles 
or propositions of reason are innate. 1118 However, this 
third essential element (the propositions of reason), 
Farrell tells us, are for St. Thomas innate only in a 
qualified sense--inasmu.ch as such principles are naturally 
known ("naturaliter nota") or implanted in natural cognition 
("indita erant in naturali cognitione") . 19 Farrell cites a 
passage from the De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, 20 and quotes both 
Cajetan and Sylvius to help explain the sense in which first 
moral principles are understood by St. Thomas to be 
innate. 21 According to Farrell, the term "innate" for St. 
Thomas "indicates that every man, by the very nature of his 
16 Ibid. I 92. 
17 Ibid. I 144. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. I 144-5. 
20 Ibid. , 145: " ... quod praeexistunt in nobis quaedam 
scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones 
intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis 
cognoscuntur per species a sensibilibus abstractis, ... et 
hujusmodi, quae statim intellectus apprehendit." 
21 Ibid., 145-46; see Commentarium in Summam Theologicam 
(Leonine edition of the Summa Theologiae): Cajetan in ST I, 
q. 82, a. 4; Sylvius in ST I-II, q. 89, a. 6, ad 1. 
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intellect, immediately and without any reasoning, knows the 
truth of these propositions once their terms are understood 
through the help of acquired sense knowledge, memory and so 
on. 1122 Such an interpretation, while accurate, is 
nevertheless inadequate in addressing the challenges of more 
recent interpretations concerning the derivation of natural 
law. 
Another important exposition on St. Thomas' natural law 
doctrine is undertaken by Odon Lottin in study, Le droit 
naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aguin et ses predecesseurs. 23 
In this work, Lottin first traces the historical influences 
which contributed to St. Thomas own synthetic doctrine of 
natural law. 24 Next, he maps out the general features of 
St. Thomas' natural law teachings in view of the secular, 
Dominican, and Franciscan traditions. 25 Similar to the 
opinion of Farrell, Lottin contends that while St. Thomas 
speaks of natural law judgments as innate, he means that 
they are naturally acquired according to the Aristotelian 
doctrine on the origin of ideas. The term "innate," Lottin 
tells us, is employed by St. Thomas with respect to natural 
law judgments merely for the sake of keeping with the 
22 Ibid., 146-47. 
230don Lottin, Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas 
d'Aguin et~ predecesseurs (Bruges: Beyaert, 1931). 
24 Ibid., 3-60. 
25 Ibid., 61-68. 
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formulas of his times. 26 Further, in his account of St. 
Thomas' understanding of natural law, Lattin speaks of the 
law of man's own being--his very form--as the internal 
principle which inclines him towards his perfection or 
natural end. This natural end preexists in his being in the 
manner of an "idea" or "form" to be achieved by man who must 
find there the norms of human activity; accordingly, it is 
in natural reason, Lattin tells us, that man finds his 
fundamental direction towards his proper end. 27 
26 Ibid. , 70: "Il faudra en conclure que ces j ugements, 
naturels, sont innes. De fait, saint Thomas accepte toutes 
les expressions du temps pour designer cette inneite." See 
also ibid., 73: "N'etait-ce pas le moment de retoucher les 
formules qui accentuaient l'inneite de la loi naturelle et 
de dire tout uniment: la loi naturelle consiste dans les 
jugements primordiaux que l'homme emet sur les relations de 
ses actes avec sa nature et l'Auteur de la nature. Ces 
jugements sont l'oeuvre de notre raison, comme les jugements 
premiers de l'ordre speculatif; mais ils s'acquierent tout 
naturellement, sans le secours du raisonnement. C'est en ce 
sens uniquement qu'ils sont principia per se nota. Plus que 
nul autre, saint Thomas etait invite a formuler de la sorte 
l'inneite de la loi naturelle; car, contrairement a saint 
Bonaventure, il etendait a l'idee meme de Dieu la these 
aristotelicienne sur l'origine des idees. Mais saint Thomas 
etait de son temps; et il a maintenu la formule re9ue qui 
accentuait l'inneite de la loi naturelle: 'Praecepta prima 
et communia sunt scripta in ratione naturali quasi per se 
nota.'" 
27 Ibid., 70-71: "La loi naturelle est n'est pas une 
'forme'imprimee violemment du dehors a l'activite de l'etre. 
C'est en un sens la 'forme' meme de l'etre. Car tout etre 
cree, etant perfectible, tend a se parfaire; il le fait, en 
atteignant sa fin naturelle. Mais cette fin naturelle 
preexiste dans l'etre a la maniere d'une 'idee' ,d'une 
'forme' a realiser. La loi de l'etre, pour saint Thomas, est 
precisement le principe qui incline la forme de l'etre a 
s'actualiser pleinement. Et si, pour designer ce principe, 
le saint Docteur reserve le nom de loi, oppose a 
l'estimative animale, c'est parce que, preludant a sa 
definition de la loi 'ordinatio rationis', il envisage la 
11 
When Lottin states that man's natural end preexists in 
him, he is ref erring to the form of man and not to any 
innate idea as such (see note 16 above); but how this 
preexistent natural end translates into an idea in human 
reason is left unexplained. Without further consideration of 
the manner by which natural law judgments are "naturally 
acquired," Lottin brings his discussion on the innate 
character of natural law to a close. 
At this very point where Lottin ends his discussion on 
natural law knowledge, other commentators have pressed 
further. With respect to the relationship between the 
natural inclinations of man and his knowledge of natural 
law, Jacques Maritain proposes the following account of St. 
Thomas' teaching: 
I think that Thomas Aquinas' teaching, here, should be 
understood in a much deeper and more precise fashion 
than is usual. When he says that human reason discovers 
the regulations of natural law through the guidance of 
the inclinations of human nature, he means that the 
very mode or manner in which human reason knows natural 
law is not rational knowledge, but knowledge through 
inclination. That kind of knowledge is not clear 
knowledge through concepts and conceptual judgments; it 
is obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge by 
connaturality or congeniality, in which the intellect, 
loi comme le principe interne de direction, propre a 
l'homme. C'est dans la raison 'forme' de l'homme, que l'on 
devra trouver la norme de son activite, la loi de son 
devenir. Et comrne il s'agit de direction premiere, ce sera 
dans la 'raison naturelle' que l'homrne trouvera ses 
directives fondamentales; de la sorte, saint Thomas evoque 
le concept de 'ratio naturalis'qui avait servi au juriste 
remain Gaius pour definir le droit specifiquement humain." 
12 
in order to bear judgment, consults and listens to the 
inner melody that the vibrating strings of abiding 
tendencies make present in the subject. 28 
What can be said of Maritain's interpretation of the 
derivation of natural law knowledge, and the nature of such 
knowledge as being in some way non-rational? In an incisive 
article, "The Thomist Concept of Natural Law, " 29 D. 
O'Donoghue takes Maritain to task. Granted that such an 
interpretation bears "a certain plausibility by the language 
which St. Thomas uses. Nevertheless," asserts O'Donoghue, 
"they are contradicted by the teaching of St. Thomas. 1130 
O'Donoghue then cites several texts which clearly establish 
that natural law knowledge for St. Thomas is indeed a 
rational knowledge. 31 O'Donoghue then gives his own account 
of St. Thomas' natural law teaching: 
The first principles of practical reason are the 
primary precepts of Natural Law. These principles arise 
in the mind through the operation of that power which 
governs all our thinking, the active intellect. The 
28Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951), 93. Maritian also 
discusses natural law in connection with natural rights in 
The Person and the Common Good (New York: Scribner, 1947); 
see also The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacgues 
Maritain: Selected Readings, ed Joseph Evans and Leo Ward 
(New York: Scribner, 1955), 37, 42. In these latter works, 
however, he offers no further analysis regarding the 
derivation of natural law. 
29D. O'Donoghue, "The Thomist Concept of Natural Law," 
Irish Theological Quarterly 22 (1955), 89-109. 
30 Ibid. I 96-97. 
31 Ibid., 97; cf. De Veritate, q. 11, a. 1; q. 16, a. 1. 
13 
active intellect does not discover these principles 
within itself, nor within the passive intellect, nor 
does it find them written in human nature. Neither does 
it arrive at them by way of a vision of an intelligible 
world or through contact with the veritas 
incommutabilis of St. Augustine. It arrives at them by 
addressing itself to the data provided by the 
senses. 32 
While O'Donoghue is justified (we think) in his 
critique of Maritain, his own interpretation, while sound in 
its positive affirmations, appears to us to be heavy-handed 
in its denials--namely, inasmuch as he seems to completely 
dismiss (or, at least, overlook) human nature and natural 
inclination as contributing causal factors in the production 
of natural law knowledge. The question must be asked, 
however, whether human nature and natural inclinations have 
any bearing at all upon the formation of natural law 
principles--and if so, in what way? Further exploration on 
these matters is therefore in order. 
Robert Henle has recently published a translation and 
commentary on St. Thomas' Treatise on Law (ST I-II, qq. 90-
97) . 33 The primary purpose of his book, Henle states, "is 
to provide the background and the explanations necessary for 
an intelligent and understanding reading of St. Thomas's 
Treatise on Law. "34 In addition to his introductory 
32 Ibid. I 97. 
33Robert Henle, St. Thomas Aguinas. The Treatise on 
Law: [Summa Theologiae. I-II. gg_._ 90-97] (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993). 
34 Ibid. I xv. 
14 
exposition of pertinent Thomistic teachings, Henle provides 
a running commentary on the texts and clarifies points of 
doctrine along the way vis-a-vis different interpretations 
or schools of ethical thought. With regard to ST I-II, q. 
90, a. 4, ad 1 ("promulgatio legis naturae est ex hoc ipso 
quod Deus earn mentibus hominum inseruit naturaliter 
cognoscendam"), Henle comments as follows: 
What does "God instilled the Natural Law in the minds 
of men so as to be naturally known by them" 
mean? .... Clearly, as opposed to being supernaturally 
known, Natural Law is "naturally known," But the term 
"naturally" is still ambiguous and lies open to at 
least two interpretations. One interpretation is to say 
that there are in our intellects, prior to reflection 
or experience, fully formed first principles of the 
Natural Law and therefore of the moral order .... The 
correct interpretation [however] is as follows. The 
Practical Intellect has by nature the habit of the 
first principles of the Natural Law. This means that 
the Practical Intellect has the innate ability to 
recognize the first principles without previously 
acquiring the ability to do so. The habit is the 
ability to recognize the first principles, that is, by 
the habit the first principles are recognized without 
learning to do so, but the habit is not the first 
principles themselves. The distinction between the 
habit as that by which something is known and the 
things thereby known is fundamental. 35 
Henle's interpretation is, we think, accurate; but he 
offers no further explanation as to how first moral 
principles become "naturally known" and recognized as per .Qg 
nota. In our study of whether (or in what manner) natural 
law is innate, we hope to explore and clarify what Henle 
leaves unsaid. 
35 Ibid. I 141-42. 
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Not only is there controversy over the teachings of St. 
Thomas on the derivation of natural law; in more recent 
years, there has even been debate as to whether natural law 
has any significant bearing for St. Thomas upon his ethical 
teaching. Among the contemporary disputants is Vernon Bourke 
who offers a challenge to the usual classification of St. 
Thomas' ethics as "a theory of natural law. " 36 As Bourke 
sees it, "the ethics of Thomas Aquinas is not grounded on a 
code of immutable precepts constituting the natural law"; 
hence, to maintain "that Thomas' 'moral philosophy is 
dominated by the concept of natural law' is quite an 
exaggeration. "37 Rather, "the theory of right reason 
seems ... to take precedence over the theory of natural law." 
Therefore, "instead of classifying St. Thomas's ethics in 
terms of natural law, we would do better to call it an 
orthological ethics. "38 
36Vernon Bourke, "Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural Law 
Ethicist?," The Monist 58 (1974), 52. 
37 Ibid., 65; Bourke cites here the words of W. D. 
Hudson in the "Editor's Preface" to D. J. O'Connor, Aguinas 
and Natural Law (London: Macmillan 1967) . 
38 Ibid., 66 and 55. Bourke's reservation for 
identifying St. Thomas' ethics in terms of natural law is 
twofold. First, he is concerned that "such a classification 
may give the false impression of imperatives arbitrarily 
imposed by an omnipotent Legislator." Secondly, "Aquinas 
thought [Bourke maintains] that lex derives from legere (to 
read) and so he understood lex to be a written statement of 
ius. Strictly speaking, then, when Thomas talks about law 
(lex), he is not discussing what is fundamentally the right 
thing to do but some sort of reasonable statement of what is 
generally the right thing." For a refutation of Bourke's 
exegesis on St. Thomas' use of the terms lex and ius, see 
16 
To add to the present debate, Joseph Owens has recently 
declared that for St. Thomas, "the starting point or first 
principle of a moral decision cannot be determined by the 
nature of things. It is determined by human choice. "39 
"Choice," Owens tells us, 
is the starting point of the moral order. The actual 
relating of human activities to their ultimate goal, as 
viewed both in moral philosophy and in moral theology, 
has to come freely from the human agent. It cannot be 
dictated by any outside cause. Morality, then, is not 
to be identified in Aquinas with the eternal law, or 
with natural law, or with any other law. It is not a 
set program, fixed and stable after the fashion of a 
blueprint .... Christian revelation introduced nothing 
that infringed upon Aquinas' wholehearted acceptance of 
Aristotle's basic tenet in regard to the order of 
morality. The starting point remained free choice, and 
the whole [italics added] moral order could be viewed 
as man-made. " 40 
Oscar Brown, Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1981), 
165-74. 
39Joseph Owens, "Human Reason and the Moral Order in 
Aquinas," Studia Moralia 28 (1990), 169. 
40 Ibid., 170. In this same section Owens also states 
that "the natural law is a participation of the eternal law 
by the human mind. But that is still not the moral order. 
The moral order arises only when the human agent in her or 
his own thinking freely directs conduct in accord with that 
law [italics added]." (170). Owens concludes his discussion 
(172) by assuring the reader that "the foregoing study has. 
remained within the limits of Catholic philosophy." One 
wonders why Owens feels the need to make such a remark. In 
any case, inasmuch as the principle of non-contradiction is 
presumably a tenet of the Catholic philosophical tradition, 
further clarification by Fr. Owens on the relationship 
between free choice, natural law, and the moral order is 
required in order for his assertions--taken as a 
comprehensible unity--to remain within that philosophical 
tradition. 
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There is yet another group of ethical theorists--
notably, John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle--who, 
to a great extent, appeal to the moral philosophy of St. 
Thomas in support of their own version of a natural law 
ethics. As argued in his book, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, John Finnis sees no need for a metaphysics or 
philosophy of nature in order to establish an ethics; 
rather, morality, as Finnis sees it, is based upon the 
underived first principles of practical reasonableness. On 
this score, he claims the patronage of St. Thomas: 
For Aquinas, the way to discover what is morally right 
(virtue) and wrong (vice) is to ask, not what is in 
accordance with human nature, but what is reasonable. 
And this quest will eventually bring one back to the 
underived first principles of practical reasonableness, 
principles which make no reference at all to human 
nature, but only to human good. From end to end of 
his ethical discourses, the primary categories for 
Aquinas are the 'good' and the 'reasonable'; the 
'natural' is, from the point of view of his ethics, a 
speculative appendage added by way of metaphysical 
reflection, not a counter with which to advance either 
to or from the practical prima principia per se 
nota. 41 
Similarly, Germain Grisez asserts that an ethics cannot 
be founded upon any examination of human nature or 
metaphysical speculation; rather, morality is based upon the 
self-evident and underivable principles of natural law. In 
41John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980), 36. 
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his article, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A 
Commentary on the Summa Theologiae. ~ Question .2..!...._ 
Article 2_, 11 Grisez thus interprets St. Thomas: 
[The first principle of practical reason, namely:] Good 
is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided, 
together with the other self-evident principles of 
natural law, are not derived from any statements of 
fact. They are principles. They are not derived from 
any statements at all. They are not derived from prior 
principles. They are underivable .... Of course, one 
cannot form these principles if he has no grasp upon 
what is involved in them, and such understanding 
presupposes experience. However, one does not derive 
these principles from experience or from gny previous 
understanding [italics added] . 42 
If one supposes that principles of natural law are 
formed by examining kinds of actions in comparison with 
human nature and noting their agreement or 
disagreement, then one must respond to the objection 
that it is impossible to derive normative judgments 
from metaphysical speculations. The invocation of a 
metaphysics of divine causality and providence at this 
point is no help, since such a metaphysics also 
consists exclusively of theoretical truths from which 
reason can derive no practical consequences. 43 
Further, according to Grisez' reading of St. Thomas, 
the first principle of practical reason "requires only that 
what it directs have intentionality towards an intelligible 
purpose. 44 Accordingly, "the first principle of practical 
42Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical 
Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae. ~ Question 
.2..!...._ Article 2_," Natural Law Forum 10 (1965), 195. 
43 Ibid. I 196. 
44 Ibid., 188. See also 179: "In forming this first 
precept, practical reason performs its most basic task, for 
it simply determines that what it shall think about must at 
least be set on the way to something--as it must be .if 
reason is to be able to think of it practically." The words 
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reason does provide a basic requirement for action merely by 
prescribing that it be for some purpose (or another), and it 
is in the light of this requirement that the objects of all 
the inclinations are understood as human goods and 
established as objectives for rational pursuit." 45 
Inasmuch, then, as the first principles of practical reason 
pertain to a multiplicity of human goods taken precisely as 
"natural" (as opposed to the "supernatural"), natural law, 
according to St. Thomas, "does not direct man to his 
supernatural end; in fact it is precisely because it is 
inadequate to do so that divine law is needed as a 
supplement. "46 
In line, then, with their interpretation of St. 
Thomas, 47 Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle have fashioned a "New 
"requires" and "must" as used by Grisez in the above 
statements are misleading inasmuch as the first principle of 
practical reason presumably lacks imperative force. See 
ibid., 190-91: "The mistaken interpretation of Aquinas's 
theory of natural law considers natural law precepts to be a 
set of imperatives .... I wish to show both that the first 
principle does not have primarily imperative force and that 
it is really prescriptive." The term "prescriptive" as used 
here by Grisez evidently refers, not to what is imperative, 
but to what is merely advisable or recommended. 
45 Ibid. I 199. 
46 Ibid. I 184. 
47At times, Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle admit (or 
suggest) that they do not embrace certain teachings of St. 
Thomas; yet, the exact points of disagreement are never 
clearly identified and discussed. Hence, in his article, 
"Practical Reasoning, Human Goods and the End of Man" 
[Proceedings of the ACPA 58 (1984), 33], Finnis writes: 
"This conclusion, def ended by Grisez and myself as valid 
apart from the authority of St. Thomas [italics added], is: 
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Natural Law" ethics as based upon the incommensurability of 
basic human goods. "It follows from this incommensurability 
that all basic purposes are alike only in being desired for 
some reason. They differ in desirability because there is no 
single reason underlying every purpose for the sake of which 
one acts [italics added] . 1148 
Still other scholars--notably, Russell Rittinger, Ralph 
any state which could count as the 'one ultimate good for 
all humans' must involve a plurality of goods, such as the 
irreducible complexity of integral human fulfillment." As 
this statement seems to imply, Finnis and Grisez do 
acknowledge St. Thomas' view that there is indeed one 
ultimate good to which all other goods are reducible. 
Apparently, then, Grisez' interpretation of St. Thomas 
concerning the first principle of practical reason has 
changed since his 1965 commentary on the Summa Theologiae I-
II, q. 94, a. 2. See also Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis, 
"Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987), 99: "While this 
paper proposes philosophical clarifications and arguments 
rather than textual interpretations, it uses some language 
common in the (broadly speaking, Thomistic) natural-law 
tradition from which we developed the theory. But what we 
say here differs in various ways from the theories 
articulated by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and others." The 
points of disagreement between these authors (Grisez, Boyle, 
and Finnis) and St. Thomas are not spelled out, however. 
Rather, it is left to the careful reader who is familiar 
with the authentic teachings of St. Thomas to recognize the 
fundamental philosophical differences between his doctrine 
of natural law and their own. 
48Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, 
"Practical Principles," 110. See ibid., 133: "Nevertheless, 
integral human fulfillment cannot be the ultimate in the 
sense of being the ultimate reason why one chooses or should 
choose whatever one chooses. In this sense, the basic goods 
are ultimate ends .... But is not God the ultimate end of 
human persons? ... To begin with, God is not the ultimate 
reason for acting. The basic goods are reasons for actions. 
In choosing actions to instantiate the goods, one does not 
find the ultimate reason for one's choices in divine 
goodness." 
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Mcinerny, and Henry Veatch--insist that the "New Natural Law 
Theory," as proposed by Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, cannot be 
squared with the natural law doctrine of St. Thomas. 49 In 
defense of Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, however, Robert George 
thinks that much of the criticism leveled against their 
theory is unwarranted. In a recent article, George purports 
to show (1) that contrary to what their critics claim 
the natural law theory advanced by Grisez and his 
collaborators does not entail the proposition that 
basic human good or moral norms have no connection 
to, or grounding in, human nature, and (2) that Grisez 
and his followers are correct in maintaining that our 
knowledge of basic human goods and moral norms need 
not, and logically cannot, be deduced, inferred, or (in 
any sense that a logician would recognize) derived from 
facts about human nature. so 
With regard to George's first point, he is quite 
correct, provided we understand him according to the 
parameters he sets out in his second point--namely, in the 
49See, for example, Russell Hittinger, A Critigue of 
the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1987); Ralph Mcinerny, Ethica Thomistica 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1982), 54-55; Henry Veatch, "Does the Grisez-Finnis-Boyle 
Moral Philosphy Rest on a Mistake?" Review of Metaphysics 
44, (1991), 807-30; "A Possible Mis-Step in the Articulation 
of the Grifinnboyle Moral Philosophy," in Greek and Medieval 
Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S.J., ed. William J. 
Carroll and John J. Furlong (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 
145-60. In the above mentioned critiques, Hittinger, 
Mcinerny, and Veatch clarify many different aspects of St. 
Thomas' moral theory (such as the epistemological and 
metaphysical significance of the term bonus); but such 
clarifications do not constitute developed expositions of 
St. Thomas' natural law theory. 
50Robert P. George, "Natural Law and Human Nature," in 
Natural Law Theory, ed. Robert P. George (Oxford: Cl-arendon 
Press, 1992), 33. 
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sense that a logician would allow. Accordingly, Grisez, 
Boyle, and Finnis do acknowledge that first practical 
principles are proper to human nature. It should be clear, 
they state: 
why one cannot derive the moral ought from any 
theoretical is .... The is-to-be of practical truth 
cannot be reduced to the is of human nature without 
eliminating the distinction between, on the one hand, 
action and fulfillment through it, and, on the other, 
what persons are by nature, prior to their exercise of 
free choice. Still this twofold irreducibility does not 
mean that morality is cut off from its roots in human 
nature. For the normativity of the moral ought is 
nothing but the integral directiveness of the 
is-to-be of practical knowledge. And any adequate 
theory of human persons will include among its true 
propositions: Everyone who does rationally guided 
actions naturally knows the first principles of 
practical knowledge and naturally wills (by simple 
volition) the goods to which they direct. In this 
sense, the is-to-be of the first principles of 
practical knowledge is itself an aspect of human 
nature. 51 
Thus, provided we (1) understand "theoretical" 
knowledge according to the meaning a logician would permit, 
and (2) understand by the term, "human nature," to include 
the proposition, "Everyone who does rationally guided 
actions ... ," George is correct in insisting (1) that "it 
remains logically invalid to move from premises that do not 
include reasons for action to conclusions that state reasons 
51Grisez, Boyle and Finnis, "Practical Principles, 11 
127. 
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for actions, 1152 and (2) that Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle 
clearly admit that basic human goods or moral norms pertain 
to human nature. 
In sum, Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle maintain that the 
first principles of practical knowledge, 11 cannot be derived 
from any theoretical knowledge. Thus, they cannot be 
verified by experience or deduced from any more basic truths 
through a middle term. They are self-evident. Self-evident 
principles are per se nota--known just by knowing the 
meaning of their terms. 1153 11 Aquinas knew this, 11 Grisez 
asserts, "and his theory of natural law takes it for 
granted. 1154 
In the debate over St. Thomas' natural law doctrine, 
52George, "Natural Law, 11 41, note 20; see also Grisez, 
Finnis and Boyle, "Practical Principles," 102: "The theory 
we defined also departs from classical models--at least, as 
many have understood them--by taking full [sic] account of 
the fact that the moral ought cannot be derived from the is 
of theoretical truth--for example, of metaphysics and/or 
philosophical anthropology. Logically, of course, one can 
derive a moral ought from an is, whenever the is expresses a 
truth about a reality which embodies a moral norm. Thus, 
from 'This is the act an honest person would do' one can 
deduce 'This act ought to be done.' But from a set of 
theoretical premises, one cannot logically derive any 
practical truth, since sound reasoning does not introduce 
what is not in the premises. And the relationship of 
principles to conclusions is a logical one among 
propositions. Therefore, the ultimate principles of morality 
cannot be theoretical truths of metaphysics and/or 
philosophical anthropology." 
53Grisez, Finnis and Boyle, "Practical Principles," 
106. 
54Grisez, "The First Principles of Practical Reason, 11 
194. 
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however, Grisez begs the question: just what does St. 
Thomas' theory of natural law take for granted? does he 
understand ratio recta in the way Bourke claims--as taking 
precedence over natural law? does he take moralia as Owens 
claims--as identified with free choice and not with natural 
law? does he understand ratio speculativa and ratio practica 
in the manner that Finnis and Grisez understand theoretical 
reason and practical reason? does he understand natura as 
George's logician takes the word nature? does he think of 
first practical principles as per se nota in the way Grisez, 
Finnis, and Boyle understand basic goods of reason--namely, 
as underived, noncommensurable, and irreducible? From our 
comparative study on St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas as to 
whether (or in what manner) natural law is innate, we hope 
to consider and possibly answer many of these questions. 
V. List of Texts 
St. Bonaventure 
In researching pertinent texts in St. Bonaventure, we 
have consulted the indices of the Opera Omnia.ss What 
follows is a chronological listing of passages where St. 
Bonaventure discusses either lex naturalis, lex naturae, or 
ssooctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae, Opera Omnia, 10 
vol. Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 
Grottaferrata (Roma). 1882-1902. 
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ius naturale. 56 . 
1. In .I Sent., d . 47, a. un. q. 4, ad 3. 
2. In II Sent., prooemium. 
3. Ibid. I d. 35, dub. 4, resp. 
4. Ibid. I d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, arg. pro parte 3 . 
5. *Ibid. I d. 39 t a. 1, q. 3, fund. 1-6, resp. and ad 2. 
6 . *Ibid. I d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, resp. 
7 . *Ibid. I d. 3 9 t a. 2, q. 1, resp. and ad 4. 
8 . In III Sent., d. 8, a. 1, q. 2 I fund. 2 . 
9 . Ibid. I d. 35, a. un. q. 2, resp. 
10. Ibid. I d. 3 7 t a. 1, q. 3, fund. 1 and 4. 
11. Ibid. d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3 and 4. 
12. Ibid. I d. 40, a. un. q. 1, ad 3. 
13. In IV Sent., d. 1, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, resp. 
14. Ibid. I d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. 
15. Ibid. I d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, arg. pro parte 2. 
16. Ibid. I d. 22, a. 2, q. 1, ad opp. 1. 
17. Ibid. I d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, resp. 
18. Ibid. I d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, ad opp. 4. 
19. Ibid. I d. 26, a. 2, q. 2, resp. 
20. Ibid. I d. 33, a. 1, q. 1, resp. and ad 3 . 
21. Ibid. I d. 33, a. 1, q. 2, resp. 
22. Ibid. I d. 33. a. 1, q. 2, fund. 4. 
56For a chronology of St. Bonaventure's works, see 
Appendix B. In the following list, an asterisk indicates a 
passage where St. Bonaventure speaks of natural law or 
natural law principles as either innata, impressa, scripta, 
or indita. 
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23. Ibid. I d. 33, a. 1, q. 2, contra 2 . 
24. Ibid. I d. 33, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1. 
25. Ibid. I d. 33, a. 3, q. 1, fund. 2. 
26. Ibid. I d. 36, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 1. 
27. Ibid. I d. 36 I a. 1, q. 3 I resp. 
28. Ibid. I d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 2 . 
29. *Ibid. I d. 42, p. 2 I a. 1, q. 1, contra 1 and 2. 
30. *Ibid. I d. 42, a. 2. q. 1, resp. 
31. Ibid. I d. 33, a. 3 I fund. 2. 
32. *Ibid. I d. 49. p. 1, a. un, q. 2, resp. 
33. Comm. Ion. c. 9, v. 13. 
34. *Comm. Luc., c. 12, v. 57, n. 84. 
35. *Ibid. I c. 19, v. 3. 
36. *Ibid. I c. 19, V. 21, n. 34. 
37. Comm. Sapien., c. 6, v. 19. 
38. Ibid. I c. 15, v. 13. 
39. Ibid. I c. 18, v. 4. 
40. *De Perf. Evang., q. 4, a. 1, fund. 2 I 4, 7, 10 
41. *Ibid. I q. 4, a. 1, resp. 
42. *Itin., c. III, n. 2. 
43. *Septem Donis Spiritus Sancti., q. 4, a. 2 I resp. 
From the above list of passages, the following directly 
concern the derivation of natural law, and thus will serve 
as key-texts for further investigation: 
1. In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un. q. 2, concl. 
2. Comm. Luc., c. 19, v. 21, n. 34. 
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3. De Perf. Evang., q. 4, a. 1, concl. 
St. Thomas 
In consulting the Index Thomisticus57 we find over 
seventy pages of citations where St. Thomas employs the 
terms ius or lex. Thus, to keep our study within manageable 
limits, we have searched for the terms lex naturae, lex 
naturalis, ius naturale, lumen naturale, naturalis 
inclinatio, and natura as employed only in connection with 
the terms (and conjugations of) indere, impressio, innatus, 
and inscribere. Further, inasmuch as St. Thomas treats 
natural law in a topical manner only in his Scriptum super 
libros Sententiarum and Summa Theologiae, we have narrowed 
our scope to cite passages only from these two writings. 58 
Innatus: 
1. In II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 
2 *Ibid. I d. 42, a. 1, a. 4, ad 3. 
3. In III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1. 
4. *Ibid. I d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 
57Roberto Busa, Index Thomisticus (Stuttgart: Frommann-
Holzboog, 1974). 
58Discussion of natural law is found in many of St. 
Thomas' other works as well--particularly the De Veritate 
and the Summa Contra Gentiles; in these works, however, 
natural law is dealt with only indirectly. We will refer to 
these other works in our study insofar as they are pertinent 
and help make clear the thought of St. Thomas as explicated 
In I-IV Sententiarum and in the Summa Theologiae. 
In the following list, an asterisk is placed at those 
passages where the terms lex naturalis, lex naturae,- ius 
naturale, or prima principia are employed. 
5. *In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 1 sol. 2. 
6. *Ibid., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 
7. ST I-II, 93. 6, resp. (interius) 
Impressio: 
8. In III Sent., d. 3, a. 1, q. 1 ad 3. 
9. *In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4. 
10. *Ibid., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, sol. and ad 3. 
11. Ibid., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4. 
12. ST I, q. 88, a. 3 I ad 1. 
13. Ibid. I q. 93, a. 6, ad 1. 
14. ST I-II, q. 90, a. 3, ad 1 ( inserui t) . 
15. *Ibid. I q. 91, a. 2, resp. 
16. *Ibid. I q. 93, a. 5, resp. 
17. *Ibid. I q. 93, a. 5, ad 1. 
Indere 
18. In .I Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4. 
19. In ll Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 5, sol. 
20. In III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 3. 
21. Ibid. I d. 33, q. 2 I a. 4, sol. 
22. *Ibid. I d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 
23. *In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, sed contra 
24. *Ibid. I d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 
25. *Ibid. I d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4. 
26. ST I, q. 60, a. 1, ad 3. 
27. Ibid. I q. 79, a. 12, resp. 
28. *ST I-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 2. 
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6 . 
29. Ibid., q. 109, a. 1, ad 2. 
30. ST I-II, q. 91, a. 3, ad 2. 
31. ST II-II, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1. 
Inscribere 
32. *In II Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 4. 
33. Ibid., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3. 
34. *Ibid., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, arg 3. 
35. In III Sent. d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol. and ad 3. 
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From the above passages, the following are most 
pertinent to our investigation of natural law as innate, and 
thus will be studied as key-texts: 
1. In IV Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 
2. ST q. 91, a. 2, resp. 
VI. Method of Study 
Having isolated and arranged in chronological order the 
various texts which deal directly or indirectly with natural 
law as innate, we will now investigate the key-texts 
selected first from St. Bonaventure and then from St. 
Thomas. In each case we will study the texts in their 
chronologized order so as better to appreciate the 
development of St. Bonaventure's and St. Thomas' thought. 
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Each key-text will be considered according to the 
following divisions: 
1) a contextual introduction to the key-text; 
2) its translation followed by the Latin text; 
3) a commentary upon it. 
4) a summary and conclusion. 
Our six textual studies will be followed by a final 
chapter consisting of a general summation of our findings, a 
comparison between the natural law doctrines of St. 
Bonaventure and St. Thomas, and--in view of our findings--a 
closing comment with respect to contemporary ethical 
thought. 
CHAPTER 1 
KEY-TEXT A 
In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un., q. 2: "Utrum omnes 
appetant beatitudinem veram. 111 
I. Context 
Context for this first key-text will be twofold: 
(1) remote: Bonaventure's doctrines on (a) the human 
soul, (b) conscience, and (c) synderesis. 
(2) proximate: Peter Lombard's discussion, "Si omnes 
homines volunt esse beati." 
Remote Context #a 
St. Bonaventure's Psychology 
The soul, according to Bonaventure, is at once the 
entelechia of the body and also a complete substance in 
1Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, ed. 
studio et cura PP. Collegii S. Bonaventura (Quaracchi), 
1882-1902, 10 volumes. All textual citations of St. 
Bonaventure's works are from this critical edition unless 
otherwise indicated. In citing the Opera Omnia, reference to 
the volumes and pages of the Quaracchi edition will be 
indicated by roman numerals and arabic numbers respectively. 
For example, our present key-text is found in volume II, 
page 1002, which we indicate as: II, 1002. 
Further, all italicized words used for emphasis are my 
own unless otherwise indicated. The Commentarius in guatuor 
libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi was probably written 
between 1250 and 1255; see Appendix B, note 4 regarding the 
chronology of Bonaventure's early works. 
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itself composed of spiritual matter and form. 2 By reason of 
this hylomorphic composition, Bonaventure distinguishes 
2 See In I.I Sent., d. 18, a. 2, q. 3, fund. 5 (II, 452): 
" ... anima rationalis, cum sit substantia per se existens et 
incorruptibilis, habet materiam et formam ... "See In ll 
Sent., d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, fund. 1 (II, 445): "Anima 
rationalis est actu et entelechia corporis humani. 11 Ibid., 
d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 415): "Licet autem anima 
rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma, 
appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam; 
sicut corpus organicum ex materia et forma compositum est et 
tamen habet appetitum ad suscipiendam animam." See Brevil., 
II, c. 9, n. 5 (V, 227a): "Quoniam autem ut beatificabilis 
est immortalis; ideo, cum [anima rationalis] unitur mortali 
corpori, potest ab eo separari; ac per hoc non tantum forma 
est, verum etiam hoc aliud." The component of spiritual 
matter is required by Bonaventure to account for the soul's 
individuality and mutability. See In i Sent., d. 19, p. 2, 
a. un, q. 3, contra 1 (I, 360) "Boethius, in Libro De 
Trinitate [c. 2; PL 64, 1250)]: 'Forma vero quae est sine 
materia non poterit esse subiectum.'" Cf. In ll Sent., d. 
17, a. 1, q. 2, contra 5 (II, 414); ibid., concl. (II, 
415b): " ... anima rationalis, cum sit hoc aliquid et per se 
nata subsistere et agere et pati, movere et moveri, quod 
habet intra se fundamentum suae existentiae et principium 
materiale, a quo habet existere, et formale, a quo habet 
esse .... Concedendum est, animam humanam materiam habere. 
Illa autem materia sublevata est supra esse extensionis, et 
supra esse privationis et corruptionis, et ideo dicitur 
materia spiritualis." Cf. ibid., d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1 
(II, 447a): "· .. intellectus individuatus secundum corporis 
indigentiam; non tamen eius individuatio est a corpore, sed 
a propriis principiis, materia scilicet et forma sua, quas 
de se habet, sicut in se subsistit, sicut determinatum est 
supra." 
Bonaventure does not explicitly state that the soul of 
man is the substantialis forma of the human body. Indeed, he 
holds that the body itself possesses a substantial form 
which is light (see note 80). It appears, then, that the 
human compositum is for Bonaventure constituted by a 
plurality of forms unified through order. See In ll Sent., 
d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 415), as cited above. Ibid., a. 
2, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 423): "Et sic in unione animae ad corpus 
servatur ordo." For further discussion on the theory of the 
plurality of forms implicit in Bonaventure's doctrine, see 
Etienne Gilson, La philosophie de saint Bonaventure, 260-
262. See also K. Ziesche, "Die Naturlehre Bonaventuras," 
Philosophisches Jahrbuch 18 (1908), 56-89. 
33 
between the soul and its powers through which it operates; 
for otherwise the operations of the soul, he argues, would 
be the same as its existence and consequently always be in 
operation--which is clearly not the case. 3 Further, 
inasmuch as these powers (such as intellect and will) go out 
from the soul in their operations to their exterior objects, 
they cannot be entirely identified with the soul. 
Nevertheless, these powers are consubstantial with the soul 
since they proceed directly from it and are reduced to it. 4 
3 In ~Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3 (I, 86b-87a): 
"Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est principium essendi 
et operandi; dicendum quod verum est de principio remoto, 
sed de proximo est impossibile. Nam si idem omnino esset 
principium proximum, tune idem esset in re esse et operari. 
Similiter, si idem esset principium proximum, cum res semper 
habeat esse, semper haberet operare. Quoniam igitur forma 
dicit proximum et immediatum principium essendi, potentia, 
vero proximum et immediatum principium operandi, patet quod 
impossibile est esse omnino idem." 
4 In ~Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, f. 5 (I, 85b): 
" ... virtus egreditur substantiam, quia operatur in objectum, 
quod est extra." Ibid., concl. (I, 86a): "Contingit iterum 
nominare potentias animae, ut immediate egrediuntur g 
substantia; ut per haec tria: memoriam, intelligentiam et 
voluntatem. Et hoc patet, quia omni accidente circumscripto, 
intellecto quod anima sit substantia spiritualis, hoc ipso 
quod est sibi praesens et sibi coniuncta, habet potentiam ad 
memorandum et intelligendum et diligendum se. Unde istae 
potentiae sunt animae consubstantiales et sunt in eodem 
genere per reductionem, in quo est anima. Attamen, quoniam 
egrediuntur anima--potentia enim se habet per modum 
egredientis--non sunt omnino idem per essentiam, nee tamen. 
adeo differunt, ut sint alterius generis, sed sunt in eodem 
genere per reductionem." Through reduction, then, these 
powers are consubstantial or essential to the soul; indeed, 
they are necessary for the soul's perfection. Ibid., ad 1-2 
(I, 86b): "Quarto modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non 
potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, ut sunt potentiae in 
anima, in quibus attenditur imago; et hoc est minimo modo 
substantiale sive essentiale; tamen non transit in a-liud 
genus: ideo anima dicitur suae potentiae." The res which we 
34 
Hence, Bonaventure regards the intellect and will as 
distinct powers of a common substance. 5 
The intellective power is itself differentiated into 
the speculative intellect and practical intellect, the 
latter being the same power as the former but as joined to 
the will in directing conduct. 6 Thus, Bonaventure 
are here concerned with is the human soul. For the meaning 
and applications of reductio, see In .I.I Sent., d. 24, p. 1, 
a . 2 , q . 1 , ad 8 ( I I , 5 6 2 b) . 
5 In .I.I Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (II, 
560ab): 11 ••• nee tamen concedunt, eas simpliciter 
diversificari secundum essentiam, ita ut dicantur diversae 
essentiae, sed differre essentialiter in genere potentiae, 
ita ut dicantur diversae potentiae sive diversa instrumenta 
ejusdem substantiae. 11 Ibid., (II, 561a): 11 ••• rationem et 
voluntatem diversas esse potentias. 11 Bonaventure further 
distinguishes between powers and their operations. See In .I.I 
Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3 (II, 561b): 11 ••• quia 
cognoscere et amare absque dubio sunt actus differentes 
potentiae, quae sunt ad hos actus, per se ipsas diversitatem 
habent. 11 
6 In .I.I Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (II, 
566b): 11 Intellectus enim speculativus secundum alium statum 
efficitur practicus, vidilicet dum coniungitur voluntati et 
operi in dictando et regendo. 11 Bonaventure catagorizes the 
various powers of the soul as follows: 11 Aliquando secundum 
naturam ipsarum potentiarum, ut cum dividuntur potentiae 
animae in vegetabilem, sensibilim et rationalem, vel ipsa 
rationalis in intellectivam et affectivam.--Aliquando vero 
secundum officia, ut cum dividitur ratio in superiorem et 
inferiorem--Aliquando secundum status, ut cum dividitur 
intellectus in speculativum et practicum; intellectus enim 
speculativus secundum alium statum efficitur practicus, 
videlicet dum coniungitur voluntati et operi in dictando et 
regendo.--Aliqundo vero fit divisio potentiarum secundum 
aspectus, sicut dividitur potentia cognitiva in rationem, 
intellectum et intelligentiam, secundum quod aspicit ad 
inferius, ad par et ad superius.--Aliquando vero secundum 
actus, sicut fit divisio in inventivam et iudicativam; 
invenire enim et iudicare sunt actus potentiae cognitivae ad 
invicem ordinati.--Aliquando vero fit divisio potentiarum 
animae secundum modos movendi; et sic est illa, quae, est per 
natruralem et deliberativam. 11 In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 
reiterates the position of Aristotle--namely, that the 
practical intellect differs from the speculative intellect 
by the addition of the will. 7 
In connection with the operative powers of the soul, 
Bonaventure employs the term habitus as that by which an 
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operative power is easily (facilis) capable of a particular 
act. 8 Conscience is such a habitus of the intellective 
power; more precisely, conscience is a habitus which 
perfects (perf iciens) the intellect to the extent that the 
intellect is practical--i.e., as it directs the intellect in 
conduct. 9 
2, q. 3, concl. (II 566ab). 
7 In ll Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 899b): 
"Intellectus enim speculativus et practicus eandem potentiam 
dicunt, sola extensione differente." See Aristotle, De 
Anima, III, c. 9 (432b21-433a8). With regard to praecepta as 
produced by both reason and will, see In I Sent., d. 35, a. 
1, q. 3, concl.; d. 45, a. 3, q. 2, ad 2; In ll Sent., d. 
44, a. 2, q. 2, concl.; In IV Sent., d. 27, a. 2, q. 3, dub. 
2, resp. 
8 See In I Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1 ad 1 (I, 89b): 
11 
••• habitus est quo potentia facilis est in actum." Cf. In I 
Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad. 1 (89-90). Implicit in 
the meaning of habitus is the facility or aptitude with 
which a habitus endows an operative faculty. See note 44 
below where Bonaventure employs the term habilis in this 
manner. See note 73 for a description of the various modes 
of habitus with respect to natural law. See Etienne Gilson, 
La philosophie de saint Bonaventure, 328, for further 
discussion on these various types of habitus. 
9 In ll Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 899b): 
"[Conscientia] est habitus potentiae cognitivae ... perficiens 
intellectum nostrum, in quantum est practicus, sive in 
quantum dirigit in opere. 11 Note here that the habitus of 
conscience is said to perfect the intellect; in turn, the 
soul is perfected by the actuation of its powers which are 
consubstantial with it (see note 4) . Conscience is sometimes 
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Remote Context #b: 
InllSent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 2: "Utrumconscientiasit 
habitus innatus aut acquisitus." 
Taking conscience as a habitus, then, Bonaventure asks 
whether it is innate or acquired (In ll Sent., d. 39, a. 1, 
q. 2). He opens this discussion with several positions 
affirming the innateness of conscience. First, Scripture 
teaches that the Gentiles, without the written law, manifest 
the law which is written on their hearts; lacking the law of 
Scripture, they nonetheless possess the natural law (lex 
naturalis) to which their conscience bears witness. 
Conscience is therefore said to be a habitus naturally 
inscribed within the human heart ("naturaliter cordi humane 
inscriptum") . 10 Secondly, Augustine teaches that every man 
taken for a power with respect to natural law which is said 
to be written in the conscience. Ibid., (II, 899b): 
"Aliquando autem accipitur conscientia pro ipsa potentia 
consciente, ut ita dicam, secundum quod dicitur, quod lex 
naturalis scripta est in conscientiis nostris." Because 
conscience is in some manner joined to the will and 
operation, it is named not simply scientia but conscientia. 
Ibid., (II, 899b) : "Et propterea talis habitus non 
simpliciter nominatur scientia, sed conscientia, ut in hoc 
significetur quod habitus iste non perficit ipsam potentiam 
speculativam in se, sed prout est quodam modo iuncta 
affectioni et operationi." 
10 In ll Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 1 (II, 901): 
"Ad Romanos [Romans 2, 14-15] secundo: 'Cum gentes, quae 
legem non habent, naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt, ipsi 
sibi sunt lex, quia ostendunt opus legis scriptum in 
cordibus suis, testimonium illis reddente conscientia.' Et 
Glossa ibidem.'Etsi gentes non habeant legem scriptam, 
habent tamen legem naturalem, qua sibi conscii sunt:' ergo 
ex textu et Glossa patet, quod conscientia dicit habitum 
naturaliter cordi humane inscriptum." Cf. Petri Lombardi, 
Collectanea in Omnes I2..... Pauli Apostoli Epistolas (PL 191, 
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has received a natural judgment (naturale iudicatorium) by 
which he places wisdom before error and peace before strife. 
If, therefore, conscience is of this kind of judgment, it 
must be an innate habitus in man. 11 Thirdly, St. Isidore 
holds that as natural law (ius naturale) teaches all 
animals, all the more does it teach man who excels all 
animals; but knowledge of natural law is nothing other than 
conscience; hence conscience is innate. 12 Again, every man 
1345) . As cited in note 9 above, conscience is considered a 
potentia in relation to the natural law which is written in 
the conscience. In the present case, conscience is taken as 
an innate habitus in virtue of the innate natural law. 
11 Ibid., fund. 2 (II, 901): "Item Augustinus in libro 
tertio de Libero Arbitrio: 'Ante omne meritum boni operis 
non est parum accepisse naturale iudicatorium, quo 
sapientiam quis praeponat errori, et quietem difficultati.' 
Si ergo conscientia est huiusmodi iudicatorium, est igitur 
habitus homini innatus." Cf. S. Augustinus, De Libero 
Arbitrio, III, c. 20, n. 56, (PL 32, 1298). From this 
context, the term naturale iudicatorium seems to indicate a 
faculty or operative power of judgment rather than an 
operation. The term iudicium is employed by Bonaventure to 
indicate the act or operation of judgment. See note 44 below 
in this regard. 
12 Ibid., fund. 3 (II, 901): "Item, Isidorus: 'Ius 
naturale est quod natura docuit animali:' ergo si natura 
docuit animalia illud quod est iuris naturalis, multo 
fortius docuit hominem, qui excellit omnia animalia; sed 
cognitio iuris naturalis non est aliud quam conscientia: 
ergo etc." See In IV Sent., d. 33, a. 1, q. 2 (IV, 749-50). 
Cf. Sancti Isidori Etymologiarum, v, c. 4. n. 1 (PL 82, 
199): "!us naturale est commune omnium nationum et quod 
ubique instinctu naturae, non constitutione aliqua habeatur 
ut viri et feminae conjunctio, librorum susceptio et 
educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, 
acquisitio eorum quae coelo, terra, marique capiuntur." Cf. 
Gratian's Decretum, D. I, 7. The citation above which 
Bonaventure attributes to Isidore (died 636 A.D.) is traced 
either to Justinian (Corpus Iuris Civilis, I tit. 2) or 
Ulpian (Digest, I, 1, 1, 3), whose position Isidore himself 
abandons. See Michael Crowe, "St. Thomas and Ulpian's 
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has a natural inclination (naturalis instinctus) for 
happiness and to honor his parents; but this could not be 
without some prior knowledge which seems to be naturally 
impressed upon us ("naturaliter nobis impressam"); and such 
knowledge is conscience. 13 Further, if natural law were 
known through acquisition, then the law should not be called 
natural but acquired; but such is not the case. 14 Finally, 
natural law naturally binds the will before it is known by 
the intellect; but as intellect precedes affect ("affectum 
enim praecedit intellectus"), it seems that knowledge of 
this law is natural. 15 
Natural Law," St Thomas Aguinas Commemorative Studies 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 
261-65. Inasmuch as St. Bonaventure employs the terms lex 
naturalis and ius naturale interchangeably, we will 
translate both terms as "natural law" throughout this study. 
See Key-Text B, note 17, for further clarification on the 
meaning of these two terms. 
13 Ibid., fund. 4 (II, 902) : "Item, natural em habemus 
instinctum ad appetendum beatitudinem et ad honorandum 
parentes; sed hoc non potest esse sine aliqua 
praecognitione: ergo videtur, quod ad huiusmodi facienda 
habeamus aliquam cognitionem naturaliter nobis impressam. 
Sed cognitio inclinans ad hoc est conscientia: ergo etc." 
Cf. St. Augustine, Confessions, X, c. 20. n. 29 sqq.; De 
Libero Arbitrio, I, c. 14. n. 30; De Civitate Dei, X, c. 1; 
Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, prosa 2. 
14 Ibid., fund. 5 (II, 901) : "Item, lex natural is 
cognoscitur ab homine aliquo modo, aut ergo per 
acquisitionem, aut per naturam. si per acquisitionem: ergo 
non debet dici naturalis, sed acquisita, sicut nee virtutes 
politicae. Si vero per naturam; et cognitio legis naturalis 
non est aliud quam conscientia: ergo etc." 
15 Ibid., fund. 6 (II, 901): "Item, ius naturale 
naturaliter ligat voluntatem; sed ligamen voluntatis 
necessario praecedit actus cognitionis--affectum enim 
praecedit intellectus--ergo si voluntas naturaliter ad illud 
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Bonaventure also presents several positions arguing 
that conscience is to some extent an acquired habitus, after 
which he lays the groundwork for his own solution. Three 
opinions are presented which claim that a habitus of 
knowledge is in some manner partly innate and partly 
acquired; but each position differs as to the manner in 
which knowledge is both innate and acquired. In the first 
case, knowledge is considered innate with respect to the 
agent intellect and acquired with respect to the possible 
intellect which Aristotle says is originally a tabula nuda 
ius ligatur, videtur, quod illud ius naturaliter ab anima 
cognoscatur. Si ergo illius iuris cognitio est conscientia, 
patet etc." The will itself is defined by Bonaventure as the 
appetite arising from reasoning. See In III Sent., d. 33, a. 
1, q. 3, (III, 717b): " ... nihil aliud quam affectus sive 
appetitus ratiocinatus." It appears that Bonaventure employs 
the terms affectus, appetitus, and voluntas more or less 
synonymously to indicate the operative power of will as 
distinguished from that of intellect. See, for example, 
notes 5, 9, 37, 40, 42, 44, 45, 67 and 90, where these 
various terms are used in similar fashion. Bonaventure also 
cites Boethius who employs the term cupiditas which connotes 
an emotional state of desire (see note 51) . On this score, 
Bonaventure speaks of caritas as an affectio of the soul 
which suggests both a state of emotion or desire as well as 
an innate characteristic proper to the essence or nature of 
the soul (see note 74). In another instance, affectio seems 
to indicate both the operative power and desire (see note 
87). Further, Bonaventure uses these terms as verbs which 
signify the activity of such operative powers; for example, 
see note 53 where it is stated that "omnes homines appetunt 
beatitudinem veram. 11 When used without reference to 
intellectus, the terms affectus or appetitus often indicate 
simply an emotion (e.g., amor or timor) or need (see notes 2 
and 30); see also Hex. VII, 7 (V, 366). In each of these 
cases, the context suffices to clarify the intended emphasis 
of meaning. See note 57, 61, and 66, regarding appetitus in 
connection with the creature's condition of indigence. 
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to be perfected through the mediation of the senses. 16 
Bonaventure replies, however, that this theory is neither 
true nor consonant with Aristotle's own words; for if the 
agent intellect possessed innate knowledge, it could 
communicate its knowledge to the possible intellect without 
the aid of the inferior senses; moreover, the soul would 
never be in a state of ignorance if in fact the agent 
intellect possessed its knowledge innately. Rather, 
knowledge depends on both the possible intellect by which 
the mind becomes what it knows and the agent intellect by 
which all knowledge is produced. 17 
According to the second position, the habitus of 
knowledge is innate with respect to universal knowledge or 
principles and acguired with respect to knowledge of 
particulars or conclusions. Such a position, however, is 
16 Ibid., concl. (II, 902b) : "Quidam enim dicere 
voluerunt, quod innati sunt intellectui agenti, sed 
acguisiti sunt quantum ad intellectum possibilem; et quantum 
ad istum intellectum dicit Philosophus, animam creari sicut 
tabulam nudam, et ille intellectus est, qui habet perfici 
mediantibus potentiis sensitivis." 
17 Ibid. (II, 902b): "Sed istud non videtur esse 
consonum nee verbis Philosophi nee veritati. Si enim 
intellectus agens haberet habitus cognoscendorum, quare non 
possit illos communicare possibili sine adiutorio sensuum 
inferiorum? Rursus, si intellectus agens haberet habitus 
cognoscendorum, iam anima a sua conditione non esset 
ignorans, immo potius esset sciens. Difficile etiam est 
simul cum hoc intelligere, quomodo species dicantur esse in 
intellectu agente, cum possibilis dicatur 'quo est omnia 
fieri,' et agens 'quo est omnia facere.'" Cf. Aristotle, De 
Anima, III, c. 5. Correlatively, Bonaventure argues that the 
agent intellect is individual and not universal, as Avicenna 
erroneously held. See In .II Sent., d. 7, p. 2, a. 2,· q. 1 
(II, 198b); see note 2 above. 
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contrary to the words of both Aristotle and Augustine; for 
Aristotle proves that knowledge of principles is not innate 
in us, but rather is acquired via the senses, memory, and 
experience; 18 and Augustine, referring to the boy in 
Plato's Meno who knows the principles of geometry, states 
that he does not know such principles innately, but sees 
them in an incorporeal light proper to the soul just as the 
carnal eye sees corporeal objects in visible light. 19 Thus 
Bonaventure rejects the second theory. 
The third position, which Bonaventure accepts, holds 
that habitus of knowing (habitus cognitivi) are innate and 
acquired, not only with regard to knowledge of particulars 
and conclusions, but of principles as well; for knowledge 
requires the presence of both knowable items and a certain 
18 Ibid. (II, 902b-903): "Et ideo est secundus modus 
dicendi, quod habitus cognitivi quodam modo sunt innati, 
quodam modo acguisiti. Innati enim sunt quoad cognitionem in 
universali, acguisiti quoad cognitionem in particulari; sive 
innati quoad cognitionem principiorum, acguisiti quoad 
cognitionem conclusionum; unde dignitas est illa quam 
quisque probat auditam. Sed nee iste modus dicendi consonat 
verbis Philosophi et Augustini. Nam Philosophus in libro 
Posteriorum [II, c. 15.) probat, quod cognitio principiorum 
non est nobis innata, deducens ad plura inconvenientia; et 
ibidem ostendit, quod 'cognitio principiorum acquiritur via 
sensus, memoriae et experientiae.'" Cf. Aristotle, Analytica 
Posteriora, II, c. 19. 
19 Ibid. (II, 903a): "Augustinus etiam in duodecimo 
libro de Trinitate [c.15. n. 24.), loquens se parvulo, qui 
respondebat de omnibus principiis geometriae, dicit ibi, 
quod hoc non erat, quia anima illius parvuli prius illa 
novisset, sed potius 'ista videbat in quadam luce sui 
generis incorporea; quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in 
hac luce corporea contra adiacent, cuius lucis capax-eique 
congruens est creatus.'" 
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light, by which we are able to judge them. 2° Cognitive 
habitus are thus in some manner innate in us by reason of a 
light impressed in the soul ("luminis animae inditi"); yet 
they are acquired by reason of species ("ratione speciei") 
derived through the senses. Such a position thus concurs 
with the words of both Aristotle and Augustine; for the 
species (species) and the similitudes (similitudines) of 
things are acquired through the senses, as Aristotle says 
and experience teaches. Hence, no one ever knows whole or 
part, or father or mother, unless he receives some external 
species of them through his senses; and this is why, as 
Aristotle says, the loss of any one of the senses entails 
the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge. But 
further, the cognitive powers are identified with an innate 
light or natural judgment which, as Augustine holds, directs 
the soul in judging both speculative truths (cognoscibilia) 
20 Ibid. (II, 903a) : "Et propterea est tertius modus 
dicendi, quod habitus cognitivi quodam modo sunt nobis 
innati et quodam modo acguisiti, non tantum loquendo de 
cognitione in particulari et de cognitione conclusionum, sed 
etiam de cognitione principiorum. Cum enim ad cognitionem 
duo concurrant necessario, videlicet praesentia 
cognoscibilis et lumen, quo mediate de illo iudicamus, sicut 
videmus in visu, et in praecedenti auctoritate innuit 
Augustinus." Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XII, c. 15. n. 
24 (PL 42, 1011): "[S]ed potius credendum est mentis 
intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus 
intelligibilibus naturali ordine, disponente Conditore, 
subjuncta sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis 
incorporea, quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac 
corporea luce circumadjacent, cujus lucis capax eique 
congruens est creatus." 
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and practical truths (operabilia) . 21 
21 Ibid. (II, 903b): "Habitus cognitivi sunt quodam modo 
nobis innati ratione luminis animae inditi, sunt etiam 
quodam modo acguisiti ratione speciei; et hoc quidem verbis 
Philosophi et Augustinus concordat. Omnes enim in hoc 
concordant, quod potentiae cognitivae sit lumen inditum, 
quod vocatur naturale iudicatorium; species autem et 
similitudines rerum acquiruntur in nobis mediante sensu, 
sicut expresse dicit Philosophus in multis locis; et hoc 
etiam experientia docet. Nemo enim umquam cognosceret totum, 
aut partem, aut patrem, aut matrem, nisi sensu aliquo 
exteriori speciem eius acciperet; et hinc est, quod 
'amittentes unum sensum necesse habemus unam scientiam 
amittere.' Illud autem lumen sive naturale iudicatorium 
dirigit ipsam animam in iudicando tam de cognoscibilibus 
quam de operabilibus." Cf. Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, 
I, c. 18; II, c. 15; De Anima, III, c. 8; Metaphysica, I, c. 
1; II, c. 2. 
One might infer from the words, "potentiae cognitivae 
sit lumen inditum, quod vocatur naturale iudicatorium," that 
the cognitive power of the soul not only possesses an innate 
light but in fact is identical with this very light which, 
in turn, is perfectly synonymous with natural judgment. But 
if so, how can the cognitive power qua lumen or iudicatorium 
also be distinguished by Bonaventure as both possible 
intellect and agent intellect? Cf. II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, 
a. 2, q. 4. concl. (II 570a): "Intellectum agentem et 
possibilem duas differentias esse intellectivae potentiae, 
licet aliquae ex eis non sint multum cogentes." Elsewhere he 
seems to indicate that while the lumen inditum is proper to 
the intellect, they are not completely synonymous with one 
another. See In .I.I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (910a): 
"Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi, quod quemadmodum ab 
ipsa creatione animae intellectus habet lumen, quod est sibi 
naturale iudicatorium dirigens ipsum intellectus in 
cognoscendis." Ibid., fund. 4 (908b): " ... sicut intellectus 
indiget lumine ad iudicandum .... "What, then, is the precise 
relationship between the natural light, natural judgment and 
the intellective power qua agent and possible? Bonaventure 
insists that the agent and possible intellects are two 
differences of the same power and operation. See In II 
Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, resp. (II, 568a): 
"Intellectus agens et possibilis sunt duae ipsius potentiae 
intellectivae differentiae, quae in unam operationem 
completam intelligendi inseparabiliter concurrunt." Ibid, ad 
4 (II 570b): " ... sicut materiale et formale principium ad 
unum esse compositi constituendum." Ibid., ad 5 (II, 572): 
"Sic cogitandae sunt esse illae duae differentiae, quod in 
unam operationem completam intelligendi veniant 
inseparabiliter, sicut lumen et diaphanum veniunt in 
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In speculative knowledge first principles are most 
evident while particular conclusions are less evident. 
Similarly, first principles of conduct are most evident, 
such as "Never do to others what you would not have them do 
to you," or "God must be obeyed. 1122 Cognition of all first 
abstractionem coloris. 11 But here the difference is expressed 
in terms, not of pure act and potency (see Aristotle's 
distinction as cited in footnote 17), but of that which 
illumines and that which is illumined. Ibid., fund. 4 (II, 
567b): "Sed intellectus agens se habet sicut lux, 
intellectus possibilis sicut illuminatum a luce. 11 Evidently, 
the lumen innatum, while not fully equated with the 
cognitive power, is associated most intimately with the 
active intellect. Moreover, it is noteworthy that 
Bonaventure assigns the task of iudicium to the possible 
intellect; yet this operation requires the help of the agent 
intellect. Ibid., ad 5 (II, 572): 11 [Intellectus possibilis] 
non potest sua conversione nee speciem abstrahere nee de 
specie iudicare nisi adiutorio ipsius agentis. 11 Granted 
Bonaventure sometimes uses the terms naturale lumen and 
naturale iudicatorium indifferently; nevertheless he 
describes the active intellect and possible intellects as 
two differences of a cotnIUmon power and operation whose roles 
are distinguished according to light and judgment 
respectively. Such a description suggests, then, that the 
naturale lumen and naturale iudicatorium are not perfectly 
and properly synonymous, but rather are distinct and 
complementary terms which constitute one complete power and 
operation. See note 76 regarding natural law qua light. It 
is not certain from the above passages, however, whether the 
active and possible intellects are two differences of a 
single intellect or if they are distinct--but inseparable--
intellective powers which conjoin to form a cotnIUon but 
composite power and operation qua intellectiva potentia. In 
any case, there is but one knowing ( 11 ex eis non sint multum 
cogentes; 11 see above). G. H. Tavard sums the process of 
judgment as follows: 11 The 'judgment' of an acquired species 
is rendered by the 'passive intellect' by virtue of a power 
deriving from the 'agent intellect,' which in turn held it 
from natural illumination." See his Transiency and 
Permanence: The Nature of Theology According to St. 
Bonaventure (N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1954), 71. 
22 Ibid. (II, 903b): "Sed hoc attendendum est praecipue; 
quia, sicut inter cognoscibilia quaedam sunt valde 
evidentia, sicut dignitates et prima principia; quaedam sunt 
principles is innate in us by reason of that innate light 
which suffices for knowing them in a self-evident manner 
upon the reception of sensible species and without any 
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additional persuasion; accordingly, knowledge of first moral 
principles is innate in us. 23 Knowledge of particular 
conclusions, however, must be acquired because that innate 
light in us does not fully suffice but needs further 
persuasion or new facility. Thus, knowledge of particular 
moral conduct requires some additional instruction. 24 As 
conscience is that cognitive habitus which directs our 
judgments of conduct (operabilia), it is innate with respect 
to the directing light of the intellect ("respectu luminis 
directivi") and what pertains to the primary precept of 
nature ("de primo dictamine naturae"); however, it is also 
acquired with respect to those things which are additionally 
minus evidentia, sicut conclusiones particulares; sic et in 
operabilibus quaedam sunt maxime evidentai, utpote illud: 
'quod tibi non vis fieri, alii ne feceris [Tobias, 4, 16] ,' 
et quod Deo obtemperandum est, et consimilia." 
23 Ibid. (II, 903b): "Quemadmodum igitur cognitio 
primorum principiorum ratione illius luminis dicitur esse 
nobis innata, quia lumen illud sufficit ad illa cognoscenda; 
post receptionem specierum, sine aliqua persuasione 
superaddita, propter sui evidentiam: sic et primorum 
principiorum moralium cognitio nobis innata est, pro eo quod 
iudicatorium illud sufficit ad illa cognoscenda." 
24 Ibid. (II, (903b): "Rursus, quemadmodum cognitio 
particularium conclusionum scientiarum acquisita est, pro eo 
quod lumen nobis innatum non plene sufficit ad illa 
cognoscenda, sed indiget aliqua persuasione et habilitatione 
nova: sic etiam intelligendum est ex parte operabilium, quod 
quaedam sunt agenda, ad quae tenemur, quae non cognoscimus 
nisi per instructionem superadditam." 
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learned by means of their species. 25 Thus we possess a 
natural light which suffices for knowing that parents ought 
to be honored and neighbors should not be injured; yet the 
species of father and neighbor are not naturally impressed 
upon our soul but must be acquired through the senses. 26 
25 Ibid. (II, 903b) : "Quoniam igitur conscientia nominat 
habitum directivum nostri iudicii respectu operabilium, hinc 
est, quod quodam modo habitum nominat innatum, et quodam 
modo nominat acquisitum. Habitum, inquam, innatum nominat 
respectu eorum quae sunt de primo dictamine naturae; habitum 
vero acquisitum respectu eorum quae sunt institutionis 
superadditae. Habitum etiam innatum dicit respectu luminis 
directivi; habitum nihilominus acquisitum respectu speciei 
ipsius cognoscibilis." 
26 Ibid. (II, 903b) : "Naturale enim habeo lumen, quod 
sufficit ad cognoscendum, quod parentes sunt honorandi, et 
quod proximi non sunt laedendi; non tamen habeo naturaliter 
mihi impressam speciem patris, vel speciem proximi." See In 
ll Sent., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4 (II, 415ab): "Ideo anima 
non cognoscit rem, nisi speciem eius et formam sibi 
imprimat; et hoc non potest esse, nisi illa abstrahur a 
materia." Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, III, c. 7. 
How does knowledge of sensible objects come about for 
Bonaventure? It begins with (1) perception or apprehension 
which consists of the reception (receptio) of a sensible 
species by a bodily organ and an initial judgment (iudicium) 
of the sensitive faculty upon the impression it undergoes. 
See In ll Sent., d. 8, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2 ad 7 (II, 223a): 
"· .. dicendum quod cum ista duo sint in sensu, videlicet 
receptio et iudicium; receptio est principaliter ratione 
organi, sed iudicium ratione virtutis." Note that sense 
perception for Bonaventure is not merely a passion as for 
Aristotle but involves an act of the soul. See In ll Sent., 
d, 25, p. 2, a. un, q. 6, concl. (II, 623a): "Actum 
sentiendi [i.e., iudicium] dicitur communicare anima 
corpori. Cf. In IV Sent., d. 50, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, concl. 
(IV, 1045b): "In potentia sensitiva ... activa potentia est ex 
parte animae, passiva ex organo." 
Upon this apprehension there follows (2) a judgment of 
the inner or common sense which determines whether the 
object is healthful or harmful (Cf. In IV Sent., d. 12, p. 
1, dub. 1 (IV, 286); then (3) a third judgment declares why 
the object is desirable or not. This judgment is an action 
of the soul which causes the sensible species to enter the 
intellective faculty by purification and abstraction from 
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Bonaventure thus agrees with the opening arguments that 
conscience is in some way an innate habitus; and this by 
reason of the light signed 1ill.Q!! us which shows us the 
good; 27 moreover, conscience is a seed-bed ( seminarium) of 
other acquired habitus; thus he also concedes that 
conscience is in some manner an acquired habitus by reason 
of the species of knowable objects received through the 
senses and with respect to particular conduct. 20 However, 
time, place and motion; in this way, the species is rendered 
intelligible, that is, immutable, eternal, and wholly 
spiritual. See Itin., II, 4-6, (V, 300b-301): "Abstrahit 
igitur a loco, tempore et motu, ac per hoc est 
incommutabilis, incircumscriptibilis, interminabilis et 
omnino spiritualis. Diiudicatio igitur est actio quae 
speciem sensibilem, sensibiliter per sensus acceptam, 
introire facit depurando et abstrahendo in potentiam 
intellectivam." See In ll Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, ad 
4 (II, 569): "··.ad nostrum intelligere concurrit recipere 
et iudicare sive abstrahere et suscipere; et hi sunt plures 
actus ad invicem ordinati, ex quibus resultat unus actus 
perfectus." Accordingly, the sensible species of, say, 
father is rendered intelligible from an abstraction; 
however, the abstraction itself is caused by a judgment 
which comes to bear upon the sensible species. Thus, if our 
analysis is correct, the sensible species, father, is made 
intelligible through an act of judgment which produces the 
universal, father, and simultaneously issues in the 
recognition that a father ought to be honored. But what 
enables and directs the act of judgment in producing this 
twofold knowledge is the soul's naturale lumen, without 
which no sensible species could be rendered intelligible. 
See note 21 above. 
27See Psalms 4, 6 sqq. "Quis ostendit nobis bona? 
Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine." Cf. St. 
Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, II, c. 10, n. 29 (PL 32, 
1256) . 
28 Ibid. (II, 903b-904): "His visis, plana est responsio 
ad quaestionem propositam etiam ad objecta. Concede enim, 
quod conscientia dicit habitum quodam mode innatum, 
videlicet ratione illius luminis super nos signati, quod 
quidem ostendit nobis bona, et quod est seminarium aliorum 
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conscience is said to be a habitus simply innate 
(simpliciter innatus) with regard to things known by their 
essence, such as 'to love God,' and 'to fear God;' for God 
is not known through any similitude received through the 
senses ("per similitudinem a sensu acceptum"); rather, 
"knowledge (notitia) of God is naturally inserted in us," as 
Augustine says. 29 Nor is love or fear known by us through 
habituum acquirendorum; et sic currunt rationes ad primam 
partem inductae. Concede nihilominus, quod conscientia dicit 
quodam modo habitum acquisitum, videlicet ratione specierum 
ipsarum cognoscibilium, sicut ostendunt tres primae rationes 
ad secundam partem inductae. Concede etiam, quod dicit 
habitum quodam modo acquisitum respectu specialium 
operabilium, sicut tres aliae rationes ostendunt." 
Upon the recognition of a primary precept such as, 
"Parents must be honored," how does the soul concretize it 
in conduct with respect to this particular father? 
Bonaventure explains that conscience is not confined merely 
to universals, but descends to the particular. See J.l. Sent., 
d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (II, 915): " ... pro eo quod ipsa 
conscientia non tantum consistit in universali, immo etiam 
descendit ad particulare." Herein the universal father--now 
characterized by the immediate recognition which bears upon 
it, i.e., a parent must be honored--is reduced to, and 
conferred upon, the particular object from which the 
sensible species originated. For a discussion of the various 
applications of reductio, including that of similitudines, 
see In l.l. Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, ad 8 (II, 562b); In III 
Sent., d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (III, 28ff); Brevil., II, 9 
(V, 226). 
29 Ibid. (II, 904a): "Si qua [sic] autem sunt 
cognoscibilia, quae quidem cognoscantur per sui essentiam, 
non per speciem, respectu talium poterit dici conscientia 
esse habitus simpliciter innatus, utpote respectu huius quod 
est Deum amare et Deum timere. Deus enim non cognoscitur per 
similitudinem g sensu acceptam, immo 'Dei notitia 
naturaliter est nobis inserta, sicut dicit Augustinus." The 
Quaracchi editors cite (II, 904, n. 1.) St. Damascene's 
Fidei Orthodoxae, I, c. 1 (PG 94, 790) as the proper source 
of the above quotation: "Nemo quippe mortalium est, cui non 
hoc ab eo naturaliter insitum sit, ut Deum esse cognoscat." 
See also ibid, c. 3 (PG 94, 794): "Velut enim iam diximus, 
insitum nobis a natura est, ut Deum esse noscamus." See In .I 
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any similitude received externally, but through their own 
essences (per essentiam) ; for affections of this kind are in 
the soul essentially. 30 
When Aristotle states that nothing is in the intellect 
which was not first in the senses and that all cognition has 
its origin in sensation, this must be understood, claims 
Bonaventure, with regard to things which have being (esse) 
in the soul through abstracted likeness ("per similitudinem 
abstractam"); such things are said to be in some manner 
written ("ad modum scripturae") in the soul; thus Aristotle 
rightly says that nothing is written ("nihil scriptum est") 
in the soul, not that the soul knows nothing, but because no 
picture (pictura) or abstract likeness is in the soul from 
Sent., a. 3, p. 1, a. un, q. 1, ad 5: " ... Deus est praesens 
ipsi animae et omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est 
necesse, ab ipso abstrahi similitudinem, per quam 
cognoscatur; nihilominus tamen, dum cognoscitur ab 
intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est 
velut similitude quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, 
inferior Deo, quia facit ipsam meliorem." While God and many 
truths are known innately, such knowledge is nonetheless 
occasioned by the knowledge of external things. See De Myst. 
Trin., q. 1, a. 1, concl. (V, 49); In i Sent., d. 3, p. 1, 
q. 3, ad 1 and 2 (I, 75); q. 1, ad 5 (I, 69-70); In ~ 
Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 124); !tin., c. 2, 
n. 3, (V, 300). Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IX, c. 11,. 
n. 16 (PL 42, 969) and ibid, VIII, c. 3, n. 4 (PL 42, 949), 
where he describes how the notions of God and good are known 
to the soul. Cf. note 74 regarding the knowledge of charity 
as impressed in the soul. 
30 Ibid. (II, 904a) : "Quid autem sit amor et timor, non 
cognoscit homo per similitudinem exterius acceptam, sed per 
essentiam; huiusmodi enim affectus essentialiter sunt in 
anima." 
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its origin. 31 Thus, in affirming the innateness of 
conscience, St. Bonaventure closes his discussion with the 
words of Augustine: "God inserts in us a natural judgment 
(naturale iudicatorium) by which light and darkness are seen 
in the book of light, which is truth, because truth is 
naturally impressed in the human heart. 1132 
Let us summarize the above discussion. Bonaventure 
follows Aristotle in insisting that human knowledge is 
acquired inasmuch as the knowledge of sensible objects must 
be acquired through the senses; but he also concurs with 
Augustine that the soul possesses an innate light or natural 
judgment which enables us to know such things. Accordingly, 
conscience is in one sense an acquired habitus of the 
practical intellect with regard to the acquired knowledge of 
31 Ibid. (II, 904ab): "Ex his patet responsio ad illam 
quaestionem, qua quaeritur, utrum omnis cognitio sit a 
sensu. Dicendum est, quod non. Necessario enim oportet 
ponere, quod anima novit Deum et se ipsam et quae sunt in se 
ipsa, sine adminiculo sensuum exteriorum. Unde si aliquando 
dicat Philosphus [De Sensu, c. 6.], quod 'nihil est in 
intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu' et quod 'omnis 
cognitio habet ortum a sensu;' intelligendum est de illis 
quae quidem habent esse in anima per similitudinem 
abstractam; et illa dicuntur esse in anima ad modum 
scripturae. Et propterea valde notabiliter dicit Philosophus 
[De Anima, III, c. 4.], quod in anima nihil scriptum est, 
non quia nulla sit in ea notitia, sed quia nulla est in ea 
pictura vel similitudo abstracta." Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 
III, c. 4-8 (429a10-432a130); De Sensu, c. 6 (445b17-20). 
32 Ibid. (II, 904): "Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in 
libro de Civitate Dei [XI, c. 27. n. 2.], 'Inseruit nobis 
Deus naturale iudicatorium, ubi quid sit lucis, quid 
tenebrarum, cogniscitur in libro lucis, qui veritas est, 
quia veritas in corde hominum naturaliter est impressa.'" 
Cf. St. Augustine, Civitate Dei, XI, c. 27, n. 2. (PL 41, 
341) . 
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sensible objects; yet, in another respect, conscience is an 
innate habitus by reason of the innate light of the 
intellect; this light suffices for knowing that a man must 
honor his parents upon the reception of the sensible species 
of mother or father; hence, conscience can be said to be 
both an acquired and an innate habitus; but further, 
conscience is simply innate with regard to things knowable 
by their essence such as the soul, affections of the soul, 
and "to love God." Such knowledge, while occasioned by 
cognition of sensible objects, is not obtained from the 
sensible species of these objects, but rather is in the soul 
essentially. 
Although much of Bonaventure's phraseology and usage 
of terms are elliptical and tangential, let us attempt to 
distinguish relevant terms, identify a few correlations, and 
draw some inferences from his discussion on conscience with 
regard to natural law as innate. 
1. For Bonaventure, to be natural is to be innate; 
hence both natural law and natural judgment are innate by 
definition; both are said to be impressed upon the human 
heart (see notes 10-12, 14 and 32). 
2. All knowledge, whether speculative or practical, 
requires the presence of an innate light (lumen inditum) and 
some intelligible content (i.e., sensible species or non-
sensible essences) . Thus, all knowledge involves an innate 
component, namely, an innate light. This light is often 
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identified with natural judgment (naturale iudicatorium) , 
most likely because it is the actuating principle (id guo) 
of natural judgment (see note 21). Further, this innate 
light is distinguished from primary precepts; the latter are 
apparently are the product of (a) content-determining-causes 
(sensible species, the soul and its affections) and (b) the 
innate light itself (see notes 18-19, 23). 
3. The cognitive habitus are identified with the innate 
light (or natural judgment) which directs the soul in both 
cognoscibilia and operabilia (see note 21) . Sometimes the 
innate light and natural judgment are identified with the 
cognitive power itself qua agent intellect and possible 
intellect respectively (see note 21) . 
4. Lex naturalis is equated (or at least associated) 
with naturale iudicatorium insofar as each term is held as 
(a) that by which conscience is innate and (b) that by which 
conscience knows moral principles and directs conduct (see 
notes 10, 11, 32). 
5. If the same innate light (or natural judgment) 
directs both the speculative intellect and the practical 
intellect, and if the practical intellect is an extension of 
the speculative intellect, then first moral precepts are 
metaphysically and epistemologically related to first 
speculative principles by reason of this same innate light 
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(or natural judgment) . 33 
6. Recall that the will and intellect are 
consubstantial to the soul (animae consubstantiales) because 
they proceed directly (immediate) from the soul and are 
reduced to the soul (see note 4). Now, since natural law 
directly binds the will prior to any mediation on the part 
of the intellect (see note 15), natural law must hold an 
ontological primacy over the will. Consequently, natural law 
must be situated at a depth of the soul which precedes the 
division of powers; for as the will proceeds directly from 
substance (g substantia) (see note 4 above), it follows that 
33The epistemological and metaphysical connection 
between first speculative principles and practical precepts 
is a function of the organic unity St. Bonaventure envisions 
between metaphysics, epistemology, and moral philosophy. See 
Hex., I, 13 (V, 331b): "Metaphysicus enim assurgit ad illud 
esse considerandum in ratione principii omnia 
originantis .... Assurgit etiam ad considerandum illud esse 
in ratione ultimi finis; et in hoc convenit cum morali sive 
ethico, qui reducit omnia ad unum summum bonum ut ad finem 
ultimum considerando felicitatem sive practicam, sive 
speculativam .... Nam idem est principium essendi et 
cognoscendi." See also note 86 below. Indeed, for St. 
Bonaventure, epistemology is co-extensive with metaphysics 
inasmuch as intelligibility is possible only through being 
(esse) precisely in act (in actu). See Itin., V, 3 (V, 
308b): "Si igitur non ens non potest intelligi nisi per ens, 
et ens in potentia, non nisi per ens in actu; et esse 
nominat ipsum purum actum entis: esse igitur est quad prime 
cadit in intellectu, et illud esse est quad est purus actus. 
Sed hoc non est esse particulare, quad est esse arctatum, 
quia permixtum est cum potentia; nee esse analogum, quia 
minime habet de actu, eo quad minime est. Restat igitur, 
quad illud esse est esse divinum." Bonaventure's meaning of 
esse in actu should not be confused, however, with St. 
Thomas' notion of existentia. Regarding Bonaventure's use of 
the term esse, see George Klubertanz, "Esse and Existere in 
St. Bonaventure," Medieval Studies 8 (1946), 169-88. See 
Appendix D for a further account of Bonaventure's 
understanding of metaphysics. 
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natural law itself must be rooted at this substantial level 
from which this power directly proceeds; hence, natural law 
must itself be consubstantial to the soul (see note 44). 
7. Further, because practical reasoning is comprised of 
natural judgment as conjoined to the operation of the will 
(see notes 6, 7 and 9), the first moral precepts of 
practical reason thus represent a confluence of operations 
of powers. Hence, natural law represents an ontological and 
epistemological nexus between the intellect and the will at 
both (a) the level of reduction of powers and (b) in the 
combined operations of those powers respectively. 
Remote Context #c 
In II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1: "Utrum synderesis sit in 
genere cognitionis, vel affectio?" 34 
In this discussion on synderesis, Bonaventure maps out 
the relationships between natural and deliberative will, 
34 In ll. Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, (II, 908-911). The 
term synderesis, which was frequently employed in the 
thirteenth century, appears to be derived from St. Jerome's 
Commentary on Ezechiel, I. 7. Cf. S. Busebii Hieronymi, 
Commentariorum in Bzechielem Prophetam, I, 7. sqq. (PL 25, 
22-23). Herein, St. Jerome relates a common interpretation 
of the Prophet's vision of the four living creatures--man, 
lion, ox, and eagle--to Plato's threefold division of the 
soul. Above and beyond these three principles was a fourth, 
which the Greeks call synteresis. Cf. In ll. Sent., d. 39, a. 
2, q. 1, quaestio incidens 2 (II, 909a). For a history of 
this term, see Michael Crowe, "The Term Synderesis and the 
Scholastics," in Irish Theological Quarterly 23 (1956), 151-
64, 228-45; cf. Lottin, Odon, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe 
et XIIIe siecles, II (Gembloux-Louvain, 1942), 105-10. For 
parallel discussions, cf. St. Thomas, De•Veritate, q~ 16, a. 
1; q. 17, a. 2; ST I, q. 79, a. 12; I-II, q. 94, a. 1, ad 2. 
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cognition and affection, synderesis and conscience--and the 
place and role of natural law. Let us present a summary of 
this discussion as follows. 
Bonaventure first presents three different theories to 
explain the roles of synderesis, conscience, and natural 
law. The first and third theories are of particular concern 
to us. According to the first theory, synderesis is 
identified with the power of superior reason which is turned 
to God; conscience is named a habitus by which superior 
reason governs lower reason according to the direction of 
natural law. However, Bonaventure rejects this theory 
because synderesis, he states, is invariably inclined to the 
good and thus cannot be mingled with sin; but mortal sin 
always involves superior reason; 35 hence, synderesis cannot 
35What is superior reason? Bonaventure divides the 
functions of reason into portio superior and portio inferior 
rationis, which represent a distinction of dispositions of 
the rational soul (see footnote 6) . The portio superior 
represents the rational soul as it is turned toward the 
eternal laws and divine powers; the portio inferior 
represents the rational soul as it is turned toward earthly 
and carnal things. See In .I.I Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2. 
concl. (II, S64a): " ... superior portio rationis et inferior, 
etsi aliquo modo recte condividantur, tamen diversae 
potentiae non sunt--ista enim membra, videlicit superius et 
inferius, essentiam potentiae non variant--sed dispositiones 
et officia." The point at hand is that the portio superior, 
unlike synderesis, can be involved in sin. Not only can the 
judgments of superior reason be determined by the light of 
eternal laws or by the influence of objects through inferior 
reason, but also by its own natural light which has been 
considerably obscured by original sin. The superior reason 
can thus fall into sin by following its own light. Ibid., p. 
2, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, S74a): "Et quamvis aspiciendo ad 
leges aeternas non peccet iudicando, tamen, secundum ea quae 
percipit a sensibus vel etiam secundum lumen sibi datum et 
innatum, potest deficere et errare, maxime in statu naturae 
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be the same as superior reason. Moreover, while the superior 
portion of reason is said to be ordered to God, the act of 
synderesis regards both God and neighbor according to 
natural law. 36 
lapsae." See In III Sent., d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6 (III, 
541) . 
Within the scope of superior reason the intellect 
regards three degrees of being--material, spiritual, and 
divine. To each level, Bonaventure assigns a corresponding 
aspectus or field of vision. With respect to the universal 
rationes abstracted from space and time, the mind's aspectus 
is called ratio or reason. Above the corporeal world is the 
spiritual realm to which corresponds a second aspectus 
called intellectus; the intellectus is that which recognizes 
the mark of God imprinted upon spiritual creatures and in 
objects which have been spiritualized by means of 
abstraction. See Hex., V, 24 (V, 358a) : "Intellectual is 
potentia est duplex: aut ut considerat universales rationes 
abstractas, ut abstrahit a loco, tempore et dimensione; aut 
ut elevatur ad substantias spirituales separata; et sic duae 
potentiae, scilicet, ratio et intellectus." The third 
aspectus through which man is destined to know God directly 
is called intellectus or potentia divina. See ibid, V, 24 
(V, 358a) and De Regno Dei, 9. With reference to this 
supreme aspectus, the soul is named mens. See Itin., I, 4 
(V, 297): "Secundum hunc triplicem progressum mens nostra 
habet tres aspectus principales. Unus est ad corporalia 
exteriora, secundum quern vocatur animalitas seu sensualitas; 
alius intra se est et in se, secundum quern dicitur spiritus; 
tertius supra se, secundum quern dicitur mens." 
For a detailed survey of portio superior in Bonaventure 
as well as a general history of the term, see R. W. 
Mulligan, "Portie Superior and Portie Inferior Rationis in 
the Writings of St. Bonaventure," Franciscan Studies 15 
(1955) I 332-49 • 
36 In ll Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (II, 909b): 
" ... synderesis aliis peccantibus non se immiscet. Cum enim 
mortale peccatum non possit esse absque actu superioris 
portionis quia in manducatione viri consistit consummatio 
peccati; si synderesis esset superior portio rationis, 
utique aliis peccantibus se immisceret. Praeterea, superior 
portio rationis dicit ordinationem ad Deum, actus autem 
synderesis non tantus respicit Deum, sed etiam proximum, 
secundum quod lex naturalis respicit utrumque." Because 
synderesis regards both God and creatures according to 
natural law, it is evident that natural law itself pertains 
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The third opinion, which Bonaventure accepts, is stated 
as follows: 
Just as the intellect of the soul possesses from its 
creation a light or natural judgment which directs the 
intellect in thinking, so the will (affectus) bears 
a certain natural propensity (pondus) which directs 
its desiring. 37 
What is desired is of two kinds, the noble (honesti) 
and the useful (commodi) . Likewise, what is knowable 
can be distinguished either as speculative truth 
(speculabilium) or moral truth (moralium); and as 
conscience properly denotes natural judgment in its 
direction of moral activity, so synderesis denotes 
that natural propensity insofar as it inclines the 
will toward the noble good (bonum honestum) . And as the 
name conscience may be taken for a power with such a 
habit, or vice versa, so may synderesis. 38 
While distinguished from conscience, synderesis is 
said to be the spark of conscience (scintilla 
conscientiae) ; for as the intellect is unable to move 
except through the mediation of the will, so conscience 
itself is induced through the mediation of 
to man in his relations with both God and creatures. 
37 Ibid. (II, 910a): "Et propterea est tertius modus 
dicendi, quod quemadmodum ab ipsa creatione animae 
intellectus habet lumen, quod est sibi naturale 
iudicatorium, dirigens ipsum intellectum in cognoscendis; 
sic affectus habet naturale quoddam pondus, dirigens ipsum 
in appetendis." Bonaventure defines pondus as an orderly 
tendency; see Brevil., II, 4 (V, 219b): "Pondus [est] 
inclinatio ordinativa." 
38 Ibid. (II, 910a) : "Appetenda autem sunt in duplici 
genere: quaedam enim sunt in genere honesti, quaedam in 
genere commodi; sicut et cognoscibilia sunt in duplici 
genere: quaedam in genere speculabilium, et quaedam ex parte 
moralium. Et quemadmodum conscientia non nominat illud 
iudicatorium, nisi in quantum dirigit ad opera moralia; sic 
synderesis non nominat illud pondus voluntatis sive 
voluntatem cum illo pondere, nisi in quantum illam habet 
inclinare ad bonum honestum. Et quemadmodum nomen 
conscientiae potest accipi pro potentia cum tali habitu, vel 
pro habitu talis potentiae; sic etiam synderesis." 
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synderesis. 39 
Properly speaking, synderesis is an affective power 
(potentiam affectivam) of the affective habitus insofar 
as the will is moved naturally (naturaliter) and 
rightly (recte) with respect to the noble good or its 
opposite . 40 
The relationship of synderesis with conscience is also 
likened to that of charity with respect to faith or 
the affective habitus in relation to the habitus 
39 Ibid., ad 3 (II, 910): "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod 
synderesis est scintilla conscientiae; dicendum, quod ideo 
dicitur scintilla, pro eo quod conscientia, quantum est de 
se, non potest movere nee pungere sive stimulare nisi 
mediante synderesi, quae est quasi eius stimulus et 
igniculus. Unde sicut ratio non potest movere nisi mediante 
voluntate, sic nee conscientia nisi mediante synderesi." Cf. 
ibid., d. 39, div. text. (II, 897b); a. 1, q. 1, ad. 4 (II, 
900). For a history of the term scintilla, see Michael 
Crowe, The Changing Profile of Natural Law (Hague: Martinus 
Nijoff, 1977), 127, 129. 
40 Ibid., ad 4 (II, 910) : "[D] icendum, quod est potentia 
proprie, attamen non nominat potentiam voluntatis 
generaliter, sed solum voluntatem, in quantum moveter 
naturaliter; nee adhuc universaliter, sed solummodo respectu 
boni honesti, vel eius oppositi. Nihilominus potest etiam 
dicere habitum; sed ille non debet dici nee virtus et vitium 
proprie respiciunt liberum arbitrium et voluntatem, in 
quantum est deliberativa, non in quantum est naturalis." 
Ibid., ad 2. quaestionem incidentem (II, 911b): "Synderesis 
autem nominat potentiam affectivam, secundum quod movetur 
naturaliter et recte; et ideo non distinguitur ab illis 
potentiis secundum essentiam potentiae, sed secundum modum 
movendi; et quia secundum illum modum movendi semper movet 
recte: hinc est, quod dicitur super alias volare et aliis 
errantibus non se immiscere, sed eas corrigere." 
St. Bonaventure sometimes states that the natural 
appetite is invariably inclined toward beatitudinem (In .I.I 
Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a 2, concl. (II, 566b), toward the 
bonum honestum (ibid., II 566a), or toward the good in 
generali (In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, q. 2, concl. (IV, 
1003b). However, the present passage makes clear that, 
properly speaking, the natural appetite is oriented to the 
bonum honestum as opposed to good guodcumgue. Cf. In- IV 
Sent., d. 49, p. 1, q. 2, fund. 2 (IV, 1003-4). 
of the practical intellect. 41 
Having arranged conscience and synderesis as 
correlative habitus and powers of intellect and will, St. 
Bonaventure then characterizes their relationship with 
natural law as follows: 
Natural law bears upon both synderesis and conscience 
and may be understood in two ways: first, as a 
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habitus in the soul, natural law is that by which we 
are instructed in truth and rightly ordered to good. 
Enclosing both will and intellect, it thus encompasses 
(comprehendit) synderesis and conscience; hence it is 
spoken of as a habi tus . 42 
In a second way, natural law refers to a collection of 
natural law precepts ("collectio praeceptorum iuris 
naturalis"); as such, natural law is the object 
(obiectum) of both conscience and synderesis whereby 
the one dictates and the other inclines toward what 
is right; for conscience dictates and synderesis 
desires or avoids. 43 
Although natural law may be taken in both ways, this 
second mode is more precise; for, properly speaking, 
synderesis is called an affective power insofar as 
it is the natural ability of the will to incline 
41 Ibid., concl. (II, 911a) : " ... dicendum, quod sic se 
habet synderesis ad conscientiam, sicut se habet caritas ad 
fidem, vel habitus ipsius affectus ad habitus intellectus 
practici, secundum quod est habitus." 
42 Ibid. (II, 91la): "Lex autem naturalis communiter se 
habet ad utrumque, videlicet ad synderesim et ad 
conscientiam. Nam lex naturalis duplicitur accipi potest: 
uno modo, prout dicit habitum in anima; et sic quia per 
legem naturalem instruimur et per legem naturalem recte 
ordinamur, dicit habitum, qui comprehendit intellectum et 
affectum, et ita comprehendit synderesim et conscientiam." 
43 Ibid. (II, 91la): "Alio modo lex naturalis vocatur 
collectio praeceptorum iuris naturalis; et sic nominat 
obiectum synderesis et conscientiae, unius sicut dictantis, 
et alterius sicut inclinantis. Nam conscientia dictat, et 
synderesis appetit vel refugit." 
toward the good; conscience is the habitus of the 
practical intellect, but natural law is the object 
of both synderesis and conscience. 44 
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To summarize, Bonaventure sets up a fairly symmetrical 
correspondance between truth and goodness, intellect and 
will, conscience and synderesis; but it is natural law which 
holds common ground between each set of complementary terms. 
Disposing the soul in moralia and orienting it to the bonum 
honestum, the natural law habitus is that by which the soul 
is instructed in truth and is rightly ordered to good; 
44 Ibid. (II, 91lab) : "Et utroque istorum modorum 
invenitur lex naturalis in diversis locis; hoc tamen ultimo 
modo accipitur magis proprie. Et sic, ut proprie loquamur, 
synderesis dicit potentiam affectivam, in quantum 
naturaliter habilis est ad bonum et ad bonum tendit; 
conscientia vero dicit habitum intellectus practici; lex 
vero naturalis dicit obiectum utriusque." 
The distinction and connection between natural law and 
natural judgment is now apparent. While conscience (qua 
habitus) properly denotes natural judgment in its direction 
of moral activity (see footnote 38), natural law is that 
which directs conscience (see footnote 42 and 43) . Iudicium 
in itself implies for Bonaventure an act of reason which is 
regulated by a norm of truth or higher law. See .II Sent., d. 
25, p. 1, dub. 1 (II, 607a): "Iudicium importat actum 
rationis regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae 
legis." Evidently, then, natural law is itself the norm of 
truth which regulates (the habitus and, consequently, the 
act of) natural judgment. 
Since natural judgment, as Augustine holds, directs the 
soul in judging both speculative truths and practical truths 
(see note 21), and since natural judgment is itself 
regulated by a norm of truth or higher law, it follows that 
speculative and practical reason are at root regulated by 
one and the same natural law. Further, since practical 
reason is speculative reason as conjoined to the will (see 
notes 6 and 7), and the will itself is naturally bound to 
natural law (see note 15), both intellect and will are at 
root regulated by one and the same natural law (see note 
33) . 
61 
natural law is thus distinguished from the naturale pondus 
of synderesis and the naturale iudicatorium of conscience 
inasmuch as it is the underlying habitus which encompasses 
(comprehendit) both synderesis and conscience. 45 
45What does Bonaventure mean in stating (see note 42) 
that natural law "comprehendit intellectum et affectum, et 
ita comprehendit synderesim et conscientiam?" Consider his 
definition of mens: "Mens dupliciter accipitur: aliquando 
communiter, et sic comprehendit memoriam, intelligentiam et 
voluntatem .... " In ll Sent., d. 25 p. 1, a. un., q. 2, 
concl. (II, 596a). "Secundum hunc triplicem progressum, mens 
nostra tres habet aspectus principales: unus est ad 
corporalia exteriora, secundum quern vocatur animalitas seu 
sensualitas; alius intra se et in se, secundum quern dicitur 
spiritus; tertius est supra se, secundum quern dicitur mens. 
Ex quibus omnibus disponere se debet ad conscendendum in 
Deum, ut ipsum diligat ex tota mente, ex toto corde et ex 
tota anima, in quo consistit perfecta Legis observatio et 
simul cum hoc sapientia Christiana." !tin., I, 4 (V, 297a). 
On this point, P. L. Landsberg comments: "La notion de mens 
dans ce sens et l'identification permanente du mens avec une 
vue de l'esprit (oculi mentis, acies mentis, etc.) est 
d'origine augustinienne .... Ici, chez Bonaventure, vers 
l'au-dela, vers le spirituel, les idees, la verite pure, 
c'est-a-dire vers Dieu, Le Logos, Le Christ, qui est le 
centre de la doctrine bonaventurienne. Dans sa triple 
distinction, il ne s'agit pas de facultes differentes, 
inherentes a une substance stable de l'ame, il s'agit de 
possibilites dynamiques de l'existence implicant autant de 
directions cognitives." "La philosophie d'une experience 
mystique: L'Itinerarium," La Vie Spirituelle LI (1937), 77. 
We take Bonaventure to mean that mens is pre-eminent 
over its co-essential faculties, constituting them in a 
unity of operation towards God. This orientation of mind 
towards God appears to be tantamount to natural law itself. 
Thus, as it comprehends (comprehendit) the intellect and 
will--indeed, the mind, heart, and soul of man--natural law 
likewise holds primacy over the soul and its faculties, 
unifying the soul by way of orientation to God. Here, the 
notion of ordination seems implicit in Bonaventure's use of 
the verb comprehendit; that is, in encompassing 
(comprehendit) the intellect and will, natural law binds 
these powers (see note 15) and so orders them to God. So 
ordered, the will and intellect are endowed with a facile 
ability for God. For this reason natural law is understood 
by Bonaventure as a habitus (see note 42). See note 72 with 
regard to the rectitude of operations by which the soul 
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More properly, however, natural law refers to a 
collection of natural law precepts ("collectio praeceptorum 
iuris naturalis") insofar as it is the directing object 
(obiectum) of both conscience and synderesis whereby the 
former dictates and the latter inclines towards what is 
right. 
In what way, then, is natural law innate? Taken as a 
habitus, natural law encompasses (comprehendit) both the 
intellect and the will--and, consequently, conscience and 
synderesis (see note 42). In this respect, natural law 
preceeds the distinction of operative powers in the ground 
of consubstantiality (see note 4) ; as such, natural law is 
evidently intrinsic to the nature of man (see notes 33 and 
42) . 
Taken as a collectio praeceptorum, natural law follows 
upon the operative confluence of the intellect and will in 
practical reasoning. Thus, natural law precepts are the 
products of several factors--namely, the combined operations 
of the intellect and will, and various content-determining 
causes of knowledge (both innate essences and acquired 
species; see notes 23, 26-27, and 30). Further, inasmuch as 
they are the objects of both synderesis and conscience (see 
note 43 above), natural law precepts represent for 
Bonaventure a psychological common ground between moral 
truth and goodness. 
attains its ultimate end. 
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Proximate Context 
Peter Lombard's Sent., IV, d. 49, c. 1, notes 3-7: "Si omnes 
homines volunt esse beati. 1146 
Our key-text below, "Utrum omnes appetant beatitudinem 
veram," is initiated by, and corresponds to, Peter Lombard's 
treatment of the same question. Let us look, then, at the 
problem Lombard puts forward and which Bonaventure will take 
over. On this question Lombard, citing exclusively from 
Augustine's De Trinitate, 47 puts forward the following two 
premises: first, the will to possess the blessed life 
(beatitude) is common to all; secondly, since one can only 
love what one knows and blessedness is loved by all, it 
follows that blessedness is known by everyone. 
However, two difficulties challenge these claims: 
first, the diversity of wills concerning the blessed life 
indicates that not all know it; for if all knew blessedness, 
it would not be considered by some to consist in the 
goodness of the soul, by others in bodily pleasures, or 
still others in both, etc; secondly, if the blessed life 
means living according to goodness of soul, it follows that 
not everyone wills to live the blessed life since many do 
not will to live life in such a manner. Nevertheless, it 
46 Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum, Collegii S. 
Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas. (Editio tertia, Grottaferrata, 
1981); II, 549-51. 
47St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XIII, c. 4, n. 7,- (PL 
42, 1018); ibid., c. 5, n. 8 (PL, 1019-20). 
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must be held that all will to be blessed; hence these 
unavoidable contradictions. 48 
Further, to say that all are blessed who simply live as 
they please is false; rather, one is made wretched by a bad 
will and becomes even more miserable when the desire of bad 
will is satisfied. Indeed it is true, Augustine insists, 
that all men will to be blessed, and all will this one thing 
and will other things for its sake; and since no one can 
love what he is wholly ignorant of, nor be ignorant of what 
it is that he knows he wills, it follows that all men know 
the blessed life. But those who do not have what they will 
or have what they do not rightly will are miserable. Thus 
48Lombard, Sent. IV, d 49, c. 1, n. 4 (II, 549): " De 
hoc Augustinus in libro XIII De Trinitate ita disserit [c. 
4, n. 7]: 'Mirum est, cum capessendae retinendaeque 
beatitudinis voluntas una sit omnium, unde tanta exsistat de 
ipsa beatitudine rursus diversitas voluntatum: non quod earn 
aliquis nolit, sed quod non omnes earn norint. Si enim omnes 
earn nossent, non ab aliis putaretur esse in virtute animi, 
ab aliis in voluptate corporis, ab aliis atque aliis alibi 
atque alibi. Quomodo ergo omnes amant quod non omnes sciunt? 
Quis potest amare quod nescit? sicut supra disputavi [De 
Trinitate III, d. 24, cc. 4-5]. Cur ergo beatitude amatur ab 
omnibus, nee tamen scitur ab omnibus?'" 
Ibid., n. 5 (II, 549): "Augustinus: 'An forte falsum 
est quod pro vero posuimus, beate vivere omnes homines 
velle? Si enim beate vivere est, verbi gratia, secundum 
animi virtutem vivere, quomodo beate vivere vult, qui hoc 
non vult? .... Non igitur omnes beate vivere volunt, immo 
pauci hoc volunt, si non est beate vivere, nisi secundum 
virtutem animi vivere: quod multi nolunt .... An dicendum 
est, etiam si nihil sit aliud beate vivere quam secundum 
virtutem animi vivere, tamen et qui hoc non vult, beate 
vivere vult? Nimis quidem hoc videtur absurdum. Tale est 
enim ac si dicamus: Qui non vult beate vivere, beate vult 
vivere. Istam repugnantiam quis audiat, quis ferat? Et tamen 
ad hanc contrudit necessitas, si et omnes beate vivere velle 
verum est, et non omnes sic volunt vivere, quomodo solum 
vivitur beate.'" 
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only the man who has what he wills and wills nothing wrongly 
is blessed. 49 
Peter Lombard's discussion of this particular question 
goes no further than the remarks of Augustine offered above; 
and so the question remains how to reconcile the position 
that all men will, and somehow know, the blessed life, with 
the obvious facts which seem to prove the contrary. It is in 
view of such difficulties that Bonaventure takes up the 
problems related to knowing and desiring the true good; and 
it is here that his own response will shed further light on 
his doctrine of natural law as innate. 
49 Ibid., c. 1, n. 6 (II, 550): '"An illud ab his 
angustiis nos poterit eruere, si dicamus nihil esse beate 
vivere secundum delectationem suam, et ideo falsum non esse 
quod omnes beate vivere velint, quia omnes ita volunt ut 
quemque delectat?--Sed id quidem falsum. Velle enim quod non 
deceat, est esse miserrimum; nee tam miserum est non 
adipisci quod velis, quam adipisci velle quod non oportet. 
Quis ita sit caecus ut dicat aliquem ideo beatum, quia vivit 
ut vult, cum profecto etsi miser esset, minus tamen esset, 
si nihil eorum quae perperam voluisset, habere potuisset? 
Mala enim voluntate vel sola miser quisque efficitur; sed 
miserior cum desiderium malae voluntatis impletur.'" Ibid., 
n. 7 (II, 550): "'Quapropter, quoniam verum est quod omnes 
homines esse beati velint, idque ardentissimo arnore 
appetant, et propter hoc cetera quaecumque appetunt; nee 
quisquam potest amare quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit, 
nee potest nescire quid sit quod se velle scit, sequitur ut 
omnes beatam vitam sciant. Omnes autem beati habent quod 
volunt, quamvis non omnes qui habent quod volunt, continue 
sint beati. Continue autem miseri sunt, qui vel non habent 
quod volunt, vel id habent quod non recte volunt.'" 
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II. Key-Text A 
In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un., q. 2: "Qualiter beatitude 
sit appetibilis" and "Utrum omnes appetant beatudinem 
veram. 1150 
In treating the two-fold question put forward in the 
key-text, Bonaventure offers three introductory statements 
which (1) affirm the universal desire for the true good and 
to some extent (2) characterize the nature of beatitude 
itself. All three statements bear on natural law and thus 
set the immediate focus for and support of Bonaventure's own 
conclusion and commentary: 
According to Boethius, 'Inserted in the mind of 
man is the desire for the true good;' but the 
true good is that which effects our true happiness; 
therefore all desire true happiness. 51 
Building on Boethius' assertion that the desire for 
true happiness is implanted in the mind of man, Bonaventure 
further states that man desires beatitude by a natural 
50 In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2 (IV, 1002-04). 
For parallel discussions, cf. St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 
49, q. 1, a. 3; Summa I-II, q. 5, a. 8. 
51 In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, fundamenta 1 
(IV, 1002): "Boethius: 'Inserta est mentibus hominum veri 
boni cupiditas;' sed verum bonum est quod nos beatos vere 
efficit: ergo omnes appetunt beatudinem veram." The words 
Bonaventure attributes to Boethius are not the same as those 
of De Consolatione Philosophiae, III, prosa 2, (PL 63, 724) 
"Est enim mentibus hominum veri boni naturaliter inserta 
cupiditas." The meaning is essentially the same, however. 
appetite which is lasting and common to all. 52 
The second introductory statement indicates something 
of the nature of the true good according to which we 
naturally and rightly desire it: 
The Philosopher states that 'everyone desires 
the good;' now either they desire any good 
whatsoever or the good which suffices. Such good 
cannot be of any [insufficient] sort, otherwise 
one's desires would never be sated; hence it must be 
the sufficient good which all desire. But no good 
suffices to fill the human soul except the true 
good; thus all men desire the true good53 
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52 Ibid., fund. 3 (IV, 1002): "Ergo appetit appetitu 
naturali. Sed naturalis appetitus est communis omnibus et 
perpetuus: ergo si talis est appetitus beatitudinis, patet, 
etc." See note 66 below regarding the constancy of the 
natural appetite. 
53 In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, fund. 2 (IV, 
1002-03): "Item, Philosophus dicit, quod 'omnia bonum 
exoptant;' aut ergo exoptant bonum guodcumgue, aut bonum 
quod sufficit. Non quodcumque, quia si quodcumque, tune 
processus est in infinitum: constat ergo, quod bonum, quod 
sufficit. Sed nullum bonum est sufficiens implere animam 
nisi beatitude vera: ergo omnes homines appetunt 
beatitudinem veram." See Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, I, 
c. 1 (1094a): "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly 
every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good; and 
for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be 
that at which all things aim." From The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 
1941), 935. While Aristotle speaks of a multiplicity of 
goods, he nevertheless echoes Plato in acknowledging a 
supreme good [end] to which all other goods [ends] are 
subordinate: See ibid., I, c. 2 (1094a18): "If, then, there 
is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own 
sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), 
and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something 
else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, 
so that our desire would be empty and vain) , clearly this 
must be the good and the chief good." McKeon, Basic Works, 
935. Cf. Plato's Republic, X (618c-d). On this score, 
Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle are outside the tradition of 
Western philosophical thought; see our Introduction,- note 
48. 
The third introductory statement forms the undisputed 
premise of the second sed contra position which further 
indicates the nature of the true good: 
Sin [according to Augustine] consists in hating the 
immutable Good and adhering to what is mutable; 
but beatitude is the immutable Good. 54 
Here, then, are revealed two aspects of the true good 
which distinguish it from every other good--namely, 
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sufficiency and immutability. Recall in this connection that 
the will is bound by natural law (see note 15), and is moved 
naturally and rightly with respect to the noble good 
according to natural law (see notes 39 and 42). Evidently, 
then, it is according to the distinction and relation 
between the true good and other goods55 that natural law 
54 In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, contra 2 (IV, 
1003): "Item, 'peccatum est, spreto Bono incommutabili, 
rebus commutabilibus adhaerere;' sed beatitudo est Bonum 
incommutabile .... " See St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, 
II, c. 19, n. 53 (PL 32, 1269): "Voluntas ergo adhaerens 
communi atque incommutabili bono, impetrat prima et magna 
hominis bona, cum ipsa sit medium quoddam bonum. Voluntas 
autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono, et conversa 
ad proprium bonum, aut ad exterius, aut ad inferius, peccat. 
Ad proprium convertitur, cum suae potestatis vult esse; ad 
exterius, cum aliorum propria, vel quaecumque ad se non 
pertinent, cognoscere studet; ad inferius, cum voluptatem 
corporis diligit .... Ita fit ut neque illa bona quae a 
peccantibus appetuntur, ullo modo mala sint, neque ipsa 
voluntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam mediis numerandam 
esse comperimus; sed malum sit aversio ejus ab incommutabili 
bono, et conversio ad mutabilia bona." 
55See In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, contra 3 
(IV, 1003): "Item, beatitudo aut appetitur propter se, aut 
propter aluid. Si propter aluid: ergo non appetitur ut 
beatitudo, quia omni, a quo appetitur, propter se .... " 
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rightly orders the will; hence, an intimate relationship 
obtains between the soul's natural appetite, the true good, 
and natural law. Let us see what Bonaventure's concluding 
discussion further reveals on this relationship: 
Respondeo: 
[1] It must be said that there are two factors which 
comprise appetite, namely, conformity and need. 
Therefore, because the rational soul (a) has been 
created in the image and likeness of God, (b) has 
been made capable of the most sufficient good, and 
(c) does not suffice for itself since it is empty 
and in want, it naturally seeks true happiness. 
Dicendum quod duo sunt quae faciunt appetitum, 
scilicet convenientia et indigentia. Quoniam igitur 
anima rationalis creata est ad Dei imaginem et 
similitudinem56 et facta est capax boni 
sufficientissimi; et ipsa sibi non sufficit cum sit 
vana et deficiens; ideo dico, quod veram 
beatitudinem appetit naturaliter. 
Bonaventure next makes several distinctions necessary 
to locate natural law with respect to knowledge (cognitio) 
and love (amor) and to explain its significance precisely as 
innate: 
[2] ... just as there is in us a twofold love, natural 
and deliberative, so similarly there is a twofold 
knowledge: thus, just as deliberative knowledge 
precedes deliberative love, so natural knowledge 
precedes a natural love. 
56See In I.I Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 2, fund. 1 (II, 
403a) : "Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem 
suam, masculum et feminam creavit illos; si igitur mulier 
creata est imaginem Dei et ad aequalitatem viri ... videtur 
ergo, quod in viro et muliere reperiatur ratio imaginis." 
Cf. In i Sent., d. 1, a. 3, q. 2. 
... sicut in nobis est duplex amor, naturalis et 
deliberativus; sic similiter et duplex cognitio: 
ergo sicut deliberativa cognitio deliberativum 
amorem praecedit, sic naturalis naturalem. 
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[3] Accordingly, just as there is a double inclination 
toward good, namely generally and specifically, so 
also there is a double appetite. 57 And the precept 
concerning the general good comes from natural 
cognition and here there is no error; but the 
precept concerning this or that particular good is 
not wholly from a natural habitus, but through our 
assumption made by deliberating reason; and 
concerning this error arises. It must likewise be 
understood with regard to the appetite. Therefore 
everyone has the general knowledge of, and desire 
for, true happiness. For everyone believes that 
happiness is the good which fills the soul, and all 
people seek that. 
57 It is not clear what distinguishes instinctus from 
appetitus. One might suppose that instinctus commonly 
signifies the tendency or impulse proper to any creature 
while appetitus specifically signifies an impulse as 
characterized by desire proper to a sensitive or rational 
creature; but Bonaventure does not make any such a 
clarification and, in fact, uses these terms rather loosely; 
he does, however, distinguish appetitus according to (1) 
natural necessity, (2) sensual impetuousity, and (3) 
rational liberty. Self-movement is most proper to rational 
liberty, less proper to sensual impetuosity, and improper to 
natural necessity. See In .I.I Sent., d. 38, a. 2, q. 2 concl. 
(II, 891a). In any case, Bonaventure explains that a thing 
moves according to its appetite which follows from a certain 
indigence that characterizes its form. See In .I.I Sent., d. 
14, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2, contra 5 (II 348a): "Item, omne quod 
movetur propria forma, movetur propter propriam indigentiam; 
natura enim formae non movet nisi propter appetitum rei, qua 
naturaliter indiget." Moreover, appetite not only 
characterizes the natural indigence of a creature but also 
specifies its fulfilling object. See In .I.I Sent., d. 24, p. 
1, a. 2, q. 4, ad 4 (II, 567b): " ... et appetitu, ibi 
distinguitur naturalis potentia a rationali non solum 
quantum ad modum appetendi sed etiam quantum ad appetibile; 
et penes hoc contingit diversas differentias potentiarum 
accipere." Appetitus thus bears a double significance (1) by 
revealing the indigent nature of a creature (indigentia), 
and (2) by indicating its proper object or end 
(convenientia) . 
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Et propterea dicendum, quod sicut duplex est 
instinctus ad bonum, scilicet in generali et in 
speciali; sic et duplex appetitus. Et dictamen boni 
in generali venit a cognitione naturali, et quantum 
ad hoc non est error; sed dictamen in speciali 
illius vel illius non est omnino ab habitu 
naturali, sed per assumtionem factam a ratione 
deliberante, et circa hoc est error. Similiter et 
de appetitu intelligendum. Omnes ergo habent 
appetitum beatitudinis verae in generali et habent 
cognitionem in generali. Omnes enim credunt, quod 
beatitude sit bonum quod sufficit, et omnes istud 
appetunt. 
Through these distinctions Bonaventure illustrates how 
someone who naturally desires true happiness may falsely 
assume honor or money to be the object of that happiness. 50 
He then explains the nature of this general knowledge of 
happiness: 
[4] If you ask how he knows in general, I answer that 
such type of knowledge is innate; 59 and if you 
58 In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1 a. un., q. 2, concl. ad 1-3 
(IV, 1003b): "In speciali vero, quando, assumit: hoc 
sufficit, scilicet honor, vel pecunia, errat cognitio, et 
declinat affectio. Et est simile de eo qui vult emere aurum 
et credit, hoc frustum aurichalci esse aurum, et frustum 
auri credit esse aurichalcum .... Similiter, si ab avaro 
quaeras, utrum appetat beatitudinem veram et velit habere; 
respondebit, quod sic. Si quaeras, quid velit, utrum 
paradisum vel denarium; respondebit: denarium. Et huis ratio 
est, quia hie credit sufficientiam, ibi non." 
59See St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, II, c. 9, n. 
26 (PL, 32, 1254): " ... ergo antequam beati simus, mentibus. 
tamen nostris impressa est notio beatitatis [read: 
beatitudinis]; per hanc enim scimus, fidenterque, et sine 
ulla dubitatione dicimus, beatos nos esse velle." Ibid., I, 
c. 6, n. 15 (PL 32, 1229): "Ut igitur breviter aeternae 
legis notionem, quae impressa nobis est, quantum valeo 
verbis explicem, ea est qua justum est ut omnia sint 
ordinatissima;" See also De Trinitate, VIII, c. 3, n. 4 (PL 
42, 949), regarding the notion of the good as impressed 
within us. 
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ask, "through what?" I will say that he knows what 
is sufficient through what he needs. If you object 
that privation is not a way of knowing a 
habitus, 60 it must be said that there is one 
indigence which is wholly a privation, and another 
which is a disposing and inclining towards certain 
things; and this is the way of knowing. 61 Whence 
if matter necessarily had the power of knowing, it 
would at least know the form to which it is 
inclined and disposed; thus the soul knows what 
suffices it through its own lack. 62 
Si quaeras: quomodo cognovit in generali? dice, 
quad sufficientiam cognoscit per indigentiam. Si 
opponas, quad privatio non est via cognoscendi 
habitum; dicendum, quad est quaedam indigentia 
omnino privans, quaedam disponens et inclinans; et 
haec est ratio cognoscendi. Unde si materia 
necessario haberet potentiam cognoscendi, 
cognosceret utique f ormam, ad quam inclinatur et 
disponitur; sic anima sufficientiam per suam 
indigentiam. 
[5] In the same way, we can say that knowledge of 
beatitude and of many natural things, such as the 
reckoning of natural law, is innate in us; 63 and 
if the soul should be said to have been created "as 
60As the context indicates, habitum appears to signify 
a condition of being precisely as a capacity for completion. 
See footnote 8. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, I, c. 5 (4lla2-5) 
"One element in each pair of contraries will suffice to 
enable it to know both that element itself and its 
contrary." McKean, Basic Works, 552. 
61Such an indigence issues in a corresponding kind of 
appetite. See In l.I Sent., d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6 (II, 
301b): " ... dicendum, quad appetitus non semper sequitur 
f ormam completam, sed etiam attenditur secundum appetentis 
indigentiam et aliquam dispositionem semiplenam." See note. 
57 regarding the significance of appetitus. 
62 For Aristotle's example of matter as disposed toward 
its form, see Physics, I, c. 9 (192a17-22). Cf. St. Anselm, 
Cur Deus homo, I, c. 24 (PL 158, 397): "Beatitude est 
sufficientia, in qua nulla est indigentia." 
63Cf. Itin., II, 3 (V, 300); St. Augustine, De 
Trinitate, XII, c. 15. n. 24 (PL 42, 1011). 
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a blank tablet" 64 this is understood only insofar 
as it pertains to species and similitudes, which 
the soul acquires through the use of the senses. Or 
this expression is used in a third way, as we spoke 
of love in our first book, 65 how he who does not 
have it knows of it, and nonetheless without the 
reception of species from the senses. 
Posset tamen dici, quod cognitio beatitudinis et 
multarum rerum naturalium, ut puta iuris naturalis, 
nobis innata est. Et si anima dicatur creata esse 
"ut tabula rasa;" hoc intellegitur solum quantum ad 
species et similitudines, quas acquirit per sensus. 
Vel dicatur tertio modo, sicut in prime libro 
dictum est de caritate, quomodo cognoverit earn, qui 
non habet, et tamen sine receptione speciei 
sensibus. 
Let us briefly summarize the discussion up to now and 
identify a few key points with respect to natural law. 
Appetitus is a determinate tendency or inclination which 
follows from the indigence and conformity of a creature's 
form for its fulfilling object (see notes 57 and 61). Hence, 
the soul of a rational creature possesses a natural desire 
for its fulfilling object (true happiness) according to the 
convenientia and indigentia of its natural form qua imago 
Dei. Now, inasmuch as the knowledge of a thing's indigence 
is a way of knowing the fulfilling object of that thing, so 
man has knowledge of his fulfilling object through knowledge 
of his indigent nature; and to the extent that knowledge of 
his own indigent nature is innate, it follows that knowledge 
of his fulfilling object is innate. Simply put, man has an 
64See Aristotle, De Anima, III, c. 4 (430a). 
65 In .I Sent., d. 17. p. 1. a. un, q. 4 (I, 301-302). 
See note 74 for a citation of this passage. 
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innate knowledge of his end (the true good) through the 
innate knowledge of his indigent nature which is disposed 
and inclined toward that end; for this reason, knowledge of 
natural law is said to be innate. 
Since the natural appetite for the general good is 
determined by (the indigence of) human nature itself, and 
the knowledge of the general good is inf erred according to 
the knowledge of that indigent nature, there can be no error 
in either the natural desire or in knowledge of the general 
good. Hence, the intellect and will bear a natural 
orientation for the general good--simply by virtue of the 
human form as imago Dei. 66 
In light of the above account, how can we understand 
the nature and role of natural law as habitus and as a 
collectio praeceptorum? Insofar as man has knowledge of his 
fulfilling end according to the knowledge of his own natural 
appetite for the end (as determined by his own indigent 
nature) , then natural law qua habitus corresponds or 
correlates in some way with the rational form of man as 
66See section [3] above. With regard to the absence of 
error in the natural appetite, Bonaventure cites Aristotle 
as follows: "Quod naturale est non assuescit in contrarium." 
See In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2 contra 2 (IV, 
1003a). Cf. Aristotle, Bthica Nichomachea II, c. 1 
(1103a20) : "For nothing that exists by nature can form a 
habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which 
by nature moves downward cannot be habituated to move 
upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up 
ten thousand times; nor can anything else that by nature 
behaves in one way be trained to behave in another."- McKeon, 
Basic Works, 952. 
characterized by convenientia and indigentia; as such 
natural law is innate. 
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Note that natural law as a precept concerning the 
general good is not knowledge simply, but something that 
follows upon natural cognition ("dictamen boni in generali 
venit a cognitione naturali"); this precept subseqently 
serves as the directing object of both synderesis and 
conscience (see note 43). Accordingly, one can see the 
ontological and epistemological connection between the 
indigent nature of man, the consubstantial habitus of 
natural law, the natural inclination for the true good, and 
the natural law dictate, "God must be obeyed," which comes 
from that underlying natural law habitus (see notes 22, 29-
30) . 
Let us summarize a few important points in light of the 
above discussion. 
1. Inasmuch as (a) natural law is said to bind and 
rightly order the will towards the general good (see notes 
15, 39 and 42), and (b) man's natural inclination follows 
from and according to his indigent nature (see [3] and [4] 
above), it appears that natural law qua habitus corresponds 
with human nature itself, as marked by its capacity and need 
for God (see [1] above); as such natural law is innate. 
2. Knowledge of natural law is innate inasmuch as 
knowledge of man's true good is innate (see [5] above); in 
turn, knowledge of man's true good is innate inasmuch as 
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knowledge of man's own indigent nature is innate. 
3. To the extent that natural law precepts are rooted 
in the knowledge of a habitus which is proper to the nature 
of man, there is an evident correspondence between human 
nature, natural inclination, the natural law habitus, and 
natural law precepts. 
III. Commentary 
Let us begin our commentary with a closer look at 
natural law qua habitus and follow with a consideration of 
natural law as associated with truth, light, and perfection. 
From this study we hope to further illumine the relationship 
between human nature, natural law, and the true good. 
Natural Law gua Habitus 
With regard to habitus itself, Bonaventure 
distinguishes three different modes of habitus--namely, by 
acquisition (acguisitione), by innate disposition (innata 
dispositione), and by natural origin (naturale origine). 
Since a habitus is that by which a power is endowed with a 
facile ability to act, a power is facilitated in its action 
by these three modes. For example, the affective power (see 
note 15) possesses the ability for (1) loving some good 
through an acquired disposition, as through a virtue; for 
(2) loving one's proper good through a innate disposition; 
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and (3) for loving one's self by natural origin. 67 
To which modality does the natural law habitus 
correspond? Recall that the will and intellect are 
consubstantial to the soul (animae consubstantiales) because 
they proceed directly (immediate) from the soul and are 
reduced to the soul (see note 4). Since natural law 
encompasses and directs both intellect and will (see note 
46), it holds an ontological primacy over these powers. 
Rooted at this substantial level from which these powers 
directly proceed, natural law is itself consubstantial to 
the soul (see notes 33, 44). With regard to the modality of 
habitus, then, natural law is clearly an innate habitus per 
naturalem originem. 
Next, as natural law knowledge regards both God and 
creatures (see note 36), and natural law precepts direct the 
naturale iudicatorium and incline the naturale pondus 
towards the soul's proper good, it follows that natural law, 
taken precisely as knowledge and precept, is also an innate 
habitus per innatam dispositionem. 
67 In .I Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1 ad 1 (I, 89b): 
" ... dicendum quod triplex est habitus. Quemdam enim habitum 
habet animae potentia ab acguisitione, quemdam ab innata 
dispositione, tertium habet a sui ipsius origine. Hoc autem 
patet, quia habitus est quo potentia facilis est in actum; 
potentia autem his tribus modis est facilis, verbi gratia, 
affectus noster habet facilitatem ad diligendum bonum 
alienum per acguisitam dispositionem, ut per virtutem; ad 
diligendum vero bonum suum per innatam dispositionem; et ad 
diligendum se ipsum per sui naturalem originem." The term 
af f ectus as used here appears to signify the operative power 
of the soul and not merely an emotional state. Cf. note 15. 
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Finally, as the operation of intellect and will are 
necessary for the perfection of the soul (see notes 4, 9, 
and 49), and natural law encompasses and rightly orders the 
intellect and will in their operations (see notes 42 and 
43), it follows that natural law is a habitus per acguisitam 
dispositionem in the order of action or perfection. 68 
Bonaventure also distinguishes three modes of habitus 
68The terms operatic and perf ectio both denote a state 
of action which characterizes this third likely mode of 
natural law; but more precisely, the term operatic signifies 
the movement of the operative powers themselves. Through 
their own proper activity--according to the norm of natural 
law--these powers are perfected; and through the perfecting 
actuation of these faculties, the perfection of the soul is 
attained (cf. notes 4 and 9). See In .II Sent., d. 33, a. un, 
q. 5, ad 4 (III, 724): "Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum una 
operatic, an plures perducant ad virtutis completionem; 
dicendum, quod plures, quia non ex una operatione generatur 
habitus, sed ex multis." In .II Sent., d. 4, dub. 3, resp. 
(II 143a): "Dicendum, quod perfectum dicit complementum sive 
completionem, in qua est status." In .I Sent., d. 17, p. 2, 
a. un, q. 4, concl. (I, 317a): "Sed notandum quod quantitas 
virtutis perfecta est dupliciter: vel simpliciter, vel 
genere. Simpliciter perfecta est in sum.mo et simplicissimo, 
ut in Deo; in genere vero in omnibus, qui pertingunt ad 
actum completum, ad quern sunt, et hoc est dilgere Deum ex 
toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota virtute." Man's 
perfection thus consists in loving God with one's whole 
heart, soul and power. Cf. !tin., I, 4 (V, 297) where 
Bonaventure speaks of loving God with one's whole mind: "ex 
tota mente, ex toto corde et ex tota anima, in quo consistit 
perfecta Legis observatio et simul cum hoc sapientia 
Christiana." See note 46. As human conduct is guided by 
conscience (" ... dirigit ad opera moralia;" see note 38), and 
conscience is regulated by natural law, we may say that 
natural law is concretized in such conduct (opus). Further, 
the soul is said to be the perfecting act and entelechy of 
the body (see note 2). Hence, by way of the soul, natural 
law is implicated in the perfection of the human compositum. 
In sum, natural law is clearly at work in the operation and 
perfection of the soul's faculties--and consequently in the 
perfection of the soul itself. Let us see if further texts 
confirm the role of natural law in the perfection of. the 
human compositum. 
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in a slightly different but correlative manner with regard 
to the powers of the soul. The first type of habitus is that 
by which a power is made easily capable of an act by reason 
of its own nature; such a habitus differs from its power 
only by a distinction of reason. 
The second kind of habitus is that according to which a 
power is given a certain facility which is added to its 
nature, but is nevertheless proper to it; for example, the 
intellect as such does not know geometrical figures, but is 
capable of adding the accident of geometrical knowledge to 
itself; this habitus of knowledge is added to the intellect 
and thus is really distinct from it. 
The third mode of habitus pertains to an operative 
power with the facility for its own natural action as 
conjoined in operation with another power; such is the 
habitus of free choice which adds nothing to the essence of 
the soul or to the rational power, but only gives the 
intellect a conjunction with the will. 69 
69 In ll Sent., d. 25, p. 1, a. un, q. 5, concl. (II, 
603b) : "Quaedam namque potentia respectu alicuius actus est 
facilis per se ipsam, ut patet, cum dicitur mens esse nata 
ad meminendum sui ipsius vel intelligendum se; et tune talis 
habitus non differt a potentia secundum rem, sed secundum 
rationem et modum dicendi .... Quaedam est potentia, quae 
respectu alicuius actus est habilis per aliquid sui sicut 
potentia intellectiva ad cognitionem figurarum geometricarum 
non est habilis per se ipsam, sed potius per aliquod 
accidens quod habet esse in ea; et tune habitus talis addit 
supra potentiam, non solum secundum rationem, sed etaim 
secundum essentiam et rem. Aliqua vero potentia facilis est 
ad aliquem actum per se ipsam, non tamen sola, sed cum alia; 
et sic potentia rationalis sine aliquo habitu superaddito ex 
sola coniunctione sui cum appetitu nata est in actum 
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How do the habitus of natural law per naturalem 
originem, per innatam dispositionem, and per acguisitam 
dispositionem correlate to this second set of distinctions? 
Natural law as an innate habitus per naturalem originem 
appears to correspond with the first instance whereby a 
power is capable of an act by reason of its own nature; in 
this case, natural law differs from the powers it 
encompasses and directs only by a distinction of reason (see 
note 45). 
Natural law as an innate habitus per innatam 
dispositionem correlates with the second case in which a 
power is capable of an act which is added to its nature, but 
is nonetheless proper to it. As the science of geometry is 
at once really distinct from the intellect and yet proper to 
it, so we may say that natural law as knowledge and precept 
is added to the intellect but is nevertheless proper to 
it. 70 
habitus non differt a potentia secundum rem, sed secundum 
rationem et modum dicendi .... Quaedam est potentia, quae 
respectu alicuius actus est habilis per aliquid sui sicut 
potentia intellectiva ad cognitionem figurarum geometricarum 
non est habilis per se ipsam, sed potius per aliquod 
accidens quod habet esse in ea; et tune habitus talis addit 
supra potentiam, non solum secundum rationem, sed etaim 
secundum essentiam et rem. Aliqua vero potentia facilis est 
ad aliquem actum per se ipsam, non tamen sola, sed cum alia; 
et sic potentia rationalis sine aliquo habitu superaddito ex 
sola coniunctione sui cum appetitu nata est in actum 
consentiendi et eligendi exire." Cf. notes 45 above and 71 
below. 
70Although Bonaventure has distinguished natural law 
qua habitus from natural law qua collectio preceptorum (see 
notes 42 and 43), it is now evident that natural law 
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Finally, natural law as a habitus per acguisitam 
dispositionem corresponds with the third distinction whereby 
a power capable of an act is conjoined with another power 
for its operation; such is the habitus of free choice. 71 
Since free choice represents the conjunction of intellect 
and will, and both these powers are encompassed and rightly 
precepts themselves represent a mode of habitus--namely, the 
habitus of innate disposition. On this point, see note 28 
regarding conscience as a seminarium of other acquired 
habitus. 
71 Free choice is defined by Bonaventure as a habitus of 
reason and will (see note 96 below); more precisely, it is a 
conjuction of the rational and appetitive habitus. See In lI 
Sent., d. 25, p. 1, a. 1. q. 2 (II, 601b): "Quoniam igitur 
liberum arbitrium secundem propriam suam assignationem 
facultas rationis et voluntatis esse dicitur, hinc est quod 
liberum arbitrium principaliter dicit habitum et 
complectitur rationem et voluntatem, non tamquam una 
potentia ex eis constituta, sed tamquam unus habitus, qui 
quidem recte dicitur facultas et dominium, qui consurgit ex 
conjunctione utriusque et potens est super actus utriusque 
potentiae, per se et in se consideratae, sicut arbitraria 
potestas in duabus personis regimen habet super actus 
utriusque in se consideratae." Note that the operation of 
free choice presupposes the actuation of the operative 
powers of intellect and will. See In .I.I Sent., d. 25, dub. 
1, resp. (II, 607a): "Judicium importat actum rationis 
regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae legis; 
arbitrium vero importat actum rationis regulatum secundum 
imperium voluntatis." Moreover, free choice requires that 
the intellect and will be able to reflect upon their own 
acts. Ibid., a. 1, q. 3, concl. (II, 599a): "Nisi enim 
posset se super actum suum reflectere, numquam posset illum 
refrenare, nisi posset se ipsam movere, nee posset in illum 
exire, quando vellet." The point here is that the operation 
of free choice represents a degree of actuation beyond the 
levels of essence (or consubstantiality of powers) and 
knowledge (or intellection) . For a concise discussion of 
free will, see W. G. Thompson, "The Doctrine of Free Choice 
in Saint Bonaventure," Franciscan Studies 18 (1958), 1-8. 
Regarding natural law in the conjunction of operative 
powers, see note 33 and the concluding paragraph of -Remote 
Context #b. 
82 
ordered by natural law, natural law itself is implicated in 
the complex operation of free choice. 
In view of the various modalities of habitus described 
above, we may conclude that natural law is an innate habitus 
in the orders of (1) natural origin (or essence) and (2) 
innate disposition (or knowledge and precept). However, 
natural law is an acquired habitus in the order of acquired 
disposition (or perfection; see notes 67 and 68). 
Natural Law and Truth 
There are several passages throughout Bonaventure's 
Commentarium which, taken together, strongly associate 
natural law with truth as impressed in the soul. Let us 
consider a few of these associations and then bring our 
findings to bear upon our key-text. 
1. Bonaventure states that conscience and synderesis 
are rightly ordered (recte ordinamur) by natural law (see 
note 42); but Bonaventure equates rectitude (rectitude) 
itself with truth (veritas) and asserts that when our 
intelligence is turned to truth, it is rectified 
(rectificatur) and coincides (aeguatur) with truth through 
imitation ("per quamdam imitationem") . 72 
72 See In ll Sent., prooemium (II, 4a): "Primo igitur 
homo rectus est, cum intelligentia sununae veritati aequatur; 
aequari autem dico non per omnimodam impletionem, sed per 
quamdam imitationem. Si enim 'veritas,' ut dicit Anselmus, 
'est rectitude sola mente perceptibilis,' et rectitudini non 
potest aequari nisi rectum; cum intellectus noster aequatur 
veritati, necessario rectificatur. Tune autem aequatur, 
quando actualiter se convertit ad veritatem. Veritas enim in 
2. It is God alone who most perfectly unites with a 
soul according to truth and intimacy; for only God, in His 
sublime simplicity and spirituality, can imbue the soul so 
that according to truth, God is more intimate to the soul 
than the soul is to its own self. 73 
actu definitur, quod est adaequatio rei et intellectus. 
Intelligentia autem nostra ad veritatem conversa 
verificatur, ac per hoc veritati aequatur, et dum aequatur 
rectitudini, rectificatur." 
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Correlatively, Bonaventure speaks of the will: by the 
rectitude of its operation, man attains his ultimate end 
(finum ultimum) . Note here the implication that the right 
operation of man's faculties entails the rectitude of man 
himself and the attainment of his final end. Ibid., (II, 
4b): "Similiter homo rectificatur, dum voluntas summae 
bonitati conformatur. Summa enim bonitas est sum.ma aequitas 
sive iustitia .... Sed, ut dicit Anselmus [Dialog. de lib 
arbit., c. 3; PL 158, 494] 'iustitia est rectitude 
voluntatis:' nihil autem conformatur rectitude nisi rectum. 
Dum ergo voluntas bonitati summae et aequitati conformatur, 
necessario rectificatur .... Nihilominus homo rectificatur, 
dum virtus summae potestati continuatur. Rectum enim est 
cuius medium non exit ab extremis. Extrema sunt primum et 
ultimum, alpha et omega, principium et finis. Medium inter 
haec est operatio, per quam efficiens pervenit in finem. 
Illa ergo virtus recta est, cuius operatic est a principio 
primo et ad finem ultimum." Cf. De Reduct. Art., 23 (V, 
325a). Bonaventure also links natural law with rectitude. 
See In III Sent., d. 35, a. un, q. 2, concl. (III, 777b): 
"Et haec fundata est super principia iuris natualis, quae 
ordinatur ad rectitudinem et honestem vitae." 
For further discusssion on Bonaventure's notions of 
truth and rectitude in connection with his epistemology of 
illumination and metaphysics of exemplarism, see Ewert 
Cousins, "Truth in St. Bonaventure," Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association 43, (1969), 205-
10. Cf. note 45 regarding natural law as comprehending the. 
intellect and will. 
73 In l. Sent., d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, concl. (I, 41a): "Item, 
quia ibi est coniunctio; solus autem Deus est qui 
perfectissime coniungitur [animae] . Nam coniungitur secundum 
veritatem et intimitatem. Solus enim Deus propter summam 
simplicitatem et spiritualitatem illabitur animae, ita quod 
secundum veritatem est in anima et intimior animae quam ipsa 
sibi." 
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3. Conscience denotes the naturale iudicatorium in 
directing moral activity (see notes 6, 7 and 38); in turn, 
natural law rightly orders conscience (see note 42); hence 
natural law directs natural judgment. Now iudicium in itself 
implies for Bonaventure an act of reason which is regulated 
by a norm of truth or higher law ("regulas veritatis sive 
supernae legis"; see footnote 44); thus natural law is 
implicated as the norm of truth regulating the habitus (and 
consequently, the act) of natural judgment. 
4. Bonaventure concurs with Augustine that "God inserts 
in us a natural judgment by which light and darkness are 
seen in the book of light, which is truth, because truth is 
naturally impressed in the human heart" (see note 32). 
5. Concerning the innate knowledge of charity, 
Bonaventure states that whatever is known by man is known in 
the eternal truth. Truth pours into the mind, as in the case 
of the Prophets, or because it is impressed in our being 
(see note 29) . Although charity is not known by sinners by 
infused species, it is nevertheless known by a certain 
innate species of truth which is a similitude of charity. 
Bonaventure distinguishes innate species in two ways: (1) by 
mere similitude (similitude tantum), such as the species ot 
stone, or (2) by a similitude (similitude) which is a 
certain impression of the eternal truth in the soul. Now, 
the soul is given a certain guiding light (lumen guoddam 
directivum) and a certain natural direction (guaedam 
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directio naturalis) which also extends to the will. The soul 
thus knows what rectitude is, what affection is (see note 
15), and so knows what right affection is; and since charity 
is right affection, the soul knows charity by a certain 
truth which is a similitude of charity. As Augustine 
asserts, such truth is impressed in the soul by Truth itself. 74 
74See In l. Sent., d. 17. p. 1. a. un, q. 4, concl. (I, 
301b-302): "Dicendum, quod cognitione experientiae non 
cognoscitur caritas nisi ab habente; cognitione vero 
speculationis certum est cognosci caritatem etiam a non 
habente. Modus autem huius cognitionis non potest esse per 
caritatis essentiam nee per similitudinem a sensibus 
acquisitam: ergo necesse est, quod sit per similitudinem 
infusam, vel innatam. Utraque autem, quae sic cognoscuntur 
ab homine, dicuntur ab Augustine cognosci in Veritate 
aeterna, aut quia a conditione imprimit secundum illud: 
[Psalm 4, 7] 'Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, 
Domine etc.' Caritas autem non cognoscitur a peccatoribus 
per speciem infusam: ergo oportet, quod per innatam 
cognoscatur. Species autem innata potest esse dupliciter: 
aut similitude tantum, sicut species lapidis, aut ita 
similitude, quod etiam quaedam veritas in se ipsa. Prima 
species est sicut pictura et ab hac creata est anima nuda. 
Secunda species est impressio aliqua summae veritatis in 
anima, sicut verbi gratia animae a conditione sua datum est 
lumen guoddam directivum et guaedam directio naturalis; data 
est etiam ei affectio voluntatis. Cognoscit igitur anima, 
quid sit rectitude, et quid affectio, et ita, quid rectitude 
affectionis; et cum caritas sit hoc, cognoscit caritatem per 
quandam veritatem, quae tamen veritas est similitude 
caritatis; et tune recte habet rationem similitudinis, dum 
accipitur ab intellectu; habet tamen rationem veritatis, 
prout est in anima. Unde quod Augustinus dicit, quod 
huiusmodi habitus cognoscuntur in ipsa veritate et per 
similitudines, quae sunt idem quod ipsae, non dicit hoc [ad 
opp. 1; De Trinitae, IX, c. 6, n. 9; PL, 42, 965-66], quia 
non fiat aliqua species in intellectu cognoscentis, sed quia 
in anima non est pura species, sed veritas quaedam ab ipsa 
veritate impressa." Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate., VIII, 
c. 6, n. 9; c. 9, n. 13; IX, c. 6, n. 9 (PL 42, 955 sqq., 
959, 966); cf. De Gen gg lit., XII, c. 31, n. 59 (PL 34, 
479) : "Aliud autem est ipsum lumen, quod illustratur anima, 
ut omnia vel ipse Deus est, haec autem creatura, quamvis 
rationalis et intellectualis ad ejus imaginem facta,- quae 
cum conatur lumen illud intureri palpitat inf irmitate, et 
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minus valet." Consequently, the habitus of conscience is 
simply innate with regard to an affection (affectio) such as 
love (amor) since affection is in the soul essentially (see 
notes 15 and 30). Note in this connection the intimate 
relationship of charity (right affection) with natural law 
as that by which the will (i.e., affectus sive appetitus 
ratiocinatus; see notes 30 and 42) is rightly ordered. See 
Comment. in Sapientiam, VI, v. 19 (VI, 149b): "'Finis 
praecepti est caritas;' legem, scilicet natualis, Moysaicae 
et evangelicae." Indeed, right ordering of the will 
constitutes charity. 
What is the object of charity? See In III Sent., d. 27, 
a. 1, q. 1, ad 5 (III, 593a): " ... obiectum caritatis non est 
quodcumque bonum, sed bonum summam et bonum sub ratione 
boni." As the soul knows charity (right affection) by 
knowing its own essence, and natural law is the norm of 
right affection (charity), the soul knows natural law 
innately in knowing its own essence. Evidently, natural law 
characterizes the very essence or nature of the human soul. 
See In IV Sent., d. 33, a. 1, q. 2. fund. 4 (IV, 749b): 
"Item, quod indictum est homini _g sua constitutione spectat 
ad ius naturale; sed a sua constitutione dictum est: 
'Relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et erunt duo in carne 
una.'" Cf. notes 46, 68-69, and 79. Moreover, charity is 
described by Bonaventure as the root of all emotions (radix 
omnium af f ectionem) and the end and form of all virtues 
(finis et forma omnium virtutum); see Hex. VII, 14-15 (V 
367b) . Hence, natural law, as the norm of charity, can, with 
even greater profundity, be said to be the root of all 
emotions and the end and form of all virtues. In this 
connection, the divine archtypes are said to work upon the 
soul in the orders of knowledge, will, and operation. See 
ibid., VI, 10 (V, 362a) : "haec imprimuntur in anima per 
illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in cognitivam, in 
affectivam, in operativam." See ibid., VI, 6 (V, 361b): 
"Dico ergo quod illa lux aeterna est exemplar omnium, et 
quod mens elevata, ut mens aliorum nobilium philosophorum 
antiquorum, ad hoc pervenit. In illa ergo prime occurrunt 
animae exemplaria virtutum." There appears, then, to be a 
connection between the Eternal Light, the divine archtypes, 
and the light of natural law. What the precise relationship 
between these terms may be remains to be clarified. Cf. 
notes 91 and 105 in this regard. Further, since natural law 
is a habitus proper to the essence of the rational soul, and 
since the rational soul is conscious of itself ("Reflectere 
autem se super se hoc est virtutis cognitivae;" In II Sent., 
d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, concl.; II, 599a), knowledge of 
natural law is implicit in self-consciousness. This innate 
knowledge accounts for the the self-evident knowledge of 
natural law precepts as constituted in accord with the 
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What can be said of the above? The truth impressed in 
in the soul by the eternal truth appears to be natural law 
itself; it is not clear, however, whether this impression of 
truth refers to the operative powers themselves--i.e., the 
natural light and the natural appetite--or to the underlying 
habitus which rightly directs those powers. In any case, 
natural law qua similitude or imitation of truth, is proper 
to the soul itself, and thus is intrinsic to man. 
Natural Law and Light 
In addition to the correspondence found between natural 
law and truth, we find a similar connection between natural 
law, truth, and the notion of light. For example, these 
three terms all bear a parallel correspondence in their 
common distinction and relations qua created (natural) and 
uncreated (eternal). Accordingly, Bonaventure describes the 
conformity of man to God in terms of light. 75 Indeed, man 
essence of the rational soul. 
75See ibid., d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6 (II, 412b): "Lux 
enim spiritualis, quae Deus est, cum sit simplicissima, non 
potest esse perfectio rerum diversarum naturarum. Cum autem 
sit omnipotentissima, potest producere et facere lucem 
creatam aliquo modo sibi conf ormem; quae tamen sibi non 
sufficit, etiam postquam producta est nisi adsit ei summae 
lucis influentia. Et sic intelligendum est in anima humana. 
quod ipsa habet lucem propriam, scilicet creatam, per quam 
completur, quae a luce aeterna et producitur et 
conservatur." See notes 35, 74, and 100, for references to 
eternal law, eternal truth, and eternal and uncreated light 
respectively. See Comment. in Sapientiam, XVIII, v. 4 (VI, 
223a) where Bonaventure links law with the light which 
illumines the intellect: "Notandum quod lex aliquando 
dicitur lumen, quia illuminat intellectum; Proverbiorum 
sexto: 'Mandatum lucerna, et lex lux;' incorruptum, quia 
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bears in himself the light of the divine visage; and by a 
conformity of order--which evidently is the work of natural 
law--man is an image of God with a capacity to be configured 
to Him. 76 
Finally, as natural law is equated with truth (see note 
72), so truth is equated with light (see notes 32 and 100). 
Consider, for example, the following words of Bonaventure: 
Secunda species est impressio aliqua sununae veritatis 
in anima, sicut verbi gratia animae a conditione sua 
datum est lumem quoddam directivum et quaedam directio 
naturalis; data est etiam ei affectio voluntatis. 
(cited in note 74; see note 21) 
It is unclear whether natural law, created light, and 
created truth differ for Bonaventure by anything more than a 
distinction of reason. All things considered, natural law 
appears to be for Bonaventure an impression or similitude of 
the eternal light of truth. As a created truth impressed 
purif icat vel a corruptione conservat af fectum, secundum 
illud Psalmi: 'Eloquium Domini igne examinatum, probatum 
terrae, purgatum septuplum." Cf. ibid., IX, 13, v. 11 (VI, 
374), where Bonaventure associates light and law with 
Christ. 
76 See note 79 below. Moreover, Bonaventure states that 
light is the substantial form of the body. See In .l.l Sent., 
d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, concl. (II, 320b): " ... lux dicitur ipsa 
forma, quae dat esse corpori lucido, et a qua luminosum 
corpus principaliter est activum, sicut a prime movente et 
regulante. Alio modo lux dicitur ipse fulgor, qui est circa 
corpus luminosum, qui consequitur existentiam lucis in tali 
materia, et qui etiam est sensus obiectum et operationis 
instrumentum." Ibid., ad 6 (II, 322): " ... forma enim 
substantialis per se posse agere videtur ... lux interius 
perficiens sit substantialis forma .... "Yet, the body is 
ordered to the spiritual soul as its act and entelechia. Cf. 
notes 2, 80 and 93). 
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upon the soul, natural law is itself an illumination--a 
lumen guoddam directivum--by which the soul is ordered, 
rectified, and conformed to God. Natural law thus bears a 
teleological significance, particularly in conjunction with 
appetite and free choice. It remains, then, to explore its 
innate role in the actuation and perfection of the rational 
soul. 
Natural Law and Perfection 
Let us then take up Bonaventure's conclusion from the 
key-text--namely, that all men naturally desire true 
happiness (see [l] above) . His respondeo outlines the nature 
of the rational soul and can be reduced to the following 
syllogism: 
1. Appetitus is to be understood in terms of 
convenientia and indigentia. 
2. The anima rationalis 
(a) is created to the imago and similitude of 
God [natural conformity] ; 
(b) is made capable [natural habitus] of the 
most sufficient good; 
(c) is deficient in itself [natural 
indigence] . 
3. Therefore, the rational soul is characterized by 
natural capacity and appetite. 
Such a response sums up the nature of the human soul, 
which in turn reveals man's raison d'etre-- for his soul is 
characterized in terms of (a) conformity, (b) capacity, and 
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(c) indigence; and it is precisely conformity and indigence 
which produce (faciunt) his desire (appetitus) according to 
his capacity for the true good. Let us look more closely at 
these various terms with a view to their bearing on natural 
law. 
With regard to man as created to the image and likeness 
of God, Bonaventure argues that a rational creature is born 
to be directly ordered ( "nata est ordinari") to God; 77 and 
77 In ll Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, (II, 394b): "Ipsa 
autem creatura rationalis, quia de se nata est et laudare et 
nosse et res alias in facultatem voluntatis assumere, nata 
est ordinari in Deum immediate." Bonaventure continues 
(ibid., II, 395a): "Et hoc est quod dicit Augustine de 
Trinitate decimo quarto [c. 8, n. 11; PL 42, 1044] , quod 
'eo est anima imago Dei, quo capax eius est et particeps 
esse potest.'" For a parallel discussion, cf. St. Thomas, ST 
I, q. 93, a. 1 sqq. Man is ordered to God as his beatitude 
in two related senses--namely, as obiectum and as informans. 
That which satisfies our appetite as obiectum is God alone, 
to which the human soul is ordained to possess; and that 
which fills our appetite as informans is the influencing 
presence of God in the soul, which thereby becomes God-like 
(deiformis) . The name, beatitude, is accorded primarily to 
uncreated beatitude as the fulfilling end as obiectum and 
secondarily to created beatitude which is fulfilling as 
informans or deiform in virtue of its object. See In IV 
Sent., d. 49, a. un., q. 1, concl., (IV, lOOOb): "Dicendum, 
quod beatitude est finis satians nostrum appetitum est 
dupliciter: vel sicut obiectum, vel sicut informans. Satians 
nostrum appetitum sicut obiectum solus Deus est, ad quern 
capiendum humana anima ordinatur. Satians autem sicut 
inf ormans est ipsa influentia Dei in animam, quae est ipsa 
deiformatis et satietas. Secundum hoc nomen beatitudinis 
commune est secundum prius et posterius ad beatitudinem 
increatam, quae est finis satians ut obiectum, et ad 
creatam, quae est satians ut informans; et per prius dicitur 
de beatitudine increata, per posterius de creata, quia non 
satiat influentia obiecti nisi propter obiectum." For 
parallel discussions cf. St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 
2, a. 2; ST I-II, q. 3; Scotus, Oxon., IV, d. 49, q. 1, 
(XXI, 5 sqq) i Rep., d. 49, q. 1, (XXIV, 614 sqq). While we 
translate the expression nata est as born, G. H. Tavard 
renders this expression as destined. He states that "the 
because (~) he is so ordered, he is capable (capax) of 
Him (and vice-versa) : because (quia) he is capable of God, 
he is born (or destined) to be configured (configurari) to 
Him78 and bears in himself from his origin (g sua origine) 
91 
the light of the divine visage. Thus according to similitude 
(similitudinem), which pertains to a conformity of order 
(convenientiam ordinis), man is properly said to be the 
image of God. 79 
phrase natus est--translated: 'destined'--has a definite 
meaning in the language of the 13th century in general and 
of the Seraphic Doctor in particular. It points out an 
extension which belongs to the nature of things, which is 
implied in the status of the object in question." See 
Transiency and Permanence, 91. Apparently, while the term 
nata est implies the relationship between a product and its 
originative cause, the term also implies a relationship of a 
product to its final cause. See Key-Text C, note 17, 
regarding efficient and final causes as correlative terms. 
78Such is a spiritual configuration. Cf. ibid., ad. 4 
(II, 395b): "dicendum quod imago corporalis exigit 
conf igurationem corporalem, imago vero spiritualis 
configuratione et effigie spirituali contenta est." 
79 In ll Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 395a): 
"Ouia enim ei immediate ordinatur, ideo capax eius est, vel 
e converso; et ~ capax est, nata est ei configurari; et 
propter hoc fert in se g sua origine lumen vultus divini. Et 
ideo quantum ad similitudinem, quae attenditur ad 
convenientiam ordinis, perfecte dicitur image Dei, quia in 
hoc ei assimilatur expresse." 
Further, man is created to the image of God through 
conformity of proportionality whereby man's own essence 
bears a resemblance to the relation of Divine Persons 
according to power order and distinction; ibid. (II, 395a): 
"Similiter in similitudine, quae attenditur in convenient~ 
proportionalitatis-vel proportionis, expresse assimilatur 
Deo creatura rationalis, et ideo secundum earn recte dicitur 
imago .... Creatura vero rationalis non solum sic convenit, 
sed etiam quantum ad intrinsecarum suarum potentiarum 
originem, ordinem et distinctionem, in quibus assimilatur 
illi distinctioni et ordini, quae est in divinis personis 
intrinseca divinae naturae .... Et ideo est ibi expressa 
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Without direct reference to natural law, the above 
argument is nevertheless suggestive of the innate role of 
natural law--precisely as a consubstantial habitus--in 
directly ordering man to God; for natural law, which rightly 
orders the intellect and will (see note 42), is that innate 
habitus by which these operative powers are capable of 
operation (see notes 8 and 67) and subsequent perfection 
(see notes 9 and 49) . By reason of this ordination, man has 
a capacity for God; and because of this capacity, he is born 
to be configured to God and bears in himself s sua origine 
the light of divine visage; such a capacity itself bears a 
congruence to the natural law habitus per naturalem originem 
(see note 67) . Indeed, if natural law is the impression, 
imitation, or similitude of eternal truth (see notes 72, 74, 
and 79), then it is implicated as the similitude pertaining 
to a conformity of order, according to which man is said to 
be an image of God. 80 
similitude proportionis; et propter hoc rationalis creatura, 
quae est homo, est imago Dei." The similitude of man as 
creata informans (or deiform; see note 77 above) certainly 
qualifies as a convenientia proportionalis with God; but 
what distinguishes it precisely as a convenientia ordinalis 
is its causal and telic significance as created similitude 
which the relationship of proportionality in itself does not 
involve. See !tin., III, 5-6 (V, 305a) where Bonaventure 
further describes the structure of the human soul according 
to a trinity of powers--namely, memory, intelligence, and 
will. These powers represent the Blessed Trinity--Father, 
Son (Word), and Holy Spirit (Love)--respectively. Cf. 
Brevil. II, 9. 
80Evidently, as natural law is that by which man is 
directed to God as obiectum and informans, it is according 
to natural law that he is subsequently rendered God-like 
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If capacity for Bonaventure entails conformity, what 
can be said of indigence? We recall that the soul knows what 
fulfills it through its own indigence (see [4] above) ; What 
then does man's indigence reveal of his capacity and 
corresponding true _good? Nothing satisfies the human soul, 
Bonaventure tells us, except the highest good which is 
infinite. As the natural cognition of the soul is unbounded, 
it is not sated by any particular knowledge, but only in 
possessing all knowledge and that by which everything is 
known. 81 Similarly, the desire (affectio; see note 15) of 
the soul is able to extend itself to where the intellect 
holds esteem and thus necessarily surpassses all 
limitations; thus, nothing finite can satisfy the soul. 
(deiformis) . Since man is rendered capable of God because 
(guia) he is ordered to God, and since natural law is that 
by which man is rightly ordered to God, it would seem that 
natural law qua habitus per naturalem originem not only 
facilitates man's capacity for God, but perhaps even 
constitutes this capacity. Note in this connection that the 
habitus of natural law differs from the essence of the soul 
only by a distinction of reason (see note 69) and in a sense 
characterizes the essence of the soul (see note 74) . Recall 
that the human soul for Bonaventure is the perfecting act 
and entelechia of the human body (see notes 2 and 93). 
Hence, as the body is perfected by the soul, and the soul is 
perfected according to natural law (see note 9 and 75), the 
dominion of natural law, then, extends to the physical 
realm. Cf. note 93. 
81 In .I Sent., d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, concl. (I, 40b): 11 Et 
ratio huius est, quia nihil potest animam sufficienter 
finire nisi bonum, ad quod est. Hoc autem est bonum summum, 
quod superius est anima, et bonum infinitum, quod excedit 
animae vires. Cognitio enim animae naturalis est cognitio 
non arctata; unde nata est quodam modo omnia cognoscere, 
unde non impletur cognitio eius aliquo cognoscibili, nisi 
quod habet in se omnia cognoscibilia et quo cognito omnia 
cognoscuntur. 11 
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Rather, perfect enjoyment is in God alone, because He is the 
highest and infinite good. 02 The correspondence between 
indigence, capacity, and fulfilling good is summed up by 
Bonaventure as follows: 
The appetite is not fully pacified except through 
something else which fills it; for the soul is of 
itself deficient of peace in virtue of its lack of 
completeness; however, the soul is capable of God 
according to its appetite. Thus if every creature 
is less than infinite, then nothing can fulfill the 
desire of the soul. So Augustine says: "Nothing less 
than the Trinity can fill the soul capable of the 
entire Trinity. 83 
82 Ibid., (I, 4la) : "Aestill'latio autem supergredi tur omne 
finitum, quia omni finito postest maius cogitari aliquid: 
Ergo cum affectio possit se extendere ubi et aestimatio, 
necessario aff ectio animae supergreditur omne f initum; et si 
hoc, nullo bono finito sufficienter finitur. Fruendum est 
ergo solo Deo, quia summum bonum et infinitum." Cf. De 
Myst. Trin., q. VI, a. 1, conc1. (V, 99a), where God is 
further described as immutable, simple, immense, unchanging, 
eternal, etc. Cf. Hex., V, 28, (V, 358). Desire or affection 
(i.e., qua operation of the appetitive faculty) for 
Bonaventure presupposes knowledge. See note 13. Cf. In IV 
Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un. q. 2, contra. 1 (IV, 1003): 
"'Invisa possumus diligere, incognita nequaquam,' ut dicit 
Augustinus." See Augustine, ~ Trinitate, X, c. 2, n. 4 (PL 
42, 975). Note here that the Precept concerning the infinite 
good cannot rightly be construed as a kind of Kantian 
"categorical imperative;" for man's natural desire for the 
infinite good transcends all categories and essences. Simply 
put, man is determined by his God-given nature for the 
indeterminite Good. 
83 Ibid., fund. 3 (I, 40a): "Item, appetitus non 
sufficienter quietatur nisi per aliquid, quod animam implet, 
qui ex ea parte anima deficit in quiete, qua [sic] deficit 
in plenitudine; sed est capax Dei secundum appetitum; ergo 
si omne creatum est in infinitum minus illo, nullum supplet 
animae appetitum. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus: 'Animam 
totius Trinitatis capacem nihil minus quam Trinitas potest 
implere.'" The Quaracchi editors [I, 40, note 2] attribute 
this latter remark to the author of De Spiritu et Anima, c. 
27. (PL 40, 799): "Animam tamen hominis, id est mentem, 
nulla creatura iuxta substantiam implere potest, nisi sola 
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The soul, then, is capable of God according to its 
appetite (see notes 57, 61, and 66); and this appetite, as 
we have seen, is bound and directed by natural law (see 
notes 15, 42, and 80). Further, since appetite follows upon 
indigence and conformity (see [1] above), it itself is 
characterized both by the indigent nature of the soul as 
well as by its fulfilling object--namely, the supreme and 
infinite good (see note 83) . 
In light of the above analysis, let us bring natural 
law into focus with regard to capacity, indigence, 
conformity, and appetite. 
1. As an innate habitus per naturalem originem, natural 
law rightly orders the soul to God; in virtue of this 
natural ordination, the soul is made capable of God. 
2. This capacity is marked by both indigence and 
conformity which in turn produces and characterizes man's 
appetite for God according to natural law. 
3. As a similitude (similitude) of truth, natural law 
pertains to a conformity of order (convenientia ordinis) by 
which man is properly said to be the image of God. 
In short, the rational soul is characterized by natural 
capacity and appetite; but in turn, the natural law habitus 
characterizes capacity and appetite. As previously noted 
Trinitas .... Solius enim Trinitatis est intrare et implere 
naturam sive substaniam, quam creavit." For parallel 
discussions, cf. St. Thomas, ST, I-II, q. 11, a. 3.;- Scotus, 
Oxon., I, d. 1, q. 1, sqq. (VIII, 298 sqq.). 
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(see note 67), natural law is an innate habitus per 
naturalem originem which is consubstantial with the soul; as 
such, it differs from the operative powers it encompasses 
only by a distinction of reason; hence, the difficulty in 
delineating natural law from the natural powers themselves. 
Since man is born to be configured to God--and this 
according to natural law--his perfection is clearly rooted 
in natural law in the order of essence. 
What can be said of natural law per innatam 
dispositionem in the order of knowledge/precept? It was 
noted earlier (see notes 53-54) that the soul discerns the 
true good from every other good according to sufficiency and 
immutability (incommutabilitas) . Here, the true good is 
further distinguished qua supreme (summum) and qua infinite 
(infinitum) . 84 Knowledge of these distinctions between the 
inferior and supreme and between the finite and infinite is 
innate to the soul since the very indigence which 
characterizes the creature itself is the point of reference 
84See notes 81-83 above. Two other distinctions between 
the true good and other goods are offered in Bonaventure's 
discussion on beatitude in terms of propter se and propter 
aluid, and honestum and commodum. See In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 
1, a. un., q. 2, contra 3 and 4 (IV, 1003a); see also note 
38; cf. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 
41, 621): "Illud enim est finis boni nostri, propter quod 
appetend sunt cetera, ipsum autem propter se ipsum." See 
Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, I, c. 2 (1094a18), as cited 
in note 53. 
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from which such knowledge issues (see [4] above) . 85 
Ordering the mutable to the immutable, the inferior to the 
supreme, and the finite to the infinite, the habitus of 
natural law per innatam dispositionem (see note 67) directs 
the naturale iudicatorium and inclines the naturale pondus 
toward the soul's proper object--namely God. 
It follows that the natural law precepts, at once 
distinct from the soul and yet proper to it (see note 67), 
direct the soul according to these same innate metaphysical 
criteria. 86 Pertaining to both God and creatures (see 
85Knowlede of God as the immutable, supreme, and 
infinite good is thus innate, but it is not direct. As our 
Key-Text indicates (see [4] above, and notes 69-64), such 
knowledge is attained through a kind of natural inference; 
accordingly, the immutable is innately known from knowledge 
of the mutable, the supreme from the inferior, and the 
infinite from the finite. As we will later see, Bonaventure 
accounts for such knowledge by a process of resolution. See 
De Myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1, concl (V, 49-50). Regarding 
Bonaventure's doctrine on contuition, see De Scientia 
Christi, q. 4, concl (V, 22-24). For a well researched and 
cogent refutation of the claim of ontologism in Bonaventure, 
see Thomas Mathias, "Bonaventurian Ways to God Through 
Reason," (Part One) Franciscan Studies 36 (1976), 192-247; 
(Part Two) Franciscan Studies 37 (1977), 153-206; see also 
Anton C. Pegis, "The Bonaventurean Way to God," Mediaeval 
Studies 29 (1967), 207-42; for a comparison of Bonaventure 
and Aquinas on this issue, see Thomas Fay, "Bonaventure and 
Aquinas on God's Existence: Points of Convergence," The 
Thomist 41 (1977), 588-96. 
86Namely, the ordination of the mutable to the 
immutable, the inferior to the supreme, the finite to the 
infinite, the in aliud to the in se, the bonum commodum to 
the bonum honestum, etc. See Hex., I, 13 (V, 331b): 
"Metaphysicus enim assurgit ad illud esse considerandum in 
ratione principii omnia originantis .... Assurgit etiam ad 
considerandum illud esse in ratione ultimi finis; et in hoc 
convenit cum morali sive ethico, qui reducit omnia ad unum 
summum bonum ut ad f inem ultimum considerando felicitatem 
sive practicam, sive speculativam .... Nam idem est 
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footnote 36), natural law precepts are practical formulas of 
metaphysical import which serve to orient and guide man to 
his proper object through conduct. On this score, let us 
restate the following passage as cited earlier (see note 
54) : 
Sin [according to Augustine] consists in hating the 
immutable Good and adhering to what is mutable; but 
beatitude is the immutable Good .... The immutable Good 
is none other than God Who is at once the supreme and 
infinite Good. 
The immutable Good is none other than God Who is at 
once the supreme and infinite Good (see note 84) . By 
extension, then, we may say that sin consists in hating the 
supreme and infinite Good and adhering to what is inferior 
and finite; but beatitude (or perfection) consists in loving 
the supreme and infinite Good with one's whole heart, soul, 
and power (see note 49). Evidently, moral deliberation is 
based upon the principle of reduction as applied to the 
metaphysical conditions of esse (see notes 33 and 86) . These 
principium essendi et cognoscendi." See In III Sent., d. 1, 
a. 2, q. 3, concl. (III, 28): "Posterius habet reduci per 
illud, quod est prius in eodem genere." See Brevil., II, 9 
(V, 226): "Lex divinitatis haec est ut infima per media 
reducantur ad summa." Ibid., IV, 5 (V, 245) ; I tin., IV, 3 
( V, 3 O 6) ; Hex . , I I I ( V, 3 4 2 ff . ) . 
We can now better understanding the metaphysical and 
epistemological connection between rules of conduct (such as 
God must be adored) and speculative principles (such as the 
whole is greater than its parts) ; see footnote 9 regarding 
the common psychological origin of practical and speculative 
reasoning. Note the principle of reduction as key to 
Bonaventure's metaphysics, his epistemology--and also his 
moral philosophy. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, II, 2 -(994a-
994b30). See also noted 29 and 33 above and Appendix D. 
99 
various conditions of being, as well as their proper 
ordinations, are innately known--or recognized--by all men 
according to natural law. 87 
Let us now consider natural law with respect to the 
order of operation which involves deliberation. How does the 
appetitive power qua deliberative differ from the appetitive 
power qua natural? Bonaventure holds that they may be 
distinguished according to an object proper either to a 
rational creature or a brute; 88 but in another sense, these 
appetitive powers may be distinguished according to the mode 
of desire (modo appetendi)--that is, either by (1) natural 
will (voluntas naturalis or synderesis) , which inclines the 
will toward the noble good (bonum honestum) and flees from 
evil, 89 or (2) deliberative will (voluntas deliberativa 
87See [SJ above. For Bonaventure, then, the moral 
dimension of man rests upon and operates within a 
metaphysical--and corresponding epistemological--context, 
not outside or opposed to such a context; see notes 33 and 
86. 
88See In ll Sent,. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (II, 
566a) "Dicendum, quod cum dividimus appetitum in naturalem 
et deliberativum, sive quamcumque aliam potentiam; hoc 
duplicitur potest intelligi: aut ita, quod appetitus 
naturalis et deliberativus diversitatem habeant in obiectis, 
utpote cum unum est appetibile solum a substantia rationali, 
aliud autem est appetibile a brutali." Cf. Aristotle De 
Anima, III. c. 9. sqq. 
89 Ibid., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, ad. 2 (II, 910): "Et 
propterea iudicatorium illud quod quidem est conscientia, 
bonum est, quando bonum dictat et ad bonum inclinat et a 
malo retrahit et ipsum refugit .... " Ibid., ad. 3: "Unde 
remorsus non est a conscientia principaliter movente, sed 
sicut a dictante; a scintilla autem conscientiae, quae 
quidem est synderesis, est sicut a movente .... " 
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appetitus) by which we sometimes adhere to good and 
sometimes to evil. 90 This distinction of will (voluntas or 
appetite (appetitus) into naturalis and deliberativa does 
not, however, represent a diversity of powers or essences; 
rather there is but one voluntary (or appetitive) power 
which is capable of moving in diverse modes. 91 This common 
power, as it is invariably inclined toward happiness, is 
called natural; but insofar as it desires to do this or that 
particular good with a view toward happiness, it is called 
deliberative; 92 Thus, as deliberation represents a mode of 
90 Ibid., d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. concl. (II, 566a): 
[2] "Alio modo potest dividi appetitus sive potentia in 
naturalem et deliberativam, ita tamen, quod non sit 
differentia in obiectis, sed in modo appetendi; ut cum 
appellamus synderesim esse voluntatem naturalem, quae quidem 
naturaliter inclinat et instigat ad bonum honestum et 
murmerat contra malum; et voluntatem deliberativam 
appetitum, quo post deliberationem aliquando adhaeremus 
bono, aliquando malo." Note the indiscriminate use of the 
terms voluntas and appetitus to characterize one and the 
same operative power; cf. note 15. 
91 Ibid., (II, 566a): "Et sic divisio potentiae per 
naturalem et deliberativam non variat earn secundum essentiam 
potentiae, sed secundum modum movendi. Et hoc modo dividit 
Damascenus, non quia naturalis et deliberativa sint diversae 
potentiae, sed quia una est potentia, diversimode tamen 
movens." See Quaracchi editors' note 1 (II, 565), for a 
detailed explication of Damascene's division of rational 
powers. 
92 In ll Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl., (II, 
566b) : "Eadem enim est potentia, qua appeto beatitudinem, et 
qua appeto virtutem, sive facere hoc bonum vel illud ad 
beatudinem ordinatum; quae, ut appetit beatitudinem, dicitur 
naturalis, quia immutabilitur appetitus eius ad beatitudinem 
inclinatur; ut vero appetit hoc vel illud bonum facere, 
deliberativa dicitur, et secundum iudicium rationis potest 
ad contrarium inclinari." See also ibid., fund. 1-2 (II, 
565-66); ibid., d. 28, dub. 4; ibid., d. 39, dub 2; .In III 
Sent., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. For a parallel discussion, cf. St. 
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appetitive motion with respect to the particular, and 
natural law binds and directs the appetitive power itself, 
it follows that natural law enters into deliberation. 
Indeed, as Bonaventure asserts, conscience is not confined 
merely to universals, but descends to the particular. 93 
Subsequent conduct, however, need not instantiate man's 
proper ordination to God as innately directed by natural 
law; for the deliberative appetite is not determined to any 
particular good; 94 rather, the will is free--that is, it 
has full dominion (dominium) over its object and its act. 95 
Thomas, ST I, q. 82, aa. 1-2. 
93 See note 28 for this citation as well as an 
explanation of how a natural law precept is concretized in 
the particular. See footnote 26 regarding the formulation of 
a natural law precept from the apprehension of the 
particular. See notes 2 and 80 with regard to natural law in 
relationship with the human body. There is no doubt, then, 
that in Bonaventure's doctrine natural law extends its 
jurisdiction into the physical realm. See In l...l Sent., d. 
17, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6 (II, 416): "Licet autem anima 
rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma, 
appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam." 
Cf. In I Sent., d. 8, p. 2, a. un., q. 3, ad. 7 (I, 172). 
Thus man--a composite of soul and body--is rightly ordered 
with relation to God and other (bodily) creatures (see note 
36) according to natural law. 
94See In I..I Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2 (II, 
566) : "Licet autem determinate inclinatur ad beatitudinem, 
ad multa tamen genera appetibilium illa et eadem voluntatis 
potentia est indeterminata, ita quod nata est moveri in 
opposita." 
95 Put another way, the rational soul in its power of 
self-movement is not bound to any particular good. See In l...l 
Sent., d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 593a): 11 ••• unde 
illa potentia dicitur esse libera quae dominium habet plenum 
tam respectu obiecti quam respectu actus proprii. 11 Ibid., ad 
4: (II, 594a): 11 Unde non quicumque motus ab intrinseco facit 
potentiam liberam, sed ille motus quo vis motiva movet se 
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While free choice (liberum arbitrium) 96 is born to act with 
equity in its bearing toward a good object, it nevertheless 
possesses a natural defectability rendering it capable of 
sin, 97 as well as error through false assumption (see [3] 
ipsam; 'voluntas enim et liberum arbitrium,' ut dicit 
Anselmus, est instrumentum se ipsum movens.'" 
96The term arbitrium, which we translate as choice, 
implies an act of reason as regulated by a command of the 
will; choice is thus an act of judgment by which other 
powers of the soul are moved. See In I.I Sent., d. 25, p. 1, 
a. 1, q. 1 (II, 593b): "Arbitrium enim idem est quod 
iudicium, ad cuius nutum ceterae virtutes moventur et 
obediunt. Iudicare autem illius est secundum rationem 
completam, cuius est discernere inter iustum et iniustum et 
inter proprium et alienum." Ibid., dub 1 (II, 607a) : 
11 [Arbitrium] importat actum rationis regulatum secundum 
imperium voluntatis. 11 See note 71 above. 
97 In I.I Sent. d. 25, p. 2, a. un., q. 3, concl. (II, 
614b): "[Liberum arbitrium] natum est exire in actum 
aequitatis susceptibilem et aequitate informatum .... 
Sic ... liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum est, habet 
obiectum bonum et exit in bonum, non in malum .... 
Nihilominus tamen, in quantum cum liberate habet 
def ectibilitatem, potest in malum, ita quod malitia non est 
obiectum liberi arbitrii nee a libero arbitrio secundum quod 
liberum, sed secundum quod deficiens." Cf. In I.I Sent., d. 
24, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 575a): 11 ••• in [superior] 
portione consistat arbitrii libertas, et ita per naturam 
insit ei ad malum vertibilitas, et ita possibilitas ad 
peccandum." Bonaventure cites three ways in which the will 
of man is defective: "Unus quidem naturalis, alius 
culpabilis et tertius poenalis." In I.I Sent., d 39, a. 1, q. 
2 concl. (II, 807a) . 
The nature of an object which the soul regards can 
influence the soul toward good or evil. See In II Sent., d. 
24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, concl. (II, 564a): 11 Dum enim ratio 
nostra ad superiora convertitur, purgatur et illuminatur et 
perficitur; dum leges aeternas conspicit et immutabilitatem 
divinae virtutis et aequitatis, in bono fortificatur et 
vigoratur; dum autem ad haec inferiora convertitur, utpote 
ad sensibilitatem et carnem, quodam modo trahitur et 
emollitur." Nevertheless, the soul may be ill-disposed and 
sinful even while regarding a noble object. See In I.I Sent., 
d. 24, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1 ad 3 (II, 575b): 11 ••• non solum est 
peccatum, quando fit conversio ad id quod secundum veritatem 
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above) . But if the soul is capable of error and sin, it is 
also capable of right deliberation and good works. 98 In 
this case, the good will (bonitas voluntatis) in natural 
appetite is thus consummated (consummatur) in 
deliberation; 99 indeed, man himself attains his final end 
through conformity of will to the highest Good (see note 
72). Thus, when man acts deliberatively with a right will 
(recta voluntas)--i.e., according to natural law--his 
conduct is rightly ordered; and through such conduct 
(although not exclusively; see note 100) man attains his 
est bonum commutabile, sed etiam quando fit conversio ad id 
quod est bonum incommutabile et appetitur ut commutabile." 
Cf. notes 35, 54 and 90. For further discussion of man's 
fallen nature with regard to natural law, see John F. Quinn, 
"St. Bonaventure's Fundamental Conception of Natural Law," 
571-98. 
98See In II Sent., d. 25, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, concl. (II, 
599a): 11 ••• liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum est, 
habet obiectum bonum et exit in bonum, non in malum ... " 
Ibid., d. 34, a. 1, q. 2, concl. (II, 807b): " ... sed ipsa 
voluntas, quae est domina sui actus et libera, potest se 
ipsam convertere ad illud ad quod vult et sicut vult .... 
Unde sicut ille qui stat rectus, posset statim, si vellet ... 
sic voluntas, recta consistens et in ordine ad ultimum 
finem, potest illum exire." 
99See In ll Sent., d, 39, dub. 3 (II, 917): "Dicendum 
quod bonitas voluntatis inchoatur in appetitu naturali et 
consummatur in virtute deliberativa; nee est voluntas 
simpliciter bona et recta, nisi sit recta in quantum movetur 
deliberative et in quantum movetur naturaliter .... Sicut 
enim melius est bene vivere quam vivere, et bene vivere 
praesupponit vivere, sic melior est voluntas, quae recte 
movetur et natualiter et deliberative quam naturaliter 
tantum." The phrase "bonitas voluntatis inchoatur in 
appetitu naturali," suggests that voluntas for Bonaventure 
is not precisely synonomous with the appetitive power, but 
rather represents the impulse of the appetitive powe-r for 
its object. 
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ultimate end. Such attainment clearly represents the 
perfection or consummation of man himself qua compositum. In 
this manner we may say that natural law is instantiated in 
the order of perfection. 100 
100See note 49 for an explanation of the terms operatic 
and perfectio. Insofar as (1) the soul is perfected through 
the operation of its powers according to natural law, (2) 
the body is perfected by the soul, (3) conscience directs 
man in his moral conduct (opus), we speak of natural law as 
instantiated in the orders of operation and perfection (see 
notes 49, 80, and 93); but further, (4) man, through right 
conduct, attains his ultimate end (finum ultimum) (see notes 
38, 72, and 99). In this sense, we speak of natural law in 
the highest order of perfection (or consummation) which is 
none other than beatitude. Recall that the perfection of man 
consists in loving God with one's whole mind, heart, and 
soul--"in quo consistit perfecta Legis observatio et simul 
cum hoc sapientia Christiana." See note 46. See In III 
Sent., d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4 (III, 820b), where 
Bonaventure states that the precepts of the Decalogue, which 
are explicit dictates of natural law, will abide in the 
state of glory: "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ea quae sunt 
de dictamine legis naturae, manent in statu gloriae; 
responderi potest dupliciter. Primum quidem, quia, sicut 
dicitur de virtutibus, quod manent in patria secundum 
excellentiores et nobiliores usus et actus; ... et quod est de 
dictamine legis naturae simpliciter et explicite, illud 
manebit in statu gloriae." 
Free choice as directed by natural law produces good 
acts which can be ordered to man's proper end; however, 
beatitude requires the assistance of God for man's good 
efforts to be brought to completion. Thus while right 
conduct according to natural law is necessary for man's 
perfection, such conduct is insufficient of itself. See In 
ll Sent., d. 38, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (II, 689b): "In bonum 
autem, quod ducit ad bonum perfectum, sive merito congrui 
sive merito condigni, non potest absque auxilio Dei .... Et 
constat quod, se habet hoc naturale iudicatorium, per illud 
per quod potest nosse parentes esse honorandos, per illud 
potest cogitare; et cum habeat naturalem instinctum, potest 
etiam velle; et cum habeat exteriora organa sibi 
subservientia, potest opere implere. Sed prout illud facit 
iudicium rationis rectae absque munere gratiae, non dirigit 
ad obtinendum finem, qui Deus est, et mercedem aeternae 
beatitudinis, quam nosse non potest nisi Deus revelet .... 
Lumen creatum non potest perf icere operationem suam -absque 
cooperatione luminis increati, per quod illuminatur omnis 
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Is natural law innate or acquired in the order of 
perfection? In the sense that man's own nature is perfected 
through conduct according to natural law qua innate habitus, 
we hold that natural law is indeed innate in the order of 
perfection; but insofar as such perfection is attained only 
by deliberation through free choice, natural law must be 
said to be acquired. 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
It is clear from the above exposition and analysis that 
natural law for Bonaventure is proper to the soul in the 
order of essence; in this case, natural law is an innate 
habitus per naturalem originem; according to this kind of 
habitus, a power is capable of an act by reason of its own 
nature. Evidently, then, natural law--qua habitus per 
naturalem originem--is equated with the very nature of the 
soul's powers inasmuch as the nature of a power determines 
homo qui veni t in hunc mundum. " Cf. ibid. , d. 2 9, a. 1, q. 
2, concl. and ad 4 (II, 698-99). This dependency upon the 
uncreated light is stated with even greater force when 
Bonaventure later writes against the Averroists at Paris. 
Identified as the light of Christ, divine illumination is 
held as necessary, not only for moral perfection, but for 
all knowledge--even that of sense knowledge. See Hex,. XII, 
5 (V, 385a): "Christus est doctor interius, nee scitur 
aliqua veritas nisi per eum ... interius illustrando .... Si 
enim scire est cognoscere rem aliter impossibile se habere, 
necessarium est ut ille solus scire faciat qui veritatem 
novit et habet in se veritatem." Cf. !tin., III, 7 (V, 
305b); see Hex., I, 13 (V, 331b), where Christ is further 
identified as the immutable truth (veritatem immutabilem) . 
Cf. notes 75 and 86. For further discussion on this point, 
see Hayes, "Christology and Metaphysic," 82-95; Sweeney, 
"Christian Philosophy," 271-308. 
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and directs its operations; precisely in this sense natural 
is consubstantial to the soul, and thus is innate or 
intrinsic to man. 
Secondly, natural law--qua innate habitus per innatam 
dispositionem--is proper to the soul in the order of 
knowledge; in this case, natural law is understood as innate 
inasmuch as the intellect possesses a certain facility to 
aquire knowledge which, while distinct from the intellect, 
is nevertheless suitable to it. In yet another sense, 
natural law precepts are taken as innate (see [5] above) 
insofar as they are self-evident upon knowledge of sensible 
objects; nevertheless, such precepts are acquired insofar as 
the sensible knowledge which, in part, constitutes the 
contents of these precepts is itself acquired. 
Finally, in the order of operation or perfection, 
natural law appears as a habitus per acgµisitam 
dispositionem through deliberative conduct; nevertheless, 
this mode of natural law may be said to be innate precisely 
insofar as right conduct itself is ordered according to 
natural law per innatam dispositionem. Here we see the 
teleological connection among the orders of essence, 
knowledge/precept, and operation; for natural law as 
consubstantial with the soul corresponds with a certain 
truth which is impressed upon the soul; such truth is an 
imitation or similitude of the eternal truth; and through 
deliberate conformity with truth, man becomes united to God 
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(qua obiectum) and becomes God-like (deiformis) . Such union 
and conformity with God constitute the perfection and 
beatitude of man. 
Let us enumerate a few general implications drawn from 
the above investigation: 
1. Since the practical intellect differs from the 
speculative intellect only by its extension to will and 
operation, an ontological and epistemological connection 
between rules of conduct (such as God must be adored) and 
speculative principles (such as the whole is greater than 
its parts) is implicated (see note 9) . This point of 
connection is the naturale iudicatorium which, in turn, is 
guided by natural law as its normative principle. Thus, both 
practical and speculative reasoning are rooted in the 
ordination of natural law. 
2. As a habitus per naturalem originem, natural law 
precedes the distinction of intellect and will in the ground 
of consubstantiality. Encompassing and regulating both 
operative powers, this mode of natural law represents the 
ontological and psychological ground of unity between the 
intellect and will; as a collectio praeceptorum, natural law 
is an innate habitus per innata dispositione and represents 
the progeny of intellect and will as conjoined in the act of 
practical judgment. 
3. Knowlege of the (a) metaphysical distinction between 
the true good and (relative) good and the (b) natural 
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ordination of relative good to the true (absolute) good is 
innate to the soul by virtue of the innate knowledge of 
soul's own indigence; this innate knowledge (concerning the 
ordination of the mutable to the immutable, the inferior to 
the supreme, the finite to the infinite, etc.) is the 
(moral) standard according to which the soul is ordered to 
its true good. 
4. Natural law precepts are thus intelligible formulas 
of this standard of ordination; pertaining to both God and 
creature, these precepts are practical dictates of 
metaphysical significance which regulate the relations of 
the human person with God and other creatures. 
5. Hence, moral judgment and deliberation (free choice) 
are carried out within a metaphysical order which is 
innately known by all men according to natural law. 101 
6. There seems to be a correspondence between the light 
of natural law and the eternal light; it may in fact be that 
natural law for Bonaventure is the radical divine 
illumination as found in man. In any case, it appears that 
Bonaventure gives primacy of law and morality over all other 
aspects of human life (see notes 45, 74, 86, and 100 above). 
101Let us reiterate that although first practical 
principles are self-evident, knowledge of particular moral 
conduct requires additional instruction; thus conscience for 
Bonaventure is also an acquired habitus (see notes 24 and 
28). Of course, the development of moral knowledge 
represents a further explication of natural law consistent 
with its own order. 
CHAPTER 2 
KEY-TEXT B 
Commentarius in Evengelium Lucae, c. 19, v. 21, n 34. 1 
I. Context 
Comm. Luc., c. 12, v. 57, n. 84. 
This passage incorporates much of the same terminology 
employed in the Commentarius in libros Sententiarum and 
further implicates natural law as innate. Here, Bonaventure 
comments on the question Christ puts to the multitude (Luke 
12, 56-57): 
You hypocrites. You know how to discern the appearance 
of earth and sky; but how is it that you do not discern 
the present time? And why even of yourselves do you not 
judge that which is just?2 
The significance of Christ's words are explained by 
Bonaventure as follows: 
We take this to mean: even if you neglect the more 
outward warning, do not neglect the more interior 
warning. For as it says in Ecclesiasticus [31, 18]: 
1This work was most likely composed between 1253-1257;. 
see note 5 in Appendix B. Throughout our study, we will 
abbreviate the Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae as Comm. 
Luc. 
2 Ibid., (VII, 334b): "Secundo quantum ad commonitionem 
interioris iudicii subditur: Quid autem et a vobis ipsis non 
iudicatis quod iustum est?" 
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"Recognize the things of your neighbor from your self--
that is, by your own natural judgment." For natural 
judgment has been inserted in man through which he is 
directed in living and choosing. As the Psalm says 
[4, 6]: "The light of your countenance is signed upon 
us, Lord;" and Isaiah [46, 8]: "Liars, return to your 
heart;" for what is said therein is just. 3 
Bonaventure continues: 
Among all things which are just, natural reason 
dictates that it is just (iustum est) to submit to God 
and not to think mortal man equal to God. This, 
therefore, is eminently just--and everyone ought to 
judge so--namely, that God must be worshipped, and 
Christ honored, and the gift of the Holy Spirit be 
received with reverence; for "He who does not honor the 
Son does not honor the Father [John 5, 23] ." It is even 
just to judge that "God will judge the world in equity 
[Psalm 95, 13], and to judge oneself in anticipation of 
that judgment; because, if we judge ourselves, we will 
not be judged . 4 
3 Ibid., (VII, 334b) : Quasi dicat: etsi negligitis 
exteriorem commonitionem, non negligatis interiorem. Unde 
Ecclesiastici trigesimo primo: 'Cognosce quae sunt proximi 
tui ex te ipso,' id est ex tuo naturali iudicatorio. 
Insertum est enim homini naturale iudicatorium, per quod 
dirigitur ad videndum et eligendum; Psalmus [4, 6]: 
'Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine;' et Isaiae 
quadragesimo sexto: 'Redite, praevaricatores, ad cor;' ibi 
emin dictatur quod iustum est." See Text-A, notes 10, 11, 
27, and 28, where Bonaventure speaks of natural judgment and 
the light of the Divine visage as impressed or written upon 
the heart. Cf. Augustine, Confessions, IV, c. 12 (PL 32, 
700) . 
4 Ibid., (VII, 334b) : "Et inter omnia, quae iusta sunt, 
haec dictat ratio naturalis, quae dixit etiam Antiochus, 
secundi Machabaeorum [9, 12]: 'Iustum est subditum esse Deo, 
et mortalem hominem non paria Deo sentire.' Hoc ergo 
potissime est iustum, quod debet iudicare quilibet, scilicet 
Deum esse colendum et Christum honorandum et Spiritus sancti 
donum cum reverentia suscipiendum; quia, Ioannis [5, 36-47], 
'qui non honorificat Filium non honorificat Patrem,' etc. 
Iustum est etiam iudicare, quod "Deus iudicabit orbem 
terrarum in aequitate [Psalm 95, 13], 'et se ipsum iudicando 
praevenire illud iudicium, quia, primae ad Corinthios [11, 
31], 'si nosmetipsos diiudicaremus, non utique iudicaremur,' 
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Bonaventure then concludes: 
Our conscience naturally murmurs against our evil deeds 
and bears witness that such evil, if disregarded, will 
not go unpunished. We must therefore be solicitous in 
meriting divine grace. [As St. Paul says] to the Romans 
[2, 14-15]: "When the Gentiles who do not have the 
[written] Law do those things that are of the Law, 
these not having the Law are a law to themselves, 
because they show the work of the Law written in their 
hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them." 5 
What does this passage reveal about natural law? We 
have seen Bonaventure speak of a universal norm of conduct 
as impressed upon man's heart in terms of natural 
judgment, 6 the light of God's countenance, 7 truth, 8 and 
law. 9 To this constellation of terms Bonaventure now 
introduces the notions of justice, obligation, and 
culpability, which qualify man's relationship with God and 
etc." 
5 Ibid., (VII, 334b-35): "Unde conscientia naturaliter 
remurmurat, et ipsa etiam testatur, quod mala nostra non 
remanebunt inulta. Et ideo ex ipsa debemus sollicitari ad 
divinam gratiam promerendam; ad Romanos [2, 14-15]: 'Cum 
gentes, quae Legem non habent, ea quae Legis sunt faciunt; 
eiusmodi Legem non habentes, ipsi sibi sunt lex, quia 
ostendunt opus Legis scriptum in cordibus suis, testimonium 
reddente illis conscientia eorum,' etc." See In ll Sent., d. 
24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (II, 566a): " ... appellamus 
synderesim esse voluntatem naturalem, quae quidem 
naturaliter inclinat et instigat ad bonum honestum et 
murmurat contra malum." Cf. Text-A, notes 38-40 and 90. 
6See Key-Text A, note 11. 
7See Key-Text A, notes 27 and 28. 
8 See Key-Text A, notes 72-74. 
9See Key-Text A, note 10. 
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his neighbor. Note also the implication of congruity between 
the written law and the law which is impressed upon the 
heart. These new characterizations carry over into Key-Text 
B where natural law is explicitly identified as innate. 
II. Key-Text B 
Commentarium in Evangelium Lucae, c. 19, v. 21, n. 34. 
, The scriptural passage upon which Bonaventure comments 
(Luke 19, 21) is as follows: 
I was afraid of you, because you are a severe man; you 
take up what you did not lay down, and reap what you 
did not sow. 
Bonaventure recalls the words of Christ with regard to 
those who would wrongly blame their laziness and negligence 
on the austerity of the Lord. On the contrary, the Lord 
says, "Learn from me, for I am gentle in heart. 1110 
Nevertheless, it is true that the Lord harvests where he did 
not sow; that is to say, He holds guilty of impiety those to 
whom He did not minister the word of law or the word of the 
1
°Comm. Luc., c. 19, v. 21, n. 34 (VII, 484a): "Secundo 
quantum ad excusationem nequam subdit: 'Timui enim te, quia 
homo austerus es;' in quo se excusat ut piger per timorem; 
Proverbiorum [22, 13]: 'Dicit piger: Leo est in via, leaena 
in itineribus, et in medio platearum occidendus sum.' Unde 
et talibus competit illud Psalmi [56, 6]: 'Trepidaverunt 
timore, ubi non erat timor.' Excusat nequiter, quia culpam 
suae negligentiae imponit austeritati Domini iudicantis, cum 
e contrario ipse dicat Matthaei [11, 29; cf. Romans 2, 4]: 
'Discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde.'" 
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Gospel. 11 How can this be? Because the law of nature (legem 
naturae) is impressed (impressam) in mens' hearts: 
[1] However, the Lord punishes also those to whom he 
did not give the Law, from whom he requires 
justice, because even though they do not have the 
written law, nevertheless, they have the law of 
nature impressed interiorly. Therefore, [as St Paul 
says] to the Romans [Rom. 2, 12): "Those who sinned 
without the Law will perish without the Law;" and 
then from the same place: "For when the Gentiles 
who do not have the Law do naturally those things 
which are of the Law, not having a law of this 
kind, they themselves are for themselves a law; for 
they show the work of the Law written in their 
hearts with their conscience giving witness to 
them from whence God will judge the secrets of men 
through Jesus Christ. 
Punit autem Dominus illos etiam, quibus Legem non 
dedit, a quibus requirit iustitiam, quia, etsi non 
habent legem scriptam, habent tamen legem naturae 
interius impressam; propter quod dicitur ad Romanos 
secundo: "Qui sine Lege peccaverunt sine Lege 
peribunt." Unde et ibidem: "Cum enim gentes, quae 
Legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae Legis sunt, 
faciunt, eiusmodi Legem non habentes, ipsi sibi 
sunt lex, qui ostendunt opus Legis scriptum in 
cordibus suis, testimonium reddente illis 
conscientia ipsorum, cum iudicabit Deus occulta 
hominis per Iesum Christum. 
11 Ibid., (VII, 484b) : "Et ad Romanos secundo: 'An 
ignoras, quoniam benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam te adducit7' 
Excusat etiam insipienter, quia, cum deberet loqui pro se, 
loquitur contra se, cum subdit: Tollis quod non posuisti, et 
metis quod non seminasti; Gloss: 'Metit Dominus, ubi non 
seminavit, id est, eos reos impietatis tenet, quibus verbum 
Legis, vel Evangelii non ministravit.' In quo allegat 
severitatem divini iudicii, quia Dominus punit etiam 
ignorantes; et ideo timere debet, quod multo fortius 
puniet negligentes; unde Eccleciastici [2, 19): 'QuL timent 
autem Dominum inquirent quae beneplacita sunt ei.'" 
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III. Commentary 
Natural Law as Universal 
Taken in tandem with Comm. Luc., c. 12, n. 84, which 
implies natural law as innate, 12 Key-Text B (Comm Luc., c. 
19, n. 34) clearly establishes natural law as the innately 
known standard of conduct which is common to all people. 13 
It is precisely in virtue of this innate and universal norm 
that the Lord holds guilty of impiety even those to whom the 
word of law or the Gospel has not been given. Moreover, the 
apparent congruence between this natural norm and the 
12 In Comm Luc., c. 12, n. 84, Bonaventure expressely 
indicates that the natural judgment has been inserted in man 
through which he is directed in living and choosing (see 
note 3 above) ; Bonaventure further acknowledges that the 
Gentiles have the Law written on their hearts (see note 5). 
He does not explicitly say in this passage, however, that 
natural law is interiory impressed in man; rather, such an 
explicit statement appears in ibid., c. 19, n. 34 (see B 
[ 1] ) . 
13As exemplified by the Gentiles who have the law 
written in their hearts, natural law is evidently common to 
all cultures. Further, Bonaventure indicates that natural 
law is common to all times. See In III Sent., d. 37, a. 1, 
q. 3, fund. 2: " ... obligatio, quae se extendit ad ornne 
tempus attenditur secundum illam legem, cuius dictamen 
currit in omni tempore; .... Ergo obligatio illorum 
mandatorum attenditur secundum legem naturae." Cf. In IV 
Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, concl. (IV, 591b) : 11 Communia sunt 
illa quae sunt quodam modo ex dictamine naturae, quod quia 
semper idem manet ... "Cf. In .I Sent., d. 47, a. un, q. 4, ad 
3 (I, 847a): "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod [Deus] potest 
super ornnem legem datam; dicendum, quod verum est quod 
potest, quia potest imponere, sed non potest destruere iam 
positam. Quoniam enim ordinationem ad ipsum dicunt aliqua 
mandat, sicut non potest contra suam iustitiam facere, sic 
nee contra illa praecipere." 
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written law suggests some connection between them. 14 
Natural Law and Written Law 
What, then, is the precise relationship between natural 
law and the written law? In his Commentarius in libros 
Sententiarum, Bonaventure states that the Decalogue precepts 
possess the force of obligation according to natural law; 
for, aside from Scripture, grace, the law of Moses and the 
law of the Evangelists, such precepts are themselves 
dictates of right reason. 15 Consequently, inasmuch as the 
14 In a broad sense, the term lex for Bonaventure 
includes in its scope of meaning natural law, the law of 
Scripture, and the law of grace. See In .l.l Sent., d. 35, 
dub. 4, resp. (II, 837b): "Dicendum, quod lex aliquando 
accipitur stricte pro lex scripta vel data; aliquando large, 
prout comprehendit legem naturae et legem Scripturae et 
legem gratiae." What does Bonaventure mean by the term 
gratia? See In II Sent., d. 26, a. un, q. 4, concl. (II, 
638): "[Gratia] sit simpliciter donum gratuitum et omnino 
deorsum descenduns a Patre luminum." See De donis .s_,_ ,S.. (ca. 
1268), VIII, 6 (V, 495): "Gratia fundamentum est 
rectitudinis voluntatis et illustrationis perspicuae 
rationis." Cf. Itin. (ca. 1259), I, 8 (V, 298). For further 
discussion of grace as a gift of understanding for the 
healing of our fallen nature, see Gilson, La philosophie de 
saint Bonaventure, 356-59. 
15See In III Sent., d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, fund. 3 (III, 
818): "Item, mandata, quae obligant hominem, circumscripta 
Scriptura et gratia, habent obligare secundum legem naturae; 
sed talia sunt mandata Decalogi--sunt enim de dictamine 
rationis rectae, circumscripta lege Moysi et lege 
Evangellii." Ibid., fund. 4 (III, 818): "Ea autem, quae in. 
Decalogo prohibentur vel praecipiuntur, de se sunt mala vel 
bona, secundum quod dictat ratio recta--sicut Deum esse 
colendum, et parentes honorandos, hoc utique bonum est de 
se; falsum testimonium et homicidium, hoc utique de se malum 
est--sed talia spectant ad legem inditam: igitur obligatio 
mandatorum Decalogi attenditur secundum vinculum legis 
naturalis." Since obligation is rooted in natural law, and 
natural law pertains to knowledge of one's own indigent 
nature as disposed and inclined towards its true good (see 
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obligations explicated in the Decalogue are rooted in and 
follow from (radicaliter seguitur) natural law, the latter 
evidently holds an ontological priority over the Decalogue. 
Because of the obscurity of mind and weakness of will which 
mark man's fallen nature, the law was made explicit to help 
regulate him in justice; further, since the law written in 
the heart has been clouded by sin, and as man is now prone 
to sin though his bodily senses, it is fitting that the law 
be exteriorly written so as to be received through his 
bodily senses. 16 
Key-Text A, notes 62-63), then obligation can be understood 
as arising from the knowledge of one's natural orientation 
for his proper end. 
16See In I I I Sent. , d. 3 7, a. 1, q. 3, concl. (I I I, 
819b): "· .. obligatio mandatorum Decalogi radicaliter 
sequitur legem naturae, sed quantum ad explicationem 
sequitur legem Scripturae. Explicatio enim plenaria 
mandatorum Decalogi opportuna fuit secundum statum peccati 
propter obscurationem luminis rationis et propter 
obliquationem voluntatis. Quia enim voluntas corrupta 
prompta erat ad multiplicem deordinationem, oportebat earn 
religari per multiplicia mandata. Rursus, quoniam scriptura 
cordis interior propter peccatum erat obnubilata, et homo, 
qui fuerat spirituali mente praeditus, effectus erat 
sensibilis et carnalis; opportunum erat, ut exterius legeret 
et audiret per sensus corporis ea, per quae posset in 
rectitudinem iustitiae regulari." See also In ll Sent., d. 
35, dub. 4, concl. (II, 837); In III Sent., d. 40, q. 1 ad 3 
(III, 886); Brevil. (ca. 1254-57), prol. n. 2 (V, 203-04). 
There is yet another link between light, truth, Christ, 
and the law as written interiorly and exteriorly See !tin.; 
VI, 7 (V, 312) where Bonaventure speaks of Christ as the 
book written within and without: "· .. librum scilicet 
scriptum intus et extra." See Key-Text A, note 100, where 
Christ is described as the interior teacher. See Key-Text A, 
note 32, where Bonaventure cites Augustine: "Inseruit nobis 
Deus naturale iudicatorium, ubi quid sit lucis, quid 
temembrarum, cogniscitur in libro lucis, qui veritas est, 
quia veritas in corde hominum naturaliter est impresssa." As 
the interior law itself was explicated in history, so the 
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Natural Law and Justice 
In addition to establishing an accordance between the 
impressed law of nature and the expressed law of Scripture, 
Bonaventure implies a connection between natural law and 
justice (iustitia) (see [1] above). What, then, is the 
relationship between these two terms? As previously noted 
(see Key-Text A, note 72), natural law--qua similitude of 
eternal truth--is that innate principle by which the soul is 
rectified; now, Bonaventure tells us that man is rectified 
when his will is conformed to the summum bonum; hence, man 
is conformed to the summum bonum according to the direction 
of natural law. Bonaventure understands justice, however, as 
the rectitude of will (voluntas) with respect to the summum 
bonum. 17 In turn, the will's rectitude with respect to the 
summum bonum depends on right reason, since natural reason 
Son, the interior teacher and eternal Art and Wisdom of all 
creation, entered into history and became incarnate; hence 
the conformity and continuity between the interior law and 
exterior law as united in the Person of Christ. See Brevil., 
II, 11 (V, 229a) as cited in Key-Text C, note 27. See notes 
29 and 33 below with regard to this theme of interiority and 
exteriority. In this vein, G. H. Tavard writes: "Christ is 
present to knowledge by a two-sided immanence; objectively, 
in the resemblance of God which constitutes created beings 
and is apprehended through all acts of knowledge that go to 
the core of their object; subjectively, through an active 
presence inside the mind's functioning." Transiency and 
Permanence, 58. 
17See In ll Sent., prooemium (II, 4b): "Similiter homo 
rectificatur, dum voluntas summae bonitati conformatur. 
Summa enim bonitas est summa aequitas sive iustitia .... Sed, 
ut dicit Anselmus, 'iustitia est rectitude voluntatis:'" In 
this connection, see Key-Text A, note 15: " ... ius naturale 
naturaliter ligat voluntatem." 
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dictates what is just (see note 4 above) ; but natural reason 
itself is rectified according to natural law; hence, it is 
evident that justice is rooted in natural law and represents 
the combined rectitude of both reason and will--inasmuch as 
the rectitude of the will (justice) depends upon the 
rectitude of reason (qua conformity to truth--i.e., natural 
law) . 18 On this score, charity (caritas) is seen to be 
equivalent with justice since charity is likewise defined by 
Bonaventure as right affection (rectitude affectionis) . 19 
Further, as justice involves the conformity of man to the 
summum bonum (see note 17), so the object of charity is the 
summum bonum qua good. 2° Consequently, we can say that 
charity is rooted in justice which, in turn, is rooted in 
natural law. Indeed, inasmuch as charity consists in human 
affection as ordered--by right reason--to the sum.mum bonum, 
charity represents the conformity of the whole man 
18See In i Sent., d. 48, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 4 (I, 853b): 
"Item, intellectus nester non potest conformari divine, quin 
efficiatur verus: ergo nee affectus nester potest conformari 
divine, quin efficiatur iustus; sicut enim veritas est 
rectitude intellectus, sic iustitia est rectitude affectus." 
See Text A, note 72, where rectitude is equated with truth, 
and truth is equated with natural law. See note 4 above 
where justice is linked with natural reason (ratio 
naturalis) inasmuch as everyone judges it just (est iustum)-
-according to natural reason--that God must be worshiped. 
See also 15 above. 
19See Key-Text-A, note 72, for further analysis of the 
term charity as rectitude affectionis. 
20See In III Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, ads (III, 
593a): " ... quia obiectum caritatis non est quodcumque bonum, 
sed bonum summum et bonum sub ratione boni." See Key-Text A, 
note 72. 
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(intellect and will, soul and body) to the summum bonum; 
accordingly, charity is said to constitute the perfection of 
the law. 21 
Natural Law as Relational-Personal 
If justice is natural law as it pertains to the will, 
and since justice itself involves an ordination of 
persons, 22 then natural law itself implies an ordination of 
persons. Indeed, Bonaventure states that natural law 
regulates man's relationship towards God (see note 21 
above) , towards his neighbor, 23 and towards himself. 24 In 
21see I tin., I, 4 (V, 297a) : "Ex quibus omnibus 
disponere se debet ad conscendendum in Deum, ut ipsum 
diligat ex tota mente, ex toto corde et ex tota anima, in 
quo consistit perfecta Legis observatio et simul cum hoc 
sapientia Christiana." See Text-A, note 46 for the full 
citation. See In III Sent., d. 39, a. un., q. 2, fund, 1 
(III 64la): "Primo per illud mandatum, Deuteronomii sexto 
[vers. SJ: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex 
tota anima tua; hoc dicitur esse primum et summum mandata: 
si ergo nulli alii praecipitur ut impendamus totam affectum 
nisi soli Deo; videtur quod in dilectione caritatis Deus 
teneat primum et summum locum." See John 14, 15: "If you 
love me, keep the commandments [of the law] . 
22see In III Sent., d. 33, dub. 1 (III 728b): "Alio 
modo dicitur iustitia rectitudo ordinans ad alterum in 
reddendo ei quod suum est." In this regard, see notes 4 and 
15 above. 
23 See In III Sent., d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, concl. (III, 
819) : "Statum vero naturae lapsae respicit obligatio 
mandatorum Decalogi implicite secundum duo praecepta iuris 
naturalis, quae natura semper dictabat, videlicit quod 
faceret alii quod sibi vellet fieri, et non faceret alii 
quod sibi nollet fieri. Statum autem naturae institutae 
respiciebat quodam modo implicite, quodam modo explicite. 
Quaedam enim sunt praecepta ordinantia ad Deum, quaedam vero 
ordinantia ad proximum." See Quaracchi editors' note 6 (III, 
819) for references to Hugo of St. Victor and St. Augustine 
on this point. See In II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, concl. 
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each case, the standard of justice (i.e., natural law) is 
based upon the distinction and relationship discerned 
between relative goods and the infinite and immutable good 
(see Key-Text A, notes 62-63, and 86). According to this 
metaphysical knowledge--and the innate cognition of his own 
nature as disposing and inclining him towards his proper 
good--man bears the obligation (obligatio) to regulate his 
conduct properly with regard to God, neighbor, and self . 25 
(II, 910a): " ... actus synderesis non tantus respicit Deum, 
sed etiam proximum, secundum quod lex naturalis respicit 
utrumque." See Key-Text A, note 36. 
24 Ibid., d. 38, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (III, 829b): 
" ... dicendum quod sicut in mandato de dilectione Dei et 
proximi clauditur mandatum de dilectione sui; sic in 
praeceptis, per quae intelligitur homo ordinari ad Deum et 
ad proximum, clauditur ordinatio sui ad se ipsum; et ideo 
non oportuit tabulas triplicari, sicut etiam non oportuit 
triplicari mandata caritatis.--Alia etiam est ratio, quia 
mandata distinguuntur secundum regulam iustitiae; iustitia 
autem ad alterum ordinat: et ideo non oportuit, tertiam 
tabulam intervenire, secundum quam insinuaretur ordinatio 
hominis ad proprium personam." 
25Thus Bonaventure's moral philosophy, while clearly 
rooted in his metaphysics (see Text-A, note 33, 86 and 100), 
is at once what might be called today "personalistic" 
insofar as law or justice for Bonaventure presupposes a 
relation of persons. What does Bonaventure mean by person 
(persona)? See In~ Sent., d. 25, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (I, 
436b) : "Et propterea est intelligendum, quod persona dicitur 
rationalis naturae suppositum proprietate distinctum, 
secundum omnes qui intelligunt eius signif icationem 
specialem; sed suppositum rationalis naturae constat esse 
substantiam, proprietatem distinguentem constat relationem. 
Cum ergo persona utrumque importat, scilicet suppositum et 
proprietatem, necesse est dici secundum substantiam et 
secundum relationem." See ibid., a. 1, q. 2, ad 2 (I, 440b): 
11 
••• dicendum, quod 'rationale' dicitur uno modo, quod habet 
potentiam discernendi bonum s malo. verum s falso [see note 
14]--et sic Deo et creaturae convenit." Ibid., a. 2, q. 2, 
concl. (I, 444b): "Quoniam ergo consimilis habitudo 
reperitur in personis creatis et in increatis, hinc est, 
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choose according to natural judgment (see note 3 above), or 
right reason (see notes 4 and 15 above), which tells him 
what is just. 26 Thus, while man might freely disregard and 
violate the law, he cannot do so without incurring 
punishment and remorse of conscience (see note 5 above) . 27 
26Although man is endowed with free choice by which to 
act justly or unjustly, his judgment is not free to 
determine justice itself. Judgment for St. Bonaventure 
involves an act of reason regulated by a rule of truth or 
higher law; choice, however, implies an act of reason 
regulated by a command of the will. One who decides a case 
according to law is called a judge; but one who decides a 
case according to his own will is called an arbiter. Thus, 
since the decisions of free choice more properly enjoin the 
will than the precept of law, the deliberative faculty is 
properly named from choice rather than from judgment. See ll. 
Sent., d. 25, p. 1, dub. 1, resp. (II, 607a): "Magis autem 
facultas illa censetur hoc nomine, ut dicatur liberum 
arbitrium quam liberunt iudicium, pro eo quod iudicium 
importat actum rationis regulatum secundum regulas veritatis 
sive supernae legis; arbitrium vero importat actum rationis 
regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae legis; 
arbitrium vero importat actum rationis regulatum secundum 
imperium voluntas nutum magis quam iuxta iuris praeceptum; 
hinc est, quod magis proprie nominatur per nomen arbitrii 
quam per nomen iudicii." Hence, justice for Bonaventure is 
not determined by human choice, but rather is either freely 
embraced or disregarded; accordingly, the free choice of a 
human action (precisely as human) may be either just or 
unjust. 
27Because of an obscurity of intellect, a man might 
confuse an evil for a good and thus not properly respond to 
the impulse of synderesis; moreover, a man can impede and 
weaken his conscience through sinful conduct and thereby 
deaden his sense of remorse; nevertheless, the stimulus of 
synderesis towards good can never be completely obliterated. 
See In II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 2, fund. 3 (II, 912a): 
" ... quae naturaliter insunt sunt inseparabilia; sed 
synderesis inest nobis naturaliter: ergo videtur, quod actum 
eius non possumus omnino per peccatum amittere, cum 'vitium, 
sicut dicit Augustinus, non deleat extrema naturae 
vestigia.'" Ibid., concl. (II, 912a): " ... synderesis quantum 
ad actum impediri potest, sed extingui non potest." 
Obstinancy in sin, however, can permanently impede the 
natural instinct of synderesis. The damned who are confirmed 
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Granted that free choice for Bonaventure is a sine gua non 
of the moral life, it is not the ground or standard of 
morality; rather, morality is rooted in the obligation to 
live and choose according to justice--a justice which is 
universal and innately known by virtue of natural law. 
Natural Law as Intimate 
Correlative to the metaphysical, personal, relational, 
and preeminent aspects already mentioned, there is a certain 
interiority which characterizes natural law; for natural law 
is not only innate to the soul, but is said to be written in 
the heart. 28 Evidently, the heart for Bonaventure is 
associated with truth as intimate or latent. 29 
in evil can no longer effectively be inclined toward good; 
however, their conscience endures in an endless pang of 
self-accusation and remorse. See Ibid., concl. (II, 912b): 
"Propter duritiam obstinationis impeditur etiam synderesis, 
ne [sic] ad bonum stimulet, sicut in damnatis, qui adeo sunt 
in malo confirmati, ut nunquam possint ad bonum inclinari. 
Et ideo synderesis, quantum ad instigationem ad bonum, 
sempiternum habet impedimentum; et propterea, quantum ad 
istum actum, potest dici exstincta; non tamen est exstincta 
simpliciter, quia habet alium usum, videlicet 
remurmurationis. Secundum enim illum usum, secundum quern 
synderesis habet pungere et remurmurare contra malum, maxime 
vigebit in damnatis." 
28See note 5 and section [l] above; see also Text-A, 
notes 10 and 11. See Comm. in Sapientiam, XV, 13 (VI, 207b) 
"Dicendum, quod hoc scit vel potest habitu legis naturalis 
scriptae in corde suo." 
29Bonaventure notes a contrast between the head and the 
heart with respect to truth as manifest or as intimate and 
latent. See In III Sent., d. 13, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1 (III, 
289b): "Ad illud vero obiicitur, quod generalior est 
influentia cordis quam capitis; dicendum, quod generalior 
est secundum veritatem, sed tamen influentia capitis· 
generalior est secundum manif estationem, pro eo quod in 
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Consider in this regard the exhortation by Isaiah as 
cited by Bonaventure: "'Redite, praevaricatories, ad cor;' 
ibi enim dictatur quod iustum est (see note 3 above)." The 
manifold implications here are that: (1) deceit is linked 
with injustice; (2) truthfulness is linked with justice; (3) 
injustice represents a departure or deviation from the 
heart; (4) justice represents a return to the heart; 
moreover, (5) because justice is found in the heart, it is 
implicated together with truth, which is proper to the 
heart. In this connection we have seen natural law equated 
with both truth (see Key-Text A, note 72) and justice (see 
note 18 and section [1] above) . We are thus led to regard 
truth, rectitude, 30 and justice as aspects of same thing--
capite omnes sensus apparent et eminentiorem situm habent, 
et in eo sunt cellulae aptae ad cognoscendum et nervi apti 
ad sentiendum et movendum .... Et quoniam transsumtio ad 
manif estandas proprietatas spirituales latentes sumi debet a 
re manifesta; hinc est, quod propter infuentiam magis 
dicitur Christus caput, quam dicitur cor; propter quam etiam 
evidentiam medici discordant a naturalibus. Dicunt enim 
physici, quod principium motus et sensu est in capite, lict 
naturales, qui considerant principia rerum intimius, dicant, 
quod horum principium est cor." Recall the distinction 
between the law written interiorly and exteriorly (see note 
16 above) . In this connection the distinction between truth 
qua implicit and explicit appears to correspond with natural 
law in the orders of essence and knowledge/precept 
respectively. See Key-Text A, notes 42 and 100. Such a 
distinction lends itself to Bonaventure's description of the 
generation and explication of the Word (Verbum) . See In i 
Sent., d. 27, p. 2, a. un., q. 3, (I, 487); Sermo II in nat. 
Dom., (IX, 107); cf. Zachary Hayes, "The Meaning of 
Convenientia," 76-77. 
30Recall that rectitude applies to the intellect in 
terms of truth, and to the will (as directed by right. 
reason) in terms of justice. See notes 17 and 18 above. 
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namely, natural law. Now consider Bonaventure's words as 
cited earlier (Key-Text A, note 73): 
Nam [Deus] coniungitur [ad animam] secundum veritatem 
et intimitatem. Solus enim Deus propter sumrnam 
simplicitatem et spiritualitatem illabitur animae, ita 
quod secundum veritatem est in anima et intimior animae 
quam ipsa sibi. 
According to truth, God is more intimate to the soul 
than the soul is to itself; but may it not be equivalently 
stated that, according to natural law (qua scriptum in 
corde) , God is more intimate to the soul than the soul is to 
itself? 31 In view of this intimacy between man and God--an 
31Since the truth here is evidently the truth of 
natural law qua scriptum in corde, God is intimately united 
with the soul by way of the the heart. See In III Sent., d. 
35, a. un., q. 3, concl. (III, 778a): "Dicendum, quod 
cognitio de Deo sub ratione veri potest haberi secundum 
triplicem modum: uno modo habetur cognitio de Deo per 
simplicim assensum; alio modo per rationis admimiculum; 
terio modo per simplicem contuitum. Primum est virtutis 
fidei, cuius est assentire; secundum est doni intellectus, 
cuius est credita per rationem intelligere; tertium est 
beatitudinis munditiae cordi, cuius est Deum videre." Note 
here that the beatific vision of God is held by way of the 
heart; such vision constitutes the perfection of man (see 
Text-A, note 100; cf. Itin., I, 2-4 (V, 296-97), regarding 
the interior journey of man towards God). Consequently, if 
natural law, according to the orders of essence and 
knowledge/precept, can be characterized in terms of latent 
interiority and explication (or manifestation; see note 28 
above), what can be said of natural law in the order of 
perfection? Surely, natural law qua perfection could be 
qualified at once as intimate (implicit) and manifest 
(explicit). Such a qualification would jibe with 
Bonaventure's trinitarian theology and metaphysics of 
emanation, exemplarity, and consummation (see Key-Text A, 
note 33) . 
The term contuition as cited above specifically refers 
to an indirect knowledge of God through His effects. See 
Itin., VII, 1, (V, 312): " ... mens nostra contuita est Deum 
extra se per vestigia et in vestigiis, intra se per imaginem 
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intimacy attained through the truth and justice of natural 
law--the personal, relational, and preeminent aspects of 
natural law can be seen as involving and explaining one 
another. Man bears in himself, from his origin (origine), 
the light of the divine visage (see Key-Text A, note 80) ; 
further, the soul possesses, from its creation (creatione), 
a light or natural judgment (see Key-Text A, note 37) . 
Certainly, then, the habitus of natural law (qua light, 
truth, and justice) is implicated as residing at the core of 
man's being; and it is precisely at this level of 
interiority that man bears his most intimate relationship 
with God. 32 Through natural law as written in the heart, 
et in imagine, supra se per divinae lucis similitudinem 
super nos relucentem et in ipsa luce, secundum quod 
possibile est secundum statum viae et exercitium mentis 
nostrae." See J.M. Bissen, "De la contuition," Etudes 
Franciscaines, 46 (1934), 559-69. Contuition is thus 
distinguished from a more direct intuition such as the 
grasping of axioms or first principles. However, according 
to some interpreters, the above passage suggests that there 
may be a form of contuition which is intuitive to some 
degree. This possibility is noted by T. Mathias, 
"Bonaventurian Ways to God," 189, note 22; see also J.M. 
Bissen, "De la contuition," 565-68. 
32God is intimately present to man precisely because 
man is created by God. See In IV Sent., d. 4, p. 1, a. 2, q. 
3, contra 2 (IV, 103b): "Necesse est, causam esse coniunctam 
effectui, alioquin, si causa praeterit et non est, ergo 
nihil facit." See In III Sent., d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl. 
(lOa) : "Et quemadmodum Deus, cum est in creatura per 
essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam .... " In .I Sent., d. 37, 
p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (I, 639a): "Quia enim creatura est 
et accepit esse ab alio, qui earn fecit esse, cum prius non 
esset; ex hoc non est suum esse, et ideo non est purus 
actus, sed habet possibilitatem; et ratione huius habet 
fluxibilitatem et variabilitatem, ideo caret stabilitate, et 
ideo non potest esse nisi per praesentiam eius qui dedit ei 
esse. Exemplum huius apertum est in impressione formae 
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man is oriented beyond himself toward God. Hence, God is at 
once immanent and transcendent to man; 33 correlatively, 
since natural law is that by which man is conformed to God 
(made deiform) as exemplar, and ordered beyond himself 
towards God as object (see Key-Text A, notes 80 and 81), it 
sigilli in aqua, quae non conservatur ad momentum, nisi 
praesente sigillo.--Et iterum, quia creatura de nihilo 
producta est, ideo habet vanitatem; et quia nihil vanum in 
se ipso fulcitur, necesse est quod omnis creatura 
sustentetur per praesentiam Veritatis. 11 See ibid., a. 3, q. 
2, concl. (I, 649a): "Aliquid enim est in aliquo secundum 
praesentialitatis indistantiam, ut contentum in continente, 
ut aqua in vase; aliquid secundum virtutis influentiam, ut 
motor in mobili; aliquid secundum intimitatis existentiam, 
ut illud quod est continens intra, ut anima in corpore. Et 
omne quod perfecte est in re, necesse est esse quantum ad 
hanc triplicem conditionem; et hoc modo est Deus. Et ideo 
dicitur esse potentialiter, praesentialiter et essentialier, 
quia secundum praesentialitatis indistantiam, secundum 
virtutis influentia, secundum intimitatis existentiam. Cf. 
Aristotle, Physica, VII, 2 (243a3 sqq.), regarding the 
presence of an agent to its effect; also see Metaphysica, 
II, 2 (994a-994b30) with regard to the principle of 
reduction of effect to cause. Accordingly, Bonaventure 
states: "Lex divinitatis haec est ut infima per media 
reducantur ad summa; 11 ibid. , d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl . (I I I, 
28). Note the mark of relationship to an extrinsic cause 
implicit in the past participles insertum est or scriptum by 
which Bonaventure describes the character of natural 
judgment and natural law (see notes 3 and 28 above) . 
33See I tin., V, n. 8, (V, 310) : 11 Quia perfectissimum et 
immensum, ideo est intra omnia, non inclusum, extra omnia, 
non exclusum, supra omnia, non elatum, infra omnia, non 
prostratum. 11 This passage makes it clear, however, that 
Bonaventure is not a pantheist. Cf. In III Sent., d. 1, a. 
1, q. 1, ad 4 (I, lla), where the relationship of a creature 
with God is described as a sponge immersed in the sea. This 
same metaphor appears is St. Augustine's Confessions, VII, 
5, 7 (PL 32, 736) where Augustine describes his view of God 
and creation during the time he was a Manichean. The 
metaphor is also found in Plotinus' Enneads, IV, 3, 9, from 
where it probably derives. For further discussion of the 
paradoxical relationships between man and God, see Ewert 
Cousins, "The Coincidence of Opposites in the Christology of 
Saint Bonaventure, Franciscan Studies 28 (1968), 27-45. 
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follows that natural law can likewise be characterized as 
immanent and, perhaps in a sense, transcendent to the 
soul. 34 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
Let us summarize the above discussion as follows. 
1. Because natural law is written in the human heart, 
it is universal to all men; natural law thus establishes an 
inexorable and common moral order which transcends cultural 
and historical bounds (see note 13 above). 
2. Natural law is intrinsically relational and 
personal--that is, it pertains to an inherent ordination of 
rational creatures (see note 25 above) in a communion of 
knowledge and love with God and one another. As an 
ordination of persons, natural law is a norm of justice 
which entails obligations towards God, other persons, and 
oneself. 35 
34Since natural law is intrinsically relational, it 
bears a transcendent aspect insofar as it orients a person 
beyond his own being towards another (cf. Key-Text A, note 
40) . The notion of natural law as intrinsically relational 
(see notes 22-25 above with regard to persons, and note 32 
with regard to efficient causality) is further corroborated 
in view of the psychological dependency man has upon God as 
his Final End (see Key-Text A, notes 82-84) : because of his 
created nature which renders him indigent, the intellect and 
will of man cannot not rest in the finite self, nor in any 
other creature; rather, the human person can only be 
fulfilled by the infinite Trinity: "Et hoc est quod dicit 
Augustinus: 'Animam totius Trinitatis capacem nihil minus 
quam Trinitas potest implere.'" See note 25 above. 
35We will explore the nature and dynamics of this 
ordination of persons in Key-Text C. 
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3. Natural law qua habitus per naturalem originem is 
ontologically prior to the intellective and volitional 
habitus (see Key-Text A, notes 33 and 71); as such, it holds 
an ontological priority over the habitus of free choice (see 
note 26 above) . Indeed, man is obligated to live and choose 
according to the norm of natural law qua habitus per innatam 
dispositionem; hence, natural law precepts hold a 
psychological priority over the act of free choice. 
Accordingly, while a moral act requires free choice to be 
characteristically moral (or immoral), such a deliberative 
act is itself based upon natural law. 
4. As impressed within the heart of man, natural law is 
situated at the core of man's being. As the norm of truth 
and justice, natural law directs man beyond his own 
interiority towards God and other persons. Hence, we may say 
that natural law is at once immanent and transcendent to the 
soul. 
5. Given its relational character, what can be said of 
natural law as innate? Inasmuch as (a) natural law for 
Bonaventure involves relations among corporeal creatures 
(human and subhuman), and (b) knowledge of such relations is 
acquired through the senses, natural law knowledge but must 
be acquired through sensible experience; to this extent, 
natural law knowledge for St. Bonaventure is not innate. 
CHAPTER 3 
KEY-TEXT C 
De Perfectione Evangelica, q. 4, a. 1, concl. 1 
I. Context 
(a) De Perf. Evang., q. 4, a. 1, fund. 2, 4, 7, 10. 
Article 1 of De Perf. Evang., q. 4, opens with the 
question, "Utrum sit consonum iuri naturali, quod homo 
obediendo subiaceat alteri. 11 Both the fundamenta and sed 
contra statements which precede and follow Bonaventure's 
conclusion give still broader scope to natural law. One of 
the arguments which affirm obedience as consonant with 
natural law states that the Decalogue is written in the 
heart through the dictate of nature. Nature itself teaches, 
for example, that parents are to be honored; hence, the duty 
of honor is consonant with natural law; and since honor is 
accomplished through rendering obedience, obedience itself 
is consonant with natural law. 2 
1This work was most likely composed between 1255-1256; 
see Appendix B, note 6. In this study, we will abbreviate 
the De Perfectione Evangelica as De Perf. Evang. 
2 Ibid., fund. 2 (V, 179): "Item, lex decalogi scripta 
in corde hominis dictat per dictamen naturae; sed ipsa hoc 
praecipit, scilicet parentes honorari: ergo illud est 
consonum iuri naturali. Hoc autem fit per obsequium 
obedientiae: ergo." See Key-Text B, note 14. 
130 
131 
Again, natural law dictates order (ordo); but, as 
Augustine states, "Order is the arrangement of things equal 
and unequal, each assigned to its proper place"; thus, if 
order involves subordination of one thing to another and 
natural law requires order, then natural law commands that 
one ought to be subject to another. 3 
More precisely, natural law dictates a hierarchal order 
(ordinem hierarchicum) which descends from the highest 
hierarchy through the angels to human beings; but it is in 
keeping with this hierarchal order that the lower obey the 
higher; therefore, obedience is implicit in natural law. 4 
Again, natural law dictates that the entire man obey 
right reason in itself; accordingly, natural law reasonably 
commands that the less skilled and ignorant submit in 
obedience to the more skilled and knowledgeable; it follows, 
3 Ibid., fund. 4 (V, 179): "Item, ius naturae dictat 
ordinem; sed 'ordo est parium dispariumque sua loca cuique 
tribuens dispositio,' ut dicit Augustinus decimo nono de 
Civitate Dei: si ergo ordo est, quod unun subdatur alteri, 
et ius naturae dictat ordinem; dicat ergo, quod unus alteri 
debeat subiici. 11 See Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX, 13, n. 
1 (PL 41, 640). Cf. Itin., I, 14 (V, 299b). 
4 Ibid., fund. 7 (V, 180): "Item, ius naturae dictat 
ordinem hierarchicum, qui descendit a summa hierarcha per 
angelicam usque ad humanam; sed ordini hierarchico consonat, 
quod inferior superiori obtemperat: ergo, etc." With regard 
to the meaning of hierarchia, cf. Dionysius, De Caelesti 
Hierarchia, c. 4, §3 (PG 3, 179 sqq.): "Quasi id ordo 
divinae legis sanxerit, ut per superiora ista quae inferiora 
sunt, ad divinum numen adducantur." Ibid., c. 10 (PG 271 
sqq.). See In II Sent., d. 9, praenotata (II, 237a-241). 
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then, that obedience is consonant with natural law. 5 
(b) De Perf. Evang., solutio oppositorum 4, 6, 9. 
Bonaventure presents the following objection: the law 
of nature dictates that the dignity of image [in man] must 
be preserved; but [man as] image comes immediately from God 
and is subject solely to Him because [man] is formed as 
image by the first Truth without any [other] nature 
intervening; therefore, for man to be subject to another man 
through obedience seems to be opposed to his truly being an 
image [of God] . 6 Consequently, man's obedience to another 
creature seems contrary to the law of nature. 
To this objection Bonaventure answers that the 
submission of one person to another befits man as an image 
of God, not as originally formed (or created) but as 
deformed or even as needing reformation. Such is the case in 
the Sacraments: someone in need of reformation is in a 
certain sense subjected to the sensible sacramental 
5 Ibid., fund. 10 (V, 180a): "Item, de dictamine legis 
naturae est, quod homo totus obediat rationi rectae in se: 
ergo pari ratione ius naturae dicat, quod minus peritus et 
ignorans obediendo subiaceat magis perito et scienti: ergo 
videtur, quod homo obtemperet homini, consonum esse iuri 
naturali." See Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, II, 2 
(1103b31) : "That we must act according to the right rule is 
a common principle and must be assumed." Cf. ibid. VI, 12, 
(1143b30 sqq.). 
6 Ibid., ad opp. 4 (V, 180b): "Item, ius naturae dictat, 
dignitatem imaginis esse servandum; sed imago est immediate 
a Deo et soli Deo subiecta, qu1a 'nulla interposita natura, 
a prima Veritate formatur.' Ergo videtur, hoc, quod homo 
subiaceat obediendo homini, esse contra dignitatem 
imaginis." Bonaventure cites Augustine, De Div. Ouaest. 83, 
q. 51, n. 2 (PL 40, 33). See Key-Text A, note 84. 
elements, although it is fitting that such a person be 
subject to God alone. 7 Bonaventure here distinguishes the 
human soul qua image either as image simply (in se) or as 
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incarnate (relatione ad carnem): as simple image, the human 
soul by reason of itself owes its being [created and] 
infused into a body solely to God; hence the soul is subject 
to God alone; yet, by reason of that flesh [into which the 
soul is infused] , and which it has with the help of human 
generative powers, the soul is subject to its origin just as 
offspring are subject to their parents--but in such a way 
that [corporeal] generation in no way compromises the soul's 
status as a genuine image of God. 8 
To the argument that natural law dictates that love 
must be preserved and that love produces unity, conformity 
and equality, Bonaventure replies that the perfection of a 
7 Ibid., ad 4 (V, 182a) : "Ad illud quod obiiciter de 
dignitate imaginis, iam potest patere responsio: quia, licet 
huius subiectio non competat imagini formatae, competit 
tamen imagini deformatae, vel etiam reformandae; sicut 
videmus in Sacramentis, quod homo reparandus quodam modo 
subiicitur sensibilibus elementis, licet homini stanti 
conveniat subiici respectu solius Dei." 
8 Ibid., (V, 182a): "Aliter etiam potest dici, quod 
dupliciter est loqui de imagine: vel in se, vel in relatione 
ad carnem; et licet ipsa anima ratione sui a solo Deo habeat 
infundi et illi soli subiici, ratione tamen carnis, quae 
habet per vim humani ministerii propagari, subiici habet 
suae origini, sicut proles parenti, ita tamen, quod ex hoc 
in nullo dignitati imaginis praeiudicium generetur." Cf. 
Peter Lombard, IV Sent., d. I, c. 5 (p. 234). As his reply 
(see note 6 above) indicates, Bonaventure does not dispute 
the truth or validity of the objection's first and second 
premises; nor does he dispute the conclusion, if properly 
qualified. 
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living body requires a complex equality of parts in which 
every member is distinguished and some members are ordered 
ahead of others; so it must be understood concerning the 
mystical body of Christ. Therefore, the unity of love does 
not exclude the multiform gifts and distinctions of honors 
and offices, according to which one member stands in 
subjection to one who governs. Hence, in preserving love, 
natural law preserves obedience. 9 
To the objection that the honor owed to God must not be 
given to a creature, Bonaventure answers that honor is owed 
to God Himself and to man as His image; indeed, the honor 
shown to a man because of God is honor given to God (ad Deum 
refertur) . What is not to be attributed to another creature 
is precisely the honor of worship which belongs exclusively 
to God. Nevertheless, governance, rule and sovereignty over 
subjects are not unfitting and, in fact, accord with God in 
His working through other agents (per ministrum) ; honor is 
thus shown to a creature through God, because of God, and 
according to God; for such honor refers to God entirely 
9 Ibid., ad 6 (V, 182b): "Ad illud obiicitur, quod ius 
naturae dictat, caritatem esse servandam; dicendum, quod 
sicut ad perfectionem corporis vivi requiritur aequalitas 
complexionis, in qua omnia membra conformantur, et 
multiformitas organizationis, in qua membra distinguunter et 
ordinantur et secundum variam influentiam alia aliis 
praeponuntur; sic intelligendum est circa corpus Christi 
mysticum [I Cor. 12, 12). Et ideo unitas caritatis non 
excludit multiformitatem charismatum et discretionem 
dignitatum et officiorum, secundaum quae unum membrum alteri 
habet subiici et secundum legem praelationis et subiectionis 
ab altero gubernari. 11 
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according to right order which is preserved (servat) in 
God's governance of the world (gubernando mundum) . 10 
As the above arguments collectively demonstrate, 
obedience is indeed consonant with natural law; moreover, 
these various demonstrations shed light on the nature of 
natural law--i.e., man's right ordination to God and 
creatures. From these arguments, two syllogisms can be 
formulated to establish a double ordination proper to 
natural law: 
1. Natural law requires that the dignity of [man as] 
10 Ibid., ad 9 (V, 182b) : "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod 
honor Deo debitus nulli alii est reddendus; dicendum, quod 
honor debetur Deo et in propria natura et in imagine sua; 
honor enim, qui exhibetur homini propter Deum, ad Deum 
refertur; et ideo quod proprium est Dei, scilicet honor 
latriae, non debet alteri attribui. Quod autem convenit Deo 
operanti per ministrum, scilicet gubernatio et regnum et 
imperium respectu subiectorum, non est inconveniens, quod 
per Deum et propter Deum et secundum Deum alii tribuatur, 
quia totum ref ertur ad ipsum secundum rectum ordinem, quern 
quidem servat in gubernando mundum." Cf. ibid., ad 8 (V, 
182): "Sicut enim [lex naturale] dictat, quod quis debet 
subiici alteri ad obedientiam; sic dictat, quod alter debet 
praefici alteri per providentiam." 
In upholding an ordination of authority and submission 
among creatures, Bonaventure warns against proud ambition 
and arrogance. See ibid., (V, 182): "Sicut enim dictat, quod 
quis debet subiici alteri ad obedientiam; sic dictat, quod 
alter debet praefici alteri per providentiam. Sed ex hoc non 
sequitur, quod ibi debeat appeti praelatio, sicut appetitur 
subiectio. Nam appetitus subiectionis consonat humilitati et 
reverentia; appetitus vero praelationis degenerat ut 
plurimum in fastum ambitionis et arrogantiae: ideo, quamvis 
locus dignitatis recte possit administrari secundum dictamen 
naturae, non tamen debet appeti propter annexum typum 
superbiae." Pride and arrogance can be understood as an 
inordinate adherence to a mutable (created) good. The 
disorder here lies precisely in failing to reduce the merely 
finite to the infinite and supreme Good; such disorder 
constitutes sin (see Key-Text A, notes 54, 77 and 86). 
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image be preserved; but [man as] image is immediately 
(immediate) ordered to God; thus natural law dictates this 
direct ordination to Him (see notes 6 and 8) . 
2. Conversely, obedience to other creatures befits man, 
particularly man as incarnate and fallen image; 11 further, 
God governs through the mediation of others (per ministrum) 
and is given honor through the honor shown to men (ad Deum 
honor refertur); thus, since natural law maintains the 
integrity of [man as] incarnate image, it follows with equal 
force that natural law involves a mediated ordination to God 
(see notes 8 and 10). 
3. As love (see note 8), honor (see note 2), right 
reason (see note 5), the hierarchal ordination of persons 
(see notes 3 and 4), and the immediate and mediate 
ordination of man to God (see notes 8 and 10) are implicated 
within the scope and meaning of natural law, so natural law 
itself (qua dictate of nature) is implicated as written in 
the heart (see note 2 above). 
4. Inasmuch as (a) man's ordination to God is 
immediate, and (b) knowledge of God is innate, knowledge of 
natural law--as it pertains to man's direct ordination to 
God--is innate. However, inasmuch as (a) man is mediately 
11The justification of obedience as befitting man--and 
hence the consonance of obedience with natural law--is 
argued from the standpoint of love (see note 8), honor (see 
note 2), right reason (see note 5), and the hierarchal 
ordination of persons (i.e., human beings and angels) to God 
(see notes 3 and 4) . 
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ordered to God through creatures, and (b) knowledge of 
creatures is acquired through the senses, knowledge of 
natural law--as it pertains to man's indirect ordination to 
God--is acquired. 
Let us now turn to Bonaventure's concluding discussion 
for a further account of natural law as innate. 
II. Key-Text c 
De Perf. Evang., q. 4, a. 1, concl. 
Respondeo: 
To understand what was said above, it must be noted 
that natural law, as Augustine states, 12 is the 
impression made in the soul by the eternal law; the 
eternal law, which is permanent and unchanging, is 
that by which everything else is ordered. Whence 
Augustine [states] : 13 "So that I can briefly express 
in words ... the notion of eternal law which is impressed 
in us, I will say: it is that law by which man is just 
and by virtue of which everything is most perfectly 
12see Augustine, De Div. Ouaest. 83, q. 53, n. 2 (PL 
40, 36): "Ex hac igitur ineffabili atque sublimi rerum 
administratione, quae fit per divinam providentiam, quasi 
transcripta est naturalis lex in animam rationalem, ut in 
ipsa vitae huius conversatione moribusque terrenis homines 
talium distributionum imagines servent." Cf. ibid., q. 51, 
n. 2 (PL 4 O, 3 2) . 
13 See Augustine, De Libero Arbitrium, I, c. 6, n. 15 
(PL 32, 1229): "Simul etiam te videre arbitior in illa 
temporali nihil esse justum atque legitimum, quod non ex hac 
aeterna sibi homines derivarint: nam si populus ille quodam 
tempore juste honores dedit, quodam rursus juste non dedit; 
haec vicissitudo temporalis ut justa esset, ea illa 
aeternitate tracta est, qua semper justum est gravem populum 
honores dare, levem non dare .... Ut igitur breviter aeternae 
legis notionem, quae impressa nobis est quantum valeo verbis 
explicem, ae est qua justum est ut omnia sint 
ordinatissima .... Cum ergo haec sit una lex, ex qua illae 
omnes temporales ad homines regendos variantur, num·ideo 
ipsa variari ullo modo potest?" 
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ordered." Recall what is said in De Civitate Dei: 14 
"Order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal, 
each assigned to its proper place." Therefore, if the 
proper role of a superior is to rule, and that of an 
inferior to submit, natural law, which flows from 
eternal law, naturally commands that the inferior 
submit in obedience to the superior; and this has some 
general dictates--but in different ways, inasmuch as 
superiority and inferiority are found to involve a 
diversity of differences. 
Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, 
secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium 
Quaestionum, lex naturalis est impressio facta in anima 
lege aeterna; lex autem aeterna est illa, qua 
incommutabili permamente, cetera ordinantur. Unde 
Augustinus, primo de Libero Arbitrio: "Ut breviter 
aeternae legis notionem, quae impressa est nobis, 
quantum valeo, verbis explicem: ea est, qua iustum est, 
ut omnia sint ordinatissima." Sed sicut dicitur decimo 
nono de Civitate Dei, decimo tertio capitulo: "Ordo est 
parium dispariumquae sua cuique loca tribuens 
dispositio." Si ergo superioris est praeesse, et 
inferioris subesse, lex naturalis, quae manat a lege 
aeterna, naturaliter dictat, quod inferior superiori 
obediendo subiaceat; et hoc quidem dictat in 
generalitate quadam, diversimode tamen, secundum quod 
superioritatis et inferioritatis reperire contingit 
differentias diversas. 
III. Commentary 
Nature of Natural Law Order 
In the contextual arguments presented above, a broader 
characterization of natural law is presented. Let us now 
give an integral account of this presentation. It is stated 
that natural law dictates right reason (see note 5 above) 
and preserves love (see note 9 above) ; but as we have 
previously seen, right reason and love (i.e., right 
affection) constitute rectitude--that is, the ordination of 
14See Augustine, De Civitate Dei., XIX, c. 13 (PL 41, 
640); see note 3 above. 
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man towards his final end and supreme good. Natural law is 
none other that this rectitude or order (see Key-Text A, 
notes 46 and 71; Key-Text B, notes 17 and 18); and the 
perfection of this order consists in loving God with one's 
whole mind, heart, and soul (see Key-Text A, notes 46 and 
100; Key-Text B, notes 20 and 21). What is further developed 
in the above contextual arguments is the nature of this 
ordination which specifies a complex and multiform hierarchy 
of persons (see notes 3, 4, and 9 above). This hierarchal 
ordination is seen to involve two distinct, yet 
complementary, directions of activity: (1) God governs the 
world through the mediation of creatures (see note 10); (2) 
through the mediation of creatures God is reverenced and 
loved (see note 8 and 10). We can thus say that the order of 
natural law involves a double movement of what may loosely 
be described as (1) an outward extension or descent (action 
from God), and (2) an inward return or ascent (action 
towards God) . 15 Now let us investigate what this double 
movement further entails. 
15Such movements appear to correspond with the extreme 
terms of Bonaventure's general metaphysics--namely, 
emanation and consummation. See Hex. (ca. 1273), I, 17 (V, 
332b): "Domini, exivi a te summo, venio ad te summum et per 
te summum.--Hoc est medium metaphysicium reducens, et haec 
est tota nostra metaphysica: de emanatione, de 
exemplaritate, de consummatione." The natural law ordination 
of image will presently be shown to correspond to the second 
metaphysical moment--namely, exemplarity. For a discussion 
of this double or cyclic movement in Bonaventure's general 
synthesis, see A. Schaefer, "The Position and Function of 
Man," 262-64. 
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Taken as image simply (in se; see note 8 above) the 
human person is directly (immediate) ordered to God; this 
direct and intimate relationship with God is possible by 
virtue of the rational soul's capacity to know, love, and 
praise God. 16 It is recalled (see Key-Text A, notes 78-80) 
that the rational creature, qua image, is born (or destined) 
to be ordered (nata .e..lil:. ordinari) directly to God as its 
beatitude both as uncreated (God thus is obiectum) and as 
created (God thus is inf ormans) ; beatitude is accorded 
primarily to uncreated beatitude as the fulfilling end as 
obiectum, and secondarily to created beatitude which is 
fulfilling as informans or deiform in virtue of its object; 
by virtue of this divine influence in the soul (influentia 
Dei), the soul can be configured (configurari) to God. As 
image simply (in se), the soul therefore (1) is directly 
created by, and ordered to, God as object; and by virtue of 
the influencing presence of its object, the soul (2) becomes 
16See note 15 above; Key-Text A, note 73; Key-Text B, 
note 31. Gilson writes in this regard: " ... nul effet ne 
s'ordonnera plus completement vers elle que celui qui la 
connaitra et l'aimera. Connaitre et vouloir une Perfection 
qui ne vous a connu que par soi et voulu quae pour soi, 
c'est reproduire ce vouloir et cette pensee dans l'acte meme 
par lequel ils vous ont confere l'etre. Plus profondement 
qu'un effet de Dieu, l'image est done un analogue de la vie 
divine, et c'est pourquoi, lorsqu'elle s'observe 
attentivement elle-meme, l'ame discerne comme un reflet de 
l'essence creatrice au sein de ses obscures profondeurs." La 
philosophie Q.§. saint Bonaventure, 177. 
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God-like {deiformis) . 17 In this connection, recall that it 
is natural law by which the soul is rightly ordered to God 
both as (1) obiectum and (2) informans (see Key-Text A, note 
81) . Thus, within the double movement noted above (see note 
15 above), a third and middle moment or phase of the natural 
law order can be identified as image. Natural law thus 
involves an immediate and trifold ordination of the soul in 
se to God as efficient cause, exemplar cause, and final 
cause; these three relations to God appear to coincide with 
the general phases of Bonaventure's metaphysics--namely: 
emanation (descent), exemplarity (image), and consummation 
17The causal (efficient) and teleological ordination is 
said to be primary with respect to the ordination of image 
since the being of an image is derived from an exemplar-
agent cause which engenders the image. Since it is a product 
of efficient causality, an image implies a definite relation 
of subordination--namely, effect to cause. See In i Sent., 
d. 31, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (I, 540): "Dicendum quod 
sicut exemplar secundum proprietatem vocabuli dicit 
expressionem per modum activi unde exemplar dicitur ad cuius 
imitationem fit aliquid sic e contrario imago per modum 
passivi; et dicitur imago quod alterum exprimit et 
imitatur." 
Further, since efficient and final causes are 
correlative terms [see In IV Sent., d. 4, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, 
contra 2 (IV, 103b): "Efficiens et finis sunt causae 
correlativae."], an image also implies a definite ordination 
to its end. Regarding the interconnection of efficient, 
formal-exemplar, and final causes, see Aristotle, Physica 
II, c. 7 (19815-35). Cf. Plotinus, Ennead III. 8, 7. With 
regard to man's perfection via conformity in truth, see 
Text-A, note 72. For a discussion of the intimacy of 
presence which efficient causality entails, see Key-Text B, 
note 32. See Key-Text A, note 78, concerning the expression 
nata est which G. H. Tavard renders as "destined." 
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(ascent or return) . 18 This triple and direct ordination of 
the soul to God is antecedent to the soul's relationship 
with the body and corporeal world; hence, the obligation to 
love God with one's whole mind, heart, and soul (see Key-
Text A, notes 46 and 100). In accord with this primary and 
direct ordination, man must regulate his conduct with regard 
to God, neighbor, and self (see Key-Text B, notes 23-25). 
This immediate ordination to God is the foundation for the 
inviolable dignity of every human being (see Key-Text A, 
note 81); further, since the image of God constitutes the 
very nature of the soul qua human, the dignity of a human 
creature can never be effaced. 
The human soul, however, is also an incarnate image 
(relatione ad carnem; see note 8) and by reason of the body 
which it possess through the help of human generative 
powers, the soul is subject to its (corporeal) origin as 
offspring are subject to their parents. Bonaventure states, 
however, that such (corporeal) generation does not 
18See note 15 above and notes 30 and 44 below. Consider 
in this regard the following corroborating remarks; Serm., 
(IX, 565a) : "In similitudinem hominum factus et habitu 
inventus ut homo, et in hac (etiam) primus homo, secundum 
illud Genesis primo: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et 
similitudinem nostram; et secundum istam omnis lex scripta 
est in corde hominis." In II Sent., d. 11, a. 1, a. 1, fund. 
3 (II, 277a): "Lex universitatis hoc exigit, ut media 
reducantur per prima, et postrema per media ad suum primum 
principium; et hoc confirmatur per illud quod dicit 
Dionysius in libro de Angelica Hierarchia [c. 4. §3): 'Lex 
divinitatis est in nullo negligere ordinem, sed per prima 
media, et per media postrema reducere." Cf. Brevil. - ( 1254-
57), II, 1 (V, 219b), and VII, 1 (V, 281a). 
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compromise the soul's status as an image directly ordered to 
God. How can this be? Recall that for Bonaventure the soul 
is a complete substance in itself composed of spiritual 
matter and form (see Key-Text A, note 2); as such, the soul 
is an image in se; however, the soul has an inclination for 
the perfection of the body just as the body has a tendency 
to be received by the soul. Although the body for 
Bonaventure possesses its own substantial form (see Key-Text 
A, note 76), the body is nevertheless ordered to the 
spiritual soul as its act and entelechia. Hence, because the 
body is perfected by the soul and the soul is perfected by 
natural law (see Key-Text A, note 100), the human body is 
thus subordinate to the dominion of natural law (see Key-
Text A, notes 2 and 81) . Indeed, the entire material 
universe is composed of a hierarchy of substantial forms, 
each form ordered to the next higher form; 19 and as the 
spiritual human soul is the highest substantial form in this 
world, the ordination of all other corporeal forms 
culminates in man. 20 As incarnate image, man represents in 
19See Hex., I, 18, (V, 332b) : " [Physicus] considerat 
mobile et generationem secundum influentiam corporum 
caelestium in elementa, et ordinationem elementorum ad 
formam mixtionis, et formae mixtionis ad formam 
complexionis, et formae complexionis ad animam vegetabilem, 
et illius ad sensibilem, et illius ad rationalem, et ibi est 
finis." See In ll Sent., d. 1, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2-3 (II, 
42b); ibid., d. 17, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 423b). 
20See !tin., II, 2 (V, 300a): "Notandum igitur, quod 
iste mundus, qui dicitur macrocosmus, intrat ad animam 
nostram, quae dicitur minor mundus, per portas quinque 
sensuum, secundum ipsorum sensibilium apprehensionem, 
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his own body the whole of creation. In this way, the entire 
visible world is (proximately) ordered to the soul and 
brought to perfection. 21 Thus, since the cosmos is ordained 
oblectationem et diiudicationem." See Hex., XII, 16 (V, 
386b): "Totus enim mundus describitur in anima. Et est etiam 
imago. Quia ergo est lumen et speculum habens rerum 
imagines, ideo est imago." See De Reduct. Art. (ca. 1254-
57), 20 (V, 324b): "Appetitus, qui est in materia, ordinatur 
ad rationes intellectuales, ut nullo modo perfecta sit 
generatio, nisi anima rationalis uniatur materiae 
corporali. 11 
Although man is a mediator between the corporeal world 
and God, such mediation culminates in Christ Who, as Ged-
man, is the Alpha and Omega of creation. See ibid., (V, 
324b) : "Per similem igitur rationem potest argui, quod summa 
perfectio et nobilissima in universe esse non possit, nisi 
natura in qua sunt rationes seminales, et natura, in qua 
sunt rationes intellectuales, et natura, in qua sunt 
rationes ideales, simul concurrant in unitatem personae, 
quod factum est in Filii Dei incarnatione.--Praedicat igitur 
tota naturalis philosophia per habitudinem proportionis Dei 
Verbum natum et incarnaturm, ut idem sit alpha et omega, 
natum scilicet in principio et ante tempera, incarnaturm 
vero in fine saeculorum." Cf. In ll Sent., d. 17, a. 1, q. 
2, ad 6 (II, 415b). 
21See !tin., II, 3 (V, 300a): "Homo igitur, qui dicitur 
minor mundus ... " See Brevil., II, 4 (V, 221b): "Corpora 
humana, quae disposita sunt ad nobilissimam formam, quae est 
anima rationalis; ad quam ordinatur et terminatur appetitus 
omnis naturae sensibilis et corporalis, ut per earn quae est 
forma ens, vivens, sentiens et intelligens, quasi ad modum 
circuli intelligibilis reducatur ad suum principium, in quo 
perficiatur et beatificetur." Cf. In ll Sent., d. 16, a. 2, 
q. 1, concl. (II, 401b). Cf. Plato's Timaeus (69b-92c) where 
the structure of the human body is characterized as 
representing the hierarchal order of the cosmos. 
Further, Bonaventure likens the the physical universe 
to a house constructed by God for the service of man. As 
steward who is responsible to God, man lives in this world 
as its lord and administrator until he returns to his 
heavenly home. See Dom., VIII, sermo I, c. 1, n. 2 (IX, 
385b): "Totus mundus servit homini, quia factus est pro 
homine, ut ipsa serviat ei qui fecit mundum et hominem. Ergo 
[si] sentis beneficium continuae administrationis, redde 
debitum bonae operationis." Brevil., II, 4 (V, 222a): "Haec 
igitur sensibilis corporalium machina est tanquam quaedam 
domus a summo opifice homini fabricat, donec ad domum veniat 
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to the soul of man and man's soul is ordained to God 
according to natural law, we may even say (in a loose sense) 
that the cosmic order is an extension of natural law. 22 
Because of man's rational capacity for God--a capacity 
fulfilled through free choice--man excels every corporeal 
power. In this way, the dignity of man as incarnate image 
remains uncompromised by the body and world. 23 
Such direct ordination of the soul to God nevertheless 
involves the mediation of the visible world. As previously 
mentioned (see Key-Text B, note 16) Bonaventure compares the 
universe to a book through which man comes to know its 
Author; now all creatures to some degree represent God; 
non manufactam in caelis. 11 
22The cosmic order, the order of nature, and the 
natural law which is written in man's heart evidently 
constitute different senses or aspects of one and the same 
pervasive order which Bonaventure identifies as the divine 
(or eternal--see [1] above) law. See In IV Sent. d. 19, a. 
3, q. 1, concl. (IV, 508b) : 11 Si cut di cut Dionysius, 'lex 
divinitatis est media per prima, et ultima per media 
perducere ad purgationem, illuminationem et perfectionem.' 
Ideo, sicut videmus in omnibus, sive in rationalibus, sive 
in naturalibus, sive in caelestibus, quod ad hoc, quod sit 
concordia et decor, oportet, quod sit ordo. 11 See In ll 
Sent., d. 11, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 277b). One might say 
that natural law is an extension of the cosmic order insofar 
as such order pertains to man; but since the visible 
universe is itself subordinate to man (see notes 20 and 21 . 
above), it seems proper to say that natural law embraces or 
comprehends the cosmic order rather than simply being an 
aspect of it. 
23 See Brevil., II, 4 (V, 221b) : 11 Ideo quantum ad 
arbitrii libertatem praecellit omnem virtutem corporalem; ac 
per hoc cuncta nata sunt sibi servire, nihil autem sibi 
dominari habet nisi solus Deus, non fatum seu vis positionis 
siderum. 11 
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thus, by way of knowledge of creatures, man is led to 
praise, adore, and love Him. 24 But precisely how does 
24 See Brevil., II, 11 (V, 229a): "Et secundum hoc 
duplex est liber, unus scilicet scriptus intus, qui est 
aeterna Dei ars et sapientia; et alius scriptus foris, 
mundus scilicet sensibilis." Man is endowed with a 
corresponding twofold sense to understand both interior and 
exterior books. Ibid., (V, 229a): "Ad perfectionem 
universitatis debuit fieri creatura, quae hoc sensu duplici 
esset praedita ad cognitionem libri scripti intus et foris, 
id est Sapientiae et sui operis." See Hex., XIII, 11 (V, 
389b) : "Omnis creatura repraesentat Deum, qui est Trinitas, 
et qualiter pervenitur ad eum." Ibid., XIII, 12 (V, 390b): 
11 Certum est, quod homo stans habebat cognitionem rerum 
creatarum et per illarum repraesentationem f erebatur in Deum 
ad ipsum laudandum, venerandum, amandum. 11 The visible world 
is also compared to a mirror through which man is led back 
to loving and praising God. Brevil., II, 11 (V, 229a): 
"Primum principium fecit mundum istum sensibilem ad 
declarandum se ipsum, videlicet ad hoc, quod per illum 
tanquam per speculum et vestigium reduceretur homo in Deum 
artificem amandum et laudandum. 11 
Visible nature thus expresses a moral significance 
which man is able to recognize. Rooted in a common and 
pervasive metaphysical order (see note 22 above), the 
visible universe and the moral universe are truly one and 
the same universe (see Key-Text A, note 33) . This unity 
between the moral and visible realms is corroborated by 
Bonaventure's doctrine on the relationship of practical and 
speculative judgement and the preeminence given to natural 
law over the intellect and will of man (see Key-Text A, 
notes 21, 44, 46, 86 and 100). See !tin., IV, 6 (V, 307b), 
where Bonaventure speaks of the tropological, allegorical 
and analogical meanings implicit in Scripture. Because 
Scripture is an explication of the interiorly written law 
and the Book of Nature (see Key-Text B, note 16) these 
various spiritual meanings are evidently implicit in the 
natural order itself--although such meanings are now 
obscured due to original sin. On this score, let us call 
attention to the fact that Christ (Who is the Eternal Art, 
interior Teacher and Book written within and without; see 
Key-Text B, note 16) spoke in parables to communicate his 
moral teachings. In understanding the nature of seeds and 
soil, wine and skins, sheep and goats, bread, vines, salt, 
yeast, etc., we come to understand great practical (moral) 
truths. It is apparent to Christ, at least, that the 
understanding of the nature of things is indispensible for 
moral wisdom. For further discussion of Bonaventure'·s use of 
the book analogy, particularly with respect to the notion of 
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creation represent God and lead man to Him? Bonaventure 
asserts that because a cause shines in its effect, and the 
wisdom of the artisan is manifested in his work, God, Who is 
the artisan and cause of all creatures, is known through His 
creatures. 25 There emerges a double aspect to the being and 
medium, see G. Tavard, Transiency and Permanence, 12-15, 
118-19, 142, and 185-87. 
25See In .I Sent., d. 3, p. 1. a. un, q. 2, concl. (I, 
72a) : "Dicendum, quod quia relucet causa in effectu, et 
sapientia artificis manifestatur in opere, ideo Deus, qui 
est artifex et causae creaturae, per ipsam cognoscitur." Cf. 
ibid., dub. 1 (I, 77b). Cf. Brevil., II, 1 (V, 219b); see 
!tin., II, 12 (V, 303): "Significant autem huismodi 
creaturae huius mundi sensibilis invisibilia Dei, partim 
quia Deus est omnis creaturae origo, exemplar et finis, et 
omnis effectus est signum causae, et exemplatum exemplaris, 
et via finis, ad quern ducit." 
Bonaventure explains the twofold manner by which God is 
known through creatures; ibid, (I, 72a): "Et ad hoc duplex 
est ratio, una est proper convenientiam, alia propter 
indigentiam." A cause is thus recognized in and through its 
effect both positively whereby genuine perfections may be 
properly attributed to a cause (attribuendo) , and negatively 
(removendo) whereby the deprivations which characterize the 
effect qua effect are eliminated from the cause (removendo) ; 
ibid., ad 1 (I, 72a): "Dicendum quod dupliciter est 
cognoscere creaturam: vel quantum ad proprietates speciales 
et quae sunt imperfectionis, vel quantum ad conditiones 
generales, quae sunt completionis; si autem quantum ad 
speciales conditiones et imperfectionis: aut attribuendo 
Deo, aut removendo. Primo modo est via erroris, secundo modo 
via cognitionis; et sic cognoscitur Deus per ablationem." In 
short, we may say that in virtue of an effect's conformity 
to its cause (convenientia), we know in some manner--via 
attribution--what its cause is; in virtue of an effect's 
insufficiency (indigentia), we know--via remotion or 
ablation--only that its cause is. While the aspects of 
conventientia and indigentia are distinguishable in a 
creature, it can be seen, however, that both these aspects 
mutually determine each other. For example, man's indigence 
limits his perfection of intelligence to that of a rational 
(i.e., discursive) nature; correlatively, man's indigence is 
characterized as a intellectual indigence. Accordingly, 
man's indigence, qua intellectual, not only indicates a 
cause, but specifies that cause as intellectual (but not 
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intelligibility of a creature insofar as its perfection can 
be viewed either as a picture in itself or as an image which 
signifies something more than itself--namely, its cause. 
While the former sort of view does not lead to God, the 
latter aspect is indeed a way of knowing Him; for in knowing 
a creature qua image, every noble property it possesses is 
referred or attributed to God in a preeminent manner. 26 The 
rational) . 
Regarding the exemplarity of creation and the cosmic 
movement from and to God, see, A. Schaefer, "The Position 
and Function of Man," 264. For a comprehensive account of 
mediation between man and the world, see Schaefer's second 
chapter in Franciscan Studies 21 (1961), 310-382. 
26See In .I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, concl. (I, 
72b): "Si autem cognoscatur quoad conditiones perfectionis, 
sic potest esse dupliciter, sicut pictura, aut sicut imago; 
unde aut sistitur in pulcritudine creaturae, aut per illam 
tenditur in aliud. Si prime modo, tune est via deviationis; 
unde Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio: 'Vae his qui 
nutus tuos pro Te amant et aberrant in vestigiis tuis et 
derelinguunt Te ducem.' Si secundo modo, prout est via in 
aliud, sic est ratio cognoscendi per superexcellentiam, quia 
omnis proprietas nobilis in creatura Deo est attribuenda in 
summo; et sic patet illud." See Augustine, De Libero 
Arbitrio, II, c. 16, n. 43 (PL 32, 1264). Regarding the 
metaphysical dependency of an image upon its exemplar, see 
note 17 above and Key-Text B, note 32. For the corresponding 
epistemological implications of such a causal relationship 
between image and exemplar, see note 25 above. 
The attribution of a created perfection to its Creator 
is not by way of univocation, but rather by analogy which 
involves either a comparison of relations or a simple 
comparison as that of a copy in relation to its model. See 
In .I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, ad 3 (I, 72): 
"Dicendum, quod non est commune per univocationem, tamen est 
commune per analogiam, quae dicit habitudinem duorum ad duo, 
ut in nauta et doctore, vel unius ad unum, ut exemplaris ad 
exemplatum." Cf. In .I Sent., 48, a. 1, q. 1, concl (I, 852); 
In ll Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 394); ibid., d. 
25, a. 2, q. 1. For a discussion of analogy in Bonaventure, 
see Bernard Landry, "La notion d'analogie chez saint 
Bonaventure," Revue neoscolastigue de philosophie 24 (1922), 
138-69. 
149 
recognition of a creature qua creature (i.e., insufficient, 
mutable and finite), and the consequent reduction of created 
perfections to God, involve, however, metaphysical judgments 
which are determined and guided by natural law itself (see 
Key-Text A, notes 33 and 86). It seems, then, that the 
mediation of the entire created world is a function, so to 
speak, of a common metaphysical order (see note 22 above); 
and our corresponding recognition of this order is 
determined and directed by natural law; indeed, it appears 
that natural law is this order insofar as this universal 
order is written in man's heart (see [l] above). It is upon 
this double aspect of creation that the moral dimension of 
man turns; for either man can ascend to God through the 
mediation of the visible universe21 or fall into sin 
through the inordinate love of the creature. 20 Indeed, man 
as incarnate image (ad carnem) bears a relation with the 
visible world; but it is according to natural law that this 
27See In i Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, ad 4 (I, 
73a) : "Primus autem gradus quantum ad ascensum ad aspectum 
praesentiae est in consideratione visibilium, secundus in 
consideratione invisibilium, ut animae vel alterius 
substantiae spiritualis; tertius est ab anima in Deum, quia 
imago ab ipsa veritate formatur et Deo immediate 
coniungitur." 
28 See Key-Text A, notes 34 and 52. Upon the 
distinctions cited in notes 25 and 26 above, erroneous and 
sinful moral judgments can be seen to result from either (1) 
wrongly attributing the indigence of a creature to its 
cause, or from (2) ignoring the indigence of a creature and 
regarding the creature (or any created perfection) as 
sufficient in itself without due relation to its cause. See 
Key-Text A, note 58. 
150 
relation is rightly ordered. 
Let us sum up two fundamental characteristics of the 
natural law order as follows: (1) natural law involves a 
triple movement or dynamic of emanation, conformity, and 
return; this threefold ordination corresponds with 
Bonaventure's metaphysics as represented by efficient, 
exemplar-formal, and final causality (see notes 15 and 18 
above); (2) there are two different aspects of but one 
natural law whereby man is ordered to both God and the 
world: (a) as simple image, (i) man is directly ordered to 
God (see note 6 above) and (ii) man is mediator and 
(proximate) end to which the world is ordered (see note 20 
above); (b) as incarnate image, man is ordered to God 
through the mediation of the world. 29 
29Bonaventure explicitly distinguishes a twofold order 
of things, one within the universe and another with respect 
of their end. See In i Sent., d. 47, a. un., q. 3, concl. 
(I, 844a): "Duplex enim est ordo rerum: unus in universe, 
alter in finem." Cf. Ibid., d. 3, a. 1, dub. 4 (I, 80b) and 
d. 40, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1 (705b). Both kinds of orders are 
related in such a way that that one is conformed to the 
other. See In i Sent., d. 44, a. 1, q. 3, concl. (I, 786a) 
"Et sunt isti duo ordines ita coniuncti, ut unus alteri 
conformetur, et ordo parium in universe est propter 
ordinationem ad finem." Cf. In III Sent., d. 37, a. 2, q. 1, 
concl. (III, 822a): "Fides autem dictat, nos primo ordinari 
ad Deum, et deinde ad proximum secundum conformitatem ad 
Deum." Cf. InllSent., d. 9, a. un., q. 2, ad3 (II, 244b). 
Understood in this twofold way, the order of natural law may 
be said to possess both (1) a vertical axis (ad finem) 
insofar as man is directly ordered to God (and the visible 
world is ordered to man), and (2) a horizontal axis (ad 
invicem) insofar as man is orderd (to God) through the 
mediation of the visible world. See In II Sent., d. 1, p. 2, 
a. 2, intro. (II, 43a). Indeed, Bonaventure has stated that 
natural law regards both God and neighbor (see Key-Text A, 
note 36 and Key-Text B, notes 21-25). 
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Eternal Law 
In his Respondeo, Bonaventure describes natural law as 
the impression made in the soul by the eternal law (see [1] 
above). What, then, can be said of eternal law? While given 
only passing attention in the De Perfectione Evengelica, 
eternal law is treated more extensively in the Collationes 
in Hexaemeron (ca. 1273-74). Let us look, then, at this 
later work as an indication of what his notion of natural 
law--precisely as an impression of eternal law--will develop 
into. Here (in the Collationes) Bonaventure characterizes 
[Christ] as the conserving cause and governing leader of 
creation. He is the first in the government of all actions 
according to which things are subject to government. Unlike 
the artisan who leaves home but still preserves and manages 
his belongings, Christ is constantly present to creatures 
and has within Himself the most direct norms for them; nor 
is it in the same manner that a creature issues from the 
Creator according to expressive forms or reasons and that 
the rules for its preservation emanate from the divine mind 
according to the direction of eternal laws (aeternarum 
Regarding Bonaventure's doctrine of order in the 
universe, see E. Gilson, La philosophie ~ saint 
Bonaventure, 144-45; A. Schaefer, "The Position and Function 
of Man," ch. 1, 273-74. The horizontal and vertical_aspects 
of order are noted also by Aristotle; see Physica, II, c. 2 
(194b12): "Man is begotten by man and by the sun as well." 
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regularum) . 3° Christ is said to possess these direct norms 
and He inscribed (superscribit) them first in human nature, 
next in industry or progress, then in grace, and finally in 
glory. In every state, He issues His norms which, by 
necessity, He possess within Himself . 31 These norms flow 
from God's will which is the first and supreme cause of all 
species and motions; hence, there is no event in creation 
that does not proceed either by conunand or permission from 
the inner, invisible, and rational authority of God; nor 
does anything occur which does not conform to His ineffable 
justice according to which rewards and penalties, favors and 
30See Hex., XII, 4 (V, 385a): "Quia [Christus] est 
causa conservans, est dux gubernans. Praeest enim ad 
dirigendum onmes actus, secundum quod gubernabiles sunt; non 
sicut artifex, qui domum dimittit, sed res conservat et 
dirigit. Idec habet apud se normas directissimas. Nee est 
idem modus, ut creatura manat a Creatore secundum formas vel 
rationes expressivas, et secundum quod a mente divina 
emanant regulae ad conservationem ipsarum secundum 
directionem aeternarum regularum." This passage underscores 
the Aristotelian doctrine that a cause is present to its 
effect (see Key-Text B, note 32). Unlike the example of the 
artisan with respect to his belongings, creatures for 
Bonaventure require the continual presence of God to sustain 
them in being. 
31See Hex., XII, 7 (V, 385b): "Item, habet normas 
directissimas; unde Apostolus [Heb. 8, 10] et Ieremias [31, 
33] dicunt: 'Dabe leges meas in visceribus eorum, et in 
corde superscribam eas.' Superscribit enim prime in [humana] 
natura; secundo, in industria seu in progressu; tertio, in 
gratia; quarto, in gloria. In quolibet statu dat normas 
suas: ergo necesse est ut in se habeat eas." 
Insofar as human industry involves deliberation, 
knowledge is implicit; hence, the inscription of eternal 
norms into human nature, human industry, grace, and glory 
corroborates our trif old distinction of natural law 
according to essence, knowledge/precept, and actuation or 
perfection (see Key-Text A, note 100) . 
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punishments are bestowed. 32 
Eternal Law and the Human Soul 
How are we to understand the influence of eternal law 
upon the human soul? Bonaventure states that all the 
sciences--natural, rational, and moral--have certain and 
infallible rules which descend as rays of light into our 
minds from the eternal law. 33 Such rules are necessary, 
immutable, and eternal since they are uncreated and 
eternally exist in the eternal art by which, through which, 
and according to which, all things possessing form are 
formed. 34 Thus, the rules of divine law are said to bind 
32See Brevil., I, 9, (V, 217b) : " ... secundum quae 
disponuntur a voluntate beneplaciti quaecumque in universe 
fiunt. 'Est enim voluntas Dei prima et summa causa omnium 
[corporalium] specierum ac motionum. Nihil enim fit 
visibiliter et sensibiliter in ista totius creaturae 
amplissima quadam immensaque republica, quod non de 
interiore invisibili atque intelligibili aula summi 
Imperatoris aut iubeatur, aut permittatur, secundum 
ineffabilem iustitiam praemiorum atque poenarum, gratiarum 
et retributionum.'" See Augustine, De Trinitate, III, c. 4, 
n. 9 (PL 42, 873), whose phrasing is edited here by 
Bonaventure. 
33See Itin., III, 7 (V, 305b) : "Omnes au tern hae 
scientiae habent regulas certas et infallibiles tanquam 
lumina et radios decendentes a lege aeterna in mentem 
nostram." See ibid., III, 6 (V, 305b) where Bonaventure 
catalogues the various branches of science which are 
illumined by the light of eternal law. 
34See Itin., II, 9 (V, 302a): "Ut dicit Augustinus, 
'nullus de eis iudicat, sed per illas:' necesse est, eas 
esse incommutabiles et incorruptibiles tanquam necessarias, 
incoarctabiles tanquam incircumscriptas, interminabiles 
tanquam aeternas, ac per hoc indivisibiles tanquam 
intellectuales et incorporeas, non factas, sed increatas, 
aeternaliter existentes in arte aeterna, a qua, per quam et 
secundum quam formantur formosa omnia." 
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us; and according to these unchanging rules the mind knows 
and judges that which could not be otherwise--namely, that 
the supreme principle must be venerated, that the supreme 
truth must be believed and assented to, and that the supreme 
Good must be supremely desired and loved. 35 Eternal law is 
thus equated with the divine exemplars and hence with Christ 
Who is the exemplar of all things and the light and 
principle of all knowledge and justice. 36 Indeed, we may 
say that eternal law is the divine light of Christ inasmuch 
as this light is the order by which man's soul is formed, 
35See Hex., II, 9 (V, 338a): "Haec igitur apparet 
immutabilis in regulis divinarum legum, quae nos ligant. 
Regulae istae mentibus rationalibus insplendentes sunt omnes 
illi modi, per quos mens cognoscit et iudicat id quod aliter 
esse non potest, utpote quod summum principium summe 
venerandum; quod summo vero sum.me credendum et assentiendum; 
quod summum bonum summe desiderandum et diligendum. 11 In 
Bonaventure's view, then, every science is a way to God (see 
note 41 below) . 
36See Hex., XII, 2 (V, 385a) : " [Christus est] exemplar 
omnium rerum ... conditor rerum, gubernator actuum, doctor 
intellectuum, iudex meritorum. Et ex hoc intelligitur, quod 
est causa causarum et ars praestantissime originans, dux 
providissime gubernans, lux manifestissime declarans vel 
repraesentans, ius rectissime praemians et iudicans. 11 See 
note 40 below. See Key-Text A, note 73 with regard to God as 
intimate to the soul. See Brevil., I, 8, (V, 216b): 11 Etquia 
ipsa non tantum est cognoscitiva, sed est etiam ratio 
cognoscendi; ideo, in quantum est ratio cognoscendi omnia 
cognita, dicitur lux; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi visa 
et approbata, dicitur speculum; in quantum est ratio 
cognoscendi praevisa et disposita, dicitur exemplar; in 
quantum vero est ratio cognoscendi praedestinata et 
reprobata, dicitur liber vitae.--Est igitur liber vitae 
respectu rerum, ut redeuntium; exemplar, ut exeuntium; 
speculum, ut euntium; lux vero respectu omnium. 11 See also 
Key-Text A, note 100 on this point. Cf. In IV Sent., d. 43, 
a. 2, q. 1-3. Cf. !tin., II, 13 (V, 303a) as cited in note 
40 below. 
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rectified, and perfected. 
It is by virtue of eternal law that Bonaventure solves 
the problem of certitude: since our mind is itself mutable, 
it cannot see unchanging truth except by some unchanging 
light; and it is impossible that such a light be a mutable 
creature. Now certain judgments are made through some law; 
but no one can judge with certitude unless he is certain 
that such a law is right and that he must not judge it; but 
our mind judges itself. Since, then, it cannot judge the law 
by which it judges, that law is superior to our mind; and 
through this higher law one judges according as this law is 
impressed upon us. Nothing, however, is superior to the 
human mind except Him Who made it. 37 Thus, Bonaventure 
concludes, certitude of human knowledge is secured only by 
way of the motivating and regulative action (regulans et 
motiva) of the eternal reasons upon [human] reason. 38 
37See !tin., III, 3 (V, 305a): "Iudicium autem certum 
de consiliabilibus est per aliquam legem. Nullus autem 
certitudinalier iudicat per legem, nisi certus sit, quod 
illa lex recta est, et quod ipsam iudicare non debet; sed 
mens nostra iudicat de se ipsa; cum igitur non possit 
iudicare de lege, per quam iudicat; lex illa superior est 
mente nostra, et per hanc iudicat, secundum quod sibi 
impressa est. Nihil autem est superius mente humana, nisi 
solus ille qui fecit earn." 
38See De Scientia Christi (ca. 1255-56), IV, concl. (V, 
23b): "Et ideo est tertius modus intelligendi, quasi medium 
tenens inter utramque viam [namely, between acquired 
sensible knowledge and the grace of infused knowledge] , 
scilicet quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario 
requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva." G. 
Tavard comments in this regard "that the certainty of human 
knowledge is reached through an impression of the divine 
truth in the mind .... Now and again, such 'similitudes' of 
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In this connection let us consider the nature of the 
human soul as pertaining to its manner of knowing. 
Bonaventure states that every spiritual substance is light; 
hence the Psalm: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is 
signed upon us." At the same time, the soul is a mirror 
(speculum) since it receives and represents all things; 
further, the soul has the nature of light so that it may 
pass judgment on things; lastly, since the spiritual 
creature is both light and mirror containing images of 
things, it is image too. 39 
the 'eternal reasons' are called by St. Bonaventure 'innate 
species,' in contradistinction to the 'abstract species' in 
knowledge. This nomenclature should not be misunderstood: 
these 'similitudes' do not represent the objects to which 
they correspond. They are but 'impressions' that guide the 
soul in order to confer certainty to the knowledge it 
acquires by way of abstraction." Transiency and Permanence, 
68-69. It must be stressed that the influence of the eternal 
reasons upon the soul of man means for Bonaventure the 
direct influence of God without any created mediation 
standing between God and man; for if anything created stood 
between God and man, certain knowledge for Bonaventure would 
be rendered impossible. See In i Sent., d. 3, a. 1, q. 3, 
ad 1 (I, 75); Hex., II, 10 (V, 338a). On this point, see E. 
Gilson, La philosophie de saint Bonaventure, 317; cf. note 
42 below. 
39See Hex., XII, 16 (V, 386b): "Omnis substantia 
spiritualis lumen est; unde in Psalmo [4, 7]: 'Signatum est 
super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.'--Simul etiam cum hoc 
est speculum, quia omnia recipit et repraesentat; et habet 
naturam luminis, ut et iudicet de rebus. Totus enim mundus. 
describitur in anima.--Et est etiam imago. Quia ergo est 
lumen et speculum habens rerum imagines, ideo est imago." 
That the soul for Bonaventure possesses its own natural 
light as distinct from the light of Christ is evidenced by 
his warning that the soul can fall into error and sin by 
following its own light (see Key-Text A, note 35) . See also 
Itin., IV, 2 (V, 306a): "Ideo, quantumcumque sit illuminatus 
quis lumine naturae et scientiae acquisitae, non potest 
intrare in se, ut in se ipso delectetur in Domino, nisi 
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How, then, do the eternal reasons engage the soul and 
secure for it certain knowledge? Bonaventure states that 
Christ Himself Who is intimately present to every soul 
shines from within our mind upon the obscure species of our 
understanding. In this way, these obscure species impressed 
upon the soul, mixed with the phantasms derived from the 
sensible world, are illumined by the radiance of His most 
clear species so that the intellect understands. 
Accordingly, the mind is led back to the eternal art as to 
light and truth and, consequently, it attains certitude; 40 
mediante Christo." With regard to the images or similitudes 
which the mirror of the soul contains, Bonaventure 
distinguishes between species abstracted from sense 
experience and those innate species as impressed upon the 
soul by the light of the eternal reasons (see notes 31, 33, 
35, and 38 above; Key-Text A, notes 26 and 74). As received 
into the soul, both kinds of species contribute to the 
quality or character of the soul as mirror and image. See 
Key-Text A, notes 35 and 102 on this matter. Cf. In X Sent., 
d. 3, p. l,· a. un. q. 1, fund. 2 (I, 68b): "Intellectus enim 
non intelligit nisi quod est sibi proportionabile, et quod 
sibi aliquo modo unitur, et de quo iudicat, et a quo acies 
intelligentiae informatur." Cf. Key-Text A, note 74. 
40 See Hex., XII, 5 (V, 385a): "Christus est doctor 
interius, nee scitur aliqua veritas nisi per eum, non 
loquendo, sicut nos, sed interius illustrando; et ideo 
necesse est, ut habeat clarissimas species apud se, neque 
tamen ab alio acceperit. Ipse enim intimus est omni animae 
et suis speciebus clarissimis refulget super species 
intellectus nostri tenebrosas; et sic illustrantur species 
illae obtenebratae, admixtae obscuritati phantasmatum, ut 
intellectus intelligat." See De Scientia Christi, IV, concl. 
(V, 23b): 11 ••• quod in huiusmodi cognitione recurratur ad 
artem supernam ut ad lucem et veritatem: lucem, inquam, 
dantem infallibilitatem scienti, et veritatem dantem 
immutabilitatem scibili." See Itin., II, 13 (V, 303a): "Deo 
autem gratias per Iesum Christum, Dominum nostrum, qui nos 
de tenebris transtulit in admirabile lumen suum, dum per 
haec lumina exterius data ad speculum mentis nostrae, in quo 
relucent divina, disponimur ad reintrandum." See Dom. III 
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for as the impression of a species upon a corporeal organ 
leads to its origin--namely, to its sensible object of 
knowledge--so the radiance of the eternal reasons within the 
mirror of the soul leads the soul back to God as primordial 
source and object. 41 However, the light of Christ, while 
Aav. Sermo. 14 (IX, 73a): "ldeo non nisi per veritatem 
primam potest illuminari nee apprehendi, et ideo signantur 
lux aeterna dicit: 'Ego sum lux mundi; qui sequitur me, ut 
omnem veritatem aliam cognoscat per me et per earn 
illuminetur a me, non ambulat in tenebris, sed habebit lumen 
vitae.' lpsa enim prima lux est sicut speculum tersum, in 
quo anima rationalis videt et cognoscit se et alia a se." 
See ibid., III, 1 (V, 303a); Hex., XII, 8 (V, 385b). 
Bonaventure follows here the Augustinian principle that the 
Word is the Sun of the mind. Cf. Regis Jolivet, Dieu. Soleil 
des Esprits (Paris: Desclee, 1934). 
41See Itin., II, 7 (V, 301a): "Nam cum species 
apprehensa sit similitude in medio genita et deinde ipsi 
organo impressa et per illam impressionem in suum 
principium, scilicet in obiectum cognoscendum, ducat; 
manifeste insinuat, quod illa lux aeterna generat ex se 
similitudinem seu splendorem coaequalem, consubstantialem et 
coaeternalem; et quod ille qui est imago invisibilis Dei et 
splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius, qui ubique est 
per primam sui generationem, sicut obiectum in toto medio 
suam generat similitudinem, per gratiam unionis unitur, 
sicut species corporali organo, individuo rationalis 
naturae, ut per illam unionem nos reduceret ad Patrem sicut 
ad fontale principium et obiectum." See In ll Sent., d. 24, 
p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (II, 563a): "Si autem sunt 
similitudines, sic sunt in genere per reductionem et 
reducuntur ad idem genus, sub quo continentur illa quorum 
sunt similitudiner." 
Bonaventure further identifies the exemplary virtues--
moderation, prudence, justice, and fortitude--as the first 
to appear in the eternal light; these are impressed upon the 
soul by that light and they descend into the cognitive, 
affective, and operative faculties. See Hex., VI, 6 (V, 
361b) : "Dico ergo quod illa lux aeterna est exemplar 
omnium." Ibid., VI, 7 (V, 361b): "Apparent ergo primo in 
luce aeterna virtutes exemplares sive exemplaria virtutum." 
Ibid., VI, 9 (V, 362a) : "Ecce iustitia .... Disponit omnia 
suaviter .... Sobrietatem enim et prudentiam et iustitiam et 
virtutem docet, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus." 
Ibid., VI, 10 (V, 362a): "Haec imprimuntur in anima per 
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immediately present to and active upon the soul, is 
nevertheless inaccessible for any direct vision of the mind 
in this life; rather, it is only indirectly known by way of 
the mirror of our soul which reflects its radiance. 42 
illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in cognitivam, in 
affectivam, in operativam." These virtues, then, flow from 
the eternal light, penetrate the hemisphere of our mind, and 
bring the soul back to its origin just as a vertical or 
direct ray of light is reflected back upon its descending 
path; See ibid., VI, 24 (V, 363b): "Hae virtutes fluunt a 
luce aeterna in hemisphaerium nostrae mentis et reducunt 
animam in suam originem, sicut radius perpendicularis sive 
directus eadem via revertitur, qua incessit." Note that 
justice for Bonaventure is that which governs everything 
well; further, all virtues reduce to justice. See In III 
Sent., d. 33, a. un., q. 4, ad. 4 (III, 721b): "Sic 
intelligendum est in humilitate et patientia et aliis etiam 
specialibus virtutibus, quae reduci habent ad ipsam 
iustitiam, secundum quod est virtus cardinalis et 
specialis." Insofar, then, as (1) justice holds a preeminent 
position above all norms in the exemplary light and (2) 
justice is equated with natural law (see Key-Text B, notes 
17 and 18), law and morality evidently hold primacy over all 
other aspects of human life (see Key-Text A, conclusion and 
note 45). See Hex., VI, 19 (V, 363a): "Hoc totum est per 
regulam rationis .... et quantumcumque homo habeat alias 
scientias, nisi habeat virtutes, non habet vitam; sicut, 
quantumcumque habeat stellas, nisi habeas solem in duodecim 
signis, non habebis diem." 
42 See Hex., XII, 11 (V, 386a): "Haec lux est 
inaccessibilis, et tamen proxima animae, etiam plus quam 
ipsa sibi. Est etiam inalligabilis, et tamen summe intima." 
See ibid., V, 33 (V, 359a): "Primo ergo anima videt se sicut 
speculum, deine Angelos sive Intelligentias sicut lumina et 
sicut medium delativum; sive videt in se sicut in speculo, 
in Intelligentia sicut in medio delativo lucis aeternae et 
contemparativo; deine in luce aeterna tanquam in obiecto 
fontano, quantum ad illas sex conditiones dictas, et 
rationabiliter et experimentaliter et intelligentialiter." 
See ibid., v, 29-32 (V, 359) where Bonaventure describes the 
stages of reasoning, experience, and understanding by which 
the soul infers from the creature to God. See De Scientia 
Christi, IV, concl. (V, 23a): " ... ratio aeterna ut regulans 
et ratio motive, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda 
claritate, sed cum ratione creata, et ut ex parte a ·nobis 
contuita secundum statum viae." Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 
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Let us summarize the meaning and significance of 
eternal law as follows. Insofar as it is equated with the 
divine light of Christ, eternal law is that necessary, 
immutable, and eternal order by which all creatures are 
formed and preserved in being (see notes 30 and 34 above); 
constantly present to and active upon the soul (see note 42 
above) eternal law is the motivating and regulative 
influence which secures certain and infallible knowledge for 
man (see note 38 above) and which guides him by way of 
justice and virtue to his proper end (see notes 35, 36 and 
41 above); hence eternal law is that order which forms, 
preserves, illumines, guides, rectifies, and perfects man 
(see note 31 above) . But granted eternal law is directly 
present and active upon the soul, nevertheless it is only 
II, l; cf. Text-B, note 31 regarding contuition. See In I 
Sent., d. 3, a. un., q. 3, ad 1 (I, 75a): Deus est medium 
efficiens et obiectum ipsius mentis." Cf. In ll Sent., d. 3, 
p. 2, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 124a), where Bonaventure 
explains that although God acts directly on the soul, He is 
not directly perceived by the soul. See ibid., d. 23, a. 2, 
q. 3, concl. (II, 545a): "In statu vero innocentiae et 
naturae lapsae videtur Deus mediante speculo; sed 
differenter, quia in statu innocentiae videbatur Deus per 
speculum clarum; nulla enim erat in anima peccati nebula. In 
statu vero miseriae videtur per speculum obscuratum per 
peccatum primi hominis; et ideo nunc videtur per speculum et 
in aenigmata." Cf. In I Sent., d. 3, a. un, q. 3, ad 1 (I, 
75a); In ll Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 3, ad 6 (III, 124a). See 
also De Myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1 (V, 49-50), where 
Bonaventure further discusses the innate but indirect 
knowledge of God. Cf. Key-Text A, note 85. Hence, 
Bonaventure's theory of knowledge cannot rightly be regarded 
as an ontologism; see Key-Text A, notes 33 and 85. See P. J. 
M. Bissen, "De la contuition," 559-69; cf. P. Jean de Dieu, 
"L'intuition sans concept et la theorie bonaventurienne de 
la contemplation," E:tudes franciscaines 7 (1956), 66--74, 
133-54. 
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known indirectly by way of its impressed similitude (see 
note 42 above) ; it is this impression of eternal law which 
Bonaventure identifies as natural law (see [1] above) . 
Eternal Law and Natural Law 
What, then, constitutes the distinction and 
relationship between eternal law and natural law? Since 
natural law is said to be the abiding impression (impressio) 
made in the soul by the eternal and unchanging eternal law, 
natural law must be an indelible trace or sign of that 
eternal and unchanging law; as such, natural law is akin to 
eternity and immutability; 43 accordingly, natural law is 
that by which man is preserved in being, made just, and 
perfectly ordered; 44 nevertheless, as created, natural law 
43As the impressio of eternal law, natural law is the 
effectus of eternal law; as an effect, natural law signifies 
its cause--namely, eternal law. See Itin., II, 12 (V, 303): 
" ... omnis effectus est signum causae .... "See notes 17, 25 
and 26 above. 
44See Key-Text A, note 72 and Key-Text B, note 18; see 
note 31 above. In a different context, Bonaventure employs 
the term impressio with respect to the preservation and 
nourishment an agent supplies to an indigent recipient. See 
Itin., II, 5 (V, 301a): "[Proportionalitas] attenditur, in 
quantum tenet rationem efficaciae et impressionis, quae tune 
est proportionalis, quando agens imprimendo replet 
indigentiam patientis, et hoc est salvare et nutrire ipsum." 
The term impressio for Bonaventure evidently carries within 
its meaning the integrity and sustenance a cause supplies to 
its effect. Accordingly, natural law qua impressio implies 
eternal law (qua cause) as the preserving and nourishing 
influence upon the soul (qua effect) . See notes 30 and 43 
above. Recall in this connection the meaning of natural law 
habitus as that specifying indigentia by which we are 
rendered capable of God; see Key-Text A, notes 57, 61, 66 
and section [4) . Thus, while the term impressio connotes the 
bearing a cause has upon its recipient effect, the term 
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must still bear in itself the qualities of temporality and 
mutability. 45 As an effect and sign of eternal law, natural 
law thus cannot be wholly identical with eternal law--that 
is, we cannot simply say that natural law ~ eternal law qua 
present in the human soul; but neither can we understand 
natural law as opposed to or merely parallel with eternal 
law as if the two were unrelated orders; rather, as a 
created impression, natural law is produced (facta) by 
eternal law and is reduced (reducantur) to eternal law (see 
note 18 above and Key-Text B, note 32). We may say, then, 
that natural law participates (participat) eternal law by 
virtue of a trifold relationship of efficient, formal-
habitus appears to stress the disposition and inclination 
that effect bears towards its cause. Hence natural law qua 
impressio indicates God primarily as efficient cause; 
natural law qua habitus indicates God primarily as final 
cause. See note 18 above concerning natural law in relation 
to God as efficient, exemplar, and final Cause. 
45G. Tavard writes: "As a result and in spite of the 
certainty which affects knowledge when 'eternal reasons' 
play their role, there remains in all perceptions of the 
truth of creatures an element of fleetingness which is part 
and parcel of man's intellectual atmosphere .... This 
impression of evanescence offers man an occasion to conceive 
of and desire a nobler kind of truth." Transiency and 
Permanence, 88. See Dom., III, sermo 14 (IX, 73a): "Omnis 
enim veritas praeter primam semper est in fluxu usque ad 
illam. 11 Hence, while natural law is necessary for the 
perfection of man, he still requires divine illumination and 
grace "sine qua non opera hominum vana sunt, etsi etiam 
videantur laudabilia. 11 See In II Sent., d. 25, p. 1, dub. 1, 
resp. (II, 607b). See note 47 below and Key-Text A, ~ote 100 
in this regard. 
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exemplar, and final causality. 46 This point is corroborated 
and clarified by Bonaventure's discussion of charity where 
he speaks of a certain truth as a similitude of charity. 
Such truth is said to be impressed in the soul by truth 
itself (see Key-Text A, note 74). Thus, insofar as natural 
law is equated with this impressed truth (qua rectitude of 
will), it follows that natural law is itself a similitude 
and hence an image or sign of divine truth. 47 For this 
46For a discussion of Bonaventure's doctrine of 
participation, see In i Sent., d. 22, dub. 4, resp. (I, 
400b) : "Participare est partem capere, et si partem capit, 
ergo minus est quam totum." Cf. In ll Sent., d, 34, a. 2, q. 
1, fund. 5 (II, 810b): "Omne dictum per participationem · 
reducibile est ad dictum per essentiam." De Myst. Trinit., 
q. 3, a. 1, ad 11 (V, 73): "Dicendum quod dupliciter dicitur 
aliquid participari, scilicet secundum formam, sicut genus 
participatur a speciebus; vel secundum influentiam, sicut 
causa participatur g_ suis effectibus." Cf. In ll Sent., d. 
34, dub. 3, resp. (II, 817). See !tin., II, 12 (V, 303): 
" ... omnis effectus est signum causae, et exemplatum 
exemplaris, et via finis, ad guem ducit." Insofar, then, as 
(the impression of) natural law is (1) an effect of eternal 
law (see note 44 above) and is thus (2) a sign of its cause 
(see note 47 below) which is (3) reducible to its cause, we 
may properly say that natural law participates eternal law. 
Cf. note 57 below where natural law is implicated as a 
participation of eternal law in connection with the function 
of memory. We will explore in more detail the philosophical 
notion of participation in our study of St. Thomas, Key-Text 
B, notes 24-32. For further study on participation in the 
thought of St. Bonaventure, see John Quinn, The Historical 
Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy, 207, 252-54, 
383-58, 517-18, 573-4. 
47Bonaventure argues similarly with respect to justice 
which is known not from an abstracted species but rather 
according to what is above the soul--namely the eternal 
reason. See De Scientia Christi., IV, 23 (V, 19b): 
"[Iustitia] non per speciem acceptam ab extra, cum non 
habeat similitudinem abstrahibilem per sensum: ergo necesse 
est, quod cognoscat illam per aliquid aliud, quod est supra 
intellectum suum .... Restat ergo, quod cognoscatur in 
ratione aeterna. Similiter potest argui de qualibet forma 
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reason, we must say that natural law is not the divine light 
per se, but rather an image--created by the divine light--
which signifies the divine. 
Natural Law and the Apex Mentis 
Let us take a closer look at the interface of eternal 
law and natural law within the human soul. Bonaventure 
concurs with Augustine that the most intimate part of the 
soul is its summit, and the more a power is interior, the 
higher it is. 48 It is at this interior summit that the 
human soul most approximates God so that the more the soul 
turns inward, the more it ascends and is united to eternity. 
Further, it is precisely at this core and summit where God 
is said to penetrate and operate upon soul. 49 Recall in 
intelligibili substantiali, ac per hoc de omni cognitione 
certitudinali." See Key-Text A, note 74 where we have shown 
that the soul innately knows natural law (qua rectitude of 
will or charity) in knowing its own essence. Consequently, 
one might argue as follows: if natural law can be recognized 
by the soul by virtue of knowing its own essence, then 
nothing requires natural law to be anything more than the 
soul's created essence. However, since all knowledge for 
Bonaventure depends on divine illumination (see note 36 
above), it follows that self-knowledge--and, hence, 
knowledge of natural law (or perhaps better stated, 
knowledge of its true significance)--depends on divine 
illumination. See note 45 above and Key-Text A, note 100. 
48 See Hex., XII, 16 (V, 387a) : "Secundum Augustinum, 
intimum animae est eius summum; quanto potentia intimior, 
tanto sublimior." Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, XII, c. 1, 
n. 1 (PL 42, 997); ibid., XIV, c. 8, n. 11 (PL 42, 1044). 
49See In II Sent., d, 8, p. 2, a. un., q. 2, concl. 
(II, 226b): "Dicendum quod illabi aliquid alicui importat, 
quod illud intimum sit ei et quod intime operetur in illo; 
nihil autem tale est respectu animae nisi solus Deus: ideo 
solus divinus spiritus animae potest illabi.--In anima 
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this connection the supremacy which characterizes natural 
law in relation to the intellect and will; for if natural 
law is rightly said to comprehend and regulate conscience 
and synderesis, then natural law must be distinguished by a 
certain preeminence and transcendence with respect to these 
faculties (see Key-Text A, note 45; Key-Text B, note 26); 
indeed, in separate discussions, Bonaventures identifies 
both superior reason and the spark of synderesis with the 
apex of the mind (apex mentis) ; 50 and since natural law is 
that which encompasses and directs both the intellect and 
namque humana idem est intimum et supremum; et hoc patet, 
quia secundum sui supremum maxime approximat Deo, similiter 
secundum sui intimum; unde quanto magis redit ad interiora, 
tanto magis ascendit et unitur aeternis. Et quia solus Deus 
superior est mente humana secundum sui supremum, solus Deus 
potest menti esse intimus; et ideo illabi spiritui rationali 
est divinae substantiae proprium. 11 Cf. In ll Sent., d. 10, 
a. 2, q. 2, concl. (II, 265b): 11 Dicendum quod animam quoad 
superiorem portionem rationis illuminare solius Dei est 
proprium. 11 
50See In ll Sent. I d. 24, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 1 
(II, 574a): 11 Ieremiae 2, 16: 'Filii Mempheos et Taphnes 
constupraverunt te usque ad verticem.' Si ergo vertex, 
secumdum quod Sancti exponunt, dicitur ibi apex mentis sive 
superior portio rationis, videtur quod et illa habeat per 
peccatum constuprari et foedari. 11 See I tin., I, 6 (V, 297b) : 
"Iuxta igitur sex gradus ascensionis in Deum sex sunt gradus 
potentiarum animae per quos ascendimus ab imis ad summa, ab 
exterioribus ad intima, a temporalibus conscendimus ad 
aeterna, scilicet sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, 
intelligentia et apex mentis seu synderesis scintilla. Hos 
gradus in nobis habemus plantatos per naturam, deformatos 
per culpam, ref ormatos per gratiam; purgandos per iustitiam, 
exercendos per scientiam, perficiendos per sapientiam. 11 
Properly speaking, the apex mentis is associated with 
synderesis since it holds a supremacy over conscience. See 
Key-Text A, note 39. See also In II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 
1, ad 4 (II, 911a) where the relation of synderesis to 
conscience is compared with that of charity to faith or of 
affectus to the practical intellect. 
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will (and therefore superior reason and synderesis; see Key-
Text A, notes 35 and 42) it follows that natural law holds 
that place within the soul which is at once most intimate 
and supreme . 51 
51See Key-Text A, note 45; Key-Text B, note 26. 
Moreover, Bonaventure states that the visage of the mind is 
the superior part of the soul by which it is destined to see 
God (face to face). See In Comm. Eccl., VIII, 1 (VI, 65a). 
Thus, since natural law is that by which this vision will be 
realized (see Key-Text A, note 100; Key-Text B, notes 32 and 
34), one can equate natural law with the visage of the mind; 
indeed, from his origin, man bears the light of the divine 
visage (or face of God, vultus divini) which renders man an 
image of God through a conformity of order (see Key-Text A, 
note 80); but since natural law is evidently that which 
constitutes this order (see Key-Text A, note 81), natural 
law must be the image of the face of God; hence, it can be 
said that man is destined to see God face to face by virtue 
of natural law. 
The supremacy of natural law is suggested in yet 
another way: as justice and charity are truths impressed 
upon the soul from above (see note 47 above and Key-Text A, 
note 72), so the intellect, Bonaventure states, is informed 
(informatur) by a certain notion (notitia) which is a 
similitude of God. Such an impressed truth is inferior to 
God, but nevertheless is superior to the soul because it 
makes the soul better. See In .I.I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, ad 5 
(II, 70): "Dicendum quod Deus est praesens ipsi animae et 
omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est necesse, ab 
ipso abstrahi similitudinem, per quam cognoscatur; 
nihilominus tamen, dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, 
intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut 
similitudino quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior 
Deo, quia in natura inferiori est, superior tamen anima, 
quia facit ipsam meliorem." See Key-Text A, note 29. 
Insofar, then, as it is an impressed truth, natural law is 
apparently superior to the soul since it makes the soul 
better. This superiority to the soul, does not mean, 
however, that natural law is an entity separate or other 
than the soul itself. Further, in light of the various 
relations we have seen between natural law and other 
impressed similitudes such as justice and charity, we are 
led to consider natural law (qua habitus per naturale 
originem) as either (1) the totality of impressed 
similitudes which inform the soul from above or perhaps (2) 
a common impressed similitude which the intellect and will 
may grasp under a multitude of different aspects such as 
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Natural Law and the Imago Dei 
Let us consider this interior primacy of natural law as 
it relates to the human person precisely as image. Although 
the whole soul is God's image, man is properly said to be an 
image of God in virtue of his unity of essence and trinity 
of powers--namely, memory, intellect, and will. By the mark 
of this resemblance, the soul is destined to be sealed by 
the Highest Trinity. 52 As we have seen, this resemblance is 
realized to the extent that the intellect and will function 
together in the act of deliberation according to the 
direction of natural law qua habitus per innatam 
dispositionem or collectio praecepta (see Key-Text A, notes 
44, 96, and 99). Right deliberation thus involves not merely 
the conjunction of intellect and will, but rather an inward 
God, truth, good, beauty, justice, charity, etc. There is 
evidence to suggest the latter alternative since natural law 
directs both intellect and will; hence natural law must in 
itself be undifferentiated with respect to being qua true 
and good (see Key-Text A, note 45). Cf. Key-Text A, note 25, 
where Bonaventure speaks of the primary dictate of nature 
(primo dictamine naturae) ; such an expression suggests a 
hierarchy of other precepts which are rooted in, flow from, 
and reduce to a common and comprehensive principle. 
52See In III Sent., d. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1 (III, 15b): 
"Imago de ratione sui dicit expressam repraesentationem, non 
secundum totum illud, in quo est imago, sed secundum aliquid 
sui." See Brevil., II, 9, 3 (V, 227a): "Quia forma 
beatif icabilis est capex Dei per memoriam, intellligentiam 
et voluntatem; et hoc est esse ad imaginem Trinitatis 
propter unitatem in essentia et trinitatem in potentiis." 
See In .I Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1 concl. (I, 89b): "Nam 
proprie loquendo, imago consistit in unitate essentiae et 
trinitate potentiarum, secundum quas anima nata est ab illa 
summa Trinitate sigillari imagine similitudinis." Cf. Key-
Text A, note 80. 
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ascent toward the apex of the mind and a resulting 
convergence of these two faculties upon natural law (as 
known and commanded) . In this deliberate embrace of natural 
law (as knowledge and precept), natural law represents the 
formal principle of resemblance to God which now may be 
regarded as a habitus per acguisitam dispositionem in the 
order of operation. 53 But simply as the innate habitus in 
the soul encompassing intellect and will--prior to any act 
of knowledge and deliberation--natural law must be regarded 
as a habitus per naturalem originem (see Key-Text A, note 
67). One might say, then, that the habitus of natural law 
per acguisitam dispositionem is nothing other than the 
participation of intellect and will (through deliberative 
operation) in the natural law habitus per naturalem originem 
(see note 46 above); this participation is effected through 
those natural law precepts which are derived from the 
knowledge one's own nature as disposing and inclining 
towards God. 
Natural Law and Memory 
Now, in addition to these two powers (intellect and 
will) the image of God also includes memory. What, then, can 
be said of memory and its relationship to natural law? As 
explained in the Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, the operation 
53See Key-Text A, notes 43 and 100; cf. G. Tavard, 
Transiency and Permanence, 98-100, for a concurring. 
discussion on this point. 
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of memory for Bonaventure is retention and representation, 
not only of things present, corporeal, and temporal, but 
also of past and future things, simple and everlasting; for 
memory retains the past through recollection, the present 
through reception, the future through foresight. It retains 
the simple, as the principles of continuous and discrete 
quantities--the point, the instant, the unit--without which 
it is impossible to remember or to think about those things 
whose source is in these. 54 
Memory also retains the eternal principles and axioms 
of the sciences and retains them eternally. For it can never 
be so forgetful of them while it uses reason that it will 
not approve of them when heard and assent to them, not as 
though perceiving something new, but as if it were 
recognizing them as innate and familiar, just as when 
someone says to another, "One must either affirm or deny," 
or, "every whole is greater than its part," or any other 
54See Itin., III, 2 (V, 303b): "Operatic autem memoriae 
est retentio et repraesentatio non solum praesentium, 
corporalium et temporalium, verum etiam succedentium, 
simplicium et sempiternalium.--Retinet namque memoria 
praeterita per recordationem, praesentia per susceptionem, 
futura per praevisionem.--Retinet etiam simplicia, sicut 
principia quantitatum continuarum et discretarum, ut 
punctum, instans et unitatem, sine quibus impossibilie est 
meminisse aut cogitate ea quae principiantur per haec." Cf, 
Augustine, De Trinitate, xv, c. 7, n. 13 (PL 42, 1066). In 
presenting Bonaventure's doctrine of memory we have followed 
to a great extent the translation of George Boas, The Mind's 
Road to God, (N.Y.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953). 
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axiom which cannot be rationally contradicted. 55 
In light of Bonaventure's doctrine of memory, we may 
reasonably conclude that memory is the seat of natural law; 
for natural law is that by which all first principles are 
innate in us and self-evident upon the reception of sensible 
species (see Key-Text A, note 23). Further, natural law is 
that by which the soul recognizes in a self-evident manner, 
the acquired species of, say, father--spiritualized through 
an abstracting judgment--as a simple object which is 
deserving of honor. 56 
The connection between memory and natural law, however, 
does not end here; for Bonaventure speaks further of the 
role of memory: from the first actual retention of all 
temporal things-past, present, and future--memory bears the 
likeness of eternity whose indivisible present extends to 
all times. Secondly, it seems that memory is not only formed 
from without by phantasms, but also by receiving simple 
forms from above (g superiori) and holding them in itself--
55 Itin. I III I 2 (V, 303b): "Retinet nihilominus 
scientiarum principia et dignitates ut sempiternalia et 
sempiternaliter, quia nunquam potest sic oblivisci eorum, 
dum ratione utatur, quin ea audita approbet et eis 
assentiat, non tanquam de novo percipiat, sed tanquam sibi 
innata et familiaria recognoscat, sicut patet, si proponatur 
alicui: 'De quolibet affirmatio, vel negatio;' vel: 'Omne 
totum est maius sua parte,' vel quaecumque alia dignitas, 
cui non est contradicere 'ad interius rationem.'" 
56See Key-Text A, note 25. In speaking of the simple 
and principles of discrete quantities, we understand 
Bonaventure to include in his meaning the soul's ability to 
recognize essences--that is, substantial unities as -opposed 
to mere accidental qualities or "phenomena." 
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forms which cannot enter through the doors of the senses and 
the phantasms of sensible things. Thirdly, from the 
retention of eternal principles, memory has an immutable 
light (lucem incommutabilem) present to itself in which it 
remembers unchangeable truths. And thus, through the 
operations of the memory, it appears that the soul itself is 
the image of God and His similitude, so present to itself 
and having Him present that it receives Him in actuality and 
is capable of receiving Him in potency; in this way, the 
soul is able to participate in Him. 57 
57 Itin., III, 2 (V, 303a) : "Ex prima igitur retentione 
actuali onmium temporalium, praeteritorum scilicet, 
praesentium et futurorum, habet effigiem aeternitatis, cuius 
praesens indivisibile ad omniatempora se extendit.--Ex 
secunda apparet, quod ipsa non solum habet ab exteriori 
formari per phantasmata, verum etiam g superiori suscipiendo 
et in se habendo simplices formas, quae non possunt introire 
per portas sensuum et sensibilium phantasias.--Ex tertia 
habetur, quod ipsa habet lucem incommutabilem sibi 
praesentem, in qua meminit inbariabilium beritatum.--Et sic 
per operationes memoriae apparet, quod ipsa anima est imago 
Dei et similitude adeo sibi praesens et eum habens 
praesentem, quod eum actu capit et per potentiam 'capax eius 
est et particeps esse potest.'" Because (1) the soul is said 
to participate in God through memory and (2) memory is 
evidently characterized by natural law (see subsequent 
paragraph) and (3) natural law is that which unites the soul 
to eternity (see note 49 above), one can infer that the 
impression of natural law is for Bonaventure a participation 
(participatus) in eternal law. Cf. In Sent., I, d. 3, p. 1, 
a. un., q. 1, fund. 1 (I, 168b), where Bonaventure cites 
Augustine: "Eo mens est imago Dei, quo capax Dei est et 
particeps esse potest." See Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, c. 
8, n. 11 (PL 42, 1044); see Key-Text A, note 77. Insofar as 
image is identified with natural law (see note 18 above and 
Key-Text A, notes 79-80), it can be said that man is able to 
participate God according to natural law. Cf. note 46 above 
concerning Bonaventure's doctrine of participation. With 
regard to the related meanings of the terms capax and 
particeps in Bonaventure's doctrine of image, see Alvin 
Black, "The Doctrine of the Image and Similitude in Saint 
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We see, then, further evidence that natural law is 
situated within the memory; indeed, memory is apparently 
characterized by natural law. Recall, first of all, that 
natural law is the impression of the eternal law and so 
bears a likeness to eternity (see note 43 above); moreover, 
it is through natural law that the soul is united to 
eternity (see note 49 above) ; but memory itself is described 
as a likeness of eternity and, in fact, is said to lead to 
eternity (see note 58 below); it appears, then, that memory 
is equated with natural law at least insofar as natural law 
is a component of memory. Secondly, Bonaventure has equated 
natural law with the similitudes of the eternal reasons as 
impressed from above (see notes 41 and 47 above); but again, 
memory is described as the repository of such forms from 
above; in this case it follows that memory is the repository 
of natural law. But there is evidently more to memory than 
the presence of natural law; for memory is said to possess 
within itself an immutable light by which it remembers 
unchangeable truths. Now the light of natural law is a 
created light and thus cannot properly be considered 
immutable in itself (see notes 39, 45 and 48 above); rather, 
the immutable Light present to the memory is none other that 
the light of Christ which shines within the mirror of our 
mind (see notes 39-40 above and 58 below). 
Bonaventure," The Cord 12 (1962), 269-75. See also John F. 
Quinn, Historical Constitution, 134, 207, 355, 421, -432, 
517, 533, 573-74. 
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To sum up, memory appears to be the stage or repository 
of both natural law and eternal law; that is, memory 
represents the interior chamber, so to speak, of the mind 
wherein the light of eternal law radiates and interfaces 
with its created impression--natural law. The unity with, 
and conformity to, God is thus achieved by way of an 
interplay within memory between the light of eternal law and 
natural law: (1) the light of natural law is that which 
(lumen guod) signifies eternal law; (2) the light of eternal 
law is that by which (lumen guo) the soul recognizes natural 
law as a sign of its cause--namely, God. 58 With respect to 
the powers of the soul which distinguish man as an image of 
God, natural law--as proper to memory--clearly is (1) the 
point of unity of the mind's powers and operations and (2) 
the point of unity between the mind and God. "See then," 
Bonaventure exclaims, "how close the soul is to God and how 
memory in its operations leads to eternity, intelligence to 
truth, the power of choice to the supreme good. 1159 More 
58See the Quaracchi editors' commentary on this point 
(note. 7) in their Scholion to the Itinerarium (V, 315). Cf. 
De Myst Trin., q. 1, a. 1, concl. (V, 49-50); !tin., III, 3, 
(V, 304b). 
59 Ibid., III, 4 (V, 305a): "Vide igitur, quomodo anima 
Deo est propinqua, et quomodo memoria in aeternitatem, 
intelligentia in veritatem, electiva potentia ducit in 
bonitatem summam secundum operationes suas." In this regard, 
See Plato's Symposium (210a-212a) where the ascent from the 
temporal to the eternal is described. See Hex., XX, 11 (V, 
427a) with regard to the divine Light which illumines the 
highest portion of the mind--namely, memory; see note 48 
above. Cf. Alvin Black, "The Doctrine of the Image," 275. 
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precisely, the commom and unifying medium between the soul 
and eternity, truth and the supreme good is natural law 
which is evidently the root of memory. 
Natural Law and the Genetic Unity of Mind 
The habitus of natural law per naturalem originem has 
yet a deeper significance which accounts for the unity of 
powers within the soul and the soul's resemblance to God as 
image; for insofar as the powers of the soul constitute the 
image of God as a Trinity of Persons, we may follow the 
order, origin, and comportment of these powers to the most 
Blessed Trinity Itself. How so? According to Bonaventure, 
there is an organic or genetic unity existing among memory, 
intelligence, and will: from memory arises intelligence as 
its progeny; for when a similitude which is in the memory 
leaps into the eye of the intellect--which is nothing other 
than a word--it is then that we know. 60 
From memory and intelligence is breathed forth love, 
which is the bond between the two. These three--the 
generating mind, the word, and love--are in the soul as 
memory, intelligence, and will, which are consubstantial, 
coequal and coeval, mutually immanent. Now God as perfect 
Spirit has memory, intelligence, and will; and He has both 
60 Ibid., III, 5 (V, 305a): "Secundumautemharum 
potentiarum ordinem et originem et habitudinem ducit in 
ipsam beatissimam Trinitatem.--Nam ex memorai oritur 
intelligentia ut ipsius proles, quia tune intelligimus, cum 
similitudo, quae est in memoria, resultat in acie 
intellectus, quae nihil aliud est quam verbum." 
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the begotten Word and spirated Love. These are necessarily 
distinguished, since one is produced from the other--
distinguished, not essentially nor accidentally, but 
personally. When therefore the mind considers itself, it 
rises through itself as through a mirror to the 
contemplation of the Blessed Trinity--Father, Word, and 
Love--three persons coeternal, coequal, and consubstantial; 
so that each one is in each of the others; yet one is not 
the other, but all three are one God. 61 
In this connection, we recall the trifold dynamic 
within the order of natural law (see note 18 above) which 
now deserves consideration vis-a-vis (1) the generation of 
intelligence from memory, (2) the procession of will (love) 
from memory and intelligence, (3a) the bond of memory and 
intelligence through will, and (3b) the bond of soul to God 
(through the unity of memory, intellect, and will). In each 
of these three instances, there appears a fairly consistent 
correlation with the habitus of natural law in the 
modalities of essence (per naturalem originem), 
knowledge/precept (per innatam dispositionem) and operation 
61 Ibid., III, 5 (V, 305a): "Ex memoria et intelligentia 
spiratur amor tanquam nexus amborum. Haec tria, scilicet 
mens generans, verbum et amor, sunt in anima quoad memoriam, 
intelligentiam et voluntatem, quae sunt consubstantiales, 
coaequales et coaevae, se invicem circumincedentes. Si 
igitur Deus perfectus est spiritus, habet memoriam, 
intelligentiam et voluntatem, habet et Verbum genitum et 
Amorem spiratum, qui necessario distinguuntur, cum unus ab 
altero producatur, non essentialiter, non accidentatliter, 
ergo personaliter." 
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(per acguisitam dispositionem; see Key-Text A, note 69); for 
natural law in the modality of essence is situated in the 
memory; natural law in the modality of knowledge/precept--as 
generated from the memory--is manifested in the intellect; 
natural law in the modality of operation--which transpires 
from both the modes of essence and knowledge and is realized 
in the deliberate act of the will--represents a unity of 
powers in actuation; finally, natural law is instantiated in 
the realm of perfection insofar as the soul itself is united 
(and conformed) to God (see Key-Text A, note 100) . Thus, 
according to the metaphysical moments of generation, 
conformity, and consummation which characterize natural law, 
the three habitus of natural law (in the modes of essence, 
knowledge/precept, and deliberation) are genetically 
unified; and insofar as this natural law order constitutes 
and directs the tripartite mind, the structure and 
operations of the mind itself (memory, intellect, and will) 
reflect and refer to the inner life of the Holy Trinity. As 
memory represents the originative principle of the mind to 
which the other powers refer, so the habitus of natural law 
p_.e.t: naturalem originem holds primacy over the other natural 
law habitus insofar as it is their radical and terminating 
principle.u 
62Recall that right deliberation involves the ascent of 
intelligence and volition to the apex of the mind (see notes 
50 and 51 above); this interior summit is memory, the seat 
of natural law and pathway to eternity, truth, and supreme 
goodness (see notes 57-58 and 60); hence, insofar as memory 
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Natural Law gyg Ratio Seminalis 
In determining the structure and function of the mind, 
natural law qua habitus per naturalem originem finds its 
essential meaning and significance. In this connection, 
natural law might very well be understood according to 
Bonaventure's doctrine of seminal reasons. According to this 
doctrine God creates seminal principles which, as posited as 
potencies within matter, are capable of becoming actualized. 
After being sown (so to speak) into matter, a seminal 
principle or form is actualized in matter by the primary and 
internal agency of God in cooperation with the secondary and 
more external influence of other creatures. 63 A natural 
is the locus of the ascending convergence of intellect and 
will upon natural law (see note 53), it represents a 
(proximate) principle of termination as well as origination. 
In the same way, the habitus of natural law per naturalem 
originem is both an originative and terminating principle of 
the other natural law habitus since the other two habitus 
arise from this originative principle; but through 
deliberation they are again commonly united in it insofar as 
the powers of intellect and will ascend to and participate 
in this common habitus. For further discussion of the 
metaphysical, psychological, and moral implications with 
regard to this originative habitus, see Key-Text A, notes 
33, 44, 86, and 100. 
63 See In ll Sent., d. 7, dub. 3, resp. (II, 206): 
"Quaedam est virtus quae in productione rerum solum operatur 
exterius, quaedam quae perfecte operatur interius, quaedam 
partim interius partim exterius. Virtus artificis solum 
exterius operatur, amovendo sive iudgendo et applicando unam 
naturam cum alia. Virtus Dei operatur perfecte interius, 
quia ipsa primordialia semina, quae sunt intima, producit. 
Virtus vero, quae est partim interius partim exterius, est 
virtus naturae, quae exterius est respectu rationum 
seminalium, sed interius respectu producendorum ex ipsis. 
Natura enim, dum operatur, immittit virtutem suam usque ad 
intima passi; et in illa immissione ipsam essentiam'formae, 
quae erat in potentia incompleta, non producit, sed 
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form is therefore not a static entity, but bears a 
teleological character from its creation as a potency 
destined for actuality according to its ratio seminalis: 
"illud potest esse forma et fit forma sicut globus rosae fit 
rosa. "64 Consequently, a natural form can never be wholly 
productam a Deo supponit: ipsam tamen adiuvando ad actum 
perfectum adducit. Solus igitur ille potest seminales illas 
rationes facere, qui potest creare: quoniam ipsae non sunt 
ex aliis sed ex nihilo, et ex ipsis fiunt omnia, quae 
naturaliter producuntur. Igitur nee pater est creator filii 
nee agricola segetum; quia licet pater operetur interius, 
sicut natura, tamen operatur exterius et circa aliquid et ex 
aliquo, non ex nihilo, licet non operetur adeo exterius, 
sicut agricola." See In II Sent., d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, concl. 
(II, 436a): "Ipse enim rationes causales modo dicit rebus 
fuisse insertas, modo dicit quantum ad aliqua in divina 
voluntate fuisse servatas." See ibid., d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 
1, concl. (II, 198b), where Bonaventure distinguishes 
between intrinsic and extrinsic causes. 
64See In ll Sent., d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (II, 
198b); ibid., ad 6 (II, 199): "Formae naturales sunt in 
materia quantum ad potentiam et in qua, et ex qua, et a qua, 
secundum praedictum modum. Et si tu obiicias, quod materia 
non agit nee constituit, dicendum, quod essentia materiae 
solum se habet per modum receptivi; sed seminarium inditum 
se habet quodam modo per modum activi, quodam modo per modum 
passivi, quoniam cooperatur agenti, et nihilominus ipsum 
variatur ab una dispositione in aliam, ut dictum est." While 
Bonaventure speaks of ratio seminalis as an inchoate and 
intrinsic power (virtutem), he also distinguishes between 
the productive power itself and the essential rule which 
directs or regulates this natural power. See In ll Sent., d. 
18, a. 1, q. 2, concl. (II, 436b): "Regula autem agentis 
increati est forma exemplaris sive idealis, regula vero 
agentis creati est forma naturalis; et ita rationes causales 
sunt formae ideales sive exemplares, rationes vero seminales 
sunt formae naturales .... Similiter naturales rationes et· 
seminales re idem sunt, ratione vero differunt. Quia enim 
semen dicit ut ex quo, et natura dicit ut a quo, ratio 
seminalis attenditur in quantum dirigit potentiam naturae, 
ut ex aliquo fiat aliquid; naturalis vero, ut ab aliquo fiat 
aliquid.--Vel ratio seminalis respicit inchoationem et 
intrinsecam virtutem, quae movet et operatur ad ef f ectus 
productionem; naturalis vero concernit producentis ad 
productum assimiliationem et modi agendi assuetudinem." We 
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destroyed, but [its essence] remains in the womb of matter 
in a potential or virtual state after corruption just as 
before generation. 65 
Natural law as a habitus per naturalem originem 
appears, then, to fit the description of a kind of seminal 
reason since the soul of man as a hylemorphic substance of 
spiritual matter and form is said to become the image or 
are concerned here primarily with Bonaventure's 
understanding of ratio seminalis precisely as a regulative 
and formal principle but nevertheless as inseparable from 
the natural and productive power which it characterizes and 
directs. In this respect, see Key-Text D, note 4, regarding 
the distinction between essentia and natura. 
65See In IV Sent., d. 43, a. 1, q. 4, concl. (IV, 
889a) : 11 Supponamus nunc, quod natura aliquid agit, et illud 
non agit ex nihilo; et cum agat in materiam, oportet quod 
producat formam; et cum materia non sit pars formae, nee 
forma fiat pars materiae, necesse est aliquo modo formas 
naturales esse in materia, antequam producantur; et 
substantia materiae praegnans est omnibus: ergo rationes 
seminales omnium formarum sunt in ipsa. Sed ad illud stat 
resolutio, a quo incipit generatio: ergo nulla forma omnino 
corrumpitur, sed manet in materia, sicut antequam 
produceretur. Et sic dicit Augustinus; unde formas in 
materia ante productionem dicit esse quantum ad rationes 
seminales. Dicit etiam resolvi ad materiam, sicut ad 
occultissimos sinus naturae, idem utroque nomine secundum 
alteram et alteram rationem intelligi volens. Quid autem 
haec sint, alibi melius patet, scilicet in secundo. Nunc 
autem hoc dixisse sufficiat, quod omnes formae, cum 
corrumpuntur, non omnino corrumpuntur. sed manent aliguo 
modo. 11 See In ll Sent., d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3 (II, 
199a) : "Potest dici quod essentia eius manet in potentia 
post corrupionem, sicut ante generationem. 11 Cf. Augustine, 
~ Trinitate, III, c. 8, n. 13 and c. 9, n. 16 (PL 42, 875, 
877). For further discussion of Bonaventure's doctrine of 
seminal reasons, see In II Sent., d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, (II, 
440a); see the Quaracchi editors' Scholion (II, 199, 443); 
Gilson, La philosophie de saint Bonaventure, 236-53; K. 
Ziesch~, "Die Naturlehre Bonaventuras, 11 169-89. 
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similitude of God according to the rule of natural law; 66 
Further, natural law is not only said to be (interiorly) 
impressed upon the soul, but insofar as natural law is 
equated with the image of God by which man becomes deiform, 
natural law can never separated from man's being--not in 
man's present state of fallen nature, nor even in the state 
of damnation. 67 One might reasonably conclude, then, that 
66As the eternal reasons exist in God as exemplar forms 
(see notes 30 and 31 above), so natural law, as a created 
impression of eternal law, exists in man as a natural form--
a seminal principle--which serves as the rule of rational 
operation and consequent perfection; for, as noted (see Key-
Text B, note 18), man's perfection is achieved through the 
operation of reason and will according to the regulative 
principle of natural law. See notes 15, 17, 18, 31 above; 
Key-Text A, notes 2 and 81; Also see note 63 above where 
Bonaventure speaks of natural forms or seminal reasons as 
regulative principles which direct the natural powers of a 
creature; See Key-Text A, note 28 and corresponding 
paragraph where Bonaventure speaks of conscience as a seed-
bed (seminarium) of other acquired habitus. Thus, in 
characterizing natural law as a seminal reason, we do not 
intend to construe natural law as a natural power, but as 
that rational principle which characterizes and regulates 
such a power. That the human soul comes into being like 
other natural forms as educed from preexisting matter is not 
suggested here. Bonaventure clearly states that each human 
soul is directly created by God and united to a body. See In 
I.I Sent., d. 15, a. 2, q. 3; ibid., d. 18, a. 2, q. 3 and ad 
5. What we suggest here is that natural law, as Bonaventure 
understands it, corresponds with the nature and function he 
assigns to seminal reasons in nature. With respect to the 
theory of seminal reasons vis-a-vis the human soul, see 
Conrad John O'Leary, The Substantial Composition of Man 
According to Saint Bonaventure (Washington D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1931), 49-60, 87-94. 
67See De Scientia Christi., IV, concl. (V, 24a): 
"Quoniam igitur certitudinalis cognitio competit spiritui 
rationali in quantum est imago Dei, ideo in hac cognitione 
aeternas rationes attingit. Sed quia in statu viae non est 
adhuc plene deiformis, ideo non attingit eas clare et plene 
et distincte; sed secundum quod magis vel minus eas-
attingit, semper tamen aliquo modo, guia nungµam potest ab 
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the habitus of natural law per naturale originem, is indeed 
the ratio seminalis of the human soul; and since natural law 
is that regulative principle according to which man is 
created to the image of God (see Key-Text A, note 56) and 
becomes that image (see note 18 above), it is not enough to 
say that natural law is essential to man, but rather that 
natural law is the essence of man; for if God is more 
intimate to the soul than the soul is to itself (see Key-
Text A, note 73) and if natural law represents that interior 
point of contact with God (see notes 49-51 above), then 
natural law represents the very core and inner limit of 
man's being. To affirm natural law as innate is similar to 
predicating being of God: the predicate in each case is 
bound up within the identity of the subject and only differs 
by a distinction of reason; for while God is His Being, 68 
natural law qua seminal reason is innate because it is the 
intrinsic principle by which man is capable of becoming what 
he is--namely, the imago Dei (see note 18 above). 
eo ratio 1mag1n1s separari. Unde quia in statu innocentiae 
erat imago sine deformitate culpae, nondum tamen habens 
plenam deiformitatem gloriae, ideo attingebat ex parte sed 
non in aenigmate. In statu vero naturae lapsae caret 
deiformitate et habet deformitatem, ideo attingit eas ex 
parte et in aenignate. In statu vero gloriae caret omni 
deformitate et habet plenam deiformitatem, ideo attingit eas 
plene et perspicue." See Key-Text B, note 27 with regard to 
the inexorable presence of natural law in the souls of 
obstinate sinners and even in the damned who are confirmed 
in evil. 
68See !tin., V, 3 (V, 308b). 
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IV. Summary and Conclusion 
As we learned from the study of the contextual text 
above, natural law is characterized by its metaphysical 
phases or movements of emanation, conformity, and return 
(see notes 15 and 18 above) ; according to this movement, man 
is ordered to God both directly and indirectly through 
creatures (see note 15 above). In the key-text itself, 
natural law is described as the impression made in the soul 
by the eternal law (see [1] above) . 
To better understand natural law precisely as an 
impression of eternal law, we studied St. Bonaventure's 
teaching on eternal law as explicated in the Collationes in 
Hexaemeron; here we learned that eternal law consists of 
those eternal reasons by which God creates and governs all 
creatures (see notes 30-33) . Equated with the light of 
Christ, these immutable and eternal reasons illumine man's 
mind and provide the certain norms for all natural, 
rational, and moral knowledge (see notes 33-37); such norms 
guide man in justice and virtue to his proper end (see notes 
35-41) . Although the light of eternal law is directly 
present to and active upon the soul, this light is only 
indirectly known by way of its impressed similitude--namely, 
natural law. 
As an abiding impression of eternal law, natural law 
participates in eternal law and thus preserves man's being 
and directs him to perfection (see notes 43-47); guiding 
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synderesis and superior reason, natural law holds that most 
intimate and supreme place in the mind where God meets and 
operates upon (within) the soul (see notes 48-51). In the 
Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, Bonaventure identifies this 
locus of contact between natural law and eternal law as 
memory; accordingly, it is through the operation of memory 
that the soul is said -to be an image of God and capable of 
participating Him (see notes 54-57) . As the root of memory 
and the apex of the intellect and will, natural law thus 
represents that point of unity between the powers of the 
mind and God (see note 55) . 
There is a correspondence between the three 
metaphysical movements of natural law and the structure and 
powers of the mind: natural law in the modes of essence, 
knowledge/precept, and operation characterizes and regulates 
memory, intellect, and will respectively; thus, according to 
the natural law order which is intrinsic to the soul, the 
powers of the mind bear a genetic unity which images the 
inner life of the blessed Trinity (see notes 59-60) . This 
interior primacy of natural law over the powers of the soul 
leads us to consider natural law as a ratio seminalis 
insofar as it is the radical principle by which man is 
created to and becomes the imago Dei (see note 62-65) . 
Inexorably impressed within the soul, natural law represents 
the very center of man's being and is thus innate in the 
most profound sense of the word (see note 66) . 
.. 
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Let us conclude this summary with four general points: 
1. As a created impression of eternal law, natural law 
is a likeness of the order proper to the blessed Trinity 
Itself as marked by generation, conformity, and unity 
(return) . 
2. Indelibly impressed upon the soul of man, natural 
law internally orders the structure and functions of the 
soul according to this threefold process of generation, 
conformity, and unity. 
3. Natural law is thus radically innate to man in the 
orders of being, knowledge/precept, and love; in virtue of 
this intrinsic and trif old ordination, man is said to be 
created to the image of God and is thus capable of union and 
conformity with Him. 
4. Insofar as (the impression of) natural law is (1) an 
effect of eternal law, and is thus (2) a sign of its cause 
which is (3) reducible to that cause (namely, eternal law), 
we may properly say that natural law participates eternal 
law. 69 
69See notes 47 and 58 above regarding St. Bonaventure's 
understanding of participation; see also Key-Text A, note 
77. We will explore in more detail the notion of 
participation in our study of St. Thomas' natural law 
doctrine. 
CHAPTER 4 
KEY-TEXT A 
In IV Sent., d. 33. q. 1, a. 1, resp. : "Utrum habere plures 
uxores sit contra legem naturae. 111 
I. Context 
Context for this key-text is twofold: 
(1) Remote: (a) St. Thomas' divisio textus on Peter 
Lombard's Libri IV Sententiarum; (b) Peter Lombard's 
discussions, De praeceptis legis, c. 5, and Cui iicebat 
plures habere vel non. 
(2) Proximate: (a) St. Thomas' In II Sent., d. 42, q. 
1, a. 4, ad 3; (b) In III~., d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 4; 
(c) In III~., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol.; (d) In III Sent., 
d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, sol.; (e) In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, 
sol. 2; (f) In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, sed contra 6. 
1Thomas Aquinas, St., Opera Omnia, Parma ed., 1852-
1873. Reprint, N. Y.: Musurgia, 1948, 25 vols. All textual 
citations of the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum are from 
this uncritical edition. Reference to volume and page will 
be indicated by roman numerals and arabic numbers 
respectively. For example, Key-Text A is found in volume 
VII-2, page 967a, which we indicate as: (VII-2, 967a). All 
italicized words used for emphasis in this study are my own. 
The date of composition of the Scriptum super libros 
Sententiarum is commonly given as 1254-1256. For dates of 
St. Thomas' writings, we have relied upon the chronology 
provided by James Wieshiepl, Friar Thomas D'Aguino: His 
Life. Thought. and Works, (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 351-
63. See Appendix C for a summary of this chronology. 
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Remote Context #a 
There are two major divisions in St. Thomas' commentary 
on Peter Lombard's Sentences: (1) "de rebus divinis secundum 
exitum a Deo ut a principio" (books I and II) and (2) "de 
rebus divinis secundum reditum in Deum ut in finem" (books 
III and IV) . 2 In this latter division, book IV deals with 
the Sacraments (de sacramentis), and in its distinction 
thirty-three, the propriety of marriage is considered with 
respect to the Fathers of antiquity. As St. Thomas explains 
in the divisio textus which prefaces this distinction, 3 
Lombard divides his discussion on this matter into two 
parts: in the first, the good of matrimony prior to the 
[Mosaic] law is shown; in the second part the good of 
matrimony is considered during the time of the [Mosaic] law. 
Lombard introduces the question of polygamy in the first 
part and, citing the authority of Augustine, upholds its 
licitness with respect to the Fathers--both before and 
subsequent to the law of Moses. 
2These two general divisions are found in the diviso 
textus of In i Sent., d. 2 (Parma VI, 20). For a detailed 
catalogue of St. Thomas' classification on the whole of 
Lombard's Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, see Paul 
Philippe, Bulletin Thomiste, tome I (Kain: Le Saulchoir, 
1931-1933) I 131-54. 
3 See In IV Sent., d. 33, (VI, 966). 
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Remote Context #b 
Our first passage here is from Peter Lombard's III 
Sent., d. 37, c. 5, n. 5: De praeceptis legis. 4 In this 
discussion, Lombard presents the teaching of St. Augustine 
on the concordance between the natural law, the Gospel 
(Evangelium), and the law of moral precepts. Because man did 
not attend (non legebat) to the truth written in his heart 
(i.e., natural law), it was necessary, Lombard relates, to 
make that truth explicit by writing it in stone (i.e., the 
Decalogue) . 5 
We turn next to Lombard's IV Ssfilt.., d. 33, c. 4, nn. 1-
2: "Cui licebat plures habere vel non. 116 It is this 
question to which St. Thomas' discussion, "Utrum habere 
plures uxores sit contra legem naturae" (In IV Sent., d. 33. 
4 Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum. (Editio tertia) 
2 vols. Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas. 
(Grottaferrata, 1981), II, 212. 
5 III Sent. I d. 37 I c. 5, n. 5 (II, 212): "Augustinus, 
super Psalmum. Hie opponitur quod etiam boni in illo opere 
peccaverunt, qui naturalem legem, cui concordat Evangelium 
et lex moralis praeceptionis, transgressi sunt, quae est: 
'Quod tibi non vis, alii ne feceris' [Tob. 4, 16; Math. 7, 
12; Luc. 6, 31]. 'Quam Veritas scripsit in corde hominis; et 
quia non legebat in corde, iteravit in tabulis, ut voce 
forinsecus admota, rediret 'ad cor' et ibi inveniret quod 
extra legeret.'" See Jeremias 31, 31-35. With respect to 
Lombard's understanding of natural law as proper only to 
human creatures, see Michael Crowe, "St. Thomas and Ulpian's 
Natural Law," in Saint Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: 
Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1974), vol. 1, 268-69. See note 58 below 
where St. Thomas also speaks of natural law as impressed 
upon the heart (cordibus impressa) . 
6Libri IV Sententiarum (II, 461). 
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q. 1, a. 1), directly corresponds. What, then, does Lombard 
say concerning the licitness of a plurality of wives? He 
first cites what is written in Deuteronomy [17, 17]: "He 
shall not have many wives that may allure his soul." On this 
passage, Lombard presents the commentary of Augustine: "It 
is evident that Solomon transgressed this precept. 7 David, 
however, had several wives but did not go beyond this 
precept; for it was permitted for a king to have many wives-
-but not to multiply 'wives that may allure his soul.' Thus, 
it is added [Deuteronomy 17, 20]: 'So that his heart may not 
be lifted up [in pride],' having many foreign wives 
(alienigenas) seems to be prohibited. Although a 
multiplicity of wives was generally prohibited, it was 
permitted, however, for a king to have many [wives], but not 
to multiply them so as merely to gain sexual pleasure. 118 
When the fullness of time was come, Lombard adds, by 
which the grace of Christ was extended everywhere, the law 
7See St. Augustine, Ouaestionum in Heptateuchum, v, q. 
27 (PL 34, 760). 
8 IV Sent., d. 33, c. 4, n. 1 (II, 461): "Sed numquid 
sub Lege licebat plures haberet uxores? Audi quid scriptum 
est in Deuteronomio [17, 17]: 'Non habebit uxores plurimas, 
quae alliciant animam eius.'--Augustinus. Super quern locum 
Augustinus ait: 'Manifestum est Solomonem hoc praeceptum 
transisse; David autem plures habuit, nee praeceptum 
praeteriit. Permissum est enim plures habere, non 'plurimas 
quae alliciant animam' multiplicare. Cum tamen additur 
[Deut. 17, 20]: 'Ut non elevetur cor eius,' alienigenas 
prohibitum esse videtur. Verumtamen multiplicatio uxorum 
generalier prohibita est; permissum est autem regi plures 
habere, sed non multiplicare." · 
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of matrimony was restored to its prior integrity and 
condition; accordingly, man is to have one wife according to 
the figure of Christ united to His Church; nor is the choice 
of a wife [merely] for the sake of offspring, but for the 
perfection of life and integrity of knowledge. 9 
Proximate Context #a 
Let us now take up the thought of St. Thomas as 
proximate context with regard to natural law. In the first 
passage, In ll Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3 ("Utrum 
peccatum veniale distinguatur a mortali"), he considers in 
what way venial sin is distinguished from mortal sin: 
The precepts of the law intend to order men to the 
love of neighbor and God: the end (finis) of such a 
precept is love (caritas); and therefore only those 
[sins] are mortal according as they are said to kill 
the soul: these [sins] also directly violate the 
precepts of law, not only the written laws, but even 
the natural (naturalis) law. However, although 
something may not be evil because it is prohibited by 
the exterior [written] law, it is nevertheless evil 
because it is prohibited by the interior law (lege 
interiori) . The interior law is the light of reason 
itself, by which we discern what must be done: and 
whatever in human actions is consonant with this light 
is wholly right (rectum); however, that which is 
contrary to this light is unnatural and evil 
(innaturale et malum) to man. And to this extent, 
something is said to be evil because it is prohibited 
9 Ibid., n. 2 (II, 461): "Veniente autem plenitudinis 
tempore [Gal. 4, 4), quo Christi gratia ubique est dilatata, 
reducta est lex nuptiarum ad priorem honestioremque 
institutionem, ut unus uni in figura Christi et Ecclesiae 
iungatur.--Nec quaeritur electio muneris in successione 
generis, sed in perfectione vitae et sinceritate 
scientiae .... " 
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by the interior . law. 10 
Let us enumerate a few points from the above passage 
which bear upon St. Thomas' doctrine of natural law as 
innate: 
1. In contrast to the written and exterior law, natural 
law is identified as the lex interior. 
2. This interior law is further identified as the light 
of reason. 
3. Whatever in human actions conforms with the light of 
reason is morally right (recte) [and natural to man] . 
4. Whatever is contrary to the light of reason is evil 
and unnatural to him. 11 
10See In ll Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3 (VI, 763a): 
" ... praecepta legis intendunt hominem.ordinare ad 
dilectionem proximi et Dei: qui finis praecepti est caritas, 
1 Tim. 1; et ideo illa sola mortalia sunt ex genere de 
quibus dictum est: haec enim directe fiunt contra praecepta 
legis, non solum legis scriptae, sed etiam naturalis. 
Quamvis autem aliquid non sit malum, quia est prohibitum 
lege exteriori, tamen ideo est malum, quia prohibetur lege 
interiori; lex enim interior est ipsum lumen rationis, quo 
agenda discernimus: et quidquid in humanis actibus huic 
lumini est consonum, totum est rectum; quod autem contra hoc 
lumen est, homini est innaturale ~ malum; et pro tanto 
malum dicitur, quia prohibitur interiori lege." In our 
commentary, we will refer to these proximate texts by using 
letters (e.g, #a, #b, #c) to distinguish them from key-text 
references as indicated by bracketed numbers (e.g., [1]). 
11St. Thomas offers no explanation here as to whether 
there is a relationship between what is morally right or 
evil and what is natural or unnatural. He simply states that 
what is contrary to the light of reason is at once evil and 
unnatural. See notes 35-36 and 46 below for further 
discussion on this matter. 
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Proximate Context #b 
In the second passage, In III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, 
sol. 4 ("Utrum aliqua potentia animae sit subjectum alicujus 
virtutis"), St. Thomas compares the principles of practical 
reason with those of speculative reason: 
Just as in speculative reason there are innate 
principles of demonstration, so in practical reason 
there are innate ends (innata fines) connatural to man 
( connaturales homini) . 12 
Three points may be drawn from the above passage: 
1. Insofar as practical principles (innata fines) are 
said to be in (practical) reason, they are evidently 
distinguished from the operative power to which they belong. 
2. Such principles are in some way understood to be 
innate in practical reason. 
3. These principles are distinct from, yet accord with, 
human nature (see note 17 below). 
Proximate Context #c 
In a later discussion, In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, 
sol. ( "Utrum fuerit necessarium tradi legem scriptam") , and 
ad 3 of the same article, St. Thomas addresses the question 
concerning the necessity for the written law: 
12 In III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 4 (VII-1, 
365a) . Unde sicut in ratione speculativa sunt innata 
principia demonstrationum, ita in ratione practicu sunt 
innati fines connaturales homini. For a clarification of the 
the meaning of the term innata, see note 13 below. With 
regard to the significance of the meaning of connaturality, 
see notes 14 and 17 below. · 
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It was necessary to give to people in [the form of] 
precept those things which natural reason dictates, 
which are said to pertain to the law of nature (legem) 
naturae) and to express them in writing. 
Those precepts were implanted (indita) [by God] in all 
people in natural cognition . 13 
What points do these two statements make regarding 
natural law? 
13See In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 422): 
" ... necessarium fuit ea quae naturalis ratio dicta, quae 
dicuntur ad legem naturae pertinere, populo in praeceptum 
dari, et in scriptum redigi .... "Ibid., ad 3 (VI, 422): 
"Ista praecepta omnibus indita erant [a Deo] in naturali 
cognitione." This passage corresponds to Lombard's 
discussion as cited in note 5 above. See note 52 below 
regarding St. Thomas' indiscriminate use of the terms lex 
naturae, jus naturale, and lex naturalis. To avoid confusion 
with modern understanding of the term "right," we will 
translate jy!2. naturale as natural law. 
What can be said of the meaning of the term indita? 
Taken simply, indita characterizes anything which has been 
imparted from a causal principle to a recipient item. Now, a 
causal principle may be either extrinsic or intrinsic to the 
recipient item. In the present case, as well as in #f below, 
God is the extrinsic cause of natural law given (indita) to 
man (see note 27 below) . In these two cases (#c and #f), 
indita is opposed to the meaning of innata which always 
denotes something precisely as inborn to an item by virtue 
of an intrinsic cause (e.g., #c and #e). Nevertheless, 
inasmuch as indita may also connote something as imparted 
into or within an item, that which has been imparted to an 
item is, as a result, intrinsic to it. Thus, in the present 
case, natural law (jus naturale) is intrinsic to man 
consequent to being imparted into him from without. For this 
reason, we translate indita as "implanted," to indicate 
primarily (1) that which is imparted from an extrinsic 
cause, and secondarily (2) that which, as a result of being 
implanted into an item, is intrinsic to that item. The 
exception to this rationale is found in #e below where, for 
want of a better term, we render inseruit as "implanted" 
despite the fact that the causal principle in that case is, 
as Cicero puts it, an innata vis. In this connection, see In 
I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VI, 327b), for a r~lated 
discussion on immanent and transitive action. 
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1. The dictates of natural reason (to which the written 
precepts correspond) pertain to the law of nature (legem 
naturae) and are put into written law. 
2. Precisely as dictates of natural reason, natural law 
precepts appear to be taken by St. Thomas as a product or 
operation of the intellectual faculty; as such, natural law 
precepts are intrinsically caused by man as agent (see note 
13 above). 
3. Inasmuch as these precepts (dictates of natural 
reason) were given (datum) to men or implanted (indita) [by 
God] in the natural cognition of all people, the cause(s) of 
the law of nature is/are extrinsic to man. 14 
14When St. Thomas speaks of precepts as implanted [by 
God] in natural cognition, God is clearly the principal and 
extrinsic cause of natural law. However, two different (yet 
complementary) interpretations may be advanced with regard 
to the secondary causes of natural law: (1) God implants 
natural law precepts into man through the mediation of 
sensible creatures qua content-determining-causes of human 
knowledge; that is, man acquires knowledge of natural law 
precepts from his experience of the material world 
(consisting of human and subhuman sensible natures) as 
created by God; this interpretation focuses on the extrinsic 
secondary causes (the content-determining-causes of human 
knowledge) involved in the process by which man attains 
knowledge (see our commentary discussion below concerning 
the production of the naturalis conceptio); (2) God implants 
natural law precepts into man inasmuch as He endows man with 
a human nature and those operative powers proper to that 
nature by which--and according .t..Q which--man discerns what 
is good and evil; here, the focus is upon the intrinsic 
secondary causes of natural law precepts (man's God-given 
nature, which includes his intellective and appetitive 
powers) . In this connection, see note 32 below: 
"[S]impliciter perfectum dicitur quad habet operationem 
convenientem suae formae." See note 35 below: 11 [I]llud 
dicitur esse naturale alicui rei quad convenit sibi secundum 
conditionem suae formae." See also note 52 below: 11 [N]atura 
dictat animali cuilibet secundum modum convenientem suae 
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Proximate Context #d 
In a related discussion, In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 
3, sol. ("Utrum omnia legis praecepta ad haec decem 
ordinentur"), St. Thomas discusses the relationship between 
the Decalogue, civil law, and natural law: 
speciei." See also note 12 above where St. Thomas speaks of 
innata fines connaturales homini. See our commentary 
discussion below on St. Thomas' doctrine of human nature. In 
what sense, then, does St. Thomas presently speak of 
precepts as indita in naturali cognitione? Note here that he 
is addressing the question raised by Lombard, "Utrum fuerit 
necessarium tradi legem scriptam?" (see note 5 above). In 
that commentary, Lombard speaks of natural law as written in 
man's heart (in corde; see also note 59 below where St. 
Thomas likewise speaks of natural law as cordi impressa) . 
Evidently, the focus of Lombard's discussion is the Law as 
corresponding to the natural constitution of man. Now, in 
his own discussion, St. Thomas asserts that (natural law) 
precepts are commonly known by all people; apparently, 
natural law precepts are universal by virtue of human 
nature--common to every man--to which these precepts accord. 
The assertion that knowledge of precepts is universal, 
however, cannot be based merely on the premise that such 
knowledge is sensibly acquired; it also requires the premise 
that there is (first of all) a human nature divinely 
implanted in man which, (secondly) by virtue of its definite 
structure and function, (a) subsequently enables man to 
participate in knowledge, (b) serves as a content-
determining-cause of knowledge as attained through sensible 
experience, and (c) serves as that intrinsic principle to 
which innata fines correspond (connaturales homini) . 
Accordingly, we interpret the phrase, "praecepta omnibus 
indita erant [a Deo] in naturali cognitione," as referring 
principally to the intrinsic causes of natural law precepts 
(man's underlying nature and corresponding operative powers 
as implanted in him by God) and secondarily to the extrinsic 
causes of human knowledge (human natures and other sensible 
natures taken as content-determining-causes of acquired 
knowledge) . See in this connection Contexts #a-#b above and 
#d-#f below which discuss natural law with emphasis on the 
constitution of man (his nature and natural powers) and not 
on extrinsic (content-determining) causes of knowledge per 
se. 
There are certain laws which are implanted in reason 
itself (ipsi rationi sunt inditae) which are the 
primary measure and rule of all human actions ... and 
these laws are called natural law (jus naturale) . 15 
From the above statement, three points can be made: 
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1. Natural law is the primary rule and measure of all 
human actions. 
2. Inasmuch as it is said to be implanted in reason 
itself (ipsi rationi sunt inditae), natural law must be 
traced to content-determining-causes which are extrinsic to 
the intellectual power. 
3. While the content-determining-causes of natural law 
are extrinsic to the intellectual power, natural law is in 
some way proper to that power. 
Proximate Context #e 
We next look at In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2 
("Utrum confessio sit necessaria ad salutem"); in this text, 
St. Thomas takes up the question whether the sacrament of 
confession is necessary for salvation: 
Faith is above the knowledge of natural reason; hence, 
even the Sacraments are above the dictates of natural 
reason; for "natural law (jus naturale) is that which 
opinion has not generated, but a certain innate power 
innata vis) has implanted (inseruit) ,"as Tullius 
states. Therefore, the Sacraments are not of natural, 
15 In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, sol. (VII-1, 426a): 
"Quaedam enim sunt leges quae ipsi rationi sunt inditae, 
quae sunt prima mensura et regula omnium humanorum 
actuum ... et hae leges jus naturale dicuntur." See note 53 
below regarding St. Thomas' use of the terms lex naturae, 
jus naturale, and lex naturalis. 
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but of divine law which is supernatural; sometimes 
even the word natural is said inasmuch as that is 
natural for anything which is given (imponitur) it by 
its Creator; nevertheless, natural [items] are properly 
said to be those [items] caused from principles of 
nature . 16 
From the above statement, let us note three important 
points regarding natural law: 
1. Natural law (jus naturale) is implanted (inseruit) 
in man by an innate (innata) power. 
2. Hence, natural law (in contrast to faith and the 
Sacraments) is properly "natural" to man insofar as it is 
caused from a principle of [man's] nature. 
3. St. Thomas offers no explanation in this text 
regarding the innata vis or the production of natural law 
16 In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2 (VII-2, 793b): 
"Fides autem est supra cognitionem rationis naturalis; unde 
etiam sacramenta sunt supra rationis naturalis dictamina. Et 
quia "jus naturale est quod non opinio genuit, sed innata 
quaedam vis inseruit," ut Tullius dicit (de invent. Rhetor., 
num. 56); ideo sacramenta non sunt de jure naturali, sed de 
jure divine, quod est supranaturale; et quandoque etiam 
naturale dicitur, secundum quod cuilibet rei illud est 
naturale quod ei a suo Creatore imponitur: tamen proprie 
naturalia dicuntur quae ex principiis naturae causantur." In 
this connection, see In II Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 4, sol., 
where a similar contrast is made between what is "natural" 
to man in the proper and improper sense of the term. See 
Cicero, De Inventione, II, c. 53, 161 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1949), 328: "Naturae ius est, quod non 
opinio genuit sed quaedam in natura vis insevit, ut 
religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, 
veritatem." While Cicero recognizes common biological 
tendencies as implanted in all living natures (see De 
Officiis, I, c. 4, 11), his notions of ius and lex appear to 
apply only to man qua rational being. On Cicero's 
understanding of jus naturale, see Patrick Farrell, "Sources 
of St. Thomas' Concept of Natural Law," The Thomist 20 
(1957) I 259-67 • 
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from principles of [man's] nature. What this innata vis is 
and how natural law is produced will be investigated in our 
commentary discussion on the production of the naturalis 
conceptio. 
Proximate Context #f 
Finally, in the sed contra 6 of our key-text (In IV 
Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1), St. Thomas takes up the question 
of monogamy with respect to the law of nature: 
That precept which is implanted (inditum) in man in the 
constitution (institutione) of his human nature seems 
to be of natural law (~ naturali) . But [monogamy] 
(guod sit una unius) is implanted in him in the 
constitution of human nature, as Gen. 2, 2 makes 
clear: 'They shall be two in one flesh." Therefore 
[monogamy] is of the law of nature (lege naturae) . 17 
The above passage may be reduced to a simple syllogism 
as follows: 
1. A precept which is implanted .in man in the 
constitution of his human nature is of natural 
law; 
2. monogamy is implanted in him in the constitution of 
17 In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, sed contra 6 (VI, 
967a): "· .. illud praecipue videtur esse de jure naturali 
quod homini in ipsa institutione humanae naturae est 
inditum. Sed quod sit una unius, in ipsa institutione 
humanae naturae est ei inditum, ut patet Genes. 2, 24 "Erunt 
duo in carne una.' Ergo est de lege naturae." For St. 
Thomas, then, "no moral precept can be proposed which in 
some way (aliqualiter) is not derived from the nature of 
man. All moral precepts are dictates of reason. Hence, the 
decalogue adds nothing to the substance of the act as 
prescribed by the natural law." Henri Renard, "Introduction 
to the Philosophy of the Existential Moral Act," The New 
Scholasticism 28 (1954), 164. Compare St. Thomas' above 
statement with the D. O'Donaghue's interpretation of St. 
Thomas's natural law teaching as cited in our Introduction, 
13. 
his human nature; 
3. therefore, [monogamy] pertains to the law of 
nature. 
As this last text makes clear, the law of nature and 
its precepts are in some way rooted in the nature of man. 
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What observations can be drawn from these six proximate 
context passages (see #a-f above)? First, we note the 
several different (but related) ways St. Thomas speaks of 
lex naturalis (or jus naturale or lex naturae): (1) as the 
light of reason (lumen rationis); (2) as the interior law 
(lex interior); (3) as innate ends (innata finis) in 
practical reason which are connatural to man (connaturales 
homini); (4) as precepts (praecepta) (a) implanted (indita) 
by God in natural cognition and (b) which reason dictates; 
(5) as the primary measure and rule of all human actions 
which are implanted in reason itself (~ rationi sunt 
inditae); (6) as implanted (inseruit) in man by an innate 
power (innata vis); (7) as precepts implanted (indita) in 
the constitution of human nature. 
In turn, these several accounts of natural law may be 
reduced to four inasmuch as natural law is identified either 
with (1) man's nature (#f and perhaps #c), (2) an operative 
power (#a, #d and #e), (3) the product or operation of such 
a power ("quae naturalis ratio dicta"; see #b, #c and #e), 
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or (4) precepts or principles (#b, #c, #d and #f) . 18 Taken 
as man's nature, natural law is understood as implanted 
(indita) by God. Insofar as the term indita implies a 
relationship of an item to a causal principle, natural law--
qua nature--is not simply intrinsic to man, but bears 
reference to something else outside of him--namely, God. 
Next, taken as an operative power of man, natural law is 
understood as natural and innate to man (#a, #d, and #e) . 
Now, insofar as this power is "natural" to man, natural law-
-qua natural power--bears a correspondence to man's nature 
or form (see note 35 below); and inasmuch as such a power is 
innate to man, so natural law--qua power--is understood as 
innate--i.e., as rooted in man's nature. However, taken 
precisely as a product (#b and #e) or operation (#c) of 
man's innate power, natural law is understood as innate or 
(naturally) implanted (inseruit) in man; as such, natural 
law is "natural" inasmuch as anything caused by a principle 
of [some] nature is said to be "natural" to that nature 
(#e). Finally, taken as precepts, dictates, or principles, 
natural law is said to be innate (innata) to practical 
reason (#b), connatural to man (connaturales homini; #b) and 
implanted (indita or inseruit) either (i) [by God] in 
natural cognition (#c), (ii) in reason itself (#d), (iii) 
18The extrinsic causes which determine the contents of 
natural law knowledge will be discussed in our commentary 
discussion on the naturalis conceptio. Until then, our study 
will focus primarily on the intrinsic causes of natural law 
and natural law knowledge. 
___) 
200 
(inseruit) by an innate power (#e), or (iv) [by God] in the 
constitution of human nature (#f). What St. Thomas means 
when he speaks of natural law knowledge as innate, 
connatural, and implanted remains to be explicated. 
Now, as we noted above (see note 10), natural law is 
the moral norm which directs man in his activities towards 
his end according to the light of reason; on this score, 
there is a connection between what is right (recte) and what 
is natural to man and, correlatively, what is evil and 
unnatural to him (see note 46 below). Accordingly, in taking 
up Lombard's discussion concerning polygamy ("Cui licebat 
plures habere vel non"; see note 6 above), St. Thomas does 
not merely consider the question of licitness as such; 
rather, he asks the more profound and radical question: 
"Utrum habere plures uxores sit contra legem naturae;" for 
it is according to the law of nature that the good or evil 
of polygamy must be determined with respect to man's nature 
and his end. 
II. Key-Text A 
In IV Sent., d. 33. q. 1, a. 1, resp.: "Utrumhabereplures 
uxores sit contra legem naturae" (ca. 1252-56) . 19 
After offering nine arguments--five of which hold that 
polygamy is not contrary to natural law, and four of which 
hold that it is--St. Thomas responds as follows: 
19 (VII-2, 967a). Except for changes in punctuati9n, the 
same text appears in Suppl., q. 65, a. 1. 
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[1] It must be said that there are certain principles 
naturally present in all things whereby they are 
able not only to perform their proper actions, but 
also to render them suitable to their end, whether 
such actions flow from a thing by virtue of its 
generic nature or by virtue of its specific nature: 
thus it belongs to a magnet to fall downward 
according to its generic nature and to attract iron 
according to its specific nature. 
Respondeo dicendum, quod omnibus rebus 
naturaliter insunt quaedam principia quibus non 
solum operationes proprias efficere possunt, sed 
quibus etiam eas convenientes fini suo reddant; 
sive sint actiones quae rem aliquam ex natura sui 
generis sive consequantur ex natura speciei: ut 
magneti competit ferri deorsum ex natura sui 
generis, et attrahere ferrum ex natura speciei. 
[2] Now just as forms are principles of action in 
things that act from natural necessity, by which 
they perform suitable actions proportionate to 
their end, so also in creatures which participate 
in cognition, the principles of action are 
knowledge and appetite. Hence in the cognitive 
power there must be a natural conception and in the 
appetitive power a natural inclination whereby the 
action suited the genus or species is rendered 
fitting to its end. 
Sicut autem in rebus agentibus ex necessitate 
naturae sunt principia actionum ipsae formae, a 
quibus operationes propriae prodeunt convenientes 
fini; ita in his quae cognitionem participant, 
principia agendi sunt cognitio et appetitus. 
Unde oportet quod in vi cognoscitiva sit naturalis 
conceptio et in vi appetitiva naturalis inclinatio, 
quibus operatic conveniens generi sive speciei 
) reddatur competens fini. 
[3] But since among all animals man knows the 
meaning of an end and the ordination of actions 
to the end, therefore the natural conception 
implanted in him by which he is directed in 
suitable action is called natural law or natural 
right; but in other animals it is called natural 
estimation; for brutes are impelled to produce 
proper action more from the force of their nature 
than directed to act by their own choice. 
Sed quia homo inter cetera animalia rationem finis 
cognoscit, et proportionem operis ad finem: ideo 
naturalis conceptio ei indita, qua dirigatur ad 
operandurn convenienter, lex naturalis vel jus 
naturale dicitur; in ceteris autern aestirnatio 
naturalis vocatur. Bruta enirn ex vi naturae 
irnpelluntur ad operandurn convenientes actiones 
rnagis quarn regulentur quasi proprio arbitrio 
agentia. 
202 
[4] Natural law, therefore, is none other than the 
knowledge naturally implanted in man by which he is 
directed towards suitable conduct in his 
activities, whether they are proper to him by 
virtue of his generic nature (such as in generating 
offspring or eating and so on), or belong to him 
by virtue of his specific nature (as in reasoning 
and the like) . 
Lex ergo naturalis nihil est aliud quarn conceptio 
hornini naturaliter indita, qua dirigitur ad 
convenienter agendurn in actionibus propriis, sive 
cornpetant ei ex natura generis, ut generare, 
cornedere, et hujusrnodi; sive ex natura speciei, ut 
ratiocinari, et sirnilia. 
[5] Now whatever renders an action unsuitable to the 
end which nature intends some operation to achieve 
is said to be against the law of nature. But an 
action may be unsuitable either to a principal end 
or to a secondary end; and this two-fold 
unsuitability may occur in two ways: first, 
something may wholly frustrate an end as when too 
much or too little eating impedes bodily health--
which is the principal end of eating; it may also 
impede suitability for conducting business, which 
is a secondary end of eating. In a second way, 
something makes difficult or decreases the fitting 
attainment of either the principal or secondary 
end--as when eating is inappropriate at an 
unsuitable time. 
Omne autern illud quod actionern inconvenientern 
reddit fini quern natura ex opere aliquo intendit, 
contra legern naturae esse dicitur. Potest autern 
actio non esse conveniens fini vel principali vel 
secundario; et sive sic, hoc contingit dupliciter. 
Uno rnodo ex aliquo quod omnino irnpedit finern; ut 
nirnia superfluitas aut defectus cornestionis irnpedit 
salutern corporis quasi principalern f inern 
cornestionis; et bonarn habitudinern in negotiis 
exercendis, quae est finis secundarius. Alio rnodo 
ex aliquo quod f acit diff icilern aut minus decentern 
perventionern ad f inern principalern vel secundariurn, 
sicut inordinata comestio quantum ad tempus 
indebitum. 
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[6] If, therefore, an action is not suited to its end 
by completely thwarting the principal end, then 
directly through the law of nature it is prohibited 
by the primary precepts of the law of nature, which 
hold the same place in matters of conduct as the 
first principles hold in speculative matters. If, 
however, an action is in any way unsuitable to the 
secondary end, or again to the principal end as 
rendering its attainment difficult or less fitting, 
then it is prohibited, certainly not by the primary 
precepts of the law of nature, but by the secondary 
precepts which are derived from the first--just as 
conclusions in speculative matters are given our 
assent by virtue of self-evident principles. Thus 
the action under consideration is said to be 
against the law of nature. 
Si ergo actio sit inconveniens fini quasi omnino 
prohibens f inem principalem, directe per legem 
naturae prohibetur primis praeceptis legis naturae, 
quae sunt in operabilibus, sicut sunt communes 
conceptiones in speculativis. Si autem sit 
incompetens fini secundario quocumque modo, aut 
etiam principali, ut faciens difficilem vel minus 
congruam perventionem ad ipsum; prohibetur non 
quidem primis praeceptis legis naturae, sed 
secundis, quae ex primis derivantur; sicut 
conclusiones in speculativis ex principiis per se 
notis fidem habent; et sic dicta actio contra legem 
naturae esse dicitur. 
Now matrimony, St. Thomas states, has for its primary 
end the procreation and education of children; such an end 
certainly befits man by virtue of his generic nature which 
he holds in common with other animals; thus, offspring is 
assigned as a good of marriage. But for its secondary end, 
it has, among men alone, the community of works that are a 
necessity of life; and with respect to this, [both husband 
and wife] owe fidelity to one another, which is one of the 
goods of matrimony. Further, among believers, marriage 
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involves yet a higher end since it signifies the 
relationship between Christ and his Church; here the 
sacrament is said to be a good of marriage. Thus, the 
primary [generic] end corresponds to matrimony insofar as 
man is an animal, the second [specific] end inasmuch as he 
is a man, the third inasmuch as he is a believer. 20 
The plurality of wives, therefore, neither totally 
destroys nor otherwise impedes the primary end of marriage, 
since one man suffices to beget children from a plurality of 
wives and educate children born of them. But the second 
[specific] end, while not totally destroyed, is nevertheless 
greatly impeded by a plurality of wives; for it is difficult 
to have peace in a family where one man is joined to many 
wives, since one man cannot suffice to satisfy the needs of 
many wives, and because the sharing of several in one 
20 In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VII-2967b): 
"Matrimonium ergo habet pro fine principali prolis 
procreationem et educationem; qui quidem finis competit 
homini secundum naturam generis; unde et aliis animalibus 
est communis, ut dicitur in 8 Ethicor (cap. 12, vel 14); et 
sic bonum matrimonii assignatur proles. Sed pro fine 
secundario, ut dicit Philosophus, habet in hominibus solum 
communicationem operum quae sunt necessaria in vita, ut 
supra dictum est; et secundum hoc fidem sibi invicem debent, 
quae est unum de bonis matrimonii. Habet ulterius alium 
finem, inquantum in fidelibus est, scilicet significationem 
Christi et Ecclesiae; et sic bonum matrimonii dicitur 
sacramentum. Unde primus finis respondet matrimonio hominis 
inquantum est animal; secundus, inquantum est homo; tertius, 
inquantum est fidelis." Note that the generic and specific 
ends are determined according to the generic and specific 
nature of man. In this connection, see Proximate Context #b 
regarding the innate ends (innata fines) in practical reason 
which are connatural to man (connaturales homini); see also 
Proximate Context #f. · 
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occupation generates strife among its members. The third end 
is completely destroyed by a plurality of wives; for, as 
Christ is one, so also His Church is one. Hence, a plurality 
of wives is in some [specific] manner against natural law; 
but in some [generic] manner it is not. 21 
III. Commentary 
Introduction 
Before we consider in detail the many points which St. 
Thomas puts forward in this text, let us call attention to 
the general form and thrust of his response. Note that the 
moral issue of polygamy is not immediately addressed; 
rather, St. Thomas opens the discussion with a brief 
exposition of his theory of nature. Next, he introduces his 
teaching on natural law which is clearly an extension of 
this doctrine of nature. Only then does he proceed to the 
moral problem at hand; and the solution he offers is 
squarely set in terms of his introductory discussion on 
nature and natural law. Let us, then, look more closely at 
21 Ibid., (VII-2, 967b): "Pluralitas ergo uxorum neque 
totaliter tollit neque aliqualiter impedit primum f inem, cum 
unus vir sufficiat pluribus uxoribus fecundandis, et 
educandis filiis ex eis natis; sed secundum finem etsi non 
totaliter tollat, tamen multum impedit, eo quod non facile 
potest esse pax in f amilia ubi uni viro plures uxores 
junguntur, cum non possit unus vir sufficere ad 
satisf aciendum pluribus uxoribus ad votum; et quia 
communicatio plurium in uno officio causat litem, sicut 
f iguli corrixantur ad invicem, et similiter plures uxores 
unius viri. Tertium autem finem totaliter tollit, eo quod 
sicut Christus est unus, ita Ecclesia una; et ideo patet ex 
dictis quod pluralitas uxorum quodammodo est contra legem 
naturae, et quodammodo non. " · 
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his movement of thought to see the connection he establishes 
between his doctrines of nature, natural law, and the moral 
question of polygamy. 
Movement Qf Thought 
St. Thomas puts forward a chain of arguments whereby 
the conclusion of one syllogism becomes the major premise 
for the next. First, he states his major premise22 (see 
above [l]) which consists of (1) the subject--namely, omnes 
res; (2) certain principles predicated of the subject which 
(a) are naturally present within (naturaliter insunt), (b) 
enable things to perform proper actions and (c) render such 
actions suitable toward their end. Also predicated of the 
subject are (3) the generic and specific nature and (4) the 
actions which flow from--and according to--a thing's generic 
or specific nature. Implicit in this first premise, then, is 
the conclusion that the principles of action proper to a 
thing direct both generic and specific actions towards a 
thing's suitable end--according to its generic and specific 
nature. 
22This premise is itself a conclusion which St. Thomas 
arrives at in the course of other investigations. See, for 
example, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; d. 45, q. 1, a. 3; In 
II Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. l; d. 37, q. 3, a. 2; In III 
Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2; In IV Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1. On 
this topic, see George Klubertanz, "St. Thomas' Treatment of 
the Axiom, 'Omne Agens Agit Propter Finem,' in An Etienne 
Gilson Tribute (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 
1959), 101-17; Joseph Owens, "The Causal Proposition--
Principle or Conclusion?" The Modern Schoolman 32 (1955), 
159-270; Russell Collins, "Finality and Being," Proceedings 
from the ACPA 28 (1949), 36-46. 
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Next, St. Thomas introduces the minor premise (see 
above, [2]) consisting of (1) the identification of two 
sorts of the subject (omnes res), i.e., (a) those things 
which act [simply] from the necessity of nature and (b) 
those things which [further] participate in cognition; (2) 
the identification of two kinds of principles of action 
which correspond to the above distinction of species 
respectively--i.e., (a) forms (formae) and (b) knowledge 
(cognitio) and appetite (appetitus). Thus, in view of the 
major premise [la-c], it follows that the principles of 
action of both kinds of things are (a) naturally present 
within their respective subjects, (b) enable such things to 
perform their proper [generic or specific] actions, and (c) 
render such actions [generic or specific] suitable toward 
their respective end according to the [generic or specific] 
natures of those subjects. 
In the phrase that follows (see above, [2]), St. Thomas 
narrows the focus of the discussion to the consideration of 
cognitive agents and their respective principles of action 
which he identifies with further precision: there must be in 
the cognitive power (in vi cognoscitiva) (a) a naturalis 
conceptio and in the appetitive power (in vi appetitiva) (b) 
a naturalis inclinatio or desire. Hence, in light of [2], it 
follows that the naturalis conceptio is a cognitio which is 
distinguished from--but proper to and efficiently caused 
by--the cognitive power; similarly, the naturalis inclinatio 
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is an operation of desiring which is distinguished from--but 
proper to and efficiently caused by--the appetitive power; 
these two principles of action (the naturalis conceptio and 
the naturalis inclinatio) (a) are-naturally present 
(naturaliter insunt; see #b, #e and [1] above) in those 
cognitive agents, (b) enable such agents to perform proper 
actions [whether generic or specific], and (c) render such 
actions [whether generic or specific] suitable for attaining 
their proper end according to the [generic and specific] 
natures of those agents. This conclusion now serves as the 
major premise for the next syllogism. 
In the next section of the response (see above, [3]), 
St. Thomas provides several minor premises: homo is 
distinguished from other cognitive agents (animalia) as one 
who knows the end as such and the means to that end; the 
naturalis conceptio is designated in man as lex naturalis or 
~ naturale; in other animals, the naturalis conceptio is 
identified as the naturalis aestimatio. 
From the force of [2) , which itself is founded upon 
[1], these minor premises ([3]) issue in the following 
conclusion [4] : natural law is the knowledge (cognitio; see 
above [2]) which (a) is naturally implanted in him (homini 
naturaliter indita or naturaliter inest; see #b, #e and 
[1]), (b) enables him to perform proper actions--both 
generic (such as eating) and specific (such as reasoning)--
and (c) renders those generic and specific actions suitable 
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for attaining his proper end according to his [generic and 
specific] nature. This conclusion, then, is a particular 
result sterrnning from the opening premise [1]. Accordingly, 
St. Thomas' doctrine of lex naturalis in man must be 
understood as a specific application of a more general 
doctrine of natural activity pertaining to omnibus rebus. 
Accordingly, natural law is here taken as a product or 
operation of man which is naturally implanted (i.e., 
naturally produced; see #b, #e and [4] above) in him by his 
innate cognitive power (qua efficient cause), the vis 
cognoscitiva (see #b and #e); but further, natural law is 
also a naturally implanted knowledge (see #c, #d, #e, #f and 
[4] above). Precisely as implanted (indita or inseruit), the 
contents of natural law knowledge are imparted to the 
faculty of knowing (see notes 13 and 14 above); but whether 
the content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge are 
intrinsic or extrinsic to the intellectual power itself 
remains to be investigated. 
Having identified lex naturalis as that specific 
principle of action proper to man, St. Thomas next lays down 
the foundational criteria of suitability with respect to 
natural ends: anything which renders an action unsuitable to 
an end which a nature intends (see #f) by way of some 
operation ("quern natura ex opere aliquo intendit"; see #c) 
is against the law of nature (legem naturae) (see above, 
[5]). It is not clear whether the term legem naturae as used 
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here [5] applies generally to omnibus rebus or only 
specifically to man. In any case, the term lex naturae is 
subsequently applied only with respect to man for the rest 
of the discussion. To this extent, the terms lex naturae and 
jus naturale are evidently synonymous with the term lex 
naturalis, which is used in our present text only with 
reference to man. 
Next, St. Thomas provides the further minor premise 
(see above, [5]) by (1) distinguishing between (a) principal 
ends and (b) secondary ends to which the criteria of 
suitability [4] pertains and (2) identifying how this 
criteria applies with respect to each kind of end--namely, 
when something either (a) wholly thwarts [either] end (e.g., 
bodily health or good business) or (b) inhibits or decreases 
the fitting attainment of either a principal or secondary 
end (as intended by nature). In light of the major premise 
as stated in [5], St. Thomas now derives two conclusions 
from this minor: (1) an action (e.g., the generic action of 
gluttony) which is unsuited to [either] end and wholly 
thwarts the principal end is directly prohibited through the 
law of nature (per legem naturae) by its primary precepts 
[6] ; to this conclusion is added the comparison of primary 
precepts in practical matters to the communes conceptiones 
which pertain to speculative matters [6] ; (2) an action 
which (a) in any way is unsuitable to the secondary end or 
(b) makes the attainment of the primary end difficult or 
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less fitting is forbidden by the secondary precepts [6] . 
Concerning this conclusion, St. Thomas explains that 
secondary precepts are derived from the first precepts 
("quae ex primis derivantur") similar to the way by which 
conclusions in speculative matters achieve [validity] by 
virtue of the self-evident [first] principles [6] . 23 It is 
clear, then, that St. Thomas' moral doctrine has as its 
basis the natural law, which itself issues from his doctrine 
of nature--specifically, human nature. 
St. Thomas' Doctrine of Nature 
To appreciate, then, the meaning and significance of 
natural law precisely as innate, let us briefly mark out the 
general lines of St. Thomas' doctrine of nature as expressed 
in the Commentary on the Sentences. We first recall the 
opening statement of our key-text: 
There are certain principles naturally present in all 
things whereby they are able not only to perform their 
23 For the sake of clarity, note in this discussion that 
a principal end corresponds (respondet) to man's generic 
nature while a secondary end pertains to man's specific 
nature (see note 16 above). However, an action, whether it 
stems from man's generic or specific nature, may be directed 
towards or against either a generic or specific end (see 
above, [S]). Therefore, it follows that a primary precept 
always directly prohibits the complete obstruction of a 
principal (generic) end [6]--regardless of whether the 
action involved stems from man's generic or specific nature; 
accordingly, a primary precept always directly prohibits 
generic or specific actions insofar as either kind of action 
completely thwarts a principal (generic) end. A secondary 
precept, however, never bears directly upon the total 
obstruction of principal end [6]--regardless of whether the 
action involved stems from man's generic or specific· nature. 
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proper actions, but also to render them suitable to 
their end, whether such actions flow from a thing by 
virtue of its generic nature or by its specific nature. 
(see [l] above) 
Simply put, "nature" for St. Thomas is that intrinsic 
principle by which a thing is determined in its proper 
actions and directed in those actions towards its proper 
end. 24 
This same teaching on nature and natural action is 
expressed more fully In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1: 
It is said in Wisdom, chap. 8, that God disposes all 
things sweetly, because each and every thing by the 
nature (ex natura) divinely implanted (indita) in it 
tends towards that to which it is ordained by divine 
providence according to the exigency of the impression 
it has received. Because all things proceed from God 
inasmuch as He is good, ... therefore all created things, 
according to the impression received from the Creator 
("secundum impressionem a Creatore receptam"), are 
inclined towards seeking the good according to their 
mode. Thus a certain circulation (circulatio) is 
discovered in things, while, proceeding from the good, 
they tend towards the good. 25 
24 In .I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, sol. (VI, 324b): 
"Sicut Dionysius (Div. Norn., IV), non est providentia 
naturas rei destruere, sed salvare; et ideo quasdam res sic 
instituit ut secundum suam conditionem consequatur finem per 
principium quod est natura. 11 In II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, 
sol. (VI, 36la): "· .. eodem ordine res referuntur in finem 
quo procedunt a principio, eo quod agens unusquisque ordinat 
effectum suum in f inem aliquem; et ideo secundum ordinem 
agentium est ordo finium." In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, 
sol., (VII-1, 294a): " ... omne quod sequitur aliquem finem, 
oportet quod fuerit aliquomodo determinatur ad illum finem." 
See also note 49 with respect to nature as an intrinsic 
principle (intrinsica principia) of action. 
25See In IV~., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1 (VII-II, 
119lb): "· .. dicutur Sap. 8, quia Deus omnia suaviter 
disponit: quia unaquaeque res ex natura sibi divinitus 
indita tendit in id ad quod per divinam providentiam· 
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Here, in addition to identifying natura as an intrinsic 
principle of action, St. Thomas emphasizes its relational 
significance as divinely implanted (divinitus indita) in 
each and every creature. All created things proceed from God 
and--according to the impression (namely, natura) received 
by the Creator--tend towards the good. 26 Hence, every 
natural item is related to God as principle agent, exemplar, 
and final cause . 21 
As the primary agent, exemplar, and final cause of 
ordinatur secundum exigentiam impressionis receptae. Et quia 
omnia procedunt a Deo inquantum bonus est ... ideo omnia 
creata secundum impressionem s Creatore receptam inclinantur 
in bonum appetendum secundum suum modum; ut sic in rebus 
quaedam circulatio inveniatur; dum, a bone egredientia, in 
bonum tendunt. " In .I ~. , d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, sol. (VI, 
113a): "In exitu creaturarum a prime principio attenditur 
quaedam circulatio et regiratio eo quod omnia revertuntur 
sicut in finem in id a quo sicut a principio prodierunt." 
See also In .I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2; In .I.I Sent., d. 12, 
expos. text.; ibid., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2; In III Sent., 
d. 27, q. a. 2. On St. Thomas' doctrine of circulatio, see 
Gustaf Gustaf son, The Theory Q.f. Natural Appetency in the 
Philosophy Q.f. .£t..... Thomas (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1944), 84-90. 
26Regarding the relationship between good and end, see 
In .I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, sol. (VI, 69a): " ... bonum 
habet rationem causae finalis .... " Ibid., d. 37, q. 3, a. 2, 
sol. (VI, 725b) : " ... ratio boni a fine sumitur. . . . Finis 
autem est perfecti agentis inquantum est agens, eo quod 
finis movet agentem ad operandum; unde finis, et etiam 
obliquatio a fine, per prius comparatur ad agens quam ad 
patiens." See also In II~., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 
729a) . 
27 In .I.I~., d. 1, expos. text. (VI, 401a): 
" ... secundum ipsum, primum principium agens et ultimus finis 
reducuntur in idem numero ... ex quo sequitur quod sit unum 
principium primum extra rem, quod est agens et exemplar et 
finis ... " Insofar as it is divinitus indita, the nature of a 
creature is related to God as its extrinsic cause; see note 
13 above. 
214 
creatures, God is an extrinsic cause (see note 27 above); 
nevertheless, He is an immanent (or indwelling) cause 
insofar as He [alone] is the cause of that which is 
innermost in all things--namely ~. Since esse is more 
intimate to a thing than any cause through which a thing is 
determined, it follows that the operation of the Creator 
penetrates more deeply to the core of a thing than the 
operation of any secondary determining cause. 28 
The supreme causality of God, however, does not 
exclude the causality of creatures--nor is the causality of 
creatures the result of any insufficiency on the part of 
God; rather, from the order of His wisdom, God has arranged 
to bring about an effect by the mediation of [secondary] 
causes; in this way the dignity of causality is communicated 
by God to creatures; 29 • Hence, there proceeds from the 
28 In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. (VI, 389b): 
"Horum tamen causa etiam Deus est, magis intime in eis 
operans quam aliae causae moventes: quia ipse est dans esse 
rebus. Causae autem aliae sunt quasi determinates illud 
esse .... [E]sse autem est magis intimum cuilibet rei quam ea 
per quae esse determinatur .... Unde operatio Creatoris magis 
pertingit ad intima rei quam operatio causarum secundarum." 
In 1. Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, sol. (VI, 68a): "Deus est esse 
omnium non essentiale, sed causale .... Unde patet quod 
divinum esse producit esse creaturae in similitudine sui 
imperfecta: et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, 
a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat." 
29 In 1. Sent., d. 45, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4 (VI, 361a): 
" ... causalitas divinae voluntatis non excludit omnes causas 
proximas rerum; nee hoc est ex insufficientia voluntatis, 
sed ex ordine sapientiae ejus quae effectus mediantibus 
aliis causis provenire disposuit, ut sic etiam causandi 
dignitas creaturis communicaretur." In ll Sent., d. 1, q. 1, 
a. 4, sol. (VI, 389b): " ... ideo hoc quod creatum est causa 
alii creaturae, non excludit quin Deus immediate in rebus 
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first principle of all things a diversity of particular 
principles; correlatively, there are found different proper 
ends according to the diversity of created agents (see notes 
24-25 above) . All creatures are nevertheless ordered to a 
common ultimate end--namely, God--inasmuch as every created 
good refers to the goodness of God from which the good of 
creatures flows. 30 
Good, then, is found in things according to a double 
order--namely: (1) the order of one thing to another thing, 
such as the order of members of an army to one another and 
(2) the order of things to the ultimate end, similar to the 
order of an army to its leader; and because things bear 
reference to an ultimate common end by the mediation of 
various proper and immediate ends, there is effected a 
diversity of relations of things vis-a-vis the ultimate 
omnibus operatur, inquantum virtus sua est sicut medium 
conjungens virtutem cujuslibet causae secundae cum suo 
effectu." 
30See In II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 361a): 
"In progressu autem rerum a principio invenitur unum rerum 
principium primum, quod commune est omnium, sub quo 
inveniuntur alia principia propria, quae in diversis sunt 
diversa: ita etiam in referendo res ad finem invenitur 
ultimus finis omnibus communis, qui est ultimus finis; sed 
inveniuntur diversi fines proprii secundum diversitatem 
entium." In .I Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, contra (VI, 13b): 
" ... ratio dilectionis est bonitas. Sed omnis bonitas 
refertur ad bonitatem Dei a qua fluit et cujus similitudinem 
gerit. Ergo nihil est diligendum nisi in ordine ad De_um." 
See also In .l.l Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 2. 
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end. 31 
In this connection, St. Thomas explains that the 
perfection (perfectio) of a thing consists in the attainment 
of its ultimate [end] (ultimum); perfection, however, is 
understood in two ways: with respect to what is within a 
thing (in re) and what is outside a thing (extra rem). Now, 
perfection within a thing--understood simply--consists in 
the operation which befits its form by which a thing is what 
it is. 32 But a thing which possesses a substantial form is 
31See In ll Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 361a): 
"Bonum enim invenitur in rebus secundum duplicem ordinem, ut 
in 12 Metaphys. (text. com. 52) dicitur, scilicet secundum 
ordinem unius rei ad rem aliam, qui ordo similis est ordini 
quern partes exercitus ad invicem habent: et alius est ordo 
rerum ad finem ultimum, qui scilicet est similis ordini 
exercitus ad bonum ducis: et quia res referuntur in finem 
ultimum conununem, mediante fine proprio; ideo secundum 
diversitatem finis proprii efficitur diversa relatio rerum 
ad finem ultimum. 11 St. Thomas then concludes (VI, 361a): 
"Sic ergo dicendum est, [quod sicut] rerum omnium unus est 
finis ultimus, scilicet Deus; ita et voluntatum omnium est 
unus ultimus finis, scilicet Deus .... " With respect to the 
ordination of secondary causes and goods to God, see In I 
Sent., d. q. 2, a. 1, contra; d. 45, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; In ll 
Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. Regarding instrumental 
causality, see In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol.; d. 8, q. 
2, a. 3, ad 1. The mediation of creatures will be seen to 
play a crucial role in human activity insofar as man as a 
cognitive agent attains knowledge of his end through the 
knowledge of creatures--as derived from sensible experience; 
see our conunentary on the naturalis conceptio below. 
32 In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VII-2, 583a): 
"· .. perfectio rei consistit in hoc quod res ad sui ultimum 
perducatur. Est autem dupliciter ultimum rei; unum quod est 
in re, et aliud quod est extra rem .... Ultimum autem 
cujuslibet rei in seipsa est ipsa rei operatic, propter quam 
res est .... [S]impliciter perfectum dicitur quod habet 
operationem convenientem suae formae .... 11 In III Sent. d. 
27, q. 1, a. 4. sol. (VII-1, 297): 11 ••• in rebus omnibus 
duplex perfectio invenitur; una qua in se subsistit; alia 
qua ad res alias ordinatur. 11 See also In I Sent., d.· 37, q. 
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not said to be perfected [merely by virtue of the f orrn 
itself] , but is perfected in and through esse or perfected 
in the first perfection which is esse. This latter principle 
by which a creature has esse is the ultimate end of a thing 
extra rem; and through union to this principle, a thing is 
completed and established. Thus, the first agent--namely 
God--is understood as a creature's ultimate perfecting end 
(ultimi finis perficientis) . 33 On this score, a 
relationship between perfection in re and extra rem becomes 
evident insofar as the ultimate end of a thing (perfection 
extra rem) is at once the immanent or indwelling efficient 
cause by which that thing has esse (see note 28 above) . 
Let us sum up St. Thomas' doctrine of nature as 
follows: 
1. Natura is an intrinsic (intrinseca) principle of 
action. 
2. Insofar as it is an impression (impressio) divinely 
implanted (divinitus indita) in creatures, natura signifies 
3, a. 2, sol. (VI, 725b) : " ... finis autem est perfectio 
agentis inquantum est agens .... " See note 26 above for the 
full citation. 
33 In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VII-2, 583a): 
"Unde res quae habet forrnam substantialem per quam est, esse 
non dicitur perfecta simpliciter, sed perfecta in esse, vel 
perfecta perfectione prima .... Ultimum autem cujuslibet rei 
extra seipsam, est principium a quo res habet esse: quia per 
conjunctionem ad ipsum res complentur et firrnantur ... et ideo 
primum agens habet etiam rationem ultimi finis 
perficientis." Such a passage exemplifies the irreducibility 
of St. Thomas' metaphysics of esse to that of Aristotle's 
doctrine of substance. 
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an ordination to God as its extrinsic causal principle. 
3. According to their proper natures, creatures are 
ordered to God as their ultimate end and good. 
4. This ordination to God involves the mediation 
(causal relationships) of creatures to one another. 
5. Perfection of a creature consists in {a) operation 
suitable to a creature's nature or form; (b) its union with 
the ultimate perfecting end of its being (esse) . 
Human Nature gyg Specifically Intellectual 
Let us next consider how St. Thomas applies his 
doctrine of nature to man. In related discussions on natural 
activity and natural ends, St. Thomas explicitly identifies 
man as among those creatures which participate in cognition. 
This kind of participation is proper to man by virtue of his 
nature: 
We are said to be god-like with respect to our soul, 
not in such a way that our soul is of the divine 
essence, but because it participates in an intellectual 
nature, which is also in God; accordingly, man is said 
to be [created] to the image of God. 34 
That is said to be natural to something which 
corresponds to what its own form is, through which it 
is constituted in such a nature .... The form, however, 
through which man is man is reason and intellect. Thus, 
the soul of man naturally strives towards what is 
34 In .II~., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2 (VI, 530a): 
" ... dicimur nos esse genus Dei quantum ad animam, non ita 
quod anima sit de divina essentia, sed quia participat 
naturam intellectualem quae etiam in Deo est; secundum quod 
etiam dicitur ad imaginem Dei." The meaning of the term 
participatio in connection with natural law will be explored 
in the following textual study. -
suitable to it according to reason (rationem) and 
intellect ( intellectum) . 35 
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The intellectual nature attains to being an image of 
God in which the species of its nature in some way 
consists; and thus it is that we posit the ultimate 
happiness of an intellectual creature to be 
intellection, that is, intellectual contemplation, in 
which God's happiness also consists. 36 
Man is naturally ordered to God through cognition (per 
cognitionem and through affection (~ affectionem) 
inasmuch as such participation is natural to him. 37 
As these four passages reveal, man's natural form is a 
rational and intellectual form; accordingly, what is 
"natural" to man is that which corresponds to his 
intellectual nature. Thus, since man naturally strives 
35 In II Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 1, sol. (VI, 758a): 
" ... illud dicitur esse naturale alicui rei quod convenit 
sibi secundum conditionem suae formae, per quam in tali 
natura constituitur .... Forma autem per quam homo est homo, 
est ipsa ratio et intellectus. Unde in illud quod est 
conveniens sibi secundum rationem et intellectum, 
naturaliter tendit. 11 See ibid., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, sed 
contra (VI, 532b): "·· .anima rationalis est forma cujuslibet 
hominis." The distinction between ratio and intellectus will 
be touched upon later in this conunentary. 
36 In ll Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, sol. (VI, 525a): 
"· .. intellectualis natura attingit ad imitationem divinam, 
in qua quodanunodo consistit species naturae ejus; et inde 
est quod in eadem operatione ponimus ultimam felicitatem 
intellectualis creaturae, in qua est felicitas Dei, scilicet 
in contemplatione intellectiva." Cf. note 10 above where St. 
Thomas states that the end of man is [the operation of] 
caritas for God and neighbor. See note 38 below where St. 
Thomas briefly explains the meaning of caritas. 
37 In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1 (VII-1, 244b): 
"· .. homo naturaliter ordinetur ad Deum et per cognitionem et 
per af f ectionem, inquantum est naturaliter ejus 
particeps .... " Hence, contrary to the interpretive reading 
of Germain Grisez (see our Introduction, note 46), St. 
Thomas clearly holds that man is directed by nature towards 
his supernatural end. 
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toward the good according to reason (see notes 40-43 below), 
his perfection lies in (a) that operation--namely, 
intellectual contemplation--which befits his form (see notes 
32 and 36 above) and (b) union with God--the ultimate 
perfecting end of man--through cognition and affection (see 
notes 33 and 37 above) . These two aspects of perfection are 
seen to converge in St. Thomas' doctrine of natural law 
which involves the notions of (1) operation of (2) natural 
powers as rooted in, and in conformity with, (3) one's own 
human nature or form (see [4] above), and (4) the end as 
intended by that nature. 38 
How does St. Thomas' doctrine of circulatio apply to 
man? We noted above (see notes 28 and 33) that God is the 
efficient cause of that which is innermost in all things--
namely, esse. Let us further note that the rational soul of 
38See Proximate Contexts #b and #f and section (5] 
above; see In i Sent., d. 3, exp. text (VI, 44a) where the 
convergence of man's perfection in re and extra rem is 
clearly stated: " ... mens nostra dicitur capere Deum sicut 
perfectibile [capit] suam perfectionem. Objectum enim 
operationis aliquo modo est perfectio operantis. Mens autem 
nostra habet operationem circa Deum per cognitionem et 
amorem quam non habent creaturae irrationales." In III Sent. 
d. 27, q. 1, a. 4, sol. (VII-1, 297a): " ... cognitio pertinet 
ad perfectionem cognoscentis, qua in seipso perfectum est: 
voluntas autem pertinet ad perfectionem rei secundum ordinem 
ad alias res et ideo objectum cognoscitivae virtutis est 
verum, quod est in anima, ut dicit Philosophus, 6 Metaph. 
(text. 8): objectum autem appetitivae bonum, quod est in 
rebus .... " In ll ~., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 729a): 
"Debita autem relatio voluntatis ad finem ultimum salvatur 
secundum illum finem quo voluntas nata est ultimum finem 
participare, in quo distinguitur a rebus aliis, quae alio 
modo ultimum finem participant; et hie est caritas, vel 
beatitude; et ideo non solum Deus. sed etiam caritas _finis 
est omnium rectarum voluntatum." 
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man is irrunediately caused [created] by God. 39 Inasmuch, 
then, as the intellectual soul of man is created by, and 
ordered to, God as his ultimate perfecting end through 
knowledge and affection, the natural movement of circulation 
in man is carried out in an intellectual manner. 
What can be said of man's ordination to God in view of 
the multiplicity of other causes and goods he experiences in 
the world? In our key-text, St. Thomas sums up this 
ordination of man to his end according to knowledge and 
appetite as follows: 
Man, among all animals, knows the meaning of an end 
and the ordination of actions to the end (see [3] 
above). 
The will following [knowledge] can be taken in two 
ways: either insofar as it follows the conception of 
the end simply; and thus the will tends towards the 
corrunon end without any determination of that which is 
[ordered] to the end; or insofar as the will follows 
the conception of what is [ordered] to the end and 
its condition; and thus the will attains the end 
according to some determinate mode. 40 
39 In ll Sent., d. 18, q. 2, a. 2, sed contra (VI, 
518a): "· .. Genes. 2, 7, dicitur, quod 'inspiravit Deus in 
faciem ejus spiraculum vitae.' Haec autem est anima 
rationalis, qua homo vivit. Ergo videtur quod irrunediate a 
Deo sit." Ibid., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. (VI, 389b): " ... unde 
nee Angeli nee animae rationales possunt generari, sed solum 
creari .... " 
40 In .I Sent., d. 47, q. 1, a. 3, sol. (VI, 572b): 
"Voluntas autem consequens dupliciter potest accipi. Aut 
secundum quod sequitur conceptionem finis tantum; et sic 
voluntas est de fine in corrununi sine aligua determinatione 
ejus ~ est ad f inem. Aut secundum quod sequitur 
conceptionem ejus quod est ad finem, et conditionem ejus; et 
sic voluntas consequens est de consecutione finis secundum 
aliguem determinatum modum." In .I Sent., d. 6, expos~t. 
text. (VI, 59b): "Voluntatem oportet quod praecedat aliqua 
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By virtue of his intellectual nature, man is able 
(through sensible experience; see note 64 below) to discern 
causal relationships in the world and thus trace secondary 
principles to their first principle (see note 30 above) ; 
likewise, inasmuch as he naturally tends to his end 
according to reason, man is able to refer secondary ends 
(goods) back to God as his ultimate end (or good) (see note 
31 above) . In this case, [man, through his appetitive power] 
proceeds from the love of the end (ex amore finis) , which is 
its principle, by desiring in the end those things which 
lead towards it. He thus embraces (accipit) things which 
lead towards the end, insofar as they are included in the 
end itself, and rests in them through love; therefore, 
desire (desiderium) follows upon love of the end, although 
desire precedes the love of those things which are ordered 
to the end. 41 Put another way, the will of man naturally 
cognitio. Est enim duplex actus voluntatis. Unus 
imperfectus, scilicet appetere; et iste actus praecedit 
cognitionem perfectam eorum quae acquiruntur in cognitione. 
Per appetitum enim sciendi aliquid movetur aliquis ad 
considerationem alicujus, cujus cognitionem considerando 
accipit; sed tamen hunc actum voluntatis praecedit cognitio 
indeterminata gyg res scitur in universali, et per illam 
cognitionem imperfectam tendit appetitus in perfectionem 
ipsius: si enim esset omnino ignotum, non quaereretur." See 
also note 38 above. 
41 In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1 (VII-1, 295b) 
"· .. sicut in operatione intellectus concluditur quidam 
circulus, ita et in operatione affectus .... Similiter etiam 
affectus ~ amore finis, qui est principium, procedit 
desiderando in ea quae sunt ad f inem, quae prout accipit ut 
finem in se aliquo modo continentia, per amorem in eis 
quiescit; et ideo desiderium seguitur amorem finis, quamvis 
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seeks the end and desires other things for the sake of this 
end (i.e., God) . 42 This end, St. Thomas states, is 
naturally known in the reason as good and as to be sought; 
and the will following this knowledge is called will as 
nature. 43 Now, in ad 9 of our key-text, St. Thomas 
identifies this knowledge of the end (as good) as the 
naturalis conceptio: 
praecedat amorem eorum quae sunt ad finem." 
42 See In i Sent. d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, contra (VI, 13b): 
" ... ratio dilectionis est bonitas. Sed omnis bonitas 
refertur ad bonitatem Dei a qua fluit et cujus similtudinem 
gerit. Ergo nihil est diligendum nisi in ordine ad Deum. 11 
Here, St. Thomas flatly contradicts the position of Grisez, 
Boyle, and Finnis, who assert that "God is not the ultimate 
reason for acting." See our Introduction, note 48. 
43 In ll Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2 (VI, 739a): 
"Unde illud quod finis est hominis, est naturaliter in 
ratione cognitum esse bonum et appetendum, et voluntas 
consequens istam cognitionem dicitur voluntas ut natura." In 
stating that the will follows upon knowledge, St. Thomas 
does not mean that the appetitive power proceeds from the 
intellective power. Both powers are rooted in, and 
determined by, the essence of man; hence, the natural 
inclination is ordered to the end, not by reason, but by 
human nature; nevertheless, there is a natural communication 
between the two powers whereby the natural inclination 
naturally conforms itself to the regulation of reason. See 
In III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 4 (VII-1, 365a): "Sed 
quia naturalis inclinatio ad f inem aliquem est ex 
praestituente naturam, qui talem ordinem naturae tribuit; 
idea naturalis inclinatio voluntatis ad f inem non est ex 
ratione, nisi forte secundum naturalem communicantiam, qua 
fit ut appetitus rationi conjunctus naturaliter tendat ad 
conformandum se rationi sicut regulae; et ex hoc est quod 
voluntas est naturaliter inclinata ad finem, qui naturaliter 
rationi est inditus." 
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The natural inclination in the appetitive power follows 
the natural conception in cognition. 44 
Natural law knowledge (the naturalis conceptio), 
however, is not knowledge of the end simply; rather, the 
naturalis conceptio is evidently a complex knowledge which 
involves knowledge of (1) determinate goods (human persons 
and other creatures existing in the sensible universe), (2) 
man's actions as flowing from--and in accord with--his own 
nature (generic and specific), and (3) the common end or 
good. 45 This complex knowledge is the moral norm by which 
we discern what we must do ("quo agenda discernimus"; see 
44 In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 9 (VII-2, 968b): 
" ... naturalis inclinatio in appetitiva sequitur naturalem 
conceptionem in cognitione." In this connection, see In III 
Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 2 (VII-1,424a): "Sicut 
enim natura ex parvis seminibus maximas arbores proficit, 
ita etiam et lex [naturae] ex his quae in principio et in 
promtu sunt." Such a description of natural law suggests the 
organic unity of all natural law precepts as rooted in a 
common intelligible principle which, apparently, is the 
naturalis conceptio. 
45See [3] and [4] above; In ll Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 
1, sol. (VI, 758a): "Bonum autem cujuslibet virtutis est 
conveniens homini secundum rationem: quia talis bonitas est 
ex quadam commensuratione actus fill circumstantias et finem, 
quam ratio facit. Unde quaedam inclinationes virtutum sive 
aptitudines praeexistunt naturaliter in ipsa natura 
rationali .... [I]deo homo naturaliter in bonum tendit 
[secundum rationem] . " Note that this proportion 
(commensuratio) of action to circumstances and end is 
something which reason produces (gygm ratio facit) from the 
knowledges of act, circumstance and end; in this connection, 
see #c and #d above; see also In ll ~., d. 40, q. un., a. 
3, sol. The term circumstantia as employed here apparently 
refers to all other intelligible factors (man's concrete 
situation consisting of persons, things, place, etc.) from 
which, in addition to the knowledge of actus and finis, the 
notion of "good" is conceived by reason. See our discussion 
on the production of the naturalis conceptio below. · 
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note 10 above). Now, if the will, in following this natural 
law knowledge, subordinates secondary ends (or goods) to the 
ultimate end, the will will be right (recta), and human 
action will be morally good and natural to man; but if the 
will does not follow natural law knowledge, the will will be 
perverse (perversa), and human action will be evil and 
unnatural to man. 46 
In view of St. Thomas' doctrines of nature in general 
and nature as typically human, what can be said of natural 
law in man? Let us summarize as follows: 
1. Natural law is understood by St. Thomas as (a) a 
nature which is divinely implanted (divinitus indita) in 
46 In ll £.fillt.., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 729a): 
" ... sicut rerum omnium unus est finis ultimus, scilicet 
Deus; ita et voluntatum omnium est unus ultimus finis, 
scilicet Deus; nihilominus tamen sunt alii fines proximi, 
et, si secundum illos fines servetur debita relatio 
voluntatis in finem ultimum, erit rec~a voluntas; si autem 
non, erit perversa." On the will as right, see also note 38 
above; cf. In II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3 as cited in 
note 10 above. The relationship between natural law, right 
reason, moral rectitude, and what is natural to man is 
explicated in In l.I £.fillt.., d. 42, q. 2, a. 5, sol. (VI, 
772ab): "Et ideo simpliciter concedendum est, unum peccatum 
alio gravius esse. Hoc autem contingit duobus modis. Uno 
modo ex parte ipsius peccati in se: alio modo ex parte 
peccantis. Ex parte peccati in se accidit major vel minor 
gravitas peccati ex illa causa ex qua quis actus malus 
secundum se dicitur. Hoc autem est secundum quod actus 
discordat a rectitude rationis. Unicuiquae enim naturae 
indita est naturalis quaedam inclinatio in suum f inem: et 
ideo in ratione est quaedam naturalis rectitude, per quam in 
finem inclinatur: et ideo illud quod abducit a fine illo, 
est discordans a ratione: et quia lex naturalis est secundum 
quam ratio recta est, ideo Augustinus dicit contra Faustum 
manich. (lib 22, cap. 27), quod peccatum dicitur, inquantum 
discordat a ~ aeterna. cujus expressio .e..§.t. ~ lex 
naturalis. Quanto ergo aliquis actus magis abducit a fine 
humanae vitae, tanto in se gravius peccatum est." 
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man, (b) a natural power which is innate (innata) to man, 
(c) a product or operation which is innate (innata) or 
naturally implanted (naturaliter indita) in him, and (d) a 
knowledge which is innate or naturally implanted in him. 
2. Taken precisely as man's nature, natural law is: 
(a) an intrinsic principle of action. 
(b) an impression (impressio) divinely implanted 
(divinitus indita) in man. 
(c) that principle of action which orders man to 
God as his ultimate end and good. 
(d) that principle of action by which man is 
ordered to other creatures as proximate ends 
and goods. 
(e) that principle of action by which man attains 
his perfection both with respect to (i) 
activity suitable to his own human form or 
essence and (ii) his union with God as his 
ultimate perfecting end. 
(f) that principle of action by which man attains 
to being the image of God in which the species 
of his nature in some way consists (see notes 
34 and 36 above) . 
3. Taken precisely as operative powers of man (the vis 
cognoscitiva and the vis appetitiva), natural law is: 
(a) natural to man, inasmuch as it corresponds to 
what his form or nature is (see notes 35 and 
46 above) . 
(b) innate to man, precisely because such powers 
are innate to man (i.e., they are intrinsic 
parts of his nature) . 
4. Taken precisely as a product or operation of an 
innate power (i.e., the naturalis conceptio and the 
naturalis inclinatio), natural law is: 
(a) natural to man, insofar as it (i) is an 
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operation of, or is produced (i.e., 
efficiently caused) by, a principle of his 
nature (see #e, [1] and [4] above), (ii) 
conforms to or befits his nature (see #b and 
notes 32, 35 and [4] above). 
(b) naturally implanted (inseruit) or innate 
(innata) in man, insofar as it is produced 
efficiently caused) by an innate natural 
power--the vis cognoscitiva (or the vis 
appetitiva) (see note 14 above regarding 
another complementary interpretation) . 
5. Taken precisely as a knowledge, natural law is: 
(a) natural to man, inasmuch as it (i) is 
efficiently caused by a principle of his 
nature (see #e, [1] and [4] above), (ii) 
corresponds to or befits his nature (see #b, 
#f, and [4]). 
(b) intrinsic to man, inasmuch as it is (i) innate 
(innata) in practical reason, (ii) naturally 
implanted (inseruit) in man by an innate 
power, (iii) implanted (indita) [by God] in 
natural cognition, (iv) implanted [by God] in 
the constitution of human nature. 47 
6. Natural law, taken precisely as (a) a product or 
operation of the cognitive power, and (b) a knowledge is 
identified by St. Thomas (in our present text) as the 
naturalis conceptio. 
7. This naturalis conceptio is a complex knowledge 
which involves knowledge of (a) determinate goods within 
man's concrete (sensible) situation, (b) man's actions as 
flowing from his own nature (generic and specific) as 
concerned with (c) the common end or indeterminate good. 
To further understand St. Thomas' notion of natural law 
47What St. Thomas means by the terms innata, indita, 
and inseruit in each of these cases will be examined 
shortly. 
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as intrinsic to man, let us investigate (1) three different 
ways in which St. Thomas understands natural law and (2) the 
different factors--namely, the efficient and content-
determining causes--which together produce the naturalis 
conceptio as a complex cognition. 
Three Senses .Qf Natural Law 
In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, videtur quod non 4, it 
is argued that polygamy is not against the law of nature: 
Natural law (~ naturale) is "that which nature 
has taught all animals," as stated at the beginning of 
the Digests. But nature has not taught all animals that 
one male should be joined to only one female, since in 
many animals, one male is united to many females. Thus, 
it is not against the law of nature (legem naturae) 
[for man] to have a plurality of wives. 48 
In response to this argument, St. Thomas offers three 
different accounts of natural law: 
48 In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, videtur non quod 4 
(VI-966b): "· .. jus naturale est 'quod natura omnia animalia 
docuit,' ut in principio Digestorum [I, 1, 1] dicitur. Sed 
natura non docuit hoc omnia animalia, quod sit una unius; 
cum unum mas in multis animalibus, pluribus feminis 
conjungatur. Ergo non est contra legem naturae habere plures 
uxores." The same passage cited from the Digest (compiled by 
Justinian around 533 A.D.) was borrowed from Ulpian (died 
228 A.D.) and appears again in the Co:r:pus Juris Civilis, 
lib. I, tit. II; see Thomas C. Sandars, ed., Institutes of 
Justinian (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), 7: "Jus 
naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam jus 
istud non humani generis proprium est, sed omnium animalia, 
quae in caelo, quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur. 11 On 
the meaning of ~ naturale according to Ulpian and 
Justinian, see Thomas Sandars, Institutes, xxix-xxxiv and 7; 
Odon Lottin, !:& droit naturel chez saint Thomas d'Agµin stt 
~ predecesseurs, 7-8, 61-67; Michael Crowe, "St. Thomas 
and Ulpian's Natural Law," 261-82. · 
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Natural law (jus naturale) is taken in many ways: 
First, a law is said to be natural from its 
principle, because it is implanted by nature (g natura 
est inditum) ; thus Tullius defines [i.Y..§. naturale] when 
he says: "the law of nature is that which opinion has 
not generated, but a certain innate power has implanted 
("quaedam innata vis inseruit") . 49 
And even because in natural things some movements are 
called natural, not because they are from an intrinsic 
principle, but because they are from a higher moving 
principle--just as the movements which are in the 
elements from the impression of heavenly bodies are 
said to be natural, as the Commentator states. Thus, 
those things which are of divine law are said to be 
of natural law, because they are from the impression 
and infusion of a higher principle--namely, God ("sint 
ex impressione et infusione superioris principii, 
scilicet Dei"). Thus, it is understood by Isidore who 
states that "natural law is that which is contained 
in the law and the Gospel. 1150 
Thirdly, natural law is said to be not only from an 
[extrinsic] principle, but from nature, because it is 
49 In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, ad 4 (VII-2 968a): "Ad 
quartum dicendumm, quod jus naturale multiplicitur 
accipitur. Primo enim jus aliquod dicitur naturale ex 
principio, quia a natura est inditum; et sic definit Tullius 
in 2 Rhetoricorum, dicens: 'Jus naturae est quod non opinio 
genuit, sed quaedam innata vis inseruit. 11 Regarding Cicero's 
understanding of naturae ius, see note 16 above. 
50 Ibid., (VII-2, 968a): "Et quia etiam in rebus 
naturalibus dicuntur aliqui motus naturales, non quia sint 
ex principio intrinseco, sed quia sunt a principio superiori 
movente, sicut motus qui sunt in elementis ex impressione 
corporum caelestium, naturales dicuntur, ut Commentator 
dicit in 3 Caeli et Mundi (com. 20) ; ideo ea quae sunt de 
jure divine, dicuntur esse de jure naturale, cum sint ex 
impressione et infusione superioris principii, scilicet Dei; 
et sic accipitur ab Isidoro (lib. 5 Etymol., cap. 4, et 
habetur in princ. Decret.), qui dicit, quod 'jus naturale 
est quod in lege et in Evangelic continetur.' 11 See Averroes, 
In De Caelo, lib. III, com. 28. The definition of natural 
law, "jus naturale est quod in lege et in Evangelic 
continetur," which St. Thomas falsely attributes to Isidore, 
is derived from Gratian (ca. 1140); see Decretum, (prol.) D. 
I, 1. For a related discussion on the relationship between 
divine providence, nature, and the law of nature, se~ In X 
Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 
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of natural things. And because nature is distinguished 
from reason, whereby man is man, therefore, taking 
natural law in the strictest sense, those [norms] 
which pertain man to alone--although they are of the 
dictates of natural reason--are not said to be of 
natural law; rather, only those [norms] which natural 
reason dictates commonly of both men and other animals 
[are said to be of natural law] . Thus is given the 
definition stated above [videtur quod non 4] : "Natural 
law is what nature has taught all animals. "51 
Therefore, a plurality of wives, though not contrary to 
natural law taken in this third way, is nevertheless 
against natural law taken in the second way since it 
is prohibited by divine law. It is also against natural 
law taken in the first way, as apparent from what has 
been said, inasmuch as nature instructs each animal 
according to the manner suitable to its species; thus, 
even certain animals, in which the care of both male 
and female are required for the education of offspring, 
maintain the union of one with one by natural instinct, 
as is evidenced in the case of the turtle-dove, the 
dove, and other [animals] of this kind. 52 
51 Ibid., (VII-2, 968a) : "Tertio dicitur jus naturale 
non solum a principio, sed a natura, quia de naturalibus 
est. Et quia natura contra rationem dividitur, a qua homo 
est homo; ideo strictissimo modo accipiendo jus naturale, 
illa quae ad homines tantum pertinent, etsi sint de 
dictamine rationis naturalis, non dicuntur esse de jure 
naturali: sed illa tantum quae naturalis ratio dictat de his 
quae sunt homini aliisquae communia; et sic datur dicta 
definitio, scilicet: 'Jus naturale est quod natura ornnia 
animalia docuit.'" See also In IV Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, 
ad 1 (VII-2, 918a): "Natura hominis ad aliquid inclinat 
dupliciter. Uno modo quia est conveniens naturae generis; et 
hoc est commune omnibus animalibus;alio modo quia est 
conveniens naturae dif f erentiae qua species humana abundat a 
genere, inquantum est rationalis, sicut actus prudentiae et 
temperantiae." 
52 Ibid., (VII-2, 968): "Pluralitats ergo uxorum quamvis 
non sit contra jus naturale tertio modo acceptum, est tamen 
contra jus naturale secundo modo acceptum, quia jure divine 
prohibetur; et etiam contra jus naturale prime modo 
acceptum; ut ex dictis patet, gygg natura dictat animali 
cuilibet secundum modum convenientem suae speciei; unde 
etiam quaedam animalia, in quibus ad educationem prolis 
requiritur solicitude utriusque, scilicet maris et feminae; 
naturali instinctu servant conjunctionem unius ad un~m, 
sicut patet in turture et columba, et hujusmodi." St. Thomas 
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What do these three different accounts of natural law 
(jus naturale) reveal about natural law precisely as 
intrinsic to man? 53 In the first sense (see note 48 above), 
natural law is understood by St. Thomas both (1) as the 
nature [of man] which instructs [him] according to the 
manner suitable to his species (see note 52 above and our 
discussion of the naturalis conceptio below), and (2) as 
implanted by a certain innate power, as Cicero states (see 
note 49 above). Of course, insofar as this innate power is 
taken as part of man's nature, natural law is said to be 
implanted by nature (s natura est) . Hence, natural law is 
said to be "natural" from its principle--namely, (1) as 
implanted or caused by [man's] nature through [his] natural 
powers ("proprie naturalia dicuntur quae ex principiis 
also speaks of natural law in terms of an instinct; see In 
IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, ad2 (971a): 11 ••• lexilla 
processit, et non ex instinctu legis naturae .... "Cf. ibid., 
d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 1 (VII-2, 774a): "· .. ex aliquo 
interiori instincu, quo cor hominis movetur a Deo." 
53 In light of the various statements of St. Thomas 
cited up to now, his understanding and use of the terms lex 
naturae, jus naturale or jus naturae, and lex naturalis 
appear to be as follows: (1) lex naturae is the most general 
term which may apply to every kind of creature--such as a 
magnet, an animal, or man (see [l] and [4] above); (2) jus 
naturale or jus naturae are more exclusive terms which may 
apply to all animals, including man (see notes 48-52 above); 
(3) lex naturalis is the most exclusive term which St. 
Thomas applies to man alone (see note 10 and [3] above) . 
With respect to man, these different terms appear to be used 
synonymously. For a discussion on the convertibility of the 
terms jus naturale and lex naturalis in St. Thomas, see 
Oscar Brown, Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Agµinas, 
165-74. 
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naturae causantur"; see #e above), (2) as conforming to, or 
befitting, his nature (see #b, #d, #f, notes 14, 17, 32, 35-
36, 52 and (4] above). 
Now, St. Thomas has expressly identified natural law 
both as the light of reason (proximate text #a) and, as 
stated in the key-text, the naturalis conceptio (see [3] 
above) . These two principles evidently correspond to the 
principles cited in Cicero's definition of natural law: (1) 
a certain innate power and (2) what is implanted or caused 
by that power (proximate texts #c and #e). Hence, taken as 
an intellectual conception implanted by man's own natural 
power ("quaedam innata vis inseruit"), natural law is said 
to be naturally implanted in man ("conceptio homini 
naturaliter indita"; see [4] above). In this sense, natural 
law--taken precisely as a conceptio implanted or caused by 
man's vis cognoscitiva--can be under~tood as innate or 
inborn inasmuch as it is produced (i.e., efficiently caused) 
from a principle intrinsic to man (see notes 13 above and 59 
below). Thus, this first account of natural law identifies 
it with (1) man's own nature ("in ipsa institutione humanae 
naturae est inditum"; see text #f), (2) the operative power 
or faculty of his nature (the intellectual light; see #a 
above), and (3) the operation or product of that power (the 
naturalis conceptio; see #b, #c, #e and [4] above) . 54 Note 
5
'See [2] above where, correlative to the vis 
cognoscitiva and the naturalis conceptio, St. Thomas_also 
speaks of the vis appetitiva and the naturalis inclinatio. 
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also that the animal nature of man is not taken in this 
first account (see note 49 above) as in any way opposed to 
his intellectual nature, but rather as specified by it and 
ordered to it. 55 In this sense, natural law secures the 
real substantial unity of man's being as a rational animal. 
Taken in the second sense (see note 50 above), St. 
Thomas understands natural law in relation to divine law as 
its extrinsic principle. Hence, taken strictly in its aspect 
as impressa or infusa from God as extrinsic cause (see note 
27 above), natural law (qua natura) is received from 
without. In this sense, natural law cannot properly be said 
to be innate to man--that is, as imparted from a principle 
intrinsic to him (see note 13 above) . 
Now, in speaking of its derivation from God, and citing 
Gratian's definition of natural law (mistakenly attributed 
to Isidore) as "that which is contained in the law and the 
Hence, although not explicitly stated in ad 3 of this key-
text, it follows that natural law must also be equated with 
man's appetitive power and its respective natural operation. 
On this matter, see note 43 above. 
55 In this regard, see notes 35 and 51 above. See also 
In IV Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VII-2, 918a): "Et 
sicut natura generis, quamvis sit una in omnibus animalibus, 
non tamen est eodem modo in omnibus; ita etiam non inclinat 
eodem modo in omnibus, sed secundum quod unicuique 
competit." In IV .Qsllt.., d. 40, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3 (VII-2, 
1033b): " ... conjunctio maris et feminae dicitur esse de jure 
naturali quia natura hoc omnia animalia docuit; sed hanc 
conjunctionem diversa animalia diversimode docuit secundum 
diversas eorum conditiones." Compare this view of man's 
generic nature 9.§. specified by his rational nature with that 
(Ulpian's) view of man's generic nature (see note 50 above) 
taken simply in its element of commonality with other 
animals--prescinding from specification. · 
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Gospel," does St. Thomas compromise the intrinsic character 
of natural law? In answer to this question, recall that 
natura for St. Thomas is that intrinsic principle of action 
(see note 50 above) which is itself divinely implanted 
(divinitus indita) in things (see note 24 above) ; indeed, 
the nature of a creature is characterized by him as an 
impression received by the Creator. 56 Now, among the things 
of nature, man is said to be an image of God precisely 
because his soul participates in an intellectual nature 
which also is in God ("participat naturam intellectualem 
quae etiam in Deo est secundum quod etiam dicitur ad 
imaginem Dei") . 57 Therefore, just as natura is an 
impression which the creature has received from the Creator, 
so the law of nature--taken as natura--is derived from the 
impression and infusion of God; indeed, on another occasion, 
St. Thomas states that natural law is impressed [by God] 
upon the heart (cordibus impressa; see note 59 below) . 
56See note 24 above. Recall that every natural item is 
related to God as its principle agent, exemplar, and final 
Cause (see note 27 above). Further, God is at once the 
immanent or indwelling Cause of a creature's esse (see note 
28 above) and the ultimate perfecting end of every creature 
(see note 33 above). Hence, the meaning of natura for St. 
Thomas carries a relational significance whereby God is 
implicitly understood as the radical origin, exemplar, and 
ultimate end of (a thing's) nature. Contrast St. Thomas' 
view of nature against a logician's notion of nature as 
described by Robert George in note 50 of our Introduction. 
57See note 34 above. Further, God is the immediate 
efficient and exemplar cause of man's intellectual soul (see 
note 39 above); hence, man is directly related to GoQ as his 
principal efficient and exemplar cause. 
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Clearly, then, the origin of natural law--qua natura--is 
extrinsic to man; accordingly, natural law, understood as 
natura, cannot properly be said to be innate. Nevertheless, 
having been divinely implanted in him, natural law--as man's 
nature--is now intrinsic to him; and, as intrinsic, the 
nature of man orders him to God through the operations of 
his natural powers (see notes 36-37 and [2] above)--as 
befitting his nature (see #b, #f, notes 32, 35-36, 52 and 
[4] above); This notion of natural law--qua nature--as 
received from God as extrinsic cause appears to correspond 
with the account found in the sed contra 6 of our key-text 
(proximate text #f) ; there, [monogamy] is said to be 
implanted (indita) [by God] in the constitution of human 
nature [so as to accord with human nature itself]. Now, 
these natural powers, insofar as they are taken as part of 
man's God-given nature, are likewise said to be implanted in 
man from an impression of God; taken as such, these powers 
are not properly said to be innate or inborn (see note 13 
above). However, as implanted by God, they too become 
intrinsic to man; consequently, the operations produced by 
these intrinsic powers are properly said to be innate or 
inborn to man: 
The operation of a secondary cause is founded upon the 
operation of a first cause and presupposes it; and so 
it must be that every operation of the soul proceeds by 
presupposing that it is given to the soul from the 
divine first agent's impression; ("inditum est animae 
ex impressione primi agentis, Dei scilicet"); a~d 
therefore, we see from the side of the intellect ("ex 
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parte intellectus") that the soul cannot proceed to any 
understanding except by presupposing [first principles] 
whose cognition is innate in it ("quorum cognitio est 
ei innata"); and because of this, the soul is unable to 
assent to anything which is contrary to those 
principles which it naturally knows ("quae naturaliter 
cognoscit"; and it must be a similar situation from the 
side of the will ("ex parte voluntatis"). Thus, since 
from the impression of the first cause--namely, God--
this is present in the soul: [namely], that it desire 
what is good and that it desire the perfect good as its 
ultimate end. 58 
Thus, inasmuch as it is equated with man's nature and 
faculties as divinely implanted in man, so natural law is 
understood by St. Thomas as divinely implanted in man; but 
inasmuch as it is identified with operations of natural 
cognition and natural inclination, natural law is understood 
58 In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 (VII-2, 
1192a): "· .. operatio causae secundae semper fundatur super 
operatione causae prima et praesupponit earn; et ideo oportet 
quod omnis operatio animae procedat ex suppositione ejus 
quod inditum est animae ~ impressione primi agentis. Dei 
scilicet; et ideo videmus ex parte intellectus, quod ad 
nihil intelligendum anima potest procedere nisi ex 
suppositione illorum guorum cognitio est ei innata; et 
propter hoc non potest assentire alicui quod sit contrarium 
his principiis ~ naturaliter cognoscit; et similiter 
oportet esse ex parte voluntatis. Unde cum ex impressione 
primae causae, scilicet Dei, hoc animae insit ut bonum 
velit; et perfectum bonum tamquam finem ultimum appetat." 
Surely, the cognition of first principles is innate to man 
inasmuch as cognitio is an operation and a product of man's 
vis cognoscitiva; but see our next section below with 
respect to the different content-determining causes 
(intrinsic and extrinsic) which, together with the cognitive 
power, constitute natural law knowledge. Insofar as natural 
law is taken as man's nature and natural powers as divinely 
implanted (passively received by man), it is understood by 
St. Thomas as the impression (impressio) of Eternal Law; 
however, insofar as natural law is taken as right reason 
directing man in his activities (i.e., precepts actually 
produced or naturally implanted by the intellective power) 
it is apparently understood by St. Thomas as the expression 
(expressio) of Eternal Law (see note 46 above) . 
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by St. Thomas as naturally implanted or innate--precisely as 
produced (i.e., efficiently caused) by man's nature through 
his natural powers. 
With respect to Revelation (the law and the Gospel), 
St. Thomas has previously explained that the exterior 
(written) law, by which man is ordered to the love of 
neighbor and God, is an explication of the interior 
(natural) law (see above, notes 10, 13, and 16); hence, 
although Gratian's definition does not adequately 
distinguish the natural (interior) law from the written 
(exterior) law and the Gospel, St. Thomas himself makes this 
distinction clear. Further, he at once stresses the divine 
(extrinsic) origin and the distinctively intrinsic character 
of natural law as cordibus impressa: 
The law concerning [monogamy] is not humanly but 
divinely instituted, not ever handed on by word or 
letter, but as impressed upon the heart (cordibus 
impressa), just as other [precepts] which pertain in 
any way to the law of nature. 59 
59See In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, sol. (VII-2, 
969a): "Lex autem de unitate uxoris non est humanitus, sed 
divinitus instituta, nee unquam verbo aut litteris tradita, 
sed cordi impressa, sicut et alia quae ad legem naturae 
qualitercumque pertinent." See also ibid., ad 3 (VII-2, 
969): " ... quia lex naturae non est litteris scripta, sed 
cordibus impressa .... " See Lombard's similar description of 
natural law as [inscribed] in corde in note 5 above. 
Concerning the second formulation of natural law, Patrick 
Farrell states that "Gratian, whose definition, 'id quod in 
lege et evangelic continetur,' fails to distinguish 
adequately betweeen divine and natural law ..... In failing 
to distinguish natural from divine law, it fails also to 
acconunodate St. Thomas' conception of the intrinsic 
character of the former." "Sources of St. Thomas' Cm~cept of 
Natural Law," 280-81. In response to Farrell, it should be 
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The third account of natural right is exemplified by 
Ulpian's definition, "Jus natuale est quod natura omnia 
animalia docuit." On the basis of this definition, St. 
Thomas draws the distinction between primary precepts (those 
dictates common to man and animals alike) and secondary 
precepts (those dictates which pertain to man alone) . Thus, 
this third meaning of natural law contrasts with the first 
meaning inasmuch as man's generic nature is now considered 
simply with respect to what it shares in common with 
animals--and not as humanly specified. 60 Both the first and 
third accounts of natural law, however, agree in stressing 
the intrinsic character of natural law as rooted in the 
nature of man: "jus naturale ... a natura est inditum" (see 
noted that St. Thomas has on previous occasions established 
the intrinsic character of natural law and is not precisely 
concerned with making that point at the moment; With regard 
to the Gospel, whose contents go beyond the scope of natural 
law, see 0. Lottin, I& droit naturel, 61, n. 1: "Saint 
Thomas remarquera plus tard qu'il ne faut pas voir, dans les 
deux expressions: droit naturel et droit divin, deux notions 
convertibles. Tout ce qui est de droit naturel, dira-t-il, 
est contenu dans la Loi et l'Evangile, et c'est dans ce sens 
qu'il faut interpreter Gratien. Mais tout ce qui contenu 
dans la Loi et l'Evangile n'est pas de droit naturel; car 
les saintes Ecritures renferment de multiples verites 
d'ordre surnaturel (I-II, q. 94, a. 4, ad 1) ." Regarding the 
distinction and relationship between the "natural" and 
"supernatural," see note 16 above and In IV Sent., d. 31, q. 
1, a. 3; See our Bonaventure Key-Text A, note 12, for the 
correct citation of Isidore's Etyrnol., lib. 5, c. 4. 
6
°For an example of the law of nature employed in this 
third sense, see In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1. For 
further discussion on this matter, see Jean M. Aubert, Le 
droit remain dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas (Paris: J. Vrin, 
1955), 97-99; P. Farrell, "Sources of St. Thomas' Concept of 
Natural Law," 262-64. · 
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note 48 above) and "jus naturale non solum a principio, sed 
a natura" (see note 50 above). While St. Thomas relies upon 
the third formula of natural law to resolve the difficulty 
at hand, each different meaning stresses an aspect of his 
own comprehensive understanding of natural law as pertaining 
to (1) the substantial unity and internal ordination of 
human nature, (2) man's intrinsic ordination to an extrinsic 
principle--namely, God, (3) the distinction (but not 
disparity) between his generic nature and specific nature. 
In view of these three accounts of natural right, let 
us sum up St. Thomas' own teaching on the intrinsic 
character of natural law: 
1. Natural law is intrinsic to man inasmuch as it is 
identified with (a) his human nature, (b) his natural powers 
(the vis cognoscitiva and vis appetitiva), (c) the 
operations or products of those powe~s (the naturalis 
conceptio and naturalis inclinatio), and (d) knowledge (the 
naturalis conceptio, principia, or praecepta) . 
2. Insofar as it is identified with man's nature and 
natural powers (taken precisely as part of his nature), 
natural law is understood as divinely implanted (divinitus 
indita) in him (see #c, #d, #f, and notes 24, 51, 58, and 59 
above). 
3. Inasmuch as it is identified, not precisely with 
man's nature, but with his natural powers proper to his 
nature and with what his natural powers produce, natural law 
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is understood as naturally implanted (naturaliter indita) or 
innate (innata) (see #b, #e, (l], [4], and notes 48 and 57 
above). 
4. Inasmuch as it is identified as knowledge--either as 
the naturalis conceptio or as a precept--natural law is said 
to be both naturally and divinely implanted in man (see #c-
#f and [4] above). Further, St. Thomas speaks of man's 
cognition of first principles (speculative and practical) as 
innate ("quorum cognitio est ei innata"; see #band note 57 
above). 
The Naturalis Conceptio 
Notwithstanding its identification with man's nature 
and powers, St. Thomas formally identifies natural law in 
the key-text as the naturalis conceptio. 61 Evidently (see 
note 46 above), this knowledge is a complex cognition 
involving knowledge of (1) determinate goods within man's 
concrete (sensible) situation, (2) man's actions as flowing 
from his own nature (generic and specific) as concerned with 
(3) the common end or good. Let us investigate, then, more 
closely the naturalis conceptio and its constitutive 
elements in order to understand precisely how St. Thomas 
61 See [4] above: "Lex ergo naturalis nihil est aliud 
quam conceptio homini naturaliter indita .... 11 See also In 
III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, sol. (VII-2, 426a): "Quaedam 
enim sunt leges quae ipsi rationi sunt inditae, guae sunt 
prima mensura et regula omnium humanorum actuum; et haec 
nullo modo deficiunt, sicut nee regimen rationis deficere 
potest, ut aliquando esse non debeat; et hae leges j~s 
naturale dicuntur. 11 
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understands this natural law knowledge as implanted, as 
innate, and also as acquired. 
Now, an intellectual conception (conceptio 
intellectus), St. Thomas tells us, consists of both (1) the 
operation of knowing (operatic intelligendi) and (2) the 
species which is a similitude of the object known ("species 
quae est similitude rei intellectae") . 62 Thus, on the side 
of the knower, there is the agent intellect (i.e., the 
intellectual light), and the recipient intellect 
(intellectus possibilis); and on the side of the object 
known is the similitude (or intelligible species) which is 
caused by the known object, and through which knowledge of 
the object is determined. 63 Natural law, then, taken simply 
62 In l. .£fillt., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, sol. (VI, 229a): 
" ... si inquiratur quid sit istud verbum quo aliquis sibi 
loquitur, non invenitur esse nisi conceptio intellectus. 
Conceptio autem intellectus est vel operatic ipsa quae est 
intelligere, vel species ,intellecta. Unde oportet quad 
verbum vel dicatur ipsa operatic intelligendi, vel ipsa 
species gy_g,g est similitude rei intellectae; et sine utroque 
istorum non potest quis intelligere: utrumque enim istorum 
est id quo quis intelligit formaliter." In ll Sent., d. 3, 
q. 3, a. 1, sol. (VI, 421b): " ... in intellectu vero humane 
similitude rei intellectae est aliud a substantia 
intellectus, et est sicut forma ejus; unde ex intellectu et 
similitudine rei efficitur unum completum, quad est 
intellectus in actu intelligens; et hujus similitude est 
accepta a re." In l. .s..e.n.t.., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, videtur quod 4 
(VI, 228b): "· .. verbum dicit conceptionem intellectus. Sed 
conceptus intellectus nullus est nisi species intelligibilis 
formata in intellectu." See also In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 
1, sol. For further study of St. Thomas' teaching on the 
conceptio intellectus, see Gerard Smith, "The Concept in St. 
Thomas," Modern Schoolman 15 (1938), 52-56. 
63 In III Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qu. 2 (VII-1, 56b): 
" ... ad cognitionem intellectivam tria requiruntur: scilicet 
potentia intellectus, lumen quo intelligit, et similitude 
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as a conceptio intellectus is "natural" to man, not as an 
essential part of his nature, but insofar as it is an 
operation and effect or product of that vis innata--namely 
the lumen intellectuale acting as efficient cause. 64 
Moreover, inasmuch as all human knowledge for St. Thomas is 
made through some abstraction from sensible items, it 
follows that the naturalis conceptio is a knowledge 
constituted by a sensible object precisely as a content-
determining-cause; hence, natural law knowledge must be an 
acquired knowledge. 65 Indeed, inasmuch as natural law 
rei per quam cognitio rei determinatur." See In ll Sent., d. 
17, q. 2, a. 1, sol. (VI, 553a): " ... diciturintellectus 
possibilis qui est in potentia ad recipiendum omnes f ormas 
intellectas, sicut oculus est in potentia ad recipiendum 
omnes colores; intellectus autem agens dicitur qui facit 
intelligibilia in potentia esse in actu, sicut lumen quod 
facit colores in potentia visibiles, esse actu 
visibiles .... " In ll Sent., d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, ad 1 (VI, 
422a): " ... anima dicitur species specierum, inquantum per 
intellectum agentem facit species intelligibiles actu, et 
recipit eas secundum intellectum possibilem, sicut ibidem 
sensus dicitur species sensibilis, et manus organum 
organorum, inquantum videlicet omnia artif icialia per manus 
efficiuntur .... " 
64See proximate texts #b, #e, [2], [3], [4], and notes 
46, 49, and 58 above with respect to natural law cognition 
as produced or naturally implanted in man. With regard to 
the notion of cognition as immanent or indwelling operation 
in contrast to a transitive activity, see In~ Sent., d. 40, 
q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VI, 327b). 
65 In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4 (VII-2, 1202b): 
" omnis cognitio fit per aliquam abstactionem a 
materia .... " In IV Sent., d. 50, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VII-2, 
1247a): " ... sed illud [i.e., the theory of innate forms in 
the human intellect] contradicit sententiae Philosophi qui 
dicit intellectum humanum esse sicut tabulam in qua nihil 
est scriptum: contradicit etiam experientiae, qua experimur 
nos nihil posse intelligere, nisi ex praeacceptis a ~ensu ad 
intelligendum manuducamur." See also In~ Sent., d. 35, q. 
243 
concerns man in his concrete circumstances in a world of 
other sensible creatures, among which are human persons (see 
note 45 above), natural law knowledge must involve knowledge 
of sensible objects outside the knower. Hence, natural law 
knowledge must be a knowledge acquired from the sensible 
objects known because they are its content-determining-
causes. 
If the above interpretation is correct, we must 
nevertheless account for the ways in which natural law--
precisely as a knowledge, and not merely as a product of an 
operative power--is understood by St. Thomas as naturally 
and divinely implanted and innate; to this end, let us look 
more closely at how the naturalis conceptio is produced. 
The Production of the Naturalis Conceptio 
Does St. Thomas offer any explanation as to how the 
naturalis conceptio might be produced? Let us consider two 
different texts which shed some light on how this complex 
knowledge is attained. 
In the first text, "Utrum intellectus sit donum" (In 
III Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1), St. Thomas explains 
1, a. 1, ad 3; In .II Sent. d. 3, q. 3, a. 4, ad 4; ibid., d. 
24, q. 2, a. 3, resp. Cf. Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, 
II, c. 19; ~ Anima, III c. 4; See Joseph Owens, "Aquinas on 
Cognition as Existence," Proceedings of the ACPA 48 (1974), 
74-85; "Aquinas on Knowing Existence," Review of Metaphysics 
29 (1975), 670-90; "Judgment and Truth in Aquinas," 
Mediaeval Studies 32 (1970), 138-58. See our discussion on 
Bonaventure, Key-Text A, notes 18 and 20, where he likewise 
insists that knowledge of first principles depends upon 
sensible experience. · 
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the manner by which man (in contrast to separate 
intellectual substances) apprehends essences; here, also, 
knowledge of [natural law] principles is identified as a 
kind of intellectus: 
Sometimes, however, [a knower] is not led to the 
interior of a thing except by approaching it as through 
a certain entrance; and this is the manner of 
apprehending in men, who proceed from effects and 
properties to the knowledge of the essence of a thing. 
And because in this [process] there must be a certain 
movement (discursum), the apprehension proper to man 
is therefore called reason (ratio)--even though 
[reasoning] is terminated in intellection (intellectus) 
[namely, to the knowledge] of the essence of a thing to 
which investigation leads. Thus, if something is 
immediately apprehended without discursive reasoning, 
it is not said to be a matter of reason, but of 
intellection; and so it is with first principles, which 
everyone assents to upon hearing them. By the first 
mode, intellectus is a power; but taken according to 
the second mode, intellectus is called a habitus of 
principles. However, just as the human mind does not 
enter into the essence of a [corporeal] thing except 
through its accidents, so even in spiritual [items] the 
mind does not enter into an essence except through 
bodies and sensible similitudes, as Dionysius 
states. 66 
66 In III Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1 (VII-2, 
403b) : "Aliquando vero ad intima non pervenitur nisi per 
circumposita quasi per quaedam ostia; et hie est modus 
apprehendi in hominibus, qui ex effectibus et proprietatibus 
procedunt ad cognitionem essentiae rei. Et qui in hoc 
oportet esse quemdam discursum; ideo hominis apprehensio 
ratio dicitur, quamvis ad intellectum terminetur in hoc quod 
inquisitio ad essentiam rei perducit. Unde si aliqua sunt 
quae statim sine discursu rationis apprehendantur, horum non 
dicitur esse ratio, sed intellectus; sicut principia prima, 
quae quisque statim probat audita. Primo ergo modo 
intellectus potentia est; sed secundo modo accipiendo, 
habitus principiorum dicitur. Sicut autem mens humana in 
essentiam rei non ingreditur nisi per accidentia, ita etiam 
in spiritualia non ingreditur nisi per corporalia, et 
sensibilium similitudines, ut Dionysius dicit (De Cael. 
Hier., c. 1 and Q..e. Eccl. Hierarc. c. 1) ."Cf. Dionysius, De 
Cael. Hier., c. 1 (PG 3, 122) and De Eccl. Hierarc. c. 1 (PG 
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From the above statement, it is clear that first 
principles (both speculative and practical} are known in 
themselves according to intellection (intellectus}; 
nevertheless, the mind does not attain intellection except 
through material existents (among which are human persons} 
which are the content-determining-causes of human knowledge. 
Consequently, man has no knowledge (intellectus} of any 
first principle apart from knowledge of the created universe 
as acquired through his senses and agent and recipient 
intellects. 67 
The second informative passage on natural law knowledge 
is found in ad 3 of the discussion, Utrum habitus in nobis 
existens cognosci possit" (In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1); 
here, St. Thomas explains the process by which the soul 
reflectively comes to know its acts, powers, essence--and 
consequently, the good as such: 
3, 374}. 
67 In .I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, sol. (VI, 33a}: 
" ... quia ea quae per se nobis nota sunt [i.e, first 
principles] , eff iciuntur nota statim per sensum; sicut visis 
toto et parte, statim cognoscimus quod omne totum est majus 
sua parte sine aliqua inquisitione." In ll Sent. d. 24, q. 
2, a. 3, sol. (VI, 600b} : " ... licet ad determinationem 
cognitionis eorum [i.e., of speculative and practical 
principles] sensu et memoria indigeamus, ut in 2 Poster. 
(cap. ult.} dicitur. Et ideo statim cognitis terminis, 
cognoscuntur, ut in 1 Poster. (cap. 1) dicitur." In .I Sent., 
d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 (VI, 33a} : "Unde etiam anima sibi 
ipsi praesens est; tamen maxima difficultas est in 
cognitione anirnae, nee devenitur in ipsam, nisi 
rationcinando ex objectis in actus et ex actibus in 
potentias." 
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The soul reflecting through knowledge upon itself, or 
upon those things which are proper to it, occurs in two 
ways: by one mode, the soul, according to its cognitive 
power, knows its own nature or what is proper to it; 
and this is merely the knowledge of the intellect by 
which it knows the quiddities of things. The intellect, 
however, as stated in the De Anima, knows itself 
inasmuch as it knows what is other than itself--namely, 
through a species, not indeed itself, but of the 
object, and this species is its form; from this it 
knows the nature of its own act; and from the nature of 
its act, it knows the nature of its power of knowing; 
and from the nature of this power, it knows the nature 
of its essence and, consequently, its other powers: 
not that the soul has diverse similitudes of all these 
[items], but because in [knowing] its object, not only 
does the soul know the meaning of truth (rationem 
veri), according to which the intellect is [the same 
as] its object, but every other ratio in that object 
and, hence, it knows what "good" is (rationem boni); 
and therefore it follows that, through that one and the 
same species, the soul knows the act of will, the 
nature of the will, and, similarly, also the other 
powers of the soul and their acts. 68 
68 In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 (VII-2, 240b): 
11 
••• animam reflecti [read: reflectens] per cognitionem supra 
seipsam, vel supra ea quae ipsius sunt, contingit 
dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod potentia cognoscitiva 
cognoscit naturam sui, vel eorum quae in ipsa sunt; et hoc 
est tantum intellectus cujus est quidditates rerum 
congnoscere. Intellectus autem, ut dicitur in 3 Anima (tex. 
8), sicut alia, cognoscit seipsum, quia scilicet per speciem 
non quidem sui, sed objecti, quae est forma ejus; ex qua 
cognoscit actus sui naturam, et ex natura actus naturam 
potentiae cognoscentis, et ex natura potentiae naturam 
essentiae, et per consequens aliarum potentiarum: non quod 
habeat de omnibus his diversas similitudines, sed quia in 
objecto suo non solum cognoscit rationem veri, secundum quam 
est ejus objectum, sed omnem rationem quae est in eo, unde 
et rationem boni: et ideo consequenter per illam eamdem 
speciem cognoscit actum voluntatis et naturam voluntatis, et 
similiter etiam alias potentias animae et actus earum. 11 See 
also In In Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, sol. (43a): "Alio tamen 
modo, [intellectus or intuitum] secundum Philosophum, 
intellegitur quod anima semper se intelligit, eo quod omne 
quod intelligitur, non intelligitur nisi illustratum lumine 
intellectus agentis, et receptum in intellectu possibili. 
Unde sicut in omni colore videtur lumen corporale, ita in 
omni intelligibili videtur lumen intellectus agentisi. non 
tamen in ratione objecti sed in ratione medii cognoscendi. 11 
247 
In short, in, through, and according to, the knowledge 
acquired through the intelligible species produced by 
sensible objects, the soul reflectively knows its 
operations, powers, and essence; further, according to the 
correspondence of the intellect to the known object, the 
soul knows what "truth" is (rationem veri) and every other 
ratio in that sensible object; hence, the soul attains to 
knowledge of what "good" is (rationem boni) . In this 
knowledge act, we find the knowledges of those three factors 
required of natural law knowledge (see note 45 above)--
namely, (1) the sensible existents in the created world 
(human and subhuman) which are the content-determining-
causes of all our knowledge; (2) actus--the person's own 
activities as flowing from his (generic and specific) 
Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, III, c. 8 (431b-432a). Concerning 
the ratio veritatis, see In I~., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, sol. 
(VI, 17la): "· .. ratio veritatis in duobus consistit: in esse 
rei, et in apprehensione virtutis cognoscitivae 
proportionata ad esse rei. 11 Ibid., a. 1, ad 7 (VI, 170b): 
" ... cum sit duplex operatic intellectus una quarum dicitur a 
quibusdam imaginatio intellectus, quam Philosophus (III De 
anima), nominat intelligentiam indivisibilium, quae 
consistit in apprehensione quidditatis simplicis, quae alio 
etiam nomine forrnatio dicitur; alia est quam dicunt fidem, 
quae consistit in compositione vel divisione propositionis: 
prima operatic [namely, gpprehehensio] respicit quidditatem 
rei; secunda [namely, fidem or iudicium] respicit esse 
ipsius .... [Ideo] ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non 
in quidditate .... " See also ibid., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 
On iudicium as bearing upon ~' see Joseph Owens, An 
Elementary Christiam Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1963), 
45-55, 249-257; An Interpretation of Existence, (Milwaukee: 
Bruce, 1968), 14-43; George O'Toole, "Truth is in the 
Judgment," The New Scholasticism 17 (1943), 1-15; Henri 
Renard, "The Metaphysics of the Existential Judgment," The 
New Scholasticism 23 (1949), 387-94. 
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nature; knowledge of our actions, powers, and underlying 
nature is a reflective knowledge which is acquired only in 
and through knowledge of our sensible world and the human 
persons it includes; 69 (3) finis--the good as such; 
knowledge of "the good" is attained through the knowledge of 
a sensible existent (such as another human person) precisely 
as loved by the knower. 70 
We are now in a position to understand how knowledge of 
natural law is at once divinely implanted, naturally 
implanted, innate, and acquired. First, one's own nature and 
operative powers are (a) efficient causes of natural law 
69Note here that sensible experience is not merely the 
occasion which initiates reflective self-knowledge; rather, 
self-knowledge is framed, so to speak, in the conformity of 
the intellect to the sensible object known; that is, the 
soul knows its operations, powers, and nature according to 
the formal determination of the recipient intellect (through 
the sensible and intelligible species) caused by the known 
object. Further, self-knowledge is necessarily relational 
inasmuch as knowledge of one's own operations, powers, and 
nature is attained only with regard to a sensible object. 
For St. Thomas, there is no self-knowledge apart from the 
knowledge of something else. 
70 Inasmuch as what is "good" is that which is loved 
(see notes 30-33, and 41-42 above), knowledge of what good 
is must be constituted by the knowledges of (1) one's own 
natural inclination with respect.to (2) the object (such as 
another human person) known and loved (see note 45 above) . 
Note, however, that knowledge of one's own nature, 
faculties, and natural operations is itself formally 
determined by, and grasped with reference to, the known and 
loved object (see note 68 above). Therefore, concepts such 
as "true" and "good" are relational (and, hence, complex) 
concepts which are constituted primarily by the knowledge of 
sensible objects, and secondarily by the knowledge of one's 
own natural operations (intellective and appetitive)--as 
formally and intentionally determined by those known .and 
desired objects. 
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knowledge (#a, notes 34-37 and 49 above) , and, to some 
extent, (b) content-determining-causes of such knowledge 
(#b, #c and #f and notes 68-69 above) ; hence, inasmuch as 
human nature--taken precisely as (a) the efficient cause and 
(b) a content-determining-cause of natural law knowledge--is 
divinely impressed upon man, natural law knowledge is said 
to be divinely impressed in man. Secondly, one's natural 
operations serve to some extent as content-determining-
causes of natural law knowledge; hence, inasmuch as one's 
natural operations--taken precisely as content-determining-
causes of natural law knowledge--are produced by man's own 
natural powers, natural law knowledge is understood as 
naturally implanted or innate in man (#d, #e and [4]). 
Thirdly, one's own natural operations, powers, and nature 
are known only reflectively through the knowledge of 
sensible creatures; and since the knowledge of such 
creatures is itself acquired only through sensible 
experience, the whole of natural law knowledge--as 
constituted by both its intrinsic and extrinsic content-
determining-causes- -is an acquired knowledge. Hence, 
properly speaking, natural law knowledge for St. Thomas is 
an acquired knowledge; only in a qualified sense is such 
knowledge considered as innate or naturally or divinely 
implanted in man. 
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IV. Summary and Conclusion 
As this key-text reveals, St Thomas' moral doctrine has 
as its basis natural law, which itself issues from his 
doctrine of nature. Simply stated, natura is that divinely 
implanted principle by which a creature is determined in its 
proper actions and directed in those actions towards its 
proper end. Accordingly, St. Thomas identifies the law of 
nature in man with (1) human nature itself, (2) man's 
natural powers (the vis cognoscitiva and vis appetitiva), 
(3) the natural operations (the naturalis conceptio and 
naturalis inclinatio) corresponding to them, and (4) 
precepts or principles. In our key-text, however, natural 
law is formally identified as a knowledge--namely, the 
naturalis conceptio--which is said to be naturally implanted 
in man (homini naturaliter indita (see [4]). 
What, then, can be said of the naturalis conceptio? On 
investigation, we learned that this cognition is a complex 
knowledge involving the knowledge of (a) determinate goods 
(human persons and other creatures existing in the sensible 
universe), (b) man's actions as following from his (generic 
and specific) nature, and (c) the common or indeterminate 
good. Taken precisely as an operation and immanent effect of 
the vis cognoscitiva as its efficient cause, the naturalis 
conceptio is understood as innata or naturaliter indita; but 
inasmuch as its contents are constituted by material objects 
acting as content-determining-causes, the naturalis 
conceptio is a knowledge acquired from the sensible 
universe. 
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How is the naturalis conceptio produced? Through 
sensible experience in the created world, man acquires 
knowledge of other human persons (as well as other 
creatures); according to the knowledge of these other 
existents, man acquires some knowledge of his own 
operations, powers, and nature in relation to those known 
creatures; and from the knowledge of himself in relation to 
those creatures--precisely as desired or loved--he attains 
knowledge of what "good" is. Thus, from the combined 
knowledges of (1) other creatures (human and subhuman), (2) 
the knower's own nature and operations in relation to those 
creatures as desired, and (3) what "good" is, the naturalis 
conceptio is constituted. 
From our analysis of the production of the naturalis 
conceptio we came to understand how natural law knowledge is 
at once innate, divinely and naturally implanted, and 
acquired. First, one's own nature and operative powers are 
(a) efficient causes of natural law knowledge (#a, 34-37 and 
49 above) and, to some extent, (b) content-determining-
causes of such knowledge ((#b, #c and #f and notes 68-69 
above); hence, inasmuch as human nature--taken precisely as 
(a) the efficient cause and (b) a content-determining-cause 
of natural law knowledge--is divinely impressed upon man, 
natural law knowledge is said to be divinely impressed in 
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man. 71 Secondly, one's natural operations serve to some 
extent as content-determining-causes of natural law 
knowledge; hence, inasmuch as one's natural operations--
taken precisely as content-determining-causes of natural law 
knowledge--are produced by man's own natural powers, natural 
law knowledge is understood as naturally implanted or innate 
in man. 72 Thirdly, one's own natural operations, powers, 
and nature, are known only reflectively through the 
knowledge of sensible creatures; and since the knowledge of 
such creatures is itself acquired only through sensible 
experience, the whole of natural law knowledge--as 
constituted by both its intrinsic and extrinsic content-
determining-causes--is an acquired knowledge. Hence, 
properly speaking, natural law knowledge for St. Thomas is 
an acquired knowledge; only in a qualified sense is such 
knowledge considered as innate or naturally or divinely 
implanted in man. 
71See Proximate Contexts #a #b, #c and #f, and notes 
34-37, 49, 68-69. 
72 See Proximate Contexts #d, #e and [4] . 
CHAPTER 5 
KEY-TEXT B 
Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 2, resp.: "Utrum sit in 
nobis aliqua lex naturalis. 111 
I. Context 
Context for this key-text is twofold: 
(1) remote: (a) an overview of St. Thomas' theory of 
cognition as explicated in the Summa Theologiae; (b) an 
explication of his theory of participation; (c) a 
presentation of his teachings on divine providence, eternal 
law, and nature as found in the Summa Theologiae; (d) an 
explication of his doctrine of natural appetency. 
(2) proximate: ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2 ("Utrum sit in 
nobis aliqua lex naturalis"), ~ contra. 
1Thomas Aquinas, St., Opera Omnia, Leonina ed. 
Incomplete. Roma: Polyglotta, 1882. All citations will be 
taken from this edition unless otherwise indicated. 
Reference to volume and page will again be indicated by 
roman numerals and arabic numbers respectively. See appendix 
C for a chronology of St. Thomas' writings. All italicized 
words used for emphasis in this study are the author's. In 
our translations of passages from the Summa Theologiae, we 
have consulted Anton Pegis, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Random House, 1954); R. J. 
Henle, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Treatise Qil Law, (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993). 
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Remote Context #a 
St. Thomas' Theory of Cognition 
For St. Thomas, the human intellect is a power of the 
soul which itself is united to a body as its substantial 
form. 2 Inasmuch as the human soul is united to a body, it 
is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of 
intellectual substances. 3 Hence, the human intellect, which 
is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote 
from the perfection of the divine intellect, is in 
potentiality with regard to intelligibles and is at first 
like a tabula rasa on which nothing is written. Hence, man 
is at first only in potentiality to understand, and 
afterwards he is made to understand actually. 4 How, then, 
2 ST I, q. 85, a. 1, resp. (V, 331a): "Intellectus autem 
humanus ... non enim est actus alicuius organi; sed tamen est 
quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corpori .... " See also 
ibid., q. 76, a. 1, resp. 
3 ST I, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (V, 14b): " ... sicut humanae 
animae competit uniri corpori, quia est imperfecta et in 
potentia existens in genere intellectualium substantiarum, 
non habens in sui natura plenitudinem scientiae, sed 
acquirens earn per sensus corporeos a sensibilibus rebus .... " 
See also ibid., q. 84, a. 6; q. 89, a. 1. 
4 ST I, q. 79, a. 2, resp. (V, 259b): "Intellectus autem 
humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime 
remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia 
respectu intelligibilium; et in principio est 'sicut tabula 
rasa, in qua nihil est scriptum,' ut Philosophus dicit [De 
Anima, III, 4 (430al)]. Quod manifeste apparet ex hoc quod 
in principio sumus intelligentes solum in potentia, · 
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does man attain actual knowledge? Through abstraction of a 
determinate species; such species are derived through the 
senses from material objects as content-determining-causes 
of knowledge: 
The intellectual soul is indeed actually irrunaterial, 
but it is in potentiality to determinate species of 
things. On the contrary, phantasms are actual 
similitudes of certain species, but they are irrunaterial 
in potentiality. Therefore, nothing prevents one and 
the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually irrunaterial, 
from having a power by which it makes things actually 
irrunaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of 
individual matter (this power is called the agent 
intellect), and another power, receptive of such 
species, which is called the possible intellect by 
reason of its being in potentiality to such species." 5 
As the above passage indicates, the bodily senses and 
postmodum autem efficimur intelligentes in actu." 
5 ST I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 4 (V, 268b): " ... anima 
intellectiva est quidem actu irrunaterialis, sed est in 
potentia ad determinatas species rerum. Phantasmata autem, e 
converse, sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum 
quarundam, sed sunt potentia irrunaterialia. Unde nihil 
prohibet unam et eandem animam, inquantum est irrunaterialis 
in actu, habere aliquam virtutem per quam faciat 
irrunaterialia in actu abstrahendo a conditionibus 
individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur 
intellectus agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi 
specierum, quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum 
est inpotentia ad huiusmodi species." While the term 
species has many meanings, St. Thomas employs it with 
respect to his epistemology as meaning "that by which 
something is known to be what it is." On this, see notes 18 
and 19 below; see also ibid., q. 55, a. 1, ad 2; q. 84, a. 
3, resp. and 6 resp. For a further explication of the 
meanings of species and similitude, see Leo Sweeney, 
Christian Philosophy: Greek. Medieval. Contemporary 
Reflections (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1995), 
554-58; J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. G. B. 
Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), 86-100, 
111-28 and 387-418. -
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the phantasms (as derived from the apprehension of sensible 
objects; see note 17 below) are necessary in order for the 
human knower to perceive the universal nature existing in 
the individual object. 6 As proportioned, then, to man's 
natural constitution--namely, a spiritual soul united to a 
body--the proper object of the human intellect is a quiddity 
or nature existing in corporeal matter: 
The lower spiritual substance--that is, [human] 
souls--have a being (esse) akin to a body, insofar as 
they are the forms of bodies: and consequently from 
their very mode of being (essendi), it is necessary for 
them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies, 
and through bodies; otherwise they would be united with 
bodies to no purpose. 7 
6 ST I, q. 89, a. 1, resp. (V, 370a): 11 ••• anima, quamdiu 
est corpori coniuncta, non potest aliquid intelligere non 
convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut per experimentum patet .... 
Animae igitur secundum istum modum essendi quo corpori est 
unita, competit modum intelligendi per conversionem ad 
phantasmata corporum, quae in corporeis organis sunt .... 
Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est 
animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri. 11 Ibid., q. 84, a. 
7, resp. (V, 325b) : 11 ••• ideo necesse est ad hoc quod 
intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod 
convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam 
universalem in particulari existentem. 11 Ibid., q. 79, a. 4, 
ad 3 (V, 268b): 11 [Intellectus agens] non se habet ut 
obiectum, sed ut faciens obiecta in actu: ad quod requiritur 
praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis praesentia 
phatasmatum .... 11 See ibid., q. 5, a. 2, resp.; q. 51, a. 1, 
resp.; q. 84, a. 4, ad 1; q. 87, a. 3, ad l; .QT I-II, q. 3, 
a. 8, resp.;~ Veritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad 1 (XXII-2, 322b): 
11 
••• intellectus noster nihil actu potest intelligere 
antequam a phantasmatibus abstrahat .... 11 Ibid., q. 21, a. 1, 
resp.; In III~., lect. 7; ~III, c. 56; In III de 
Anima, lect. 9; cf. Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, II, c. 
19; De Anima III, c. 4. 
7 ST I, q. 55, a. 2, resp. (V, 56a): 11 Substantiae enim 
spirituales inferiores, scilicet animae, habent esse affine 
corpori, inquantum sunt corporum formae: et ideo ex ipso 
modo essendi competit eis ut a corporibus et per corpora 
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The power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing 
known. Therefore, the proper object of the angelic 
intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is 
an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas 
the proper object of the human intellect. which is 
united to s body. is the quiddity or nature existing in 
co:r:poreal matter; and through these natures of visible 
things it rises to a certain knowledge of things 
invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in 
an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal 
matter; for instance, it belongs to the nature of stone 
to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of 
horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. 
Therefore, the nature of stone or of any material thing 
cannot be known completely and truly, except inasmuch 
as it is known as existing in the individual. 8 
Note especially the last sentence of the above passage: 
"The nature of stone or any material thing cannot be known 
completely and truly, except inasmuch as it is known as 
existing in the individual." Not only is an object of 
knowledge properly understood in its concrete individuality, 
but the perfect judgment of any such item requires all 
suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur: alioquin 
frustra corporibus unirentur." 
8 ST I, q. 84, a. 7, resp. (V, 325b): " ... potentia 
cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intellectus 
ange~i, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, obiectum 
proprium est substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata; 
et per huiusmodi intelligibilia materialia cognoscit. 
Intellectus autem humani. ,qui est coniunctus co:r:pori. 
proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia 
corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium 
rerum, etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem 
ascendit. De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo 
individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali: 
sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, 
et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de 
aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, 
cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod 
cognoscitur ut in particulari existens." See also ST I, q. 
5, a. 2, resp.; De Veritate, q. 1, a. l; q. 10, a. 6,_ ad 2; 
q. 21, a. 1, resp.; In III Meta., lect. 7; SCG III, 56. 
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pertinent data proper to it. A carpenter, for example, 
cannot judge a knife perfectly unless he knows its action 
(actus); and similarly, the natural philosopher cannot judge 
perfectly of natural things unless he knows them in their 
actual condition. Cognition is not yet fulfilled for St. 
Thomas in merely grasping an abstracted essence in its 
universality, but only in referring such an abstraction to 
its concrete and individual circumstance. 9 Moreover, as the 
complete knowledge of an item involves knowing its activity, 
it must be viewed in its dynamic relation of causal 
interaction with other existing items. In other words, the 
full and true intelligibility of an essence or nature 
necessarily involves its concrete actuality; for a thing is 
a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as 
it is actual. 10 
Let us detail the process by which man attains 
9 ST I, q. 84, a. 8, resp. (V, 328a): " ... proprium 
obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei 
sensibilis. Iudicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non 
potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur; et 
praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et finis 
iudicii .... Faber enim non quaerit cognitionem cultelli nisi 
propter opus, ut operetur hunc particularem cultellum; et 
similiter naturalis non quaerit cognoscere naturam lapidis 
et equi, nisi ut sciat rationes eorum quae videntur secundum 
sensum." 
10ST I, q. 87, a. 1, resp. (V, 35Sa) : " ... unumquodque 
cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu, et non secundum 
quod est in potentia, ut dicitur [Aristotle, De Anima., III, 
4 (42822)]: sic enim aliquid est ens et verum, quod sub 
cognitione cadit, prout actu est." Ibid., q. 12, a. 7, resp. 
(IV, 127b): "Unumquodque enim sic cognoscibile est, secundum 
quod est ens actu." 
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knowledge of material objects: 
1. In the experience of the sensible world, the human 
percipient is presented with intelligible items (tulips, 
pine trees, other human persons}; these objects are the 
content-determining-causes of human knowledge which act on 
man's external senses to help produce sense knowledge. 11 
2. Next, the internal senses produce phantasms 
(expressed species} which disclose to the knower individual 
existents qua individual. Through the internal and external 
senses, as conjoined to their respective sense organs, the 
soul knows material things as individual and particular. 12 
3. The agent intellect efficiently produces knowledge 
of the form of a material existent--precisely in its 
11STI, q. 17, a. 1, resp. (IV, 218b}: 11 ••• nostra 
cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui prime et per se est 
exteriorum accidentium." Ibid., q. 78, a. 3, resp. (V, 
253b) : "Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata 
est immutari ab exteriori sensibili. 11 
12ST I, q. 78, a. 4, resp. (V, 256a}: "Sic ergo ad 
receptionem f ormarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius 
et communis .... Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut 
conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae 
idem sunt: est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi 
thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum." Ibid., q. 
84, a. 7, resp. (V, 325a}: "Utuntur autem organo corporali 
sensus et imaginatio, et aliae vires pertinentes ad partem 
sensitivam .... Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et 
imaginationem." Ibid, q. 85, a. 1, resp. (V, 330b}: "Quaedam 
enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis, 
scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuislibet sensitivae 
potentiae est forma prout in materia cor:porali existit. Et 
quia huismodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo 
omnis potentia sensitiva partis est cognoscitiva 
particularium tantum. 11 Concerning the formation of 
phantasms, see ibid., q. 85, a. 2, ad 3, as cited in note 17 
below. 
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universal aspect--by abstracting from phantasms. 13 Thus, we 
know material objects as individual items in virtue of our 
external and internal senses; and we know what individual 
objects are in virtue of the act of intellection. 14 St. 
Thomas summarily explains the manner in which a material 
object is comprehended by man both in its concrete existence 
and in its quiddity as follows: 
Our intellect cannot know the singular in material 
things directly and primarily. The reason of this is 
that the principle of singularity in material things is 
13ST I, q. 85, a. 1, resp. (V, 331a): 11 Cognoscere vero 
id quad est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali 
materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam 
repraesentant phantasmata. Et idea necesse est dicere quad 
intellectus nester intelligit materialia abstahendo a 
phantasmatibus. 11 Ibid., q. 84, a. 6, resp. (V, 324a) : " ... ad 
causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, 
non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed 
requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est honorabilius 
patiente, ut ipse dicit [~ Anima, III, 5 (430a18)]. Non 
tamen ita quad intellectualis operatic causetur in nobis ex 
sola impressione aliquarum rerum superiorum, ut Plato 
posuit: sed illud superius et nobilius agens quad vocat 
intellectum agentem ... facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta 
intelligibilia in actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam. 
Secundum hoc ergo ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis 
operatic a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non 
suf f iciunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quad 
f iant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non 
potest dici quad sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta 
causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est 
materia causae. 11 See also note 87 below. 
14ST I, q. 85, a. 3, resp. (V, 336a): 11 ••• in cognitione 
nostri intellectus duo oportet considerare. Primo quidem, 
quad cognitio intellectiva aliquo modo a sensitiva 
primordium sumit. Et quia sensus est singularium, 
intellectus autem universalium; necesse est quad cognitio 
singularium, quoad nos, prior sit quam universalium 
cognitio .... Est ergo dicendum quad cognitio singularium est 
prior quoad nos quam cognito universalium, sicut cogn_itio 
sensitiva quam cognitio intellectiva. 11 
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individual matter, whereas our intellect ... understands 
by abstracting the intelligible species from such 
matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter 
is the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly 
the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a 
kind of reflection, it can know the singular, 
because ... even after abstracting the intelligible 
species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs 
to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the 
species .... Therefore it understands the universal 
directly through the intelligible species, and 
indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. 15 
4. With respect to knowledge of the universal, the 
agent intellect, as efficient cause of knowledge, uses as 
instrumental cause a phantasm whose content is particular, 
so as to produce in the recipient intellect an initial 
entitative actuation whose contents is the universal; 
accordingly, the recipient intellect is reduced from 
potentiality to act by the active intellect. 16 
15ST I, q. 86, a. 1, resp. (V, 347a): " ... singulare in 
rebus materialibus intellectus nester directe et primo 
cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium 
singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia 
individualis: intellectus autem nester ... intelligit 
abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. 
Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur, est 
universale. Unde intellectus nester directe non est 
cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi 
per quamdam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare: 
quia ... etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non 
potest secundum eas actu intelligere, nisi convertendo se ad 
phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit .... 
Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem 
directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt 
phantasmata." See also .s..I I, q. 12, a. 4, resp.; De 
Veritate, q. 10, a. 5, resp. 
160uodlib. (ca. 1257) VIII, q. 2, a. 3, resp. (Parma 
IX, 574a): "Intellectus agens est principlae agens, quod 
agit rerum similitudines in intellectu possibili. 
Phantasmata autem quae a rebus exterioribus accipiuntur, 
sunt quasi agentia instrumentalia: intellectus enim · 
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5. The conformity and assimilation of the possible 
intellect issues into knowledge when, in a second actuation, 
the intellect efficiently causes the concept or word 
(verbum) . 17 On this score, St. Thomas affirms that the 
possibilis comparatur ad res quarum notitiam recipit, sicut 
patiens quod cooperatur agenti." ST I, q. 84, a. 4, ad 3 (V, 
321b): 11 ••• intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de 
potentia ad actum per aliquod ens actu, id est per 
intellectum agentem, qui est virtus quaedam animae 
nostra .... " 
17De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, resp. (XXII-1, 5-6): "Omnis 
autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad 
rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa 
cognitionis: sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur per speciem 
coloris, cognoscit colorem .... Hoc est ergo quod addit verum 
supra ens, scilicet conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et 
intellectus, ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur 
cognitio rei. Sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem 
veritatis, sed cognitio et quidam veritatis effectus." ST I, 
q. 85, a. 2, ad 3 (V, 334b): "· .. in parte sensitiva 
invenitur duplex operatic. Una secundum solam immutationem: 
et sic perficitur operatic sensus per hoc quod immutatur a 
sensibili. Alia operatic est formatio, sedundum quod vis 
imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei absentis, vel 
etiam nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatic coniungitur in 
intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus 
possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. 
Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel 
divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. 
Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et 
enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem 
intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas species 
intelligibiles, sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad 
iudicandum de rebus exterioribus." Cf. Ibid., III, q. 11, a. 
2, ad 1. The knowledge of a sensible object thus involves 
two intellectual actuations: (1) the act of abstraction by 
which the recipient intellect is reduced to act by the agent 
intellect; here the intellect becomes formally determined to 
be its object (intentionally, but not yet cognitively); (2) 
the subsequent act of judgment whereby the conceptio or 
verbum is produced; here, the intellect is aware of its own 
conformity to the object known. On these two actuations, see 
In i Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; Leo Sweeney, Christian 
Philosophy, 548-58. On the conceptio intellectus, see Gerard 
Smith, "The Concept in St. Thomas," 52-56. See Key-Text A, 
note 61. 
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intelligible species is not the object of our understanding, 
but rather "that by which" the intellect understands its 
actually existing object. Likewise, the sensible image is 
not itself the object of perception, but "that by which" the 
senses perceive its concrete object. 18 
6. Thus, in a certain sense, the intellect, the object 
known, and the cognition of the object are entitatively one 
and the same: 
As sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of 
the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in 
act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object 
understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the 
thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in 
act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual 
through the species of the object understood, is itself 
understood through the same species as by its own form. 
Now to say that in 'things without matter the intellect 
and what is understood are the same,' is equal to 
saying that 'as regards things actually understood the 
intellect and what is understood are the same.' For a 
thing is actually understood in that it is 
18ST I, q. 85, a. 2, resp. (V, 334a): " ... species 
intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit 
intellectus ... et similitude rei intellectae, quae est 
species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus 
intelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, 
secundum eandem reflectionem intelligit et suum intelligere, 
et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta 
secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod 
intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est 
similitude." Ibid., ad 1 (V, 334b): "Unde non sequitur quod 
species intelligibiles abstracta sit id quod actu 
intelligitur, sed quod sit similitude eius." As these 
passages indicate, St. Thomas's theory of cognition cannot 
rightly be construed as any type of representationalism. On 
this point see Leo Sweeney, Christian Philosophy, 545_-48, 
especially note 15. 
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immaterial . 19 
Accordingly, St. Thomas states that the human intellect 
is measured by things, so that the human concept is not true 
of itself, but is called true inasmuch as it conforms to 
reality. 20 Properly speaking, truth is in the intellect 
according to the conformity of the intellect to the 
extramental object; nevertheless, the aspect of the true--as 
caused by the existence of an object known--must pass from 
the intellect to the object understood, since the true 
19ST I, q. 87, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 356b): "Sicut enim sensus 
in actu est sensibile, propter similitudinem sensibilis, 
quae est forma sensus in actu; ita intellectus in actu est 
intellectum in actu, propter similitudinem rei intellectuae, 
quae est forma intellectus in actu. Et ideo intellectus 
humanus, qui fit in actu per speciem rei intellectae, per 
eandem speciem intelligitur sicut per formam suam. Idem 
autem est dicere quod in his quae sunt sine materia idem est 
intellectus et quod intelligitur, ac si diceretur quod in 
his quae sunt intellecta in actu, idem est intellectus et 
quod intelligitur: per hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in 
actu, quod est sine materia." See In XII Meta., lect. 8, n. 
2539 (Marietti, 594): " ... fit enim intellectus 
intelligibilis per hoc quod attingit aliquod intelligibile. 
Et ideo, cum ipse intellectus fiat intelligibilis 
concipiendo aliquod intelligibile, sequitur quod idem sit 
intellectus et intelligibile. 11 See also ST I, q. 55, a. 1, 
ad 2; q. 84, a. 3, resp., and a. 6, resp. With respect to 
self-knowledge, Joseph Owens stresses that "objects other 
than the cognition [of self] appear as primary for human 
awareness. Through them the specific traits of the cognition 
become known .... The notion of cognition itself, as 
explained by Aquinas, does not require that human cognition 
should first be directly aware of itself and its own 
contents." See "Aquinas on Cognition as Existence," 82. 
20 ST I-II, q. 93, a. 1, ad 3 (VII, 163a): "Intellectus 
enim humanus est mensuratus a rebus, ut scilicet conceptus 
hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, sed dicitur verus ex 
hoc quod consonat rebus: ex hoc enim quod res est vel non 
est, opinio vera vel falsa est." See also ibid., q. 91, a. 
3, ad 2. 
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denotes that towards which the intellect tends. 21 
Hence, for St. Thomas, not only is the actual existence 
of sensible objects the (proximate) locus from which all 
nonconstructual knowledge22 is derived, it is also the 
21ST I, q. 16, a. 1, resp. (IV, 206a): " ... sicut bonum 
nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in 
quod tendit intellectus .... [Clum verum sit in intellectu 
secundum quod conformatur rei intellectae, necesse est quod 
ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem intellectam derivetur, ut 
res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, secundum quod habet 
aliquem ordinem ad intellectum." Ibid., ad 3 (IV, 207b): 
"· .. esse rei, non veritas eius, causat veritatem 
intellectus. Unde Philosophus dicit quod opinio et oratio 
vera est ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res vera est." 
Hence, truth which is in the soul--but caused by things--
does not depend on what one thinks, but on the existence of 
things. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 (XXII-2, lOa): 
"Veritas quae in anima causatur a rebus, non sequitur 
aestimationem animae sed existentiam rerum." On this point, 
Etienne Gilson remarks that "since ens (being) includes its 
own esse (to be), each and every real knowledge ultimately 
is resolved into the composition of an essence with its own 
existence, which are posited as one by an act of judging. 
This is why judgment ultimately bears upon esse (to be), and 
also why the truth of cognition ultimately rests upon the 
fact that the thing is; for all true knowledge is resolved 
into being, and, unless we reach 'to be,' we fail to reach 
'being.'" Being gng ~Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 205. See also ST I, 
q. 22, a. 2, ad 3; q. 79, a. 4; ST I-II, q. 87, a. 7; q. 91, 
a. 3, ad 2; q. 93, a. 1, ad 3; In .l.l £fill.t.., d. 17, q. 2, a. 
1; In III Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 4; SGC II, 77 and 78; In 
III Qg_ Anima, lect. 10, nn. 730-739; ibid., I, lect. 5, n. 
85; De Spirt. Creat., 10, ad 17. See also G. B. Phelan, 
"Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum," Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939), 11-
22; Armand Maurer, "St. Thomas and Eternal Truths, Mediaeval 
Studies 32 (1970), 91-107; Joseph Owens, "Judgment and Truth 
in Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies 32 (1970), 138-58; M. J. 
Farrelly, "Existence, the Intellect, and the Will," The New 
Scholasticism 29 (1955), 145-74, especially 169-70. In this 
connection, see note 100 below. 
22By "nonconstructual knowledge" we mean that knowledge 
which is based directly on actual existents; by contrast, 
constructual knowledge (such as found in logic, mathematics, 
as well as our knowledge of physical and moral evil) seems 
to be based directly on the mental activity itself which 
(proximate) measure according to which human judgment is 
formed, pronounced, and validated; indeed, the actual 
existence of sensible natures (human persons and other 
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subhuman creatures) is the term to which all nonconstructual 
knowledge directly refers. 
Let us sum up the above discussion in the following 
points: 
1. Corresponding to man's natural constitution--namely, 
a spiritual soul united to a body--the proper object of the 
human intellect is a quiddity or nature existing in 
corporeal matter. Hence, human knowledge is derived from, 
determined by, and oriented towards, the sensible world of 
actually existing creatures. 
2. Human knowledge thus depends upon two causes: (1) 
the cognitive powers (external and internal senses; the 
agent and recipient intellects) as the efficient cause of 
cognition; (2) sensible existents (human and subhuman 
helps constitute such knowledge and remotely upon actually 
existing items. See Leo Sweeney, Authentic Metaphysics in an 
Age of Unreality (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 
1988), 338, 139, note 10. Nevertheless, cognition of 
actually existing creatures is just as necessary for 
constructual knowledge as it is for nonconstructual 
knowledge. For example, the notion of, say, the hole of a 
donut--and by abstraction, the idea of "holeness," and the 
contribution which the mind itself imposes upon the original 
data to formulate the notion "emptiness"--presupposes, and 
is reducible to, the knowledge of an actually existing 
donut; see ibid., 221, note 69. In this connection, St. 
Thomas cites St. Hilary: "Non sermoni res, sed rei debet 
esse sermo subiectus." ST I-II, q. 96, a. 6, sed contra 
(VII I 187b) . 
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natures) as content-determining-causes of cognition. 23 
Remote Context #b 
The Meaning of Participation 
In Key-Text A, St. Thomas speaks of participation 
within the context of his discussion on natural law: "in his 
quae cognitionem participant, principia agendi sunt cognitio 
et appetitus. "24 Note here that natural law itself is not 
expressly considered in such terms; 25 but in the Summa 
Theologiae (as we will see) his treatment of natural law is 
explicitly framed within the rubric of participation. Hence, 
23ST I, q. 105, a. 3, resp. (V, 4 73a) : "Operationis 
autem intellectus est duplex principium in intelligente: 
unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus intellectualis, quod 
quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in potentia; 
aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet 
similitude rei intellectae in intelligente." Ibid., ad 2 (V, 
473b): " ... lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei 
intellectuae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; 
secundarium tamen, et a primo princip_io dependens." Ibid., 
q. 84, a. 6, resp. (V, 324a): " ... ad causandam 
intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non 
suffict sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur 
aliquid nobilius, quia agens est honorabilius patiente .... " 
See also De Veritate, q. 10, a. 6, resp.; ST I, q. 12, a. 
13, resp.; ibid., q. 79, a. 4, ad 3. 
24See Key-Text A, section [2]. Regarding a creature's 
relationship to God through participation, see In i Sent., 
d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, ad 6; In II~., d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, ad 
3; d. 18, q. 1, a, 6, ad l; d. 37, q. 1, a. 2. Recall that 
St. Bonaventure also speaks of man's participation in God 
through memory, knowledge, and love; see Key-Text A, note 
77; Key-Text C, notes 47 and 58. 
25 From early in his career, however, the notion of 
participation--or what amounts to it--is implied in his 
teaching of natural law; see Key-Text A, note 47: "ideo ea 
quae sunt de jure divine, dicuntur esse de jure naturale, 
cum sint ex impressione et infusione superioris prinGipii, 
scilicet Dei." 
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in order to properly grasp St. Thomas' doctrine of natural 
law, let us consider briefly his understanding of 
participation. 
What can be said about participation? The philosophical 
notion itself finds its origin in Plato who uses the term to 
explain the relationship between contingent realities and 
the Forms. 26 As Leo Sweeney observes, platonic 
participation involves three principle factors--namely, (1) 
the Form itself, (2) the participated-in-perfection, and (3) 
the participant. 27 The first factor, the unparticipated 
Form or Essence, exists independently and subsistently in 
the world of Forms. It is present in its participants, not 
directly, but through the participated-in-perfections which 
inhere directly in each individual participant. A Form is an 
extrinsic formal cause of what a participant is. 
The third factor, the participant, is the individual 
item (material, finite, and mutable) which receives the 
26For a concise historical overview on the 
philosophical notion of participation, see Sr. M. Annice, 
"Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation," The New 
Scholasticism 26 (1952), 49-79. See also Cornelius Fabro's 
entry, "Participation," in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, 
vol. 10 (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1967), 1042-46. 
27The brief account of platonic participation which 
follows is a concise summary of Sweeney's observations as 
found in his "Participation in Plato's Dialogues: Phaedo, 
Parmenides, Sophist, and Timaeus," The New Scholasticism 62 
(1988), 125-49. For a extensive investigation of Plato's 
notion of participation, see Sweeney's Divine Infinity in 
Greek and Medieval Thought (New York: Lang Publishing, 
1992), 29-94. 
269 
participated-in-perfection through which it participates in 
its corresponding Form. 
The second factor, the participated-in-perfection, is 
actually present in each particular participant, and yet is 
the medium through which the Form makes the many individuals 
participating it be what they are. Thus, the participated-
in-perfection is (1) that by which the Form is present in 
its participants, (2) that which the Form has in common with 
its participants, and (3) that by which participants are 
(univocally) like one another and (analogically) like the 
Form. The participated-in-perfection is an immanent form or 
intrinsic formal cause of what a thing is. The participated-
in-perfection, Sweeney says, "is crucial if the Form is 
itself to remain transcendent and yet be the immanent source 
of perfection in multiple participants. 1128 
But how does St. Thomas himself understand 
participation? Although he makes extensive use of the term 
in various discussions, he never treats it as a topic in 
itself; consequently, the general features of his theory of 
participation must be culled from an examination of many 
different texts. 29 As such texts collectively reveal, his 
28 Sweeney, Di vine Infinity, 51 . 
29St. Thomas offers a somewhat general explanation of 
participation in his Expositio in Librum Boethii de 
Hebdomadibus (1256-59), lect. 2 (Parma XVII, 349-69): "Est 
autem participare quasi partem capere; et ideo quando 
aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet 
universaliter, dicitur participare illud. Ita homo di9itur 
paricipare anima, quia non habet rationem animalis secundum 
notion of participation incorporates the main elements of 
platonic participation--but as transfigured (so to speak) 
within his own metaphysical vision. Accordingly, Robert 
Henle sums up the general features of St. Thomas' 
participation doctrine as follows: 
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Participation [for St. Thomas] means that the 
participating entity has something that resembles the 
exemplar cause, though in a limited, deficient or 
imperfect way and that the participating entity is 
derived from the exemplar by efficient causality. 30 
A more precise account of the factors involved in St. 
Thomas' theory of participation is offered by Leo Sweeney: 
[1] An item which of itself is conunon, general, ample, 
unencumbered, indeterminate, free and, in some cases at 
least, rich, perfect, noble [2] becomes part of 
another, [3] with the result that this other becomes 
perfected, enriched, filled out, ennobled [4] but the 
item itself becomes restricted, confined, limited, 
determined. The item in question can be [a] an 
intelligibility, [b] any sort of form or act and [c] 
totam conununitatem; et eadem ratione Socrates participat 
hominem, et subjectum accidens, et materia formam, quia 
forma substantialis vel accidentalis, quae de sua ratione 
conununis est, determinatur ad hoc vel illud subjectum. Et 
similiter effectus dicitur participare suam causam, et 
praecipue quando non adaequat virtutem suae causa: puta si 
dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis, quia non recipit 
earn in aer claritate qua est in sole." For other passages 
which illumine his theory of participation, see In II de 
Caelo et Mundo, c. 12, lect. 18, n. 6; SCG I, c. 32, 38; 
ibid., III, c. 78; .In Lib. gg causis, lect. 4; Compend. 
Theol. c. 68; In II Meta., lect. 2; ST I, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; 
q. 75, a. 5, ad 4; q. 79, a. 4; see also note 24 above. 
30Robert Henle, The Treatise Qil Law, 155. More 
accurately, however, that which "is derived from the 
exemplar by efficient causality" is the "something" that 
both (1) resembles the exemplar cause, and which (2) the 
participating entity possesses in a limited way. 
the perfection entailed in an analogous cause 
situation. 31 
In view of Henle's and Sweeney's accounts of St. 
Thomas' participation theory, what can be made of St. 
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Thomas' assertion that natural law is a participation in us 
of eternal law? 32 First, eternal law is the unparticipated 
exemplar cause, which exists independently, subsistently, 
commonly, freely, and perfectly [in the mind of God, as we 
will see] . Eternal law is present to the multiplicity of men 
(qua participants)--not directly, but through natural law 
which inheres directly in each man. Eternal law is the 
extrinsic formal cause of what a man is. Precisely as 
present to him through natural law, eternal law is 
restricted, confined, limited, and determined. 
Next, man is the individual participant (material, 
mutable, and imperfect) which receives natural law, and 
through which he participates in eternal law; as a result of 
this participation, man is perfected in his moral life. 
Finally, natural law itself is the participated-in-
perfection which--derived from eternal law through efficient 
31Leo Sweeney, "Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas's 
Early Writings," Proceedings from the ACPA (1963), 121. 
32 ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2, resp. (VII, 154b): " ... lex 
naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae 
in rationali creatura." For other uses of the term 
participatio in connection with natural law, see ibid, q. 
90, a. 2, resp.; q. 91, a. 2, ad 1 and ad 3; q. 91, a. 4, 
resp.; q. 91, a. 6, resp. and ad 2-3; q. 93, a. 2, resp; q. 
93, a. 3, resp.; q. 95, a. 5, ad 2. 
272 
causality--is actually present in each particular human 
being; it is the medium through which eternal law makes each 
man participating it to be what he is as a moral agent. 
Thus, natural law is (1) that by which eternal law is 
present in each human being, (2) that which eternal law has 
in common with each human being, and (3) that by which men 
are (univocally) like one another as moral (intellectual and 
volitional) agents and (analogously) like God as 
intellectual and volitional Agent. Natural law is an 
immanent form of what man is as moral agent. 
As we will see, natural law participation can pertain 
to (1) knowledge, (2) human nature or activity, and (3) the 
perfection of man through his actual relationship with 
creatures and God. 
Remote Context #c 
Divine Providence. Eternal ~ and Nature 
As previously stated (see note 8 above), the human 
intellect rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible 
through the knowledge of the natures of visible things; 33 
33Recall that, for St. Thomas, all knowledge--including 
the knowledge of incorporeals--depends on phantasms; See ST 
I, q. 84, a. 7, resp. (V, 32Sa) : " ... irnpossibile est 
intellecturn nostrum, secundurn praesentis vitae staturn, quo 
passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, 
nisi convertendo se ad phantasrnata." How, then are 
incorporeal things known? See Ibid., ad 3 (V, 326a): 
" ... incorporea quorum non sunt phantasrnata, cognoscuntur a 
nobis per cornparationern ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt 
phantasrnata. Sicut veritatern intelligirnus ex consideratione 
rei circa quarn veritatern specularnur; Deurn autern, ut 
Dionysius dicit [De Div. Norn., I, 5 (PG 34, 466)], 
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thus, according to the knowledge of sensible natures as they 
actually exist in the world, man is able to attain to the 
knowledge of Divine Providence: 
passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, 
nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata." How, then are 
incorporeal things known? See Ibid., ad 3 (V, 326a): 
" ... incorporea quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a 
nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt 
phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione 
rei circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deum autem, ut 
Dionysius dicit [~Div. Norn., I, 5 (PG 34, 466)], 
cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem; 
alias etiam incorporeas substantias, in statu praesentis 
vitae, cognoscere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel per 
aliquam comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de 
huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad 
phantasmata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata." 
Accordingly, knowledge of God is attained through knowledge 
of His effects; see, for example, ST I, q. 84, a. 4, ad 1 
(V, 320b): " ... species intelligibiles quas participat nester 
intellectus, reducuntur sicut in primam causam in aliquod 
principium per suam essentiam intelligibile, scilicet in 
Deum. Sed ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis 
rerum sensibilium et materialium, a quibus scientiam 
colligimus." .s..I I-II, q. 93, a. 2, ad 1 (VII, 163b): " ... ea 
quae sunt Dei, in seipsa quidem cognosci a nobis non 
possunt, sed tamen in effectibus suis manifestantur, 
secundum illud Rom. 1, 20, 'Invisibilia Dei per ea quae 
facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.'" See also ST I, q. 2, 
aa 2-3; q. 44, a. 1 and ad 1. Concerning the demonstration 
of God from the nature of beings qua composite, see ST I q. 
3, a. 7, resp.; q. 47, a. 1, resp.; see also SCG I, cc. 11 
and 15. In this connection, Joseph Owens comments that the 
knowledge of causality and the "causal proposition is not 
synthetic a priori. [Such knowledge] is based upon things, 
not upon the exigencies of human reason. It is not 
postulated but is concluded from the nature and being of 
things. One may say with truth that the being of created 
things cannot be understood except as caused [see In i Post. 
Analyt., lect. 7; De Pot., q. 3, a. 5, ad 1]; but the reason 
for that exigency lies ultimately not in the human intellect 
but in the being of those things themselves. They would have 
to have a cause even though no human intellect ever 
considered them, as human reasoning itself is able to 
demonstrate." "The Causal Proposition--Principle or 
Conclusion?," 338. 
274 
It is impossible for things contrary and discordant to 
fall into one harmonious order always or for the most 
part, except under some one guidance, assigning to each 
and all a tendency to a fixed end. But in the world we 
see things of different natures falling into harmonious 
order, not rarely and fortuitously, but always or for 
the most part. Therefore, there must be some 
[principal] by whose providence the world is governed; 
and that we cal 1 God . 34 
In what, then, does divine providence consist? 
According to St. Thomas, two things belong to notion of 
providence--namely, (1) the plan (ratio) of the order of 
things pre-ordained towards an end and (2) the execution of 
this order, which is called government. 35 Now, God, through 
His wisdom, is the creator of all things, to which He is 
related as an artist is to his artifacts. He is also the 
ruler of all the acts and movements that are found in each 
34SCG (ca. 1259) I, c. 13 (XIII, 34a) : "Impossibile est 
aliqua contraria et dissonantia in unum ordinem concordare 
semper vel pluries nisi alicuius gube~natione, ex qua 
omnibus et singulis tribuitur ut ad certum finem tendant. 
Sed in mundo videmus res diversarum naturarum in unum 
ordinem concordare, non ut raro et a casu, sed ut semper vel 
maiori parte. Oportet ergo esse aliquem cuius providentia 
mundus gubernetur. Et hunc dicimus Deus." St. Thomas borrows 
this argument from Damascene, De Fid. Orthod., I, 3 (PG 94, 
796) 
35ST I, q. 22, a. 3, resp. (IV, 267b): " ... ad 
providentiam duo pertinent: scilicet ratio ordinis rerum 
provisarum in finem; et executio huius ordinis, quae 
gubernatio dicitur." See also, ibid., a. 1, ad 2 (IV, 264a): 
"· .. ad curam duo pertinent: scilicet ratio ordinis, quae 
dicitur providentia et dispositio; et executio ordinis, quae 
dicitur gubernatio. Quorum primum est aeternum; secundum 
temporale." For an exposition of St. Thomas' doctrine of 
providence and the relationship between order and reason, 
see Edward Pace, "The Teleology of St. Thomas," The New 
Scholasticism 1 (1927), 213-31; "The Concept of Order in the 
Philosophy of St. Thomas," The New Scholasticism 2 (1928), 
51-72. 
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single creature. Hence, just as the plan in the divine 
wisdom though which all things were created has the nature 
(ratio) of an art or exemplar or idea, so the plan in the 
divine wisdom which moves everything to its proper end has 
the nature (ratio) of law. Accordingly, the eternal law is 
nothing other than the plan (ratio) in divine wisdom 
inasmuch as it directs all acts and movements of creatures 
towards their proper ends. 36 
How, then, are creatures subject to the government of 
divine providence? St. Thomas explains that every created 
being is divinely impressed with a certain inherent nature 
by which it is directed towards its proper end: 
The natural necessity inherent in those beings which 
are determined to a particular course is a kind of 
impression from God, directing them to their end ("est 
irnpressio quaedarn Dei dirigentis ad finern"); just as 
36ST I-II, q. 93, a. 1, resp. (VII, 162a): "Deus autern 
per suarn sapientiarn conditor est universarurn rerurn, ad quas 
cornparatur sicut artifex ad artificiata, ut in Primo [q. 14, 
a. 8] habiturn est. Est etiarn gubernator ornniurn actuurn et 
rnotionurn quae inveniuntur in singulis creaturis, ut etiarn in 
Primo [q. 103, a. 5] habiturn est. Unde sicut ratio divinae 
sapientiae inquanturn per earn cuncta sunt creata, rationern 
habet artis, vel exernplaris vel ideae; ita ratio divinae 
sapientiae rnoventis ornnia ad debiturn finern, obtinet rationern 
legis. Et secundurn hoc, lex aeterna nihil aliud est quarn 
ratio divinae sapientiae, secundurn quod est directiva ornniurn 
actuurn et rnotionurn." See also ST I, q. 14, a. 8, resp.; q. 
22, a. 2, resp. Cf. Plato's Timaeus, 28a-30b. In its 
simplest terms, law, for St. Thomas, denotes a kind of plan 
directing action towards an end. ST I-II, q. 93, a. 3, resp. 
(VII, 164a): "· .. lex irnportat rationern quarndarn directivarn 
actuurn ad finern .... " See fil I-II, q. 90, a. 4, resp., (VII, 
152b), for St. Thornas's formal definition of law as: "nihil 
est aliud quarn quaedarn rationis ordinatio ad bonurn commune, 
ab eo qui curarn cornrnunitatis habet, prornulgata." Cf. ibid., 
q. 90, aa. 1 and 2. 
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the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly 
towards a certain point is an impression from the 
archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a 
difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive 
from God is their nature, while that which natural 
things receive from man in addition to their nature is 
something violent. Therefore, just as the violent 
necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action 
of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows 
the government of divine providence. 37 
Correspondingly, St. Thomas tells us that every 
creature, according to its nature as divinely impressed upon 
37ST I, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 454a): " ... necessitas 
naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur ad unum, est 
impressio guaedam Dei dirigentis ad f inem: sicut necessitas 
qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum tendat, est impressio 
sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc differt, quia id 
~ creaturae g Deo recipiunt, ~ earum natura; quod autem 
ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum 
naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas 
violentiae in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis 
directionem; ita necessitas naturalis creaturarum demonstrat 
divinae providentiae gubernationem." In Meta. (ca. 1269-72), 
V, lect. 5, n. 819 (Marietti, 267): "Quia vero motus rerum 
naturalium magis causatur ex forma ... ipsa forma dicitur 
natura." Ibid., n. 826 (Marietti, 268): " ... primo et proprie 
natura dicitur substantia, idest forma rerum habentium in se 
principium motus inquantum huiusmodi .... Forma est 
principium motus rerum existentium secundum natura, aut in 
actu, aut in potentia." ST I, q. 39, a. 2, ad 3 (IV, 399a): 
" ... natura designat principium actus .... "ST III, q. 75, a. 
4, resp. (XII, 168a): "Et ideo cujuslibet agentis creati 
actio fertur super aliquem determinatum actum. Determinatio 
autem cujuslibet rei in esse actuali est per ejus formam." 
SCG III, c. 1 (XIV, 3a): "Finem autem ultimum unaquaeque res 
per suam consequitur actionem, quam oportet in finem dirigi 
ab eo qui principia rebus dedit per quae agunt." As 
explained in note 13 of Key-Text A, expressions such as 
impressa and imprimit characterize anything which has been 
imparted or given to a recipient item from an extrinsic 
cause. Hence, nature, precisely as an impressio, is a 
determinate principle of activity which is given to a 
creature from something outside itself. Likewise, with 
respect to knowledge, a sensible impressio is a determinate 
content of cognition which the percipient is given from an 
extrinsic content-determining- cause- -namely, a materi.al 
existent. 
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it, is subject to eternal law: 
Now, just as man, by a pronouncement, imprints on man 
subject to him an internal principle of action, so God 
also imprints on the whole of nature the principles of 
its proper actions; and in this way, God is said to 
command the whole of nature, according to Ps. 148, 6: 
'He has made a decree and it shall not pass away.'And 
for this reason also, all movements and actions of the 
whole of nature are subject to the eternal law. "38 
For St. Thomas, then, all creatures participate in 
eternal law according to their natures as divinely impressed 
upon them; as a kind of impression of eternal law, a nature 
is itself a kind of interior law--precisely as it directs 
the activity of a creature towards its proper end. 39 Now, 
man, qua creature of God, also participates in eternal law 
according to his own nature which has been divinely 
impressed upon him; such participation in eternal law is 
38ST I-II, q. 93, a. 5, resp. (VII, 166a): "Sicut autem 
homo imprimit, denuntiando quoddam interius principium 
actuum homini sibi subiecto, ita etiam Deus imprimit toti 
naturae principia propriorum actuum. Et ideo per hunc modum 
Deus dicitur praecipere toti naturae; secundum illud Psalmi 
[148, 6]: 'Praeceptum posuit, et non praeteribit.' Et per 
hanc etiam rationem omnes motus et actiones totius naturae 
legi aeternae subduntur." See also ibid., ad 1 (VII, 166b): 
" .... hoc modo se habet impressio activi principii 
intrinseci, quantum ad res naturales sicut se habet 
promulgatio legis quantum ad homines: quia per legis 
promulgationem imprimitur hominibus quoddam directivum 
principium humanorum actuum .... "See also Key-Text A, note 
24. 
39St. Thomas speaks of the natural inclinations proper 
to creatures as "natural laws." See In Lib. Div. Norn (ca. 
1265-67) X, lect. 1 (Parma XV, 383b): "Ipsae naturales 
inclinationes rerum in proprios fines quas dicimus esse 
naturales leges, sunt quidam partus, id est effectus 
'dulces,' id est consoni naturali appetitui effectus .... " 
See below, Key-Text section [l]; see also ST I-II, q._ 91, a. 
3, ad 3. 
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nothing other than natural law: 
Through natural law we participate in the eternal law 
in proportion to the capacity of human nature 
(capacitatis humanae naturae) . 40 
There are two ways in which a thing may be implanted 
into man (inditum homini): first, through being part of 
his nature, and thus the natural law is implanted into 
man. 41 
Through natural law, man participates in eternal law 
(i.e., the ratio of divine providence) according to the 
capacity of his human nature. What this participation 
consists in will be explicated in our Commentary section in 
light of St. Thomas' doctrine of knowledge as discussed 
above. For now, let us sum up the above discussion as 
follows: 
1. Divine providence consists of (a) the plan of the 
order of things pre-ordained towards an end and (b) the 
40ST I-II, q. 91, a. 4, ad 1 (VII, 156b): 11 ••• per 
naturalem legem participatur lex aeterna secundum 
proportionem capacitatis humanae naturae. 11 
41
.Q.'.r I-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 2 (VII, 274a): 
11 
••• dupliciter est aliquid inditum homini: uno modo quasi 
pertinens ad naturam humanam: et sic lex naturalis est lex 
indita homini. See also ST I-II, q. 94, a. 6, sed contra 
(VII, 173a): 11 ••• lex scripta in cordibus hominum est lex 
naturalis. 11 In this connection, St. Thomas traces all human 
laws to natural law as rooted in (human) nature; see ST I-
II, q. 91, a. 3, resp. (VII, 155a): 11 Unde et Tullius dicit, 
in sua Rhet. [De Invent. Rhet. II, 53), quod 'initium iuris 
est a natura prof ectum; deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex 
utilitate rationis venerunt; postea res et a natura 
prof ectas et a consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio 
sanxit. "' ST I-II, q. 95, a. 2 (VII, 175b): 11 ••• omnis lex 
humanitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis, inquantum 
a lege naturae derivatur. 11 See also ST I-II, q. 91, a_. 6, 
resp. 
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execution of this order, which is called government. 
2. Eternal law is nothing other than the plan of divine 
providence by which God directs all acts and movements of 
creatures towards their proper end. 
3. All creatures are subject to eternal law according 
to their inherent natures--as impressed upon them by God. 
4. Hence, man, who also is a creature of God, 
participates in eternal law according to his own divinely 
impressed nature; this participation in eternal law is 
nothing other than natural law. 
Remote Context #d: 
St. Thomas' Theory of Natural Appetency 
To further understand how man participates eternal law 
according to his inherent nature, let us take a closer look 
at St. Thomas' doctrine of natural appetency. Proper to each 
and every form, St. Thomas tells us, is a determinate 
tendency or inclination to a definite operation: 
From each and every form follows some inclination, and 
from the inclination an operation; as from the natural 
form of fire follows an inclination to a place that is 
upward, according to which [inclination] form is called 
light; and from this inclination operation follows--
namely, the movement which is upward .... The 
inclination following the natural form is called 
natural appetite; from appetite follows operation. 42 
42 See ll De Anima, lect. 5 (XLV, 88b): "Ex unaquaque 
autem forma sequitur aliqua inclinatio et ex inclinatione 
operatic, sicut ex forma naturali ignis sequitur inclinatio 
ad locum qui est surusm, secundum quam ignis dicitur lexis. 
et ex hac inclinatione sequitur operation, scilicet motus 
qui est sursum ... inclinatio consequens formam naturalem 
280 
St. Thomas' doctrine of natural appetency thus involves 
a distinction and relationship between three terms: (1) a 
creature's nature or form, (2) the natural inclination 
itself as a determinate tendency which is possessed by that 
nature, (3) the natural operation which follows upon, and 
according to, that determinate tendency. Hence, inasmuch as 
all creatures are endowed with certain inherent natures, all 
creatures possess natural inclinations towards certain 
operations and ends. 43 Now, some creatures, such as 
inanimate bodies and plants, possess non-cognitive natural 
inclinations and, hence, are inclined towards their proper 
operations and goods without knowledge, according to their 
nature; such inclination is called natural appetite. 44 
dicitur appetitus naturalis, ex appetitu autem sequitur 
operatic .... " See also~ Veritate, q. 27, a. 2, resp. 
(XXII-3, 794a): "Cum enim diversarum naturarum diversi sint 
fines, ad consecutionem alicuius finis in rebus naturalibus 
tria praeexiguntur, scilicet natura proportionata ad finem 
illum, et inclinatio in illum f inem, quae est naturalis 
appetitus finis et motus in finem." Note that inclinatio and 
appetitus are, for St. Thomas interchangeable terms; on 
this, see note 44 below. 
43St. Thomas asserts categorically that natural 
inclination follows natural form; see ST I, q. 80, a. 1, 
resp. (V, 282a): " ... quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua 
inclinatio .... Formam naturalem sequitur naturalis 
inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur." 
44ST I, q. 59, a. 1, resp. (V, 92a): " ... cum omnia 
procedant ex voluntate divina, omnia suo modo per appetitum 
inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim 
inclinantur in bonum per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque 
cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata: et talis 
inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis." Ibid., q. 
78, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 251,b): "· .. appetitus naturalis est 
inclinatio cuiuslibet rei in aliquid ex natura sua." 
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Other creatures, such as animals, are inclined towards their 
respective operations and goods according to sense 
knowledge--not that they know the aspect of goodness itself, 
but rather as apprehending some particular sensible good; 
such inclination--as determined by its sensitive nature 
towards a sensibly apprehended good--is called sensitive 
appetite. 45 Still other creatures possess an inclination 
towards certain operations and goods according to 
intellection whereby they perceive the very aspect of 
goodness; such inclination towards the good as such--
precisely as known--is termed the will. 46 
45ST I, q. 59, a. 1, resp. (V, 92a) : "Quaedam vero ·ad 
bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod 
cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod bonum 
particulare; sicut sensus cognoscit dulce et album, et 
aliquid huiusmodi. Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens 
dicitur appetitus sensitivus." 
46 Ibid., (V, 92a) : "Quaedam vero .inclinantur ad bonum 
cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem, quod est 
proprium intellectus ... ; et haec inclinatio dicitur 
voluntas." SCG IV, c. 19 (XV, 74b): " ... in qualibet 
intellectuali natura oportet inveniri voluntatem .... Unde 
etiam oportet quod ex forma intellibibili consequatur in 
intelligente inclinatio ad proprias operationes at proprium 
finem. Haec autem inclinatio in itellectuali natura voluntas 
est .... " See also ST I, q. 19, a. 3, resp.; q. 78, a. 1, 
resp. and ad 3; ST I-II, q. 9, a. 1, resp.; De Veritate, q. 
25, a. 1, resp. The terms appetitus and inclinatio are thus 
predicated of different natures in an analogous fashion; 
see, for example, SCG III, c. 26 (XIV, 71a): "Appetitus 
autem non est proprium intellectualis naturae, sed omnibus 
rebus inest: licet sit diversimode in diversis. Quae tamen 
diversitas procedit ex hoc quod res diversimode se habent ad 
cognitionem. Quae enim omnino cognitione carent, habent 
appetitum naturalem tantum. Quae vero habent cognitionem 
sensitivam, et appetitum sensibiliem habent .... Quae vero 
habent cognitionem intellectivam, et appetitum cognitioni 
proportionatum habent, scilicet voluntatem." While St .. 
Thomas distinguishes between a power and its proper 
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What can be said, then, of natural appetency with 
respect to human nature? Let us first recall St. Thomas' 
teaching on the nature of man; here, human nature can be 
taken in two ways: first, inasmuch as intellect is the 
principal part of human nature, man has his own specific 
nature; secondly, man's nature can be taken in contrast with 
reason--narnely, as that which is common to man and other 
animals, especially that part of man which [as directed by 
natural necessity] does not obey [human] reason. 47 
How is man's specific nature related to his common 
nature? As noted above (see note 2), man is composed of soul 
operation, the terms inclinatio and appetitus often refer, 
not merely to an appetitive power, but to its respective 
operation as well. See, for example, ~ II, c. 55 (XIII, 
394b) : "Naturalis enirn appetitus quibusdarn quidern inest ex 
apprehensione, sicut lupus naturaliter desiderat occisionern 
anirnaliurn de quibus pascitur, et homo naturaliter desiderat 
felicitatern; quibusdarn vero absque apprehensione ex sola 
inclinatione naturaliurn principiorurn, quae naturalis 
appetitus in quibusdarn dicitur sicut grave appetit esse 
deorusurn. " 
47ST I-II, q. 31, a. 7, resp. (VI, 221): "Natura autern 
in hornine dupliciter surni potest. Uno rnodo, prout 
intellectus et ratio est potissirne horninis natura, quia 
secundurn earn homo in specie constitutur .... Alio rnodo potest 
surni natura in hornine secundurn quod condividitur rationi: id 
scilicet quod est commune hornini et aliis, praecipue quod 
rationi non obedit. Et secundurn hoc, ea quae pertinent ad 
conservationern corporis, vel secundurn individuurn, ut cibus, 
potus, lectus, et hujusrnodi, vel secundurn speciern, sicut 
venerorurn usus dicuntur hornini delectabilia naturaliter." 
The bodily parts of man, while lacking understanding, can be 
said to obey [human] reason inasmuch as they are ordered to 
human reason. For a clarification of this point, see ST I-
II, q. 93, a. 5, ad 2; q. 94, a. 2, ad 2, as cited in notes 
50 and 85 below. Concerning the method by which St. Thomas 
draws the distinction between the man's specific nature and 
generic nature, see ST I, q. 76, a. 3, ad 4. 
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and body; and inasmuch as his soul is the form of the body, 
he exists as a substantial unity. 48 Now, the human soul is 
characterized as an intellectual soul (anima 
intellectiva) ; 49 but if the human soul is specifically 
intellectual, how can it also be the form of the body? St. 
Thomas explains that the soul is the first [principle] by 
which the body lives and by which each vital operation is 
performed. Consequently, the soul is at once the primary 
[principle] of our nourishment, sensation, locomotion--as 
48See notes 2 and 3 above; De Veritate, q. 16, a. 1, ad 
13 (XXII-2, 506b): " ... non enim in anima sunt duae formae 
sed una tantum quae est eius essentia, quia per essentiam 
suam spiritus est, et per essentiam suam forma corporis est, 
non per aliquid superadditum." SCG II, 57 (XIII, 406b): 
"Oportet igitur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quad non 
sint secundum esse diversa .... Est igitur anima forma 
corporis animati .... Est igitur anima forma corporis .... 
Ergo anima est forma et actus corporis." In II Q.g Anima, I, 
c. 2, n. 233 (Pirotta, 83): "Anima est actus primus corporis 
physici organici. 11 See also SCG II, 65; ST I, q. 75, a. 1, 
resp. 
0 ST I, q. 76, a. 1, resp. (V, 208b): " ... intellectus, 
qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani 
corporis forma .... Hoc ergo principium quo prime 
intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima 
intellectiva, est forma corporis." Note that St. Thomas 
distinguishes the intellectual soul--the formal principle of 
man's being--from the intellective power and all the other 
powers which flow from the soul. See ST I, q. 79, a. 1, 
resp. (V, 258a): "· .. intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae, 
et non ipsa animae essentia." Nevertheless, the intellectual 
soul is sometimes called intellectus inasmuch as the 
intellect is the soul's chief power; see ibid., ad 1 and 3; 
ibid., q. 77, a. 6, resp. (V, 246b) : "Unde manifestum est 
quad ornnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima 
sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a 
principio." Cf. ibid., q. 54, a. 3; q. 77, a. 1. 
284 
well as our understanding. 50 No other substantial form, 
then, belongs to man other than the soul. Specifically 
intellectual, the soul nevertheless contains virtually the 
sensitive and nutritive souls as well as all inferior forms; 
and it alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other 
things. In this way, for example, Socrates is said to be 
both animal and man by one and the same soul. 51 
Because the human soul is one and its powers are many, 
St. Thomas argues, and since a number of things that proceed 
50ST I, q. 76, a. 1, resp. (V, 208b): 11 Manifesturn est 
autern quod prirnurn quo corpus vivit, est anirna. Et cum vita 
rnanifestetur secundurn diversas operationes in diversis 
gradivus viventiurn, id quo prirno operamur unumquodque horurn 
operurn vitae, est anirna: anirna enirn est prirnurn quo nutrirnur, 
et sentirnus, et rnovernur secundurn locurn, et sirnilter quo 
prirno intelligirnus. 11 See ibid., q. 77, a. 6, ad 1 (V, 246b) : 
" ... ab uno sirnplici possunt naturaliter rnulta procedere 
ordine quodarn; et iterurn propter diversitatern recipientiurn. 
Sic igitur ab una essentia anirnae procedunt rnultae et 
diversae potentiae, turn propter ordinern potentiarurn, turn 
propter diversitatern organorurn corporaliurn. 11 See also In ll 
de Anirna, 4, nn. 271-278; De Spir. Creat., a. 2. 
51See ST I, q. 76, a. 4, resp. (V, 224a): 11 ••• nulla 
alia forma substantialis est in homirni nisi sola anirna 
intellectiva; et quod ipsa sicut virtute continet anirnarn 
sensitivarn et nutritivarn, ita virtute continet omnes 
inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola quidquid 
irnperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt. Et similiter est 
dicendurn de anirna sensitativa in brutis, et de nutritiva in 
plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus 
respectu irnperfectiorurn. 11 See also ST I, q. 76, a. 3, resp. 
(V, 221b): 11 ••• eadern nurnero est anirna in hornine, sensitiva 
et intellectiva et nutritiva .... Sic igitur anima 
intellectiva continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anirna 
sensitiva brutorurn, et nutritiva plantarurn ... ita nee per 
aliarn anirnarn Socrates est homo, et per aliarn animal, sed per 
unarn et eandern. 11 In speaking of the human soul as virtually 
containing all inferior forms, St. Thomas does not advocate 
the theory of a plurality of substantial forms in man; for 
his refutation of such a theory, see ibid., q. 76, a._ 5, ad 
3; SCG II, 58. 
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from one must proceed in a certain order, there must be some 
order among the various powers of the soul. In this respect, 
he identifies a twofold order of dependence of one power 
upon another: (1) according to the order of nature insofar 
as perfect things are prior to imperfect things; (2) 
according to the order of generation (and time) inasmuch as 
a thing reaches perfection from a prior condition of 
imperfection. In the first case, those powers of the soul 
which come first in the order of perfection and nature are 
the principles of the others after the manner of the end and 
active principle. For example, the senses are for the sake 
of the intellect and not the other way around. Further, the 
senses are a certain imperfect participation of the 
intellect so that, according to natural origin, they proceed 
from the intelligence just as the imperfect proceeds from 
the perfect. Thus, prior to the sensitive powers, the 
intellectual power directs and commands them as their end 
and active principle; similarly, the sensitive powers are 
prior the powers of the nutritive soul. 52 
52 See ST I, q. 77, a. 4, resp. (V, 243b): " ... cum anima 
sit una, potentiae vero plures: ordine autem quodam ab uno 
in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias 
animae ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter eas 
attenditur. Quorum duo considerantur secundum dependentiam 
unius potentiae ab altera: tertius autem accipitur secundum 
ordinem objectorum. Dependentia autem unius potentiae modo 
secundum naturae ordinem, prout perfecta sunt naturaliter 
imperfectis priora; alio modo secundum ordinem generationis 
et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad perfectum venitur." The 
third kind of order mentioned above concerns the ordination 
of certain sensitive powers to one another and has no_ 
bearing on our present discussion. See also ST I, q. 77, a. 
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In the second kind of order (i.e., generation), the 
priority is reversed; here the powers of the nutritive soul 
come before the powers of the sensitive soul insofar as they 
prepare the body for their actions; likewise, the sensitive 
powers are prior with respect to the intellectual powers. 53 
This distinction between the orders of nature and generation 
is also expressed by St. Thomas in terms of what is more 
essential (essentialius) as opposed to what is more 
excellent (dignius) . That which is more essential is prior 
in generation; and that which is more excellent is prior in 
nature. 54 
7, resp.; De Anima, a. 13, ad 7, 8 and 10; In I Sent., d. 3, 
q. 4, aa. 2 and 3; In ii Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 2. 
53See fil I, q. 77, a. 4, resp. (V, 243b) : "Secundum 
igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae 
sunt priores potentiiis sensitivis: unde dirigunt eas, et 
imperant eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine 
sunt priores potentiis animae nutritivae. Secundum vero 
ordinem secundum, e converse se habet. Nam potentiae animae 
nutritivae sunt priores in via generationis, potentiis 
animae sensitivae: unde ad earum actiones praeparant corpus. 
Et similiter est de potentiis sensitivis respectu 
intellectivarum." Cf. fil I, q. 77, a. 7, resp. (V, 247b): 
"Et propter hoc imperfectiores potentiae sunt priores in via 
generationis: prius enim animal generatur quam homo." For a 
more thorough metaphysical discussion of these two orders, 
see In Lib. de Causis, lect. 1; In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 
2; ST I, q. 77, a. 6. 
54For example, man's state of nature is more essential 
to him than the state of grace; yet the state of grace is 
more noble than the state of nature. See Suppl., q. 49, a. 
3, resp. (XII, 94a) : " ... aliquid dicitur in re aliqua 
principalius altero duorum modorum: aut quia altere 
essentialius; aut quia dignius. Si quia dignius, sic omnibus 
modis sacramentum est principalius inter tria bona conjugii. 
Quia pertinet ad matrimonium inquantum est sacramentum 
gratiae. Alia vero duo pertinent ad ipsum inquantum est 
quoddam naturae officium: perfectio autem gratiae est 
It is in view of the hylemorphic constitution of man 
and the ordination of his natural powers that natural 
appetency in man must be understood. Man is truly a 
substantial unity comprised of a hierarchy of natural 
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powers; and inasmuch as each power of the soul is in itself 
a certain form or nature, it bears a natural inclination to 
some [determinate operation] . 55 Hence, man's non-cognitive 
powers possess determinate tendencies towards certain 
operations; above these powers man possesses appetitive 
powers which bear determinate tendencies (natural 
inclinations) towards operations according to sense 
cognition; 56 higher still, man possesses an appetitive 
dignior perfectione naturae officium." In this connection, 
see De Veritate, q. 22, a. 5. 
55 See ST I, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 282b): II ••• unaquaeque 
potentia animae est quaedam forma, seu natura, et habet 
naturalem inclinationem in aliquid." Ibid., q. 78, a. 1, ad 
3 (V, 251b): "Unde naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia 
desiderat sibi conveniens." See also In III fuillt:.., d. 27, q. 
1, a. 2; De Veritate, q. 22, a. 3. Accordingly, the eye--by 
its very nature--possesses a determinate tendency (natural 
inclination) towards its proper operation of vision; 
likewise, the intellect possesses a determinate tendency 
(natural inclination) towards its proper operations of 
apprehension, reasoning, judgment, etc; the natural 
inclination of the intellect is not to be confused, however, 
with the will which is an operative power in its own right; 
see De Veritate, q. 22, a. 11, ad 6 (XXII, 640a): "Voluntas 
non directe ab intelligentia procedit, sed ab essentia 
animae, praesupposita intelligentia." ~ Virt. in Comm. (ca. 
1269-72), a. 5, ad 11 (Parma VIII, 556a): " ... ex 
propinquitate voluntatis ad rationem contingit quod voluntas 
secundum ipsam rationem potentiae consonet rationi .... " 
56ST I, q. 78, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 251b): "Sed appetitus 
animalis [qua operation] consequitur formam apprehensam; et 
ad huiusmodi appetitum requiritur specialis animae potentia, 
et non sufficit sola appprehensio." Ibid., q. 80, a. 1, ad 3 
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power--namely, the will (voluntas)--which bears a natural 
inclination towards operation according to intellectual 
cognition. 57 Human nature is thus comprised of many 
different powers with corresponding tendencies 
(inclinations) and operations. But while a lower power 
possesses its own proper action, it is nevertheless subject 
to a higher power; likewise, a lower appetite naturally 
follows the movement of the higher appetite. 58 Accordingly, 
the intellective powers direct and command the sensitive 
powers which, in turn, have dominion over the nutritive 
(V, 282b): " ... supra quern est appetitus animalis consequens 
apprehensionem; quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est 
convenins ad actum huis vel illius potentiae, utpote visio 
ad videndum, et auditio ad audiendum, sed quia est 
conveniens simpliciter animali." 
57De Malo (ca. 1266-67), q. 6, a. 1 (Parma VIII, 310a): 
" ... sicut in rebus naturalibus invenitur forma, quae est 
principium actionis, et inclinatio consequens formam, quae 
dicitur appetitus naturalis, ex quibus sequitur actio; ita 
in homine invenitur forma intellectiva, et inclinatio 
voluntatis consequens f ormam apprehensiam, ex quibus 
sequitur exterior actio." .sJ: I, q. 80, a. 2, resp. (V, 
284a): " ... appetitum intellectivum esse aliam potentiam a 
sensitivo .... Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum 
per intellectum, et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est 
quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo." 
ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3, resp. (VII, 170b): "unde cum anima 
rationalis sit propria forma hominis, naturalis inclinatio 
inest cuilibet homini ad hoc quod agat secundum rationem." 
Note in these latter two cases (sensitive appetite and 
intellectual appetite) that the operations of these powers 
only follow upon the knowledge of some sensible good. See 
notes 36 and 37 above regarding the proper objects of the 
sensitive and intellectual appetites. 
58See ST II-II, q. 158, a. 8, resp. (X, 284b): 
"· .. naturaliter appetitus inferior sequitur motum appetitus 
superioris, nisi aliquid repugnet." 
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powers. 59 Correlatively, the lower inclinations of man are 
naturally subordinate to the higher inclinations. By virtue 
of this ordination of powers, all human inclinations 
naturally reduce to the rational inclination for the 
universal good, which is God. 60 St. Thomas sums up this 
hierarchical ordination of man-qua-composite-creature 
towards his ultimate end as follows: 
First, each and every part exists for the sake of its 
proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly, 
the less noble parts exist for the more noble, as the 
senses for the intellect and the lungs for the heart; 
thirdly, all the parts are for the perfection of the 
whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, 
as it were, matter of the whole; finally, the whole man 
is ordered to an extrinsic end--namely the enjoyment 
of God. 61 
59See ST I, q. 77, a. 4, resp. (V, 243): "Secundum 
igitur primum potentiarum ordinem [i.e., the order of 
excellence or nature] potentiae intellectivae sunt priores 
potentiiis sensitivis, unde dirigunt eas, et imperant eis. 
Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores 
potentiis animae nutritivae." See ST I-II, q. 93, a. 5, ad 2 
(VII, 166b): " ... membra corporis humani moventur ad imperium 
rationis, non tamen participant ratione, quia non habent 
aliquam apprehensionem ordinatam ad rationem." 
60ST I-II, q. 9, a. 6, resp. (VI, 182b): " ... voluntas 
habet ordinem ad universale bonum; unde nihil aliud potest 
esse voluntatis causa, nisi ipse Deus gyi est universale 
bonum." ST I, q. 93, a. 4, resp. (V, 404b): " ... homo habet 
aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum: et 
haec aptitude consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est 
cornrnunis omnibus hominibus." See also note 63 below. 
61See ST I, q. 65, a. 2, resp. (V, 50a): "Si autem 
alicujus totius et partium eius velimus finem assignare, 
inveniemus prime quidem, quod singulae partes sunt propter 
suos actus, sicut oculus ad videndum. Secundo vero, quod 
pars ignobilior est propter nobiliorem; sicut sensus propter 
intellectum, et pulmo propter cor. Tertio vero, ornnes partes 
sunt propter perfectionem totius, sicut et materia propter 
formam: partes enim sunt quai materia totius. Ulterius 
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To the hierarchy of man's powers and inclinations, 
there can be inf erred a corresponding hierarchy of human 
goods (ends): bodily goods are subordinate to the good of, 
say, marriage; in turn, the good of marriage is ordered to 
the knowledge and love of God. In short, man's natural 
inclinations for determinate (finite) goods are ordered to 
his natural inclination for the indeterminate (infinite) 
good--namely, God. By virtue of this hierarchal ordination 
of ends, a unity of human activities is attained. 62 
autem, totus homo est propter aliquem f inem extrinsecum, 
puta ut fruatur Deo." Ibid., q. 103, a. 5, ad 3 (V, 458b): 
" ... creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et 
voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perf ici ab 
intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua 
creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui 
actus, indiget gubernari a Deo." Cf. ibid., q. 49, a. 3; q. 
65, a. 2, resp.; ST I-II, q. 10, a. 1. 
62 See In .I Ethic., lect. 9, n. 106 (Marietti): "Si ergo 
occurrat statim aliquis finis, ad quern ordinentur omnia quae 
operantur omnes artes et operationes humanae, talis finis 
erit operatum bonum simpliciter, idest quod intenditur ex 
omnibus operibus humanis. Si autem ad hoc occurrant plura 
bona ad quae ordinentur diversi fines diversarum artium, 
oportebit quod inquisitio rationis nostrae transcendat ista 
plura, quousque perveniat ad hoc ipsum, idest ad aliud unum. 
Necesse est enim unum esse ultimum finem hominis inquantum 
est homo, propter unitatem humanae naturae." It is in light 
of the double order of priority that the primary and 
secondary precepts of natural law, as explicated In IV 
Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, must be understood. There, primary 
precepts bear upon man's generic nature which is first in 
the order of generation or essence, while secondary precepts 
pertain to man's specific nature which is first in the order 
of nature or dignity. Cf. Key-Text A, notes 23. See note 54 
above. For further discussion on the the hierarchy of 
perfections in nature, see SCG IV, c. 11. For an analysis on 
the composite nature of man and the unity of human actions, 
see George Klubertanz, "The Unity of Human Activity," The 
Modern Schoolman 27 (1950), 75-103. For an application_ of 
the hierarchical ordination of human goods with respect to 
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Further, inasmuch as man's appetitive powers (both sensitive 
and intellectual) bear a natural determination to desiring 
and loving other sensible creatures (human and subhuman) as 
known, the perfection of the human existent is attained 
through actual (physical, sensual, and intellectual) 
communion with those creatures. 
Let us summarize the above discussion on natural 
appetency in the following points: 
1. Every nature (whether the nature of a substance or 
of an operative power) possesses a natural inclination 
(i.e., a determinate tendency) towards a certain operation 
or end. 
2. Natural inclination can be non-cognitive (as in the 
case of chemicals and plants), sensitive (as in the case of 
animals which are inclined by sense appetites to particular 
goods as sensibly apprehended), or intellectual (as in the 
case of man who is inclined by will to the universal good 
according to the knowledge of sensible goods) . 
3. By virtue of his hylemorphic constitution, man 
possesses all three kinds of natural inclinations. Inasmuch 
as the lower inclinations are naturally subordinate to the 
higher inclinations, a corresponding hierarchy of human 
goods is established by which the various activities of the 
marriage, see Bernard Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," 
Theological Studies 4 (1943), 477-510; Paul Quay, 
"Contraception and Conjugal Love," Theological Studies 22 
(1961) I 18-40 • 
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human existent are brought into line towards a unifying 
end--namely, the knowledge and love of God. 
4. Man's appetitive powers (sensitive and intellectual) 
bear a determinate tendency towards the actual desire and 
love of sensible creatures--precisely as known; accordingly, 
the perfection of man's nature requires his actual communion 
with those creatures--as known and loved in the concrete 
world. 63 
Proximate Context 
Let us next take up St. Thomas' treatment of moral 
theology as found in the Prima Secundae of the Summa 
Theologiae--in particular, De Lege (I-II; qq. 90-94); here, 
he considers the essence of law itself (q. 90), the 
63De Veritate, q. 27, a. 2, resp. (XXII-3, 794a): "Homo 
autem secundum naturam suam proportionatus est ad quendam 
finem, cuius habet naturalem appetitum; et secundum 
naturales vires operari potest ad consecutionem illius 
finis; qui finis est aliqua contemplatio divinorum, qualis 
est homini possibilis secundum facultatem naturae." Thus, 
while acknowledging a multiplicity of finite human goods (or 
ends), St. Thomas maintains that all such goods are 
reducible to one ultimate Good; see, for example, SCG III, 
c. 25 (XIV, 66b): "Nam etiam ipsae actiones ludicrae, quae 
videntur absque fine fieri, habent aliquem finem debitum, 
scilicet ut per eas quodammodo mente relevati, magis simus 
postmodum potentes ad studiosas operationes: alias esset 
semper ludendum, si ludus propter se quaeretetur, quod est 
inconveniens .... Est ergo cognitio divina finis ultimus 
omnis humanae congitionis et operationis." See also SCG III, 
c. 37. Such a position stands squarely against the theory of 
incommensurable and irreducible human goods as proposed by 
Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle (see our Introduction, notes 37 
and 38). For a comprehensive exposition of St. Thomas' 
doctrine of natural inclination, see Gustaf Gustaf son, The 
Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas 
(Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press), 1944. 
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different kinds of law (q. 91), the effects of law (q. 92), 
the eternal law (q. 93), and natural law (q. 94). Now, in 
the key-text discussion, "Utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex 
naturalis" (ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2), he presents three 
arguments denying that there is a natural law in man; his 
own response is preceded by this sed contra: 
Concerning Rom. 2, 14, "When the Gentiles, who do not 
have the law, naturally (naturaliter) do those things 
that are of the law," the Gloss comments as follows: 
"Although they have no written law, they do have the 
natural law by which each one knows and is conscious of 
what is good and what is evil. 64 
From this sed contra passage two important points can 
be derived: 
1. According to natural law man knows what is good and 
what is evil. 
2. Further, man is said to do naturally (naturaliter) 
those things that are of this law. 
With respect, then, to the issue of natural law as 
innate, two questions concern us: (1) how is knowledge of 
natural law attained? (2) in what sense do human beings 
naturaliter ea gygg legis sunt faciunt? With these questions 
in mind, we now turn to the key-text. 
64ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2, sed contra (VII, 154a): "Sed 
contra est quod super illud [Rom. 2, 14], 'Cum gentes, quae 
legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt,' 
dicit Glossa: Etsi non habent legem scriptam, habent tamen 
legem naturalem, qua quilibet intelligit, et sibi conscius 
est quid sit bonum et quid malum.'" 
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II. Key-Text B 
Summa Theologiae q. 91, a. 2, resp.: "Utrum sit in nobis 
aliqua lex naturalis." 
In his response to whether there is in us a natural 
law, St. Thomas asserts that man participates in the eternal 
law; this participation in the eternal law is none other 
than natural law: 
[l] As was said above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 1), law, since 
it is a rule and measure, can be in something in 
two ways: in one way, as in the one regulating and 
measuring; in another way, as in that which is 
regulated and measured, since, inasmuch as it 
participates in something of the rule or measure, 
it is thus regulated and measured. Hence, since 
everything that is subject to divine providence is 
regulated and measured by eternal law, as is clear 
from what has been said (a. 1), it is evident that 
everything participates in some manner in the 
eternal law, inasmuch as, from the impression of 
eternal law, it has an inclination to its own 
proper acts and ends. 
Sicut supra dictum est (q. 90, a. 1, ad 1), lex, 
cum sit regula et mensura, dupliciter potest esse 
in aliquo: uno modo sicut in regulante et 
mensurante; alio modo sicut in regulato et 
mensurato, quia inquantum participat aliquid de 
regula vel mensura, sic regulatur vel mensuratur. 
Unde cum omnia quae divinae providentiae 
subduntur, a lege aeterna regulentur et 
mensurentur, ut ex dictis (a. 1) patet; manifestum 
est quod omnia participant aliqualiter legem 
aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione eius 
habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. 
[2] Among all others, the rational creature is subject 
to divine providence in a more excellent way, 
inasmuch as it participates in providence by 
providing for itself and others. Hence, it 
participates in the eternal reason through which 
it has a natural inclination to its due act and 
end; and this sort of participation in the eternal 
law in the rational creature is called the natural 
law. 
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Inter caetera autem, rationalis creatura 
excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae 
subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae 
particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et 
in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet 
naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. 
Et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali 
creatura lex naturalis dicitur. 
[3] Hence, after the Psalmist had said (Ps. 4, 6), 
'Offer up a sacrifice of justice,' he adds, as 
though someone had asked what the works of justice 
are, 'Many say, Who shows us good things?' He 
answers this question by saying, 'The light of 
your countenance, Lord, is signed upon us,' as 
though the light of natural reason, by which we 
discern what is good and what is evil--which 
pertains to the natural law--is nothing other than 
an impression in us of the divine light. And 
from this it is evident that the natural law is 
nothing other than a participation in the eternal 
law in the rational creature." 
Unde cum Psalmista dixisset (Ps. 4, 6), 
'Sacrificate sacrificium iustitiae,' quasi 
quibusdam quaerentibus quae sunt iustitiae opera, 
subiungit: 'Multi dicunt, Quis ostendit nobis 
bona?' cui quaestioni respondens, dicit: 'Signatum 
est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine:' quasi 
lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit 
bonum et quid malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem 
legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio luminis 
divini in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis 
nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae 
in rationali creatura." 
III. Commentary 
Movement of Thought 
Let us summarize St. Thomas' movement of thought in the 
following points: 
1. There is a distinction between (a) law in the one 
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regulating and measuring--namely, the lawgiver65 --and (b) 
law in the one regulated and measured. 
2. That which participates in something of the law is 
said to be regulated and measured by the law. 66 
3. Every creature subject to divine providence is 
governed by eternal law; hence, every creature participates 
in some manner in the eternal law inasmuch as, from an 
impression of eternal law, it has an inclination to its own 
proper acts and ends (see [1] above) . 
4. The rational creature participates in eternal law 
not simply through natural inclination, but in a more 
excellent manner--namely, by discerning what is good and 
evil, and governing himself and others according to the 
light of natural reason; this light is an impression in us 
of the divine light. 
5. This (twofold) participation in eternal law by the 
rational creature is called natural law. 67 
65ST I-II, q. 97, a. 3, resp. (VII, 19la): "Omnis lex 
profiscitur a ratione et voluntate legislatoris." See also 
note 57 below. 
66See [1] and [2] above. The two above points are 
summed up in ST I-II, q. 91, a. 6, resp. (VII, 157b): 
"· .. lex essentialiter invenitur in regulante et mensurante, 
participative autem in eo quod mensuratur et regulatur." 
Ibid., q. 92, a. 1, resp. (VII, 159a): "· .. lex nihil aliud 
est quam dictamen rationis in praesidente quo subditi 
gubernantur." 
67See [3] above. This twofold participation in Eternal 
Law by man is similarly expressed in the discussion, Utrum 
omnes res humanae subiiciantur legi aeternae, ST I-II, q. 
93, a. 6, resp. (VII, 166b) : " ... duplex est modus quo. 
aliquid subditur legi aeternae, ut ex supra dictis patet 
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Natural Law as Human Nature 
What, then, can be said of St. Thomas' doctrine of 
natural law as stated in the key-text? Note first that he 
identifies natural law here with (1) human nature and its 
operative powers (i.e., the light of natural reason and the 
will--both of which possess natural appetites) and (2) the 
operations of those natural powers respectively (i.e., 
[Ibid., a. 5): uno modo, inquantum participatur lex aeternae 
per modum cognitionis; alio modo, per modum actionis et 
passionis, inquantum participatur per modum interioris 
principii motivi. Et hoc secundo modo subduntur legi 
aeternae irrationales creaturae, ut dictum est [ibid] . Sed 
quia rationalis natura cum eo quod est commune omnibus 
creaturis, habet aliquid sibi proprium inquantum est 
rationalis, ideo secundum utrumque modum legi aeternae 
subditur: quia et notionem legis aeternae aliquo modo habet, 
ut supra dictum est [Ibid., a. 2); et iterum unicuique 
rationali creaturae inest naturalis inclinatio ad id quod 
est consonum legi aeternae; 'sumus enim innati ad habendum 
virtutes,' ut dicitur in Ethic. [II, 1 (1103a25)] ." 
The distinction between reason and inclination 
according to (1) that which measures and rules and (2) that 
which is measured and ruled is more forcefully stated in ST 
I-II, q. 90, a. 1, ad 1 (VII, 149b): " ... cum lex sit regula 
quaedam et mensura, dicitur duplicitur esse in aliquo. Uno 
modo sicut in mensurante et regulante. Et quia hoc est 
proprium rationis, ideo per hunc modum lex est in ratione 
sola. Alio modo sicut in regulate et mensurato. Et sic lex 
est in omnibus quae inclinatur in aliquid ex aliqua lege: 
ita quod quaelibet inclinatio proveniens ex aliqua lege, 
potest dici lex non essentialiter, sed quasi participative." 
Although participation in eternal law through natural 
inclination is per modum obedientiae (see SJ: I-II, q. 93, a. 
5, ad 2 (VII, 166b), such participation is nevertheless both 
active as well as passive ("per modum actionis et passionis, 
inquantum participatur per modum interioris principii 
motivi"). On the active-passive distinction between natural 
reason and natural inclination, see D. O'Donoghue, "The 
Thomist Concept of Natural Law, 92-95; Joseph Collins, 
"Aquinas and Law: Law a Function of Reason," Irish 
Theological Quarterly 18 (1951), 220-37. 
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discernment, desire, and providence) . 68 The identification 
of natural law with human nature and its operative powers 
corresponds with the previously cited contextual statements-
-i.e.: natural law is implanted in man as part of his nature 
{"quasi pertinens ad naturam humanam"); through the capacity 
of human nature ("capacitas humanae naturae"), man 
participates in eternal law {see notes 40 and 41 above) . In 
those passages, as well as in the passages on divine 
providence {see notes 37 and 38 above), the term impressio 
refers to the very nature of the human creature as given to 
him by God. This identification of natural law with a power 
proper to human nature is stated again in the prologue to In 
Duo Praecepta Caritatis et in Decem Legis Praecepta {ca. 
1273) : 
[The natural law] is nothing other than the 
intellectual light implanted in us by God, whereby we 
understand what must be done and what must be avoided. 
God gave this light and this law to man at creation. 69 
Inasmuch as natural law here is identified as the lumen 
68Admittedly, St. Thomas does not here explicitly 
identify the will and its corresponding natural inclination; 
nor does he presently distinguish the will as an operative 
power from its respective operation--namely, desire or love: 
69See In Duo Praecepta Caritatis ~ in Decem Legis 
Praecepta; Prologus: (Parma XVI, 97a): "[Lex naturae] nihil 
aliud est nisi lumen intellectus insitum nobis a Deo, per 
quod cognoscimus quid agendum et quid vitandum. Hoc lumen et 
hanc legem dedit Deus homini in creatione." See ST I, q. 88, 
a. 3, ad 1 {V, 386b), where St. Thomas identifies the light 
of natural reason as "nihil aliud est quam quaedam ifi1pressio 
veritatis primae." Cf. ibid., q. 12, a. 2, resp. 
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intellectus, it is equated primarily with the natural 
constitution of man qua intellectual--and secondarily with 
natural law knowledge and his intellectual operations which 
necessarily involve the sensible world as the extramental 
and content-determining-cause of human cognition. 70 Natural 
law, as equated with human nature itself, is tantamount to 
man's natural capacity or aptitude for attaining his proper 
end. This natural capacity is ultimately ordered to God 
Himself: 
Since man is said to be to the image of God by reason 
of his intellectual nature, he is most to the image 
of God according to that in which he can most imitate 
God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual 
nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God 
understands and love Himself. Therefore, the image of 
70ST II-II, q. 8, a. 1, resp. (VIII, 66b): " ... cum 
cognitio hominis a sensu incipiat quasi ab exteriori." It is 
evidently with respect to the very nature of the human 
person that St. Thomas speaks of natural law as habitually 
present in a child; see ST I-II, q. 94, a. 1, ad contra 
(VII, 168b): " ... puer non potest uti habitu intellectus 
principiorum, vel etiam lege naturali, quae ei habitualiter 
inest propter defectum aetatis." Actual knowledge of natural 
law, however, must be attained through sensible experience 
and reasoning. On this, see Key-Text A, notes 34 and 36; De 
Veritate q. 11, a. 1, ad 12; ibid., aa. 2 and 3. Hence, if 
the above statement concerning a child indicates that 
natural law is in some sense inborn in a human being 
according to the capacity and aptitude of human nature (see 
notes 41 above and 71 below) , the same statement also makes 
it clear that natural law knowledge, for St. Thomas, does 
not consist in innate or a priori ideas. Indeed, many years 
of sensible experience are required before a child attains a 
certain level of reasoning and actually formulates the first 
principles of natural law as ~ se nota. On this, see 
Lawrence Dewan, "St. Thomas, Ideas, and Immediate 
Knowledge," Dialogue 18 (1979), 392-404; Maria Theresa Carl, 
"The First Principles of Natural Law: A Study of the Moral 
Theories of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas, " Ph ._D. 
diss., Marquette University, 1989. 
God may be considered in man ... inasmuch as man 
possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and 
loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very 
nature of the mind, which is common to all men. 71 
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The point we wish to stress from the above statement is 
that natural law is proximately rooted in man's God-given 
nature precisely as a capacity or an aptitude for his end. 
Note in this case, however, that the term nature is not 
taken by St. Thomas merely as a quiddity or static essence 
according to which man is what he is; primarily and 
properly, nature for St. Thomas means substance (constituted 
of form and matter) : as such, it is the intrinsic principle 
of movement, whether such movement be actual or 
71ST I, q. 93, a. 4, resp. (V, 404b): " ... cum homo 
secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse 
dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei secundum 
quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. 
Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad 
hoc, quod Deus seipsam intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei 
tripliciter potest considerari in homini: uno quidem modo, 
secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad 
intelligendum et amandum Deum: et haec aptitude consistit in 
ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus; 
alio modo, secundum quod homo ~ vel habitu Deum cognoscit 
et ~, sed tamen imperfecte; et haec est imago per 
conformitatem gratiae; tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum 
actu cognoscit et amat perfecte; et sic attenditur imago 
secundum similitudinem gloriae." See also the Prologue of ST 
I-II; ST I, q. 93, a. 8, resp. (V, 4lla): "Et sic imago Dei 
attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est ferri 
in Deum." On this, see In .I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, sol.; 
q. 3, a. 1, ad 3; In II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3. 
Hence, contrary to the opinions of Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle 
(see our Introduction, notes 46-48), natural law for St. 
Thomas does indeed direct man towards his ultimate and 
supernatural end. 
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potential. 72 Nor is nature for St. Thomas only the power to 
act as an agent; it is also the capacity to receive the 
action of another agent. 73 Having said this, three related 
points must be stressed: (1) inasmuch as it is a capacity or 
aptitude, human nature requires further actuation for its 
perfection; 74 (2) while God is the ultimate end of man, 
knowledge of God can only be attained through the knowledge 
12 In Y. Meta. (ca. 1269-72), lect. 5, n. 819 (Marietti, 
224) : 11 Quia vero motus rerum naturalium magis causatur ex 
forma ... ipsa forma dicitur natura." Ibid., n. 826 (Marietti, 
268): 11 ••• 'primo et proprie natura dicitur substantia,' 
idest f orma rerum habentium in se principium motus inquantum 
huiusmodi .... Forma est principium motus rerum existentium 
secundum natura, aut in actu, aut in potentia." fil I, q. 39, 
a. 2, ad 3 (I_V, 399a): 11 ••• natura designat principium 
actus .... " ST III, q. 75, a. 4, resp. (XII, 168a) : "Et ideo 
cujuslibet agentis creati actio fertur super aliquem 
determinatum actum. Determinatio autem cujuslibet rei in 
esse actuali est per ejus formam." Cf. SCG III, c. 122, 
where St. Thomas characterizes the sin of murder as the 
destruction of a human nature already in actual existence. 
Nature, as understood in these passages, is not taken in 
such a way as to include accidental perfections in this or 
that actual nature; nevertheless, such perfections are 
implied in the notion of nature, inasmuch as a nature 
possesses a capacity for such perfections. 
73 In II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (Parma VI, 
720a) : "Et sic natura dicitur esse quod agere vel pati 
potest." Regarding nature as both an active and passive 
potency, see ST I-II, q. 93, a. 6, resp., as cited in note 
35 above. For further discussion of St. Thomas' notion of 
nature as a principle of action and finality, see James 
Weisheipl, "The Concept of Nature," The New Scholasticism 28 
(1954), 377-408; Geoge Klubertanz, "St. Thomas' Treatment of 
the Axiom, 'Orone Agens Agit Propter Finem," 107-17; Russell 
Collins, "Finality and Being, 36-46. 
740n this point, see ST I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1, where St. 
Thomas distinguishes between the first act (primum actum) 
and the complete act (ultimum actum) or perfection of a 
creature's substantial existence. See ST I, q. SO, a·. 2, ad 
3; De Veritate, q. 21, a. 5, resp. 
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of creatures (see note 23 above}; (3) man is also a social 
animal who is ordered by his nature to live in communion 
with other human persons in the sensible world. 75 Hence, 
inasmuch as a human person must, by the necessity of his 
nature (qua rational and animal}, attain his perfection 
through actual involvement with other sensible existents, so 
natural law pertains to (1) human nature (qua active 
potency} as oriented towards its proper end (perfection}, 
and (2) the natural operations of knowing and willing vis-a-
vis other (human and subhuman} existents in the sensible 
world. Let us take a closer look, then, at these natural 
operations through which man exists in actual relation with 
other creatures in order to understand in what way St. 
Thomas considers natural law to be (or not to be} innate. 
75SCG III, c. 85 (XIV, 255b} : " ... homo naturaliter est 
animal politicum vel sociale." Ibid., c. 129 (XIV, 394a}: 
"Est autem homini naturale quod sit animal sociale .... Ea 
igitur sine quibus societas humana conservari non potest, 
sunt homini naturaliter convenientia. Huiusmodi autem sunt, 
unicuique quod suum est conservare, et ab iniuriis 
abstinere." Note here that man is not an intellectual 
creature simply, but a rational animal: "homo naturaliter 
est animal." See also ST II-II, q. 109, a. 3, ad 1; q. 114, 
a. 2, ad 1. In this connection, see notes 97-99 below. As a 
corporeal creature, then, man must attain his perfection 
through active engagement with other material creatures in 
the physical world. Hence, for St. Thomas, the natural order 
and the physical sciences constitute part of the fabric of 
man's moral life; see note 86 below; see also Odon Lottin, 
"Les premiers exposes scolastiques sur la loi eternelle," 
Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses XIV (1937), 298-301. 
Contrast St. Thomas' view of natural law with that of A. P. 
d'Entreves: "The notion of natural law which [Entreves] 
discusses is a notion which refers to human behavior, not to 
physical phenomena. Our concern is with ethics and politics, 
not with the natural sciences." Natural Law: An Historical 
Survey (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 7. 
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Natural Law ~ Cognitio 
What can be said of natural law per modem cognitionis 
{see note 58 above)? In ST I-II, q. 63, a. 1, resp., St. 
Thomas tells us that in man's reason there are to be found 
naturally present {naturaliter insunt) certain naturally 
known {naturaliter cognita) principles of both knowledge and 
{moral) action. 76 However, inasmuch as a natural law 
principle is a cognitio, it is based upon knowledge of the 
good as rooted in the apprehension of being {ens) ; 77 in 
turn, man's knowledge of being is derived from the 
consideration of material existents ("ens et verum 
consideratum in rebus materialibus"), from which he acquires 
knowledge of all other things ("et quibus in cognitionem 
76fil I-II, q. 63, a. 1, resp. {VI, 372b): " ... in 
ratione hominis insunt naturaliter quaedam principia 
naturaliter cognita tam scibilium quam agendorum, quae sunt 
quaedam seminalia intellectualium virtutum et moralium." 
77See ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp. {VII, 170a): 11 Sicut 
autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione 
simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in 
apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus: 
omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni. 
Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod 
fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est, 'Bonum est quod 
omnia appetunt.' Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod 
'bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum.' Et 
super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae: ut 
scilicet omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad 
praecepta legis naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter 
apprehendit esse bona humana." In this connection, see ST I, 
q. 5, a. 1, resp. {IV, 56a): " ... bonum et ens sunt idem 
secundum rem: sed bonum dicit rationem appetibilis .... " 
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omnium aliorum devenit") . 78 Hence, in speaking of natural 
law principles as naturally present (naturaliter insunt) in 
man, St. Thomas does not mean that man has innate or a 
priori knowledge of such principles; rather, inasmuch as all 
knowledge has its origin in the apprehension of material 
existents (as content-determining-causes, plus the cognitive 
faculties as efficient causes), it follows g fortiori that 
knowledge of natural law principles must properly be 
considered an acquired knowledge. 
What, then, does St. Thomas mean when he says that 
natural law principles are naturaliter cognita? In a related 
discussion, nutrum aliquis habitus sit a natura" (ST I-II, 
q. 51, a. 1), he tells us that something may be called 
78See note 8 above; ST I, q. 87, a. 3, ad 1 (V, 361b): 
" ... obiectum intellectus est commune quodddam, scilicet ens 
et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus 
intelligendi. Unde intellectus potest suum actum 
intelligere. Sed non primo: quia nee primum obiectum 
intellectus nostri secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet 
ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus 
materialibus [Ibid., q. 84, a. 7]; ~ gµibus in cognitionem 
omnium aliorum devenit." Since the notion of good is founded 
on the notion of being--as derived from the apprehension of 
sensible existents--there is no epistemological chasm for 
St. Thomas between practical reason, speculative reason, and 
the concrete world of existing natures. See ST I, q. 79, a. 
11, ad 2 (V, 279b): " ... obiectum intellectus practici est 
bonum ordinabile ad opus sub ratione veri. Intellectus enim 
practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut speculativus; sed 
veritatem cognitam ordinat gg opus." Ibid., sed contra (V, 
278a): " ... intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit 
practicus. Una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam. Ergo 
intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversae 
potentiae." On the organic unity between practical reason 
and speculative reason--as rooted in the reality of existing 
beings--see John Hartnett, "Truth, the Aid, Not the Obstacle 
to Virtue," Franciscan Studies 18 (1958), 9-35; G. 
Klubertanz, "The Unity of Human Activity," 75-103. 
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natural in two ways: first, because it is entirely from the 
nature [of an existent]; secondly, because it is partly from 
the [intrinsic] nature, and partly from an extrinsic 
principle. 79 He then applies this twofold distinction of 
the "natural" with respect to natural habitus in man: 
There are, therefore, in man certain natural habitus, 
owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to 
some extrinsic principle: in one way, indeed, in the 
apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive 
powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a 
natural habitus by way of a beginning, both in respect 
of the specific nature, and in respect of the 
individual nature. This happens with regard to the 
specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus, 
the understanding of first principles (intellectus 
principiorum) is called a natural habitus. For it is 
owing to the ~ nature Qf the intellectual soul that 
man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a 
part, should at once perceive that every whole is 
larger than its part; and in like manner with regard to 
other such principles. Yet, what is a whole and what is 
a part, this he cannot known except through the 
intelligible species which he has received from 
phantasms; and for this reason, the Philosopher at the 
end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of 
principles comes .t..Q us from the senses. "80 
79ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (VI, 325a): " ... potest 
dici aliquid naturale dupliciter: uno modo, quia totum est a 
natura; alio modo, quia secundum aliquid est a natura, et 
secundum aliquid est ab exteriori principio. Sicut cum 
aliquis sanatur per seipsum, tota sanitas est a natura: cum 
autem aliquis sanatur auxilio medicinae, sanitas partim est 
a natura, partim ab exteriori principio." 
80 Ibid. I (VI I 325b) : II Sunt ergo in hominibus aliqui 
habitus naturales, tanquam partim a naturae existentes, et 
partim ab exteriori principio; aliter quidem in 
apprehensivis potentiis, et aliter in appetitivis. In 
apprehensivis enim potentiis potest esse habitus naturalis 
secundum inchoationem, e~ secundum naturam speciei et 
secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, 
ex parte ipsius animae: sicut intellectus principiorum 
dicitur esse habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim natura animae 
intellectualis convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est 
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Since the knowledge of first principles comes to us 
from the apprehension of sensible existents, the intellectus 
principiorum is not said to be a habitus entirely from 
nature; for man is unlike the angels who have intelligible 
species naturally implanted in them ("habent species 
intelligibiles naturaliter inditas") . 81 Hence, St. Thomas 
totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius 
sua parte; et simile est in caeteris. Sed quid sit totum et 
quid sit pars, cognoscere non potest nisi per species 
intelligibiles s phantasmatibus acceptas. Et propter hoc 
Philosophus, in fine Posteriorum [II, 15 (100a3)], ostendit 
quod cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu." In this 
connection, see note 33 above; De Veritate, q. 16, a. 1, 
resp. In ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (as cited above), St. 
Thomas distinguishes man's specific nature as the 
intellectual soul itself--precisely as intellectual 
(including the powers of intellect and will)--as opposed to 
his individual nature which is identified with his sensitive 
(animal) powers; on this, see note 38 above. Regarding the 
content of knowledge as determined by intelligible species 
(id guo intelligit intellectus), see notes 12-18 and 24 
above. For further explanation of the intellectual habitus, 
see Vernon Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic 
Metaphysics of Potency and Act," in Essays in Thomism, ed. 
Robert E. Brennan (Freeport, N. Y.: Books For Libraries 
Press, 1972), 103-109; "Intellectual Memory in the Thomistic 
Theory of Knowledge," Modern Schoolman 18 (1941), 21-24; 
Joseph Romero, "Between Being and Nothingness: The Relevancy 
of Thomistic Habit," The Thomist 44 (1980), 427-40; Richard 
Lambert, "Habitual Knowledge of the Soul in Thomas Aquinas," 
The Modern Schoolman 60 (1982), 1-19. 
81 ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (VI, 325b): "Sed tamen 
neutro modo [i.e., neither with respect to man's specific 
nature nor according to his individual nature] contingit in 
hominibus esse habitus naturales, ita quod sint totaliter a 
natura. In angelis siquidem contingit, eo quod habent 
species intelligibiles naturaliter inditas: ~ non 
competit humanae naturae .... " Inasmuch as intelligible 
species are naturally implanted (naturaliter inditas) in 
angels, angelic knowledge is acgµired from an extrinsic 
cause--namely, from God, and not from creatures. See ST I, 
q. 55, a. 2, resp. (V, 56a) : " ... ideo suam perfectio;nem 
intelligibilem consequuntur per intelligibilem ef f luxum, quo 
a Deo species rerum cognitarum acceperunt simul cum 
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maintains that the agent intellect is not a habitus of 
indemonstrable principles; rather, we come to know such 
principles by abstraction from singular things. 82 And even 
when he speaks of the intellectual light as "a participated 
likeness of the uncreated light in which are contained the 
eternal reasons," he explains that these eternal reasons are 
known in the intellectual light just as we might say that we 
see in the sun what we see }2y the sun. 83 Accordingly, the 
intellectuali natura." Ibid., ad 1 (V, 56a): " ... in mente 
angeli sunt similitudines creaturarum, non quidem ab ipsis 
creaturis acceptae, sed a Deo, qui est creaturarum cause, et 
in quo prime similitudines rerum existunt." By virtue of his 
composite nature, man, however, must (naturally) acquire 
intelligible species, not directly from God, but rather from 
sensible creatures. See ibid., resp. (V, 56a): 
" ... inferiores substantiae intellectivae, scilicet animae 
humanae, habent potentiam intellectivam non completam 
naturaliter; sed completur in eis successive, per hoc quod 
accipiunt species intelligibiles a rebus." See also ibid, q. 
51, a. 1; q. 54, a. l; q. 84, a. 3; q. 85, a. l; De 
Veritate, q. 8, a. 1. In this connection, see notes 7 and 33 
above and our Recapitulation section below. 
82JL... Q_,_ d.§. Anima (ca. 1269-70), a. 5, resp. (Parma 
VIII, 480a): "Quidam vero crediderunt, intellectum agentem 
non esse aliud quam habitum principiorum indemonstrabilium 
in nobis. Sed hoc esse non potest, guia etiam ipsa principia 
indemonstrabilia cognoscimus abstrahendo g singularibus, ut 
docet Philosophus in 1 Poster." 
83ST I, q. 84, a. 5, resp. (V, 322a-b): "Cum ergo 
quaeritur utrum anima humana in rationibus aeternis omnia 
cognoscat, dicundum est quod aliquid in aliquo dicitur 
cognosci dupliciter. Uno mode, sicut in obiecto cognito; 
sicut aliquis videt in speculo ea quorum imagines in speculo 
resultant. Et hoc mode anima in statu praesentis vitae, non 
potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis ... Alic mode 
dicitur aliquid cognosci in aliquo sicut in cognitionis 
principio; sicut si dicamus quod in sole videntur ea quae 
videntur per solem. Et sic necesse est dicere quod anima 
humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum 
participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen 
intellectuale, quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam 
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light of our intellect is not the object it understands, but 
the medium whereby it understands. 84 
guaedam participata similitudo luminis increati, in ID!.Q 
continentur rationes aeternae." Ibid., q. 88, a. 3, ad 1 (V, 
368b} : "Unde cum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri non se 
habeat ad intellectum nostrum sicut quod intelligitur, sed 
sicut ID!.Q intelligitur .... " Concerning the light of natural 
reason described as a similitudo increatae veritatis, see De 
Veritate, q. 10, a. 8, resp.; a. 11, ad 12; q. 11, a. 1, 
resp.; ST I, q. 87, a. 1, resp.; ,S'.r I-II, q. 19, a. 5, ad 3; 
q. 93, a. 2, resp.; q. 109, a. 1, resp. and ad 2. Cf. note 
60 above. See also In i Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, sol. (Parma 
VI, 43a}: "Alio tamen modo, [intellectus or intuitum] 
secundum Philosophos, intellegitur quod anima semper se 
intelligit, eo quod omne quod intelligitur, non intelligitur 
nisi illustratum lumine intellectus agentis, et receptum in 
intellectu possibili. Unde sicut in omni colore videtur 
lumen corporale, ita in omni intelligibili videtur lumen 
intellectus agentis; non tamem in ratione objecti sed in 
ratione medii cognoscendi." 
84ST I, q. 88, a. 3, ad 1 (V, 386b}: " ... ipsum lumen 
intellectus nostri non se habeat ad intellectum nostrum 
sicut quod intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligitur." Such a 
doctrine of knowledge stands opposed to that professed by 
Karl Rahner who denies that cognitional determination comes 
originally from sense perception. Even in his rendering of 
Thomistic epistemology, he states that "the formal structure 
of [sense] judgrnent--and with more reason the structure and 
the content of universal judgments and especially of 
metaphysical judgrnents--cannot be grounded in the evidence 
of sense perception." See "Aquinas: The Nature of Truth," 
Continuum 2 (1964), 65. Presumably, for Rahner, St. Thomas 
teaches that there is an a priori determination as provided 
by the light of the agent intellect itself: "St. Thomas does 
not see such a principle, in the line of Plato, Plotinus, 
Augustine, Bonaventure, Malebranche, in an objective g 
priori ... but in the line of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, he 
sees it in a formal g priori of the spontaneous spirit 
itself .... Its basis, speaking in the manner of St. Thomas; 
is the light of the intelligence itself, which informs, 
objectifies, conceptualizes, and judges the data from sense 
cognition." (Ibid., 65) "This light is the g priori form 
under which the spontaneity of the spirit perceives the 
material sensible." (Ibid., 67) For a similar interpretation 
of a priori determination in Aquinas, see Victor Preller, 
Divine Science and the Science of God: A Reformulation of 
Thomas Aquinas (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1967). For a critique of Preller's interpretation of 
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Thus, when St. Thomas states that the first principles 
of practical reason are naturally present (naturaliter 
insunt} to reason and naturally known (naturaliter cognita}, 
he means that (1) such principles are derived from both (a} 
extrinsic content-determining-causes of knowledge (namely, 
sensible existents} and (b} intrinsic efficient causes 
(primarily the light of natural reason} by virtue of which 
(2) we can recognize causal relationships in the sensible 
world, understand the meaning of an end, the ordination of 
actions to an end, 85 and, accordingly, discern what is good 
and what is evil ("quo discernimus quid sit bonum et quid 
malum"} . 86 The attainment of man's end according to 
St. Thomas, see Leo Sweeney, Christian Philosophy, 537-60. 
850n this, see section [3] above; see also Key-Text A, 
section [3], notes 10, 30-31, 46, 67-69. See note 71 above 
with respect to the natural capacity and aptitude of the 
human mind as imago Dei to come to know and love God as 
final End and Beatitude. See ST I-II, q. 6, a. 2, resp. (VI, 
57b} : "Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum 
apprehenditur res quae est finis, sed etiam cognoscitur 
ratio finis, et proportio eius quod ordinatur ad finem 
ipsum. Et talis cognitio finis competit soli rationali 
naturae." De Veritate, q. 22, a, 2, resp. (XXII-3, 617a}: 
"Unde sola rationalis natura potest secundarios fines in 
ipsum Deum per quamdam viam resolutionis inducere, ut sic 
ipsum Deum explicite appetat. Et sicut in demonstrativis 
scientiis non recte sumitur conclusio nisi per resolutionem 
in prima principia; ita appetitus creaturae rationalis non 
est rectus nisi per appetitum explicite ipsius Dei, actu vel 
habitu." 
86With regard to the discernment of good and evil, see 
ST I-II, q. 18, a. 5, resp. (VI, 131b}: "In actibus autem 
bonum et malum dicitur per comparationem ad rationem: quia, 
ut Dionysius dicit [De Div. Norn., IV, 32 (PG 3, 732], 'bonum 
hominis est secundum rationem esse, malum autem quod est 
praeter rationem.' Unicuique enim rei est bonum quod · 
convenit ei secundum suam formam; et malum quod est ei 
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knowledge which, in turn, depends upon both intrinsic 
(efficient} and extrinsic (content-determining} causes, is 
summarized in the Compendium Theologiae, c. 104 ("Quis sit 
finis intellectualis creaturae"}: 
Our intellect has a natural potency with regard to 
certain intelligible objects--namely, those that can be 
reduced to act by the agent intellect. We possess this 
faculty as an innate principle that enables us to 
understand in actuality. However, we cannot attain our 
ultimate end by the actuation of our intellect through 
the instrumentality of the agent intellect [alone] . For 
the function of the agent intellect consists in 
rendering actually intelligible the phantasms that of 
themselves are only potentially intelligible. These 
phantasms are derived from the senses. Hence, the 
efficacy of the agent intellect in reducing our 
intellect to act is restricted to intelligible objects 
of which we can gain knowledge by way of sense 
perception. 87 
praeter ordinem suae formae. Patet ergo quod differentia 
boni et mali circa obiectum considerata, comparatur per se 
ad rationem: scilicet secundum quod obiectum est ei 
conveniens vel non conveniens. Dicuntur autem aliqui actus 
humani, vel morales, secundum quod sunt a ratione. Unde 
manifestum est quod bonum et malum diversificant speciem in 
actibus moralibus: differentiae enim per se diversificant 
speciem." In II Ethic., lect. 2, n. 257 (Marietti, 74} 
"Cuius ratio est, quia bonum cuiuslibet rei est in hoc quod 
sua operatic sit conveniens suae formae. Propria autem forma 
hominis est secundum quam est animal rationale. Unde oportet 
quod operatic hominis sit bona ex hoc quod est secundum 
rationem rectam. Perversitas enim rationis repugnat naturae 
rationis." In this connection, Fr. Rousselot states that 
"intelligence, being the faculty of the real, refuses to 
acknowledge a moral order that would have no affinities with 
the order of being; on last analysis, it must refuse to 
differentiate between judgments of value and judgments of 
reality." The Intellectualism of St. Thomas, tr. James 
O'Mahony (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1953}, 9. See also notes 
75 above and 95, 99, and 129 below. 
87Compendium Theologiae (ca. 1269-73; the precise date 
is uncertain} c. 104 (Parma XVI, 27b}: "Est enim intellectus 
noster in potentia naturali respectu quorumdam 
intelligibilium, quae scilicet reduci possunt in actum per 
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More remains to be said regarding natural law 
knowledge; but first we must look at natural law with 
respect to the natural operation of the appetitive power. 
Natural Law gyg Naturalis Inclinatio 
Further in the same discussion on natural habitus (ST 
I-II, q. 51, a. l; see notes 79-81 above), St. Thomas 
considers the habitus proper to the appetitive powers: 
In the appetitive powers, however, no habitus is 
natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul 
itself, as to the substance of the habit; but only as 
to certain of its principles, as, for instance, the 
principles of common law (principia iuris communis) are 
called the seeds of virtues (seminalia virtutum) . The 
reason for this is that the inclination to its 
proper objects, which seems to be the beginning 
(inchoatio) of a habitus, does not belong to the 
habitus, but rather to the very nature of the 
[appetitive] powers. 88 
intellectum agentem, qui est principium innatum nobis, ut 
per ipsum efficiamur intelligentes in actu. Est autem 
impossibile nos ultimum finem consequi per hoc quod 
intellectus nester sic reducatur in actum: nam virtus 
intellectus agentis est ut phantasmata, quae sunt 
intelligibilia in potentia, faciat intelligibilia in actu, 
ut ex superioribus patet. Phantasmata autem sunt accepta per 
sensum. Per intellectum igitur agentem intellectus nester in 
actum reducitur respectu horum intelligibiliurn tantum in 
quorum notitiam per sensibilia possumus devenire." In this 
connection, see notes 13, 16 and 17 above. 
88ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (VI, 326b): "In 
appetitivis autem potentiis non est aliquis habitus 
naturalis secundurn inchoationem, ex parte ipsius animae, 
quantum ad ipsam substantiam habitus: sed solum quantum ad 
principia quaedarn ipsius, sicut principia iuris communis 
dicuntur esse seminalia virtutum. Et hoc ideo, quia 
inclinatio ad obiecta propria, quae videtur esse inchoatio 
habitus, non pertinet ad habitum, sed magis pertinet_ ad 
ipsam rationem potentiarurn." With regard to first principles 
as seeds of virtues, see ST I-II, q. 63, a. 1, resp. 
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What does this passage reveal with respect to the 
appetitive powers and the principles of common (i.e., 
natural) law? First, it should be emphasized that such 
principles, taken precisely from the aspect of knowledge, do 
not belong to the nature of the appetitive powers as such; 
rather, these principles--whose contents have been derived 
from sensible experience (see notes 80-82 above)--are 
presented to the will by the intellect. 89 Indeed, there is 
no natural habitus proper to the will in its beginning; but 
what is wholly natural to the appetitive power is its own 
natural inclination (qua voluntas) towards its proper 
objects--as known through sensible experience and proposed 
89See notes 8, 68 and 71 above; ST I-II, q. 90, a. 2, 
resp. (VII, 150a) : " ... lex pertinet ad id quod est 
principium humanorum actuum, ex eo quod est regula et 
mensura. Primum autem principium in operativis, quorum est 
ratio practica, est finis ultimus." SCG III, (XIV, 336b): 
"· .. voluntas tendat in bonum intellectum naturaliter, sicut 
in proprium obiectum et finem .... 11 ST I-II, q. 9, a. 1, 
resp. (VI, 74b): "Bonum autem in communi, quod habet 
rationem finis, est obiectum voluntatis." Ibid., q. 19, a. 
3, resp. (VI, 144a): 11 0biectum autem voluntatis proponitur 
ei per rationem. Nam bonum intellectus est obiectum 
voluntatis proportionatum ei ... quia voluntas potest tendere 
in bonum universale, guod ratio apprehendit." Ibid., ad 1 · 
(VI, 144b): "· .. appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de 
bone, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur. 11 Ibid., q. 27, a. 
2, resp. (VI, 193a) : "Bonum autem non est obiectum 
appetitus, nisi prout est apprehensum. 11 ST I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 
l; q. 82, a. 4, resp. and ad 3; q. 87, a. 4, resp.; ST II-
II, q. 4, a. 7, resp.; De Malo q. 6, a. 1; SCG IV, c. 19. 
With regard to the principles of (practical) reason ~s 
proper to a habitus of the intellect, and not to the will, 
see De Veritate, q. 10, a. 9, ad 1 in contra. 
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to the will by the intellect. 90 Secondly and correlatively, 
those principia iuris communis which the intellect discerns 
and presents to the will are understood as natural inasmuch 
as they are naturally willed by man according to his human 
nature: 
[In one sense], that is said to be natural to a thing 
which befits according to its substance; and this 
is that which of itself is in a thing. Now, all things 
that do not exist of themselves are reduced to 
something which does exist of itself, as to their 
principle. Therefore, taking nature in this sense, it 
is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to 
a thing be a natural principle. This is evident with 
respect to the intellect, for the principles of 
intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like 
manner, the principle of volunta:r:y movements must be 
something naturally willed. Now this is the good in 
general, namely, that to which the will tends 
naturally, just as each power tends to its object; and 
again it is the last end, which stands in the same 
relation to things appetible, as the first principles 
90See note 79 above; ST I-II, q. 62, a. 3, ad 1 (VI, 
403b): "· .. intellectus indiget speciebus intelligibilibus, 
per quas intelligat: et ideo oportet quod in eo ponatur 
aliquis habitus naturalis superadditus potentiae. Sed ipsa 
natura voluntatis suf f icit ad naturalem ordinem in f inem, 
sive guantum ad intentionem finis, sive guantum ad 
conformitatem ad ipsum." ST I, q. 60, a. 2, resp. (V, lOOb): 
"Unde voluntas naturaliter tendit in suum finem ultimum: 
omnis enim homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem. Et ex hac 
naturali voluntate causantur omnes aliae voluntates [for 
particular goods; see Key-Text A, notes 38-39), cum quidquid 
homo vult, velit propter finem. Dilectio igitur boni quod 
homo naturaliter vult sicut finem, est dilectio naturalis." 
ST I-II, q. 10, a. 1, resp. (VI, 83b): "Non enim per 
voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam 
voluntatis, sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas 
potentias et ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult 
non solum objectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae 
conveniunt aliis potentiis; ut cognitionem veri, quae 
convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere, et huiusmodi alia, 
quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia 
comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam 
particularia bona." See also ibid, ad 3. 
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of demonstrations to things intelligible; and, speaking 
generally, it is all those things which are suitable to 
the one willing according to his nature. 91 
The good in general, as well as all those goods which 
91 ST I- II, q. 10, a. 1, resp. {VI, 83a) : "secundum [uno 
modo], illud diciture esse naturale rei, quod convenit ei 
secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. 
In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in 
aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo 
necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper 
principium in his quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc 
manifeste apparet in intellectu: nam principia 
intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter 
etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliguid 
naturaliter volitum. Hoc est bonum in communi, in quod 
voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia 
in suum obiectum: et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo 
se habet in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia 
demostrationum in intelligibilibus: et universaliter omnia 
illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam." 
Regarding the correspondence between a nature and its proper 
object, see ibid, ad 3. See also ST I, q. 82, a. 1, resp. 
{V, 293b): "·· .sicut dicitur aliguid naturale. guia est 
secundum inclinationem naturae, ita dicitur aliquid 
voluntarium quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis .... 
Sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, 
ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est 
beatitude: finis enim se habet in operativis sicut 
principium in speculativis, ut dicitur [Aristotle, fil:!y,§., 
II, 9 {200a21)]. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter 
alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et 
principium omnium aliorum: quia natura rei est primum in 
unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili 
[namely, the ultimate end]." St. Thomas sometimes speaks of 
man's natural inclination for the good as an instinctus; see 
ST I, q. 113, a. 1, ad 3 {V, 52Sb): " ... sicut homines a 
naturali instinctu boni .... " Ibid., q. 19, a. 10, resp. {IV, 
248a) : "Non enim ad liberum arbitrium pertinet quod volumus 
esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum." See ST III, q. 
60, a. 6, ad 3, where the law of nature, prior to the Fall, 
is identified as an interior instinctus. Regarding man's 
appetitive power as rooted in the substantial form of man, 
see Key-Text A, note 43; ST I-II, q. 63, a. 1. In this 
connections, see William O'Connor, "The Natural Desire for 
God in St. Thomas," The New Scholasticism 14 {1940), 213-
67; "The Natural Desire for Happiness," The Modern Schoolman 
26 {1949) 91-119; "Natural Appetite," The Thomist 16 {1953), 
361-409. 
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are suitable to man according to his nature, are natural to 
man in the sense that they are willed naturally--that is, 
according to human nature. A correspondence or proportion is 
thus observed between (1) the good (and goods) as known, (2) 
natural law principles--the knowledge of which is derived 
from sense experience--and (2) human nature itself--as 
marked by man's natural inclination (through his appetitive 
powers) towards those goods which befit his human nature. 
Before we seek to account for this correspondence, let us 
underscore three points from the above discussion: 
1. While the intellect of man is in some way formally 
determined by the sensible objects which it knows, his 
natural appetency is determined towards certain operations 
according to the very nature of his appetitive powers 
(sensitive and intellectual--i.e., the will) towards certain 
goods-as-known. 
2. While intrinsically determined by nature towards 
certain goods--the principal of which is the common good--
man's will (qua appetitive power) depends upon the intellect 
for the apprehension of, and actual desire for, such goods 
(see notes 45-46, 57, 77 and 89 above). 
3. Natural law principles are natural to man inasmuch 
as they bear a correspondence to his natural inclination 
towards certain human goods. 
St. Thomas incorporates these three points in his 
response to the question, "Utrum lex naturalis sit una apud 
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omnes 11 (ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3): 
To the natural law belongs everything to which man is 
inclined according to his nature (secundum suam 
naturam). However, each thing is naturally inclined to 
the operation that is proper to it, according to its 
form (secundum suam formam) as, for example, fire is 
inclined to give heat. Hence, since the rational soul 
is the form proper to man, there is in every man a 
natural inclination [i.e., a determinate tendency] to 
act according to reason (secundum rationem) . 92 
Knowledge of Natural Inclination 
Let us now consider the correspondence between natural 
law precepts as derived from sense knowledge and the natural 
inclination which is inherent in man. Just as human reason 
controls and commands the other powers, St. Thomas tells us, 
so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other 
powers should be directed according to reason. 93 Hence, all 
the inclinations of any parts of human nature (e.g., of the 
concupiscible and irascible parts, insofar as they are 
regulated by reason) belong to natural law and are reduced 
92See ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3, resp. (VII, 170b): 11 ••• ad 
legem naturae pertinet omne illud ad quod homo inclinatur 
secundum suam naturam. Inclinatur tuam unumquodque 
naturaliter ad operationem sibi convenientem secundum suam 
formam: sicut ignis ad calefaciendum. Unde cum anima 
rationalis sit propria forma homini, naturalis inclinatio 
inest cuilibet homini ad hoc quoad agat secundum rationem. 11 . 
On this, see also notes 96 and 124 below. 
93ST I-II, q. 94, a. 4, ad 3 (VII, 172b): 11 ••• sicut 
ratio in homine dominatur et imperat aliis potentiis, ita 
oportet quod omnes inclinationes naturales ad alias 
potentias pertinentes ordinentur secundum rationem. Unde hoc 
est apud omnes communiter rectum, ut secundum rationem 
dirigantur omnes hominum inclinationes. 11 See also ibid., q. 
94, a. 2, ad 2. 
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to, and governed by, one first precept. 94 This first 
precept, "Do good and avoid evil," is based on the notion of 
good as derived from the consideration of material 
existents. 95 To this extent, all natural law precepts are 
derived from a cognitio which presupposes both an intrinsic 
principle (the natural light of reason as efficient cause of 
knowledge) and extrinsic factors (sensible existents as 
content-determining-causes of knowledge) . 
However, in response to the question, "Utrum lex 
naturalis contineat plura praecepta vel unum tantum" (ST I-
II, q. 94, a. 2), St. Thomas states that the order of 
natural precepts of the law of nature is according to the 
order of natural inclination: 
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and 
evil has the nature of the contrary, all those things 
to which man has a natural inclination are naturally 
apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently, 
as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, 
and objects of avoidance. Therefore, the order of the 
precepts of the natural law is according to the order 
of natural inclinations. 96 
94ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, ad 2 (VII, 170b): " ... omnes 
huiusmodi inclinationes quarumcumque partium humanae 
naturae, puta concupiscibilis et irascibilis, secundum quod 
regulantur ratione, pertinent ad legem naturalem, et 
reducuntur ad unum primum praeceptum, ut dictum est [in 
corp.]. Et secundum hoc, sunt multa praecepta legis naturae 
in seipsis, quae tamen communicant in una radice." In this 
connection, see notes 58-62 above. 
95See ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp., as cited in note 77 
above; see also notes 78 and 89 above. 
96ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp. (VII, 170a): " Quia vero 
bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, 
inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem 
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He then distinguishes man's natural inclination to good 
according to three different aspects or orders of human 
nature. To each of these orders is a corresponding order of 
natural law precepts: 
First of all, there is in man an inclination to the 
good according to the nature which he shares with all 
substances, namely, inamsmuch as every substance seeks 
the preservation of its own existence (esse) according 
to its nature, and in accord with this inclination, 
those things by which the life of man is preserved, 
and the opposite impeded, belong to the natural law. 97 
Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that 
pertain to him more specially, according to the nature 
which he has in common with the other animals; and 
according to this [inclination] those things are said 
to belong to natural law which nature has taught to all 
animal, such as intercourse between male and female, 
the education of children, and the like. 98 
In a third way, there is in man an inclination to good 
according to the nature of reason which is proper to 
him; as man has a natural inclination to know the truth 
about God, to live in society; and in this respect, 
whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to 
natural law, namely, that a man avoid ignorance, that 
one should not offend others with whom he must live, 
inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprhendit ut bona, et per 
consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala 
et vitanda. Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum 
naturalium. ~ ordo praeceptorum legis naturae. 11 
97 Ibid., (VII, 170a) : 11 !nest enim prime inclinatio 
homini ad bonum secundum naturam in qua communicat cum 
omnibus substantiis, prout scilicet quaelibet substantia 
appetit conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam. Et 
secundum hanc inclinationem, pertinent ad legem naturalem ea 
per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur." 
98 Ibid. , (VII, 170a) : 11 Secundo inest homini inclinatio 
ad aliqua magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua 
communicat cum ceteris animalibus. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur 
ea esse de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia qocuit, 
ut est coniuncto maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et 
similia. 11 
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and other such things regarding this inclination. 99 
But if the natural inclinations of man are reducible to 
one first precept as rooted in a cognitio, then how can 
natural law precepts be said to follow the order of natural 
inclination? Evidently, natural law precepts are in some way 
dependent upon both knowledge of some object and the natural 
inclinations. In order to understand what this twofold 
dependency consists in, let us first consider more closely 
the origin of notion of the good. As earlier noted (see 
notes 77 and 78 above), the natural knowledge of being 
(ens)--as derived from the knowledge of material existents--
is apprehended by reason sub ratione veri. Now, in the 
conformity of the intellect to the known object--which is 
truth, 100 - -the intellect also understands its own act of 
understanding; and by this reflective act, the intellect 
99 Ibid., (VII, 170b) : "Tertio modo inest homini 
inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam rationis, quae est sibi 
propria: sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc 
quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate 
vivat. Et secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae 
ad huismodi incliationem spectant: utpote quod homo 
ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet 
conversari, et cetera huismodi quae ad hoc spectant." 
100See note 21 above; fil I, q. 16, a. 2, resp. (IV, 
208a) : "Cum autem omnis res sit vera secunduym quod habet 
propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, 
inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet 
similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum 
est cognoscens. Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus 
et rei veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam 
cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem." 
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knows itself. 101 Subsequent to this apprehension of being 
sub ratione veri, being pertains to the will sub ratione 
appetibilis. It is at this stage in the cognitive process 
that being is apprehended sub ratione boni; for the notion 
of good is that which all desire ("bonum est quod omnia 
appetunt") ; 102 hence, the notion of the good implies also 
101See notes 18 and 19 above; ST I, q. 87, a. 1, resp. 
(V, 355b): "Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro 
secundum statum praesentis vitae, quod ad materialia et 
sensibilia respiciat, sicut supra dictum est [Ibid., q. 86, 
a. 4, ad 2; q. 84, a. 7]; consequens est ut sic seipsum 
intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per 
species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus 
agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis 
mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam 
suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster. 11 
See ibid., ad 3; ibid., a. 3, resp. and ad 1 and ad 2; 
ibid., q. 14, a. 2, ad 3; De Veritate, q. 1, aa. 3 and 9; ST 
I, q. 93, a. 7, ad 4 (V, 410a): "Quamvis etiam dici possit, 
quod, [animal percipiendo actum suum, seipsam intelligit 
quandocumque aliquid intelligit." see also Key-Text A, note 
67. 
102See notes 77 and 94 above. ST I-II, q. 19, a. 3, ad 1 
(VI, 144b) : 11 ••• bonum sub ratione boni. idest appetibilis, 
per prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem. Sed tamen 
per prius pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad 
volutatem sub ratione appetibilis: quia appetitus voluntatis 
non potest esse de bono, nisi prius a ratione 
apprehendatur." See also ST I, q. 16, a. 5, resp. Note that 
ens is not denominated good by St. Thomas because it is 
desired, but rather the contrary: good is signified 
indirectly through its effect, namely, as that which moves 
the appetite. See .In I Ethic. (ca. 1271), lect. 1, n. 9 
(Marietti, 4): "Prima autem non possunt notificari per 
aliqua priora, sed notif icantur per posteriora, sicut causae 
per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum 
appetitus, describitur per motum appetitus, sicut solet 
manifestari vis motiva per motum." Accordingly, the name 
good signifies not only a relation, but something upon which 
a relation is consequent along with the relation itself. De 
Veritate, q. 21, a. 6, resp. (XXII-3, 609a): " ... ratio boni 
respectum implicat: non quia ipsum nomen boni significat 
ipsum respectum solum; sed quia significat id ad quod 
sequitur respectus, cum respectu ipso. Respectus autem qui 
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an apprehension of the actual desire for being: 
Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; 
secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and 
thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being . 103 
importatur nomine boni, ets habitudo perfectivi, secundum 
quod aliquid natum est perf icere non solum secundum rationem 
speciei, sed secundum esse guod habet in rebus." Cf. ST I, 
q. 5, aa. 1-5. Hence, St. Thomas' moral doctrine cannot be 
reduced to a subjectivism (such as that of, say, Heidegger, 
in which other persons or things possess a "value" to the 
extent that such value is imposed upon them by the human 
subject; rather, St. Thomas' metaphysics and corresponding 
epistemology affirm the objective goodness inherent in 
creatures (secundum esse ID!.illi habet in rebus)--independent 
of whether or not such goodness is recognized and 
appreciated by another human person. In this connection, see 
notes 103, 119, 120-130 and 133 below. See also Thomas Fay, 
"Heidegger on the History of Western Metaphysics as 
Forgetfulness of Being: A Thomistic Rejoinder," in Atti del 
Congresso Internazionale, ed. Congresso internazionale 
Tommasso d'Aguino nel suo settimo centenario, vol. 2 (Rome, 
1974), 480-84; Paul Quay, "Morality by Calculation of 
Values," Theology Digest 23 (1975), 347-64. 
103ST I, q. 16, a. 4, ad 2 (IV, 21lb): " ... secundum hoc 
est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius cadit in intellectu. 
Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum ens; et 
secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio 
apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, 
secundo ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in 
rebus." Cf. De Veritate, q. 21, a. 3 resp. It should be 
noted that, for St. Thomas, ens qua bonum is not a mere 
postulate of reason ( an "as if") by which man unifies his 
experience; rather, ens qua bonum is the actually existing 
reality which the human existent knows--however obscurely, 
from the knowledge of actually existing beings--and desires 
for his actual perfection. See note 87 above; In IV Div. 
Norn. (ca. 1265-67), lect. 11, (Parma XV, 319b): "Iste amor. 
primo est in ipso bono quod est Deus, et ex ipso bono 
emanavit in existentia et iterum in existentibus 
participatus convertit se ad suum principium quod est 
bonum." See also ST I-II, q. 2, a. 8; q. 9, a. 6. In this 
connection, Donald Gallagher states that "it is more proper 
to say that the will desires that which will completely 
exhaust the ratio of the universal good than to say that all 
men desire the universal good as good in general. The will 
does not desire the good in the abstract; it desires the 
good, presented to it secundum modum abstractionis, which 
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Simply put, knowledge of the good implies knowledge of 
one's actual desire or inclination for being. 104 Hence, .e 
fortiori, natural law knowledge, which concerns the 
regulation of man's acts with respect to his natural end, 
must involve knowledge of man's determinate tendency 
(natural inclination) for the end--as acquired, of course, 
from the knowledge of the act of the will. To understand 
precisely how the knowledge of natural law principles 
involves the knowledge of natural inclinations, we must also 
consider St. Thomas' notion of rectitude with respect to the 
intellect, the will, and human acts. 
is, in Maritain's phrase, the metaphysical concretized good 
and is as [sic] universal being itself. The good in general 
is the necessary formal object under which the will desires 
whatever it desires, but the will is seeking an existential 
good that saturates all desire." See "St. Thomas and the 
Desire For the Vision of God," The Modern Schoolman 26 
(1948), 167-168; Anton Pegis, "The Natural End of Man," 
Proceedings Q1 the ACPA 23 (1949), 47-79; see note 60 above 
where St. Thomas identifies the universal good as God; on 
this, see also Jacques Maritain, De Bergson~ Thomas d'Aguin 
(New York: Maison Fran9aise, 1944), 156; G. Gustafson, The 
Theory of Natural Appetency, 107-13; Desmond Connell, "St. 
Thomas on Reflection and Judgment," Irish Theological 
Quarterly 45 (1978) 244; Henri Renard, and William 
Stackhouse, The Philosophy of Man (Saint Louis: Swift, 
1946), 106. 
104For a further explication on the manner by which the 
will is known subsequent, and according, to the knowledge of 
some sensible object, see ST I, q. 87, a. 4, resp. (V, 
363a) : "Unde actus voluntatis intelligitur ab intellectu, et 
inquantum aliquis percipit se velle; et inquantum aliquis 
cognoscit naturam huius actus, et per consequens naturam 
eius principii, quod est habitus vel potentia." See De 
Veritate, q. 10, a. 9, ad 1 in contra, ad 3 in contra; q. 
22, a. 12, resp.; ST I, q. 16, a. 4, ad 1; q. 93, a. 7, ad 
4. 
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The Notion of Rectitude 
St. Thomas tells us that those acts by which an agent 
tends towards his natural end are naturally befitting him. 
Since man is naturally ordered to God as his end, those acts 
whereby he is brought to the knowledge and love of God are 
said to be naturally right {naturaliter recte) . 105 
Accordingly, rectitude of the will consists in being duly 
ordered to the last end {precisely as known and proposed to 
the will by reason) ; 106 concomitantly, rectitude of 
{practical) reason consists in being well disposed with 
respect to the ends. 107 Now, while truth of the 
{speculative) intellect consists in the conformity of the 
105SCG III, c. 129 {XIV, 395a): "{Praeterae) Unicuique 
naturaliter conveniunt ea quibus tendit in suum f inem 
naturalem: quae autem e contrairo se habent, sunt ei 
naturaliter inconvenientia. Ostensum est autem supra [c. 17 
and 25] quod homo naturaliter ordinatur in Deum sicut in 
f inem. Ea igitur quibus homo inducitur in cognitionem et 
amorem Dei, sunt naturaliter recta: quaecumque autem e 
contrario se habent, sunt naturaliter homini mala." 
106ST I-II, q. 4, a. 4, resp. {VI, 41a): " ... rectitudo 
voluntatis requiritur ad beatitudinem et antecedenter et 
concomitanter. Antecedenter quidem, quia rectitudo 
voluntatis est per debitum ordinem ad finem ultimum." Ibid., 
ad 2 {VI, 41b): 11 ••• omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab 
aliquo actu intellectus: aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est 
prior quam aliquis actus intellectus. Voluntas enim tendit 
in finalem actum intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et ideo 
recta inclinatio voluntatis praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, 
sicut rectus motus sagittae ad percussionem signi. 11 
107ST I-II, q. 57, a. 4, resp. {VI, 367b): "In humanis 
autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in 
speculativis, ut dicitur [Aristotle, Ethic., VII, 8 
{1151a16)]. Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae est recta ratio 
agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus circa 
fines .... " 
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intellect to the things understood {see notes 20, 21 and 100 
above), the truth of the practical intellect--which pertains 
to man's actions with respect to his end--is determined in 
comparison to right appetite; yet the rectitude of the 
appetite is itself determined by its conformity with true 
reason {which proposes to the will the end); thus, we seem 
to have returned to the dilemma as previously stated above--
namely, if the natural inclinations of man, as directed by 
reason, are reducible to one first precept as rooted in a 
cognitio, then how can natural law precepts be said to 
follow the order of natural inclination?108 The solution 
lies in distinguishing between the ultimate end itself and 
the various means to that end with respect to the related 
operations of the natural appetite {i.e., the will) and 
natural reason. Accordingly, the rectitude or goodness of 
the will depends upon the ultimate end {i.e., the bonum 
universale) as first apprehended by reason from sensible 
experience and consequently proposed by reason to the 
will . 109 However, concerning the means to that end, the 
108See also In VI Ethic. {ca. 1271), lect. 2 {Marietti, 
310): "Videtur autem hie esse quiddem dubium. Nam se 
intellectus practici determinatur in comparatione ad 
appetitum rectum, appetitus autem rectitudo determinatur per 
hoc quod consonat rationi verae, ut prius dictum est, 
sequitur quaedam circulatio in dictis determinationibus." 
109ST I-II, q. 19, a. 3, resp. {VI, 144a): " ... bonitas 
voluntatis proprie ex obiecto dependet. Obiectum autem 
voluntatis proponitur ei per rationem. Nam bonum intellectum 
est obiectum voluntatis proportionatum ei .... Et ideo 
bonitatis voluntatis dependet a ratione, eo modo quo 
dependet ad obiecto." Ibid., q. 19, a. 10, resp. {VI, 15la): 
325 
rectitude of reason depends on its conformity with the 
desire for the end. 110 In his Expositio in libros Ethicorum 
(ca. 1271), St. Thomas sums up this ordination between 
intellect and will with respect to the end, and those things 
ordered to the end, as follows: 
The appetite is both of the end and of those things 
which are ordered to the end. The end, however, is 
determined for man by [human] nature, while those 
things which are ordered to the end are not determined 
for us by nature, but are left to be investigated by 
reason. It is evident, then, that the rectitude of 
appetite with respect to the end is the measure of 
truth in practical reason. And as to this, the truth of 
practical reason is determined by its consonance to 
right appetite. However, the truth of practical reason 
itself is the rule of the rectitude of appetite for 
those things which are ordered to the end. And, in this 
regard, appetite is said to be right insofar as it 
"Non est autem recta voluntas alicuius hominis volentis 
aliquod bonum particulare, nisi referat illud in bonum 
commune sicut in finem: cum etiam naturalis appetitus 
cuiuslibet partis ordinetur in bonum commune totius." Ibid., 
q. 2, a. 7, resp. (VI, 23b): "Bonum enim, quod est ultimus 
finis, est bonum perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus 
autem humanus, qui est voluntas, est boni universalis." 
110sT I-II, q. 58, a. 5, ad 1 (VI, 376b): " ... ratio, 
secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, praecedit appetitum 
finis; sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem ratiocinantem 
ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad 
prudentiam." Ibid., q. 19, a. 3, ad 3 (VI, 144b): "In his 
autem quae sunt ad f inem, rectitudo rationis consistit in 
conformitate ad appetitum finis debiti." See also In III De 
Anima, lect. 15, n. 82. Regarding caritas as the theological 
virtue which rectifies man's will with respect to the 
ultimate end, see In II Sent., d. 38, q. 1 a, sol.; De 
Carit., q. un., a. 6, ad 11 and a. 12, ad 12. Concerning the 
role of virtue by which the will and intellect are 
rectified, see Donald Johnson, "The Ground for a Sci_entific 
Ethics," Modern Schoolman 40 (1962), 357-60; ST I-II, q. 94, 
a, 3. 
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follows the judgments of true reason. 111 
It is according to this double ordination of reason and 
will with respect to the end, and those things ordered to 
the end, that the derivation of natural law precepts can be 
understood; in a word, according to the natural inclination 
for the end--as initially apprehended by the intellect with 
respect to a known object--reason subsequently issues its 
commands as regards those things ordained to the end. 112 
Thus, a natural law precept implies in its very notion a 
relation of means to a natural end, inasmuch as something is 
perceived as being necessary to that end; and to the extent 
that many things are [understood as] necessary to a natural 
end, many precepts may be given about many things as being 
111 In VI Ethic. lect. 2, n. 1131 (Marietti, 310): 
"· .. appetitus est finis et eorum quae sunt ad finem: finis 
autem determinatus est homini a natura .... Ea autem quae 
sunt ad finem, non sunt nobis determinata a natura, sed per 
rationem investiganda. Sic ergo manifestum est, quod 
rectitude appetitus per respectum ad finem est mensura 
veritatis in ratione practica. Et secundum hoc determinatur 
veritas rationis practicae secundum concordiam ad appetitum 
rectum. Ipsa autem veritas rationis practicae est regula . 
rectitudinis appetitus, circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo 
secundum hoc dicitur appetitus rectus, qui prosequitur quae 
vera ratio dicit." 
112ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1, ad 3 (VI, 149b): " ... ratio 
habet vim movendi a voluntate, ut supra dictum est [q. 17, 
a. 1]: ex hoc enim quod aliquis vult finem, ratio imperat de 
his quae sunt ad finem. Sed voluntas de his quae imperantur, 
ad hoc quod legis rationem habeat, oportet quod sit aliqua 
ratione regulata." 
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ordained to the end. 113 
We can summarize the cognitive process by which natural 
law precepts are produced by reason as follows: 
1. First, from the consideration of material existent 
sensibly known, natural (speculative) reason apprehends 
being (ens) as such. 
2. Secondly, with respect to the apprehended object, 
the intellect apprehends that it understands its object and 
common being sub ratione veri. 
3. Next, there follows from the necessity of man's 
rational nature, the actual desire of the will for common 
being with respect to the object known and desired (or 
shunned). 
4. From the reflective knowledge of the operation of 
the will, natural (now practical) reason then apprehends its 
113ST I-II, q. 99, a. 1, resp. (VII, 199a): 
" ... praeceptum legis, cum sit obligatorium, est de aliquo 
quod fieri debet. Quod autem aliquid debeat fieri, hoc 
provenit ex necessitate alicuius finis. Unde manifestum est 
quod de ratione praecepti est quod importet ordinem ad 
f inem, inquantum scilicet illud praecipitur quod est 
necessarium vel expediens ad finem." A precept, however, 
presupposes the knowledge of a necessary connection between 
some means and a necessary end; on this, see ST I, q. 82, a. 
2 ("Utrum voluntas ex necessitate omnia velit quaecumque 
vult"). Regarding the obligatory force of precepts as rooted 
in the necessity of the end (as determined by man's nature), 
see ST I-II, q. 102, aa. 1 and 2; q. 104, a. 1, resp. See 
also ibid., q. 57, a. 6, resp. where the act of counsel is 
attributed to the speculative reason, and the act of command 
is attributed to practical reason. Contrast St. Thomas' 
position on these matters with the opinion held by Germain 
Grisez concerning the merely "prescriptive" (vs obligatory) 
force of the first principle of natural law, as cite~ in 
notes 44-45 of our Introduction. In this connection, see 
notes 126 and 128 below. 
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own determinate tendency (natural inclination) for common 
being sub ratione appetibilis as the bonum universalis or 
finis with respect to the object known and desired (or 
shunned) . 114 
5. According to the above apprehension (#4), practical 
reason then issues its praecepta concerning those things 
perceived as either necessary to pursue or to avoid with 
respect to the end as necessarily (naturally) willed (see 
note 91 above) . 
Natural law knowledge thus involves the same intrinsic 
and extrinsic causes according to which all human knowledge 
is acquired--namely, (1) the natural light of reason as the 
efficient cause of intelligibility and (2) sensible 
existents as content-determining-causes of intelligibility. 
But, further, inasmuch as knowledge of a thing as good 
implies the knowledge of that thing as desired, natural law 
knowledge involves knowledge of natural inclinations--
114ST I-II, q. 105, a. 4, resp. (V, 474a): "Virtus autem 
passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in universali: est 
enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et intellectus 
obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum creatum 
est quoddam particulare bonum: solus autem Deus est bonum 
universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et 
sufficienter earn movet ut obiectum." Compendium Theologiae 
(ca. 1269-73?) c. 104 (Parma XVI, 29a): "Tale est autem in· 
nobis sciendi desiderium, ut cognoscentes ef f ectum, 
desideremus cognoscere causam; et in quacumque re cognitis 
quibuscumque ejus circumstantiis, non quiescit nostrum 
desiderium, quousque ejus essentiam cognoscamus. Non igitur 
naturale desiderium sciendi potest quietari in nobis, 
quousque primam causam cognoscamus, non quocumque modo, sed 
per ejus essentiam. Prima autem causa Deus est. Est _igitur 
finis ultimus intellectualis creaturae, Deum per essentiam 
videre." In this connection, see notes 90 and 103 above. 
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preeminently, the natural inclination for the universal 
good. 115 Inasmuch, then, as (1) one's own natural 
inclinations serve as content-determining-causes of natural 
law knowledge, and (2) man has the capacity or ability to 
acquire knowledge of his natural inclinations with respect 
to human goods, natural law knowledge is said to be 
naturally implanted or innate. Let us immediately add, 
115Thus, E. Gilson writes: "En nous, comme en toute 
chose, !'inclination qui nous entraine vers certaines fins 
est la marque de ce que la loi eternelle impose. Puisque 
c'est elle qui nous fait etre ce que nous sommes, il suffit 
que nous suivions les penchants legitimes de notre nature 
pour lui obeir. La loi eternelle, ainsi participee par 
chacun de nous et inscrite dans notre*pl526Xnara~eit le nom 
de loi naturelle." Le Thomisme, 6th ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 
1972), 330. 
Notwithstanding the role that (knowledge of) natural 
inclination plays in the production of natural law precepts, 
the claim that knowledge of natural law "is not a rational 
knowledge" (see note 18 in our Introduction concerning 
Maritain) cannot be attributed to the doctrine of St. 
Thomas; since, for him, man's inclination is, by nature, a 
rational inclination. See ST I, q. 60, a. 1, resp. (V, 98a): 
"Est autem hoc commune omni naturae, ut habeat aliquam 
inclinationem, quae est appetitus naturalis vel amor. Quae 
tamen inclinatio diversimode invenitur in diversis naturis, 
in unaquaque secundum modum eius. Unde in natura 
intellectuali invenitur inclinatio naturalis, secundum 
voluntatem." ST I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2 (V, 279a-b): 
" ... obiectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad 
opus sub ratione veri. 11 ST I-II, q. 19, a. 10, resp. (VII, 
150b): "· .. voluntas fertur in suum obiectum, secundum ,gyQQ g 
ratione proponitur." See also ibid., q. 19, aa. 3 and 5; 
ibid., q. 94, a. 3, resp. (VII, 170b) : "Unde cum anima 
rationalis sit propria forma hominis, naturalis inclinatio 
inest cuilibet homini ad hoc quod agat secundum rationem." 
SCG IV, c. 19 (XV, 74b): " ... in qualibet intellectuali 
natura oportet intelligibili consequatur in intelligente 
inclinatio ad proprias operationes et proprium f inem. Haec 
autem inclinatio in intellectuali natura voluntas est .... " 
See note 85 below; SCG II, 55; In I.I Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 
2, sol.; De Veritate, q. 14, a. 2, ad 3. On this, see 
William O'Connor, "The Natural Desire for Happiness," 91-
119; "Natural Appetite," 361-409. 
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however, that knowledge of one's own natural inclinations is 
for St. Thomas not only the result of the knowledge of 
sensible existents; indeed, knowledge of a natural 
inclination--which implies the knowledge of the desire for 
being as such--cannot be conceived apart from the knowledge 
of a concrete object (see notes 33, 101, 103 and 104 above); 
s fortiori, neither can natural law knowledge be understood 
as consummated in the reflective knowledge and contemplation 
one's own essence; because for St. Thomas, the end of 
practical cognition is operation, which is concerned with 
singular existents. 116 Further, inasmuch as man's natural 
inclinations for certain goods are established and 
characterized by man's very nature as a composite unity of 
soul-body and various operative powers (see notes 55, 58-62, 
90 and 97-99 above), knowledge of natural inclinations, 
while involving a reflective act of the intellect with 
respect to one's own being, is a fundamentally objective 
knowledge of human nature as acquired through 
116SCG III, c. 75, (XVI, 221b): 11 (Adhuc) Haec est 
differentia inter cognitionem speculativam et practicam, 
quod cognitio speculativa, et ea quae ad ipsam pertinent, 
perficiuntur in universali: ea vero quae pertinent ad 
cognitionern practicam, perficiuntur in particulari: nam 
finis speculativae est veritas, quae prime et per se in 
immaterialibus consistit et in universalibus; finis vero 
practicae est operatic, quae est circa singularia. 11 _See 
Proximate Context #a above regarding human knowledge as 
derived from, and pertaining to, sensible experience. 
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experience. 117 Hence, St. Thomas' moral doctrine (while 
certainly relational and personal) is not susceptible to the 
trappings of relativism or subjectivism. 
Recapitulation 
We can now understand at once (1) how we come to know 
first principles (such as those of natural law) by 
abstraction from singular things (see notes 82 and 84 
117Concerning reflective knowledge, see Text-A, note 67. 
It must be noted that man's subjective knowledge of, say, 
his own desire for food does not obviate the recognition--
learned through experience--that his desire for nourishment 
is a universal condition proper to all human beings. 
Further, not all subjectively known desires are proper to 
human nature merely by virtue of being subjectively known; 
in fact, many subjectively known desires can stem from a 
defect in nature or habitus (either natural or acquired); 
and if pursued, such desires will thwart authentic 
happiness. In addition, the knowledge by which practical 
reason is rectified--in order to properly direct various 
desires--may be difficult to learn; indeed, many of the more 
subtle aspects of human nature and human happiness are 
revealed only through trial and error and careful observance 
of the collective history of human experience. St. Thomas 
seems to have this point in mind in response to the 
question, "Utrum sit aliqua lex humana", ST I-II, q. 91, a. 
3, resp. (VII, 155a): "Unde et Tullius dicit, in sua Rhet. 
[De Invent., II, 53], quod 'initium iuris est a natura 
profectum; deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitatis 
ratione venerunt; postea res a natura profectas et 
consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit.'" See 
also ibid. , q. 100, a. 1, resp. (VII, 206b) : "Quaedam enim 
sunt quae statim per se ratio naturalis cuiuslibet hominis 
diiudicat esse facienda vel non facienda: sicut, 'Honora 
patrem tuum, et matrem tuem,' et, 'Non occides, Non furtum 
facies.' Et huiusmodi sunt absolute de lege naturae. Quaedam 
vero sunt quae subtiliori consideratione rationis a 
sapientibus iudicantur esse observanda. Et ista sic sunt de 
lege naturae, ut tamen indigeant disciplina, qua minores a 
sapientioribus instruantur: sicut illud, 'Coram cano capite 
consurge, et honora personam senis' [Levit. 19, 32], et alia 
huismodi." Regarding natural law as acquired through 
experience and reasoning, see De Veritate, q. 11, a. 1, ad 
12; ibid., aa. 2 and 3. 
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above}, and (2) how the order of natural precepts of natural 
law is according to the order of natural inclination: for 
man participates in eternal law both per modem cognitio and 
per modum interioris principii motivi. 111 Accordingly, we 
are led to understand (3) how natural law knowledge is (a} 
(properly speaking} acquired, and (b} (in a qualified sense} 
naturally implanted or innate, (4) how natural law knowledge 
is "natural" to man and "naturally known," and also (5) how 
activity in accord with such knowledge is "natural" to him. 
Recall that a creature is said to participate in eternal law 
according to the nature which is implanted (impressa} in it. 
Now, according to St. Thomas' account of law in section [1] 
above, creatures (including human beings}, are regulated and 
measured by the eternal law of God; but while they are 
measured (mensuratae} by the knowledge of God qua Mensurans, 
creatures, in turn, serve as the measures (mensurae} of 
human knowledge (see note 20 above}. In ST I, q. 14, a. 8, 
ad 3, St. Thomas clarifies the double character of creatures 
as both mensuratae (with respect to the knowledge of God) 
and as mensurae (with respect to human knowledge} as 
follows: 
Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God 
and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from 
natural things, of which God is the cause by His 
knowledge. Hence, just as the natural things of 
knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its 
measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior them, and is 
111see note 67 above and Key-Text sections (2] and [3] . 
333 
their measure; as, for instance, a houses is midway 
between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and 
the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of 
the house from the house already built. 119 
Through the knowledge of (human and other) natures 
which he acquires through sensible experience, man comes to 
know something of the eternal law. In this connection, the 
term impressio (as implying something as given from an 
extrinsic cause; see note 37 above) has a double application 
with respect to man's participation in eternal law--namely, 
in terms of (1) man's own intrinsic nature and operative 
powers as divinely impressed upon him (see notes 37 through 
41, and 70 above), and (2) the acquired knowledge of eternal 
law as divinely impressed upon him through the mediation of 
actually existing natures (human and subhuman) : 
Just as the intelligible reasons (rationes) of 
everything exist first of all in God, and are derived 
from Him by other intellects in order that these may 
119ST I, q. 14, a. 8, ad, 3 (IV, 180b): " .. res naturales 
sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et scientiam nostram: nos 
enim scientiam accipimus a rebus naturalibus, quarum Deus 
per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut scibilia naturalia 
sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura eius, ita 
scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura 
ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam 
arificis qui earn fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius 
cognitionem ex ipsa iam facta capit." ST I-II, q. 93, a. 1, 
ad 3 (VII, 163a): "· .. ratio intellectus divini aliter se 
habet ad res quam ratio intellectus humani. Intellectus enim 
humanus est mensuratus a rebus, ut scilicet conceptus 
hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, sed dicitur verus ex 
hoc quod consonat rebus: ex hoc enim quod res est vel non 
est, opinio vera vel falsa est. Intellectus vero divinus est 
mensura rerum: quia unaquaeque res intantum habet de. 
veritate, inquantum imitatur intellectum divinum, ut in 
Primo [q. 16, a. 1) dictum est." 
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actually understand, so also are they derived by 
creatures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves 
the created intellect, inasmuch as he gives it the 
power of understanding, whether natural or superadded; 
and He impresses (imprimit) on the created intellect 
the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves 
both power and species in being (esse) . 120 
In the sed contra of the discussion, "Utrum lex aeterna 
sit omnibus nota" (ST I-II, q. 93, a. 2), St. Thomas cites 
Augustine: "Knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us 
(nobis impressa est) . 11121 The meaning which St. Thomas 
120ST I, q. 105, a. 3, resp. (V, 473b): "Sicut enim 
omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles prime existunt in Dec, 
et ab eo derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu 
intelligant; sic etiam derivantur in creatureas, ut 
subsistant. Sic igitur Deus movet intellectum creatum, 
inquantum dat ei virtutem ad intelligendum, vel naturalem 
vel superadditam; et inquantum imprimit ei species 
intelligibiles; et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse." 
Ibid., ad 3 (V, 473b): 11 ••• intelligibile movet intellectum 
nostrum, inquantum quodammodo imprimit ei suma 
similitudinem, per quam intelligi potest. Sed similitudines 
quas Deus imprimit intellectui create, non sufficiunt ad 
ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam .... " See also ibid., 
q. 85, a. 2, ad 3; ST I, q. 84, a. 6, resp. (V, 324a): 
"··.ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum 
Aristotelem, non suff ict sola impressio sensibilium 
corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius; quia agens est 
honorabilius patiente .... " 
121ST I-II, q. 93, a. 2, sed contra (VII, 163a): 
11 
••• Augustinus dicit [De Lib. Arb. I, 6 (PL 32, 1229)) quod 
'aeternae legis notio nobis impressa est.'" In this 
connection, see ibid., q. 91, a. 3, ad 2 (VII, 155b): 
" ... ratio humana secundum se non est regula rerum: sed 
principia ei naturaliter indita, sunt quaedam regulae 
generales et mensurae omnium eorum quae sunt per hominem 
agenda, quorum ratio naturalis est regula et mensura, licet 
non sit mensura eorum quae sunt a natura." These two 
statements are combined together by St. Thomas in the 
following passage: " ... promulgatio legis naturae est ex hoc 
ipso quod Deus earn mentibus hominum inseruit naturaliter 
cognoscendam." Ibid., q. 90, a. 4, ad 1 (VII, 152b). _ 
Evidently, knowledge of natural law is understood by St. 
Thomas to be divinely implanted in man inasmuch as (1) God 
gives to Augustine's words is clarified by him in ad 1 of 
the same discussion: 
The things that are of God cannot indeed be known by us 
in themselves, yet they are manifested to us by their 
effects, according to Rom. I, 20, "The invisible things 
of God ... are clearly seen, being understood through the 
things that are made . 122 
As the context of this statement makes clear, knowledge 
of eternal law is impressed upon man--that is, acquired--
through the sensible apprehension of actually existing 
natures (human and subhuman) . According to this acquired 
knowledge, man's reason subsequently directs him in the 
activities proper to his own nature. 
Thus, when St. Thomas speaks of right reason as the 
principle of moral action, 123 two things must be 
remembered. First, the knowledge by which man's practical 
reason is rectified--in order to subsequently direct human 
activity in a proper manner towards what is humanly good--is 
gives directly to man the natural capacity to know natural 
law (see note 31 and [2] above), and (2) God gives 
indirectly to man the actual knowledge of natural law 
through the mediation of sensible creatures as content-
determining-causes of knowledge (see note 122 below) . With 
regard to habitual knowledge of natural law as understood as 
a capacity or aptitude for actual knowledge, see note 61 
above. 
122
.s.T I-II, q. 93, a. 2, ad 1, as cited in note 24 
above. See also note 78 above. 
123See, for example, ST I-II, q. 100, a. 1, resp. (VII, 
206b) : "Cum autem humani mores dicantur in ordine ad 
rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, 
illi mores dicuntur boni qui rationi congruunt, mali autem 
qui a ratione discordant." 
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derived from his sensible experience of actually existing 
natures; for nature is the (proximate) foundation or measura 
of right reason: 
Every operation through reason and will is derived in 
us from what is according to nature. All rationcination 
is derived from principles that are naturally known. 
And every appetite for those things which are for the 
end is derived from the natural appetite for the final 
end, and thus it is also necessary that the first 
direction of our acts to the end be through the natural 
law .124 
Secondly, while a natural law precept is said to be 
constituted through an act of human reason ( 11 aliquid per 
huiusmodi actum constitutum11 ) , 125 its obligatory character-
124ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2, ad 2 (VII, 154b): 11 ••• omnis 
operatic rationis et voluntatis derivatur in nobis ab eo 
quod est secundum naturam, ut supra habitum est [ST I-II, q. 
10, a. 1): nam omnis rationcinatio derivatur a principiis 
naturaliter notis, et omnis appetitus eorum quae sunt ad 
finem, derivatur a naturali appetitu ultimi finis. Et sic 
etiam oportet quod prima directio actuum nostrorum ad f inem, 
fiat per legem naturalem." See also SI I, q. 60, a. 1, resp. 
From our above analysis of natural law as (1) a moral 
doctrine which is (2) proximately based upon the actual 
nature of the human existent, and (3) known only through, 
and according to, the sensible experience of human natures 
as actually existing in the world, we cannot accept Bourke's 
interpretation of St. Thomas' moral doctrine (see our 
Introduction, notes 36-38) as correct or credible. For a 
brief critique of Bourke's interpretation of St. Thomas' 
moral doctrine, see Oscar Brown, Natural Rectitude, 165-74. 
125ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2 (VII, 149b): 11 ••• sicut in 
actibus exterioribus est considerare operationem et 
operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in 
operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui 
est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi 
actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione prime 
quidem est definitio; secundo, enuntiatio; tertio, vero 
syllogismus vel argumentatio. Et quia ratio etiam practica 
utitur quodam syllogismo in operabilibus, ut supra habitum 
est [Ibid., q. 13, a. 3; q. 76, a. 1; q. 77, a. 2, ad 4), 
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-the very mark of a precept of law126--is not, nor can it 
be, based merely on the authority of human reason; indeed, 
if a natural law precept were nothing more than a construct 
of human reason, it would be devoid of moral force; since, 
secundum quod Philosophus docet in VII Ethic., 3 [1147a24]; 
ideo est invenire aliquid in ratione practica quod ita se 
habeat ad operationes, sicut se habet propositio in ratione 
speculativa ad conclusiones. Et huiusmodi propositiones 
universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones habent 
rationem legis. Quae quidem propositiones aliquando 
actualiter considerantur, aliquando vero habitualiter a 
ratione tenentur." 
126ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1, sed contra (VII, 149a): " ... ad 
legem pertinet praecipere et prohibere. Sed imperare est 
rationis, sicut supra habitum est [Ibid., q. 17, a. 1). Ergo 
lex est aliquid rationis." Ibid., q. 92, a. 1, resp. (VII, 
159a): " ... lex nihil aliud est quam dictamen rationis in 
praesidente quo subditi gubernantur." Ibid., q. 92, a. 2, ad 
1 (VII, 161b): 11 ••• sicut cessare a malo habet quandam 
rationem boni, ita etiam prohibitio habet quandam rationem 
praecepti; et secundum hoc, large accipiendo praeceptum, 
universaliter lex praeceptum dicitur." In his ex professo 
explanation of law, St Thomas asserts that lex is derived 
from ligare, because it binds one to act. See ibid., q. 90, 
a. 1, resp. (VII, 149a) : " ... lex quaedam regula est et 
mensura actuum, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum 
vel ab agendo retrahitur. Dicitur enim lex a ligando quia 
obligat ad agendum." Hence, the primary significance of lex 
as a decree issuing from a ruler which carries the force of 
obligation upon his subjects. 
Concerning the various human activities to which man 
applies himself, St. Thomas distinguishes between rules of 
art and precepts of law (see ST II-II, a. 47, a. 8, resp.); 
unlike rules of art, natural law precepts are not simply 
"reasonable guidelines" for "the art of successful" living," 
as might be suggested by the language of the "New Natural 
Law" theorists or other interpreters of the Thomistic ethics 
of "right reason;" rather, natural law precepts are moral 
imperatives which carry the force of obligation. On this, 
see notes 112 and 113 above and 128 below; ST I-II, q. 104, 
a. 1, resp. (VII, 258a): " ... sicut ex supra dictis patet [q. 
95, a. 2; q. 99, a. 3 and 4), praeceptorum cuiuscumque legis 
quaedam habent vim obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, 
quia naturalis ratio dictat hoc esse debitum fieri, vel 
vitari; et huismodi praecepta dicuntur moralia, eo quod a 
ratione dicuntur mores humani." See also Ouodl. V, 19. 
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properly speaking, no one imposes a law on his own acts. 127 
Rather, the obligatory character of a natural law precept 
stems from God as the author and governor of nature: 128 for 
natural law is itself nothing other than a participation in 
eternal law--to which man is inexorably bound by nature: 
Every law comes from the reason and will of the 
legislator. The divine law and the natural law proceeed 
from the reasonable will of God, but human law comes 
from the will of man regulated by reason. 129 
127ST I-II, q. 93, a. 5, resp. (VII, 166a): " ... nullus, 
proprie loquendo, suis actibus legem imponit." Cf. ibid., q. 
93, a. 4, ad 2 (VII, 165b): 11 ••• Filius Dei non est a Deo 
factus, sed naturaliter ab ipso genitus; et ideo non 
subditur divinae providentiae aut legi aeternae, sed magis 
ipse est lex aeterna per quamdam appropriationem .... 11 With 
regard to the nature of constructural knowledge, see note 22 
above. 
128ST I-II, q. 96, a. 4, ad 1 (VII, 182b): " ... sicut 
Apostolus dicit, [Rom., 13, 1], 'omnis potestas humana a Deo 
est;' et ideo, ' qui potestati resistit in his quae ad 
potestatis ordinem pertinent, 'Dei ordinationi resistit;' et 
secundum hoc efficitur reus quantum ad conscientiam. 11 See 
section [3] above and notes 40 and 41 above. For further 
discussion on the obligatory character of natural law as 
rooted in the absolute necessity of a natural act in 
reference to an absolutely necessary final end, see Walter 
Farrell, The Natural Moral Law, 130-41; see also Robert J. 
Roth, "Moral Obligation and God," The New Scholasticism 54 
(1980), 265-78. For a critique of ethical systems which 
purport to establish a morality without the foundation of 
God's existence and cosmic governance, see Thomas Wassmer, 
"Guilt and Value Philosophy," Franciscan Studies 19 (1959), 
227-40; Stanley Jaki, "Thomas and the Universe," The Thomist 
53 (1989) I 545-72 • 
129ST I-II, q. 97, a. 3, resp. (VII, 191a): " ... omnis 
lex proficiscitur a ratione et voluntate legislatoris: lex 
quidem divina et naturalis a rationablil Dei voluntate." It 
follows that human law carries the force of moral obligation 
to the extent that it accords with natural law qua man's 
participation in eternal law . .s.I I-II, q. 95, a. 2, resp. 
{VII, 175a): "Unde inquantum habet de iustitia, intaritum 
habet de virtute legis. In rebus autem humanis dicitur esse 
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The rational creature governs itself by its intellect 
and will, both of which require to be governed and 
perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore, 
above the government whereby the rational creature 
governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to 
be governed by God. 130 
Finally, let us stress two points with respect to the 
obligatory character of natural law. First, to say that a 
precept of natural law is obligatory by virtue of the 
authority of God should not be construed as eclipsing free 
choice in man; for man, while naturally inclined towards his 
last end, is free to choose or shun any particular known 
good. 131 Nor should the fact of free choice be construed as 
aliquid iustum ex eo quod est rectum secundum regulam 
rationis. Rationis autem prima regula est lex naturae, ut ex 
supradictis patet [q. 91, a. 1, ad 2) ." 
130
.s.I I, q. 103, a. 5, ad 3 (V, 458b): " ... creatura 
rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, 
quorum utrumque indiget regi et perf ici ab intellectu et 
voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua creatura 
rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, 
indiget gubernari a Deo." In this connection, see ST II-II, 
q. 154, a. 2, ad 2 (X, 219b): "Ratio autem hominis recta est 
secundum quod regulatur ex voluntate divina, quae est prima 
et summa regula." See also ST I, q. 49, a. 3, resp. As 
opposed, then, to the view of Heidegger, God (and not 
Dasein) is for St. Thomas the "shepherd of being." On this, 
see notes 20 and 36-41, 102 and 133; Odon Lottin, "Les 
premiers exposes scolastiques sur la loi eternelle," 298-
301. 
131See ST I, q. 82, a. 1, resp., as cited in note 85 
above; ibid., ad 1 (V, 293b): "Necessitas autem natualis non 
aufert libertatem voluntatis .... " Ibid., ad 3 (V, 293b): 
11 
••• sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus hoc 
vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his 
quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur [Ethic. III, 9]. Unde 
appetitus ultimi finis non est de his quorum domini sumus." 
See also In II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5; De Veritate, 
q. 22, a. 5; SCG II, c. 55; ST I, q. 83, a. 4; ST I-II, q. 
8 , aa . 2 and 3 . 
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a power to make the moral order; for the exercise of free 
choice, is set squarely within--and, hence, subject to--the 
order of divine providence: 
When it is said that God left man to himself, this does 
not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but 
merely that he does not have a prefixed operating 
force determined to only the one effect; as in the case 
of natural things, which are only acted upon as though 
directed by another towards an end: for they do not act 
of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards 
an end, like rational creatures, through the possession 
of free choice, by which these are able to take counsel 
and make a choice. Hence, it is significantly said: 'In 
the hand of his own counsel.' But since the very act of 
free choice is traced to God as to a cause, it 
necessarily follows that everything happening from the 
exercise of free choice must be subject ot divine 
providence. For human providence is included under the 
providence of God as a particular under a universal 
cause . 132 
In St. Thomas' moral doctrine, then, what is good or 
evil for man is not based upon free choice any more than 
upon a mental construct; rather, the moral order of man is 
132See section (2) above and ST I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 4 
(IV, 266a): " ... in hoc quod dicitur Deum hominem sibi 
reliquisse, non excluditur homo a divina providentia: sed 
ostenditur quod non praefigitur ei virtus operativa 
determinata ad unum, sicut rebus naturalibus; quae aguntur 
tantum, quasi ab altero directae in finem, non autem seipsa 
agunt, quasi se dirigentia in finem, ut creaturae rationales 
per liberum arbitrium, quo consiliantur et eligunt. Unde 
signantur dicit, 'in manu consilii sui.' Sed quia ipse actus 
liberi arbitrii reducitur in Deum sicut in causam, necesse 
est ut ea quae ex libero arbitrio f iunt, divinae 
providentiae subdantur: providentia enim hominis continetur 
sub providentia Dei, sicut causa particularis sub causa 
universali." ST I-II, q. 71, a. 6, resp. (VII,9a): "Regula 
autem voluntatis humane est duplex: una propinqua et_ 
homogenea, scilicet ipsa humana ratio: alia vero est prima 
regula, scilicet lex aeterna, quae est quasi ratio Dei." 
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determined by the law of human nature as ordained by 
God; 133 and it is man's task to come to discern from his 
experience in the world the moral law of his nature and to 
133Joseph Owens, however, states that "the starting 
point or first principle of a moral decision cannot be 
determined by the nature of things. It is determined by 
human choice [see our Introduction, note 29] ."Note here the 
ambiguity in the use of the word "determined." One might 
interpret Owens to mean either that (1) human choice is not 
determined (read=necessitated) by the nature of things, or 
that (2) the morality of a decision is determined 
(read=defined, specified, or established) by choice, and not 
by nature of things; or perhaps he means to say that (3) the 
proximate or immediate principle of (any) decision (moral or 
otherwise) is choice. While the first interpretation is 
faithful to the moral doctrine of St. Thomas, the second is 
not; the last interpretation seems to be a tautology 
inasmuch as a choice and a decision can be taken as 
synonymous terms. Such ambiguity is out of character for Fr. 
Owens who usually expresses himself with great precision and 
clarity. For a similar interpretation of St. Thomas' moral 
philosophy, see Ignatius T. Eschmann, "St Thomas' Approach 
to Moral Philosophy," Proceedings of the ACPA 31 (1957), 25-
33. On free choice vis-a-vis the necessity of judgment as 
determined by the things which reason judges upon, see De 
Veritate, q. 24, aa. 2 and 4; on free choice as rooted in 
the will and caused by reason (as determined, in turn, by 
the things which reason judges upon), see .Sl'. I-II, q. 17, a. 
1, ad 2 (VI, 118b): " ... radix liberatis est voluntas sicut 
subjectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio; ex hoc enim voluntas 
libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere 
diversae conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt 
liberum arbitrium, quod est liberum de ratione judicium, 
quasi ratio sit causa liberatis." Hence, every free act for 
St. Thomas is necessarily a choice among options that are 
already constituted as morally good or evil. For further 
explication on this matter, see David Gallagher, "Thomas 
Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite," Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 29 (1991), 559-584, especially 570; 
Gerard Smith, "Intelligence and Liberty," The New 
Scholsticism 15 (1941), 1-17; Anton Pegis, "Necessity and 
Liberty: An Historical Note on St. Thomas Aquinas," The New 
Scholasticism 15 (1941) 18-45; Paul Quay, "The Unity and 
Structure of the Human Act," Listening 18 (1983), 245-53; 
"The Disvalue of Ontic Evil," Theological Studies 46. (1985) , 
262-86; see also ST I, q. 83, aa. 1-4; ST I-II, q. 91, a. 3, 
ad 2. 
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freely act in accord with its principles insofar as they 
come to be understood. Thus, under divine providence, man 
possesses freedom of choice, even the freedom to choose to 
sin--for which, of course, he must take personal 
responsibility. 134 
Finally, let us state that, for St. Thomas, the 
precepts of natural law are not violently or coercively 
imposed upon a human being, as, say, in the case of an 
unjust law imposed by a tyrannical ruler or government; 135 
rather, inasmuch as natural law precepts are (1) derived 
from the knowledge of human (and other} natures as actually 
existing in the created world and (2) are connatural to man, 
it befits the human person to act in accord with these 
precepts. 136 St. Thomas' moral doctrine of natural law- -as 
134ST I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 4 (IV, 266a}: "[Deus] impios 
non retrahit a malo culpae .... " ST I-II, q. 79, a. 2, resp. 
(VII, 77a}: " ... Deus sit causa omnis actionis, inquantum est 
actio. Sed peccatum nominat ens et actionem cum quodam 
defectu. Defectus autem ille est ex causa creata, scilicet 
libero arbitrio, inquantum deficit ab ordine primi agentis, 
scilicet Dei .... Et secundum hoc Deus est causa actus 
peccati, non tamen est causa peccati. ... " See S. Pinckaers, 
"Liberte et precepts dans la morale de saint Thomas," Lex et 
libertas: Freedom and Law According to St. Thomas Aguinas, 
ed. L. J. Elders and K. Hedwig (Vatican City: Pontificia 
Accademia di S. Tommas, 1987), 15-24. 
135Concerning the difference between natural and violent 
movements, see ST I, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 454a}, as cited 
in note 37 above. See also ST I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 4 (VII, 
160a}: " ... lex tyrannica, cum non sit secundum rationem, non 
est simpliciter lex, sed magis est quaedam perversitas 
legis. 11 Cf. ibid., q. 95, a. 2, resp.; q. 96, a. 4, resp. 
1360n the connaturality of natural law precepts,_ see 
note 91 above and Key-Text A, note 12. On the role of 
natural law as making man good, see ST I-II, q. 92, a. 1; q. 
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the participation in eternal law through voluntary (free) 
action with respect to natural reason and natural 
inclination--is well summed up as follows: 
Now the due order to an end is measured by some rule. 
In things that act according to nature, this rule is 
the power itself of nature that inclines them to that 
end. When, therefore, an action proceeds from a natural 
power, in accord with the natural inclination to an 
end, then the action is said to be right ... ; but when 
an action strays from this rectitude, it comes under 
the notion of sin. Now, in those things that are done 
by the will, the proximate rule is the human reason, 
while the supreme rule is the eternal law .... 
[Hence] , it is evident that every voluntary action that 
turns aside from the order of reason and of the eternal 
law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord 
with reason and the eternal law. 137 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
In this textual study of St. Thomas' doctrine of 
natural law, we first reviewed his theory of cognition: 
94, a. 3. On natural law as leading to man's happiness as 
his ultimate end, see ibid., q. 90, a. 2. With respect to 
happiness considered in both its intrinsic and extrinsic 
aspects--namely, as (1) perfection of human form and (2) 
union with God as uncreated good--see ST I, q. 60, a. 1, 
resp.; q. 62, a. 1, resp.; ST I-II, q. 2, a. 7, resp.; q. 3, 
a. 1, resp. 
137ST I-II, q. 21, a. 1, resp. (VI, 164b): "Debitus 
autem ordo ad finem secundum aliquam regulam mensuratur. 
Quae quidem regula in his quae secundum naturam agunt, est 
ipsa virtus naturae, quae inclinat in talem finem. Quando 
ergo actus procedit a virtute naturali secundum naturalem 
inclinationem in finem, tune servatur rectitude in actu .... 
Quando autem a rectitudine tali actus aliquis recedit, tune 
incidit ratio peccati. In his vero quae aguntur per 
voluntatem, regula proxima est ratio humana; regula autem 
suprema est lex aeterna .... Manifestum est autem ex 
praemissis [ibid., q. 19, aa. 3 and 4) quod omnis actus 
voluntarius est malus per hoc quod recedit ab ordin~ 
rationis et legis aeterna: et omnis actus bonus concordat 
rationi et legi aeternae." 
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inasmuch as man exists as a creature composed of soul and 
body, the proper object of the human intellect is a quiddity 
or nature as existing in corporeal matter; all human 
knowledge is derived from, determined and made true by, the 
sensible world of actually existing creatures; from such 
knowledge man can attain to the knowledge of incorporeal 
things, such as God. Thus, there are two proximate causes of 
human knowledge--namely, (1) the cognitive powers 
(primarily, the agent intellect) as the efficient cause of 
knowledge, and (2) sensible existents as content-
determining-causes of knowledge . 138 
We then looked at St. Thomas' notion of participation 
as applied to natural law assertion that natural law is a 
participation in us of eternal law. Three main factors were 
identified 
Next, we considered St. Thomas' notion of participation 
as applied to his doctrine of natural law. Natural law, he 
tells us, "is nothing other than a participation in the 
rational creature of eternal law; "139 as this concise 
definition indicates, three main factors are involved in 
natural law participation--namely, (1) eternal law, (2) 
138The knowledge of a sensible object thus involves two 
distinct levels of intellectual actuations: (1) the act of 
abstraction by which the passive intellect is reduced to act 
by the agent intellect; (2) the subsequent act of judgment 
whereby the concept or verbum is produced. On these two 
levels of actuations, see Leo Sweeney, Christian Philosophy, 
554-58. 
139See note 32 above for the Latin. 
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natural law, and (3) man (qua rational creature). The first 
factor, eternal law, is the unparticipated exemplar cause 
which exists independently, subsistently, and perfectly in 
the mind of God. Eternal law is present to the multiplicity 
of men through natural law in a restricted and determined 
manner. The third factor, man, is the individual participant 
(finite, mutable, and imperfect) which receives natural law, 
and through which he participates in eternal law; as a 
result of this participation, man qua moral agent is 
perfected. The second factor, natural law, is the 
participated-in-perfection which--derived from eternal law 
through efficient causality--is actually present in each 
particular human being. Thus, natural law is (1) that by 
which eternal law is present in each human being, (2) that 
which eternal law has in common with each human being as a 
participant, and (3) that by which men are (univocally) like 
one another as moral agents and (analogously) like God as 
(intellectual and volitional) Agent. 
As our key-text study revealed, natural law 
participation pertains to (1) knowledge, (2) human nature 
and its activity, and (3) man's perfection through his 
actual relationships with creatures and God. 
Next, we considered St. Thomas' teaching of divine 
providence, eternal law, and nature. For him, providence 
consists of (1) a plan (ratio) by which things are pre-
ordained to an end and (2) the execution or government of 
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such a plan; eternal law is nothing other than the plan of 
divine providence by which God directs the actions of all 
creatures towards their proper ends. It is here that St. 
Thomas' doctrine of nature enters in--inasmuch as nature is 
that intrinsic principle divinely impressed upon a creature, 
by which God's providence directs that creature in its 
actions towards its proper end. A creature is thus subject 
to eternal law according to the determinations of its 
nature; and inasmuch as man is a creature, he, too, is 
subject to eternal law according to his human nature as 
divinely impressed upon him. Such participation in eternal 
law is nothing other than natural law--as it pertains to 
human nature and natural activity. 
With respect to St. Thomas' teaching on natural 
appetency, we noted that every nature (qua active potency) 
and every natural power possesses a determinate tendency 
towards certain operations and goods; thus man, by virtue of 
his hylemorphic nature and operative powers, possesses a 
multiplicity of determinate tendencies (vegetative, 
sensitive, and rational) towards certain operations and 
goods. These different tendencies are hierarchically ordered 
to one another so that a corresponding hierarchy of human 
goods is established; according to such an ordination, the 
natural activities of man are directed towards a unifying 
end--namely, the knowledge and love of God. 
Man's appetitive powers (sensible and intellectual) 
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bear a determinate tendency towards the actual desire and 
love of sensible creatures--precisely as known; accordingly, 
the perfection of a human nature is accomplished only 
through actual communion with those (human and subhuman) 
creatures. 
In the proximate context (ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2, sed 
contra), it was stated that (1) man discerns what is good 
and what is evil according to natural law, and that (2) man 
does naturally the things that are of the [natural] law. In 
view of these statements, we asked two questions: (1) how is 
knowledge of natural law (i.e., the discernment of what is 
good and evil) attained? and (2) in what sense do human 
beings "naturally do the things that are of the law?" With 
these questions in mind, and in light of St. Thomas's 
teachings on human cognition, participation, divine 
providence, eternal law, nature, and natural appetency, we 
turned to our key-text (ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2,) where St. 
Thomas addresses the question, "Utrum sit in nobis aliqua 
lex naturalis." 
Let us summarize his respondeo as follows. Every 
creature participates in eternal law inasmuch as from an 
impression of eternal law (i.e., the nature which the 
creature has received from God) it has a determinate 
tendency (natural appetite) towards its proper acts and end. 
Now, man, as a rational creature, not only participates in 
eternal law (1) according to natural inclination, but, (2) 
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in a more excellent manner, {a) by discerning what is good 
and evil and {b) providing for himself and others--according 
to the light of reason which is a God-given impression in us 
of the divine light. This two-fold participation in eternal 
law by the rational creature is called natural law. 
In our commentary upon this key-text, we noted that St. 
Thomas identifies natural law in man with {l) human nature 
and its operative powers {the natural appetites and the 
natural light of reason) and {2) the operations of those 
powers {the actual desire towards certain goods, the 
discernment of good and evil, the government of oneself and 
others). We saw that natural law, insofar as it is equated 
with human nature and its operative powers, is tantamount to 
man's natural capacity or aptitude for attaining his proper 
end--namely, knowing and loving God; taken precisely in this 
sense, natural law is intrinsic or innate to man. 
Nevertheless, a nature, understood as a principle of active 
potency {i.e., a substance possessing determinate tendencies 
towards certain operations and ends) , cannot be completely 
and truly understood apart from its operations and those 
ends by which it attains full actuation {i.e., perfection). 
Now a human nature only attains its perfection {l) through 
sensible knowledge of other existents and {2) by living in 
society with other human creatures; accordingly, natural law 
is truly and properly understood only by taking into account 
a human nature as it actually exists as an individual in 
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relation with other actually existing creatures (human and 
subhuman) in the sensible world. 
At this point, we turned to consider natural law per 
modum cognitionis. Inasmuch as all human knowledge has its 
origin in the apprehension of sensible existents, it follows 
that knowledge of natural law principles must properly be 
considered an acquired knowledge; indeed, St. Thomas 
expressly states that first principles are known by 
abstraction from singular things (see note 82 above) . 
Accordingly, when he asserts that such principles are 
naturaliter insunt and naturaliter cognita, he means that: 
(1) they are derived from both (a) extrinsic causes (i.e., 
material existents as content-determining-causes of 
knowledge) and (b) intrinsic causes (primarily, the light of 
the agent intellect as the efficient cause of the actuation 
in the recipient intellect, which then is the efficient 
cause of the knowledge itself; see note 17 above); (2) by 
the natural light which is divinely impressed upon him, man 
possesses the innate ability or capacity to recognize causal 
relationships in the sensible world, understand the meaning 
of an end, discern what is good and evil, and subsequently 
order his activities towards an end. 140 
With respect to man's natural appetency, we noted that 
natural law principles are not innate in the appetitive 
140See Proximate Context, [2] and [3], and note 85 
above. 
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power (the will), but, rather, must be presented to it by 
reason--since, by nature, actual desire and love only follow 
upon a good as known. But what is proper to the will is the 
inherent tendency (natural inclination) and the desiring for 
the good as such and for certain goods befitting human 
nature--as determined by human nature itself. In a word, 
while intrinsically determined towards goods, the will as an 
appetitive power depends upon the intellect for the 
apprehension of such goods; in this way, natural law 
principles are understood by St. Thomas as connatural to man 
inasmuch as they bear a correspondence or proportion to 
man's determinate tendencies or inclinations towards certain 
goods as known. 
We next investigated this proportion or connaturality 
which obtains between man's natural inclinations for certain 
goods and the natural law precepts concerning them. Now, on 
the one hand, all human inclinations, insofar as they are 
regulated by reason, are subordinated to a first principle--
arising from the acquired knowledge of sensible natures; on 
the other hand, St. Thomas states that the order of natural 
law precepts is according to the order of natural 
inclinations (see note 96) . 
How can we understand this apparent vicious circle? 
First, we noted that knowledge of an object as good for St. 
Thomas implies the knowledge of that thing precisely as 
desirable (by virtue of the inherent goodness of the actual 
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object itself which influences such desire in the subject); 
hence, natural law knowledge, which concerns the regulation 
of man's actions with respect to the end, must involve 
(through reflective knowledge upon his actual desires for 
certain goods) the knowledge of his natural inclination for 
the end. Next, we explored the notion of rectitude by which 
man's activities are properly ordered towards his end (i.e., 
the knowledge and love of God) : while reason is rectified 
through conformity to the will's natural inclination for the 
ultimate end (to the extent the end is apprehended by reason 
and proposed to the will), the will is rectified through 
conformity to reason regarding the proper means towards that 
end. Natural law precepts, by which man's activities are 
directed towards his natural end, thus arise from the 
knowledge of certain means as necessary with respect to the 
end. Such knowledge thus involves--in part--knowledge of his 
determinate tendencies or inclinations for certain goods. In 
a qualified sense, then, natural law knowledge is said to be 
naturally implanted or innate--precisely insofar as (1) 
one's own natural inclinations serve as content-determining-
causes of natural law knowledge, and (2) man has the 
capacity or ability to acquire knowledge of his natural 
inclinations with respect to human goods. In view of St. 
Thomas' theory of cognition, however, we stressed that the 
knowledge of a natural inclination is (1) attained only 
through the knowledge of a sensible objects, and (2).only 
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with respect to such an object--as actually desired; for, as 
St. Thomas states, the end of practical knowledge is 
operation as concerned with singular existents (see note 107 
above). 
From the above analysis, we came to understand (1) how 
knowledge of natural law precepts is (a) (properly speaking) 
acquired and (b) (in a qualified sense) naturally implanted 
or innate, (2) how natural law knowledge is "natural" to man 
and "naturally known," and (3) how activity in accord with 
natural law knowledge is "natural" to man. In this 
connection we recalled that creatures possess a double 
character--namely (1) as measured (mensuratae) by the 
knowledge of God to be what they are, and (2) as measures 
(mensurae) of human knowledge as to what is known; 
correlatively, the term impressio for St. Thomas has two 
related applications--namely, (1) with respect to (human) 
nature and those operative powers as divinely impressed upon 
man and other creatures (see notes 37-41), and (2) with 
respect to the knowledge of eternal law as divinely 
impressed upon man through the medium of actually existing 
(human and subhuman) natures (see notes 119-122) . According 
to this acquired knowledge, man's reason subsequently 
directs him in the activities proper to his nature. 
In view of our consideration of natural law as divinely 
implanted, naturally implanted, innate and acquired, we 
concluded our commentary by stressing several related 
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points: 
1. The proximate basis of St. Thomas' moral doctrine is 
not human reason simply, but human reason as rectified by 
natural law knowledge; such knowledge is acquired from the 
actual experience of individual human natures in their 
actual relationships with one another and with other 
sensible existents. 
2. Correlatively, the obligatory character of natural 
law precepts is not based simply upon the authority of human 
reason, but upon God as the author and governor of human 
nature. 
3. The obligatory character of natural law does not 
eclipse free choice; rather, man's free choice is 
established by divine providence. 
4. Nor can free choice be the foundation of the moral 
order; for free choice does not determine what is good and 
what is evil; rather, the moral order is determined by the 
law of human nature as ordained by God; hence, man is 
personally accountable to God for his freely chosen actions. 
5. The natural moral law is not imposed violently or 
coercively upon man; rather its precepts are connatural to 
him and direct him towards his true end, which is perfect 
happiness. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Having explored St. Bonaventure's and St. Thomas' 
doctrines of natural law in view of their respective 
doctrines of being, knowledge, and nature, let us now sum up 
their teachings and clarify the manner in which each thinker 
understands natural law as innate. 
I. St. Bonaventure 
In our first key-text study (In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, 
a. un., q. 2: "Utrum omnes appetant beatitudinem veram"), we 
learned that natural law is taken by St. Bonaventure in 
three different senses. First, natural law is an innate 
habitus per naturalem originem; as such, natural law is 
consubstantial to the soul. Secondly, as a collectio 
praeceptorum natural law is an innate habitus per innatam 
dispositionem, which guides the natural judgment of 
conscience and inclines the natural pondus of synderesis. 
Precisely as a collectio praeceptorum, natural law for St. 
Bonaventure is at once innate and acquired: it is innate 
inasmuch as it is identified with the natural light of 
reason by which we know and judge everything; it is acquired 
with respect to the knowledge of material creatures which we 
can only attain through sense perception. Hence, a natural 
law precept such as "Parents must be honored" is based upon 
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acquired knowledge inasmuch as the knowledge of an actual 
"mother" and "father" is sensibly derived; yet, such a 
precept is innate inasmuch as the honor due to parents is 
immediately discernable by the light of natural reason in 
the very act of knowing "mother" and "father. 111 
Concerning this second habitus of natural law (per 
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innatam dispositionem) Bonaventure goes further. In addition 
to knowledge per similitudinem g sensu acceptam, he asserts 
that man is capable of knowledge per essentiam whereby the 
soul, its affections, and God are known through innate 
species; these innate species are impressed directly upon 
the soul by God. According to this mode of knowledge, 
natural law knowledge is simply innate (simpliciter innatus) 
with respect to the soul, its affections, and God. For 
example, a natural law precept such as "Love God" qualifies 
as simply innate by virtue of both (1) the innate light of 
natural reason, and (2) the contents of such a precept (the 
soul, its affection, and God) as interiorly known per 
1See Key-Text A, remote context #a, especially notes 25 
and 26. The immediate discernment of the honor due to 
parents will be explained further below. Note that when St. 
Bonaventure speaks of the knowledge of mother, father, or 
any other creature, he does not think of these natures as 
definitional terms of logic; rather, such knowledge pertains 
to the actuality of those real beings understood (1) in the 
light of--and with respect to--absolute being and (2) in 
their concrete relations with other real beings. St. 
Bonaventure's notion of actuality, however, is different 
from that of St. Thomas' inasmuch as reality for St. 
Bonaventure is light; reality for St. Thomas is existence. 
See Key-Text A, note 33; Key-Text C, Commentary; Appendix D; 
note 57 below. 
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essentiam. 2 
By virtue of cognitio per essentiam, the notion of God 
is said to be naturally inserted in us {"naturaliter est 
nobis inserta"); yet, such innate knowledge of God is not to 
be construed in any Cartesian or Kantian fashion. In what 
way, then, is knowledge of God {qua infinite, immutable, 
absolute Being) innate for St. Bonaventure? He explains that 
man has knowledge of his end {infinite Being) through the 
innate knowledge of his own indigent nature which is 
disposed and inclined towards that end. 3 But how is 
knowledge of man's own indigent nature innate? God is 
actually present to the interior of the soul, not as a 
direct object of knowledge, but as the guiding and ruling 
Light by which the soul sees itself as signifying God qua 
infinite Being. Through God's illuminating real presence to 
the soul, the soul recognizes its sacramental significance 
as an imago Dei--that is, as a capacity for knowing and 
loving infinite Being. 4 
Thirdly, natural law can be understood as a habitus per 
acguisatam dispositionem. Such a habitus is innate insofar 
as man's nature is perfected through deliberate conduct in 
conformity to the innate habitus of natural law per 
naturalem originem; yet, the natural law habitus per 
2 See Key-Text A, Remote Context #a. 
3 See Key-Text A, sections [4] and [5], and Commentary. 
4See Key-Text A, Commentary; Key-Text C, Commentary. 
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acgµisatam dispositionem is acquired insofar as its actual 
instantiation is only brought about through right 
deliberation and conduct. 5 
As distinguished according to these three kinds of 
habitus (i.e., innate origin, innate disposition, acquired 
disposition) natural law is thus proper to the orders of (1) 
being/essence (2) knowledge/precept, and (3) operation-
perfection. 
Our study of Key-Text B (Comm. Luc., c. 19, v. 21, n. 
34) revealed several interrelated aspects of natural law in 
virtue of its character as innate. Insofar as it is equated 
with justice and charity, natural law is intrinsically 
relational and personal: it is relational because it orients 
man's intellect and will beyond his own interiority towards 
God and other creatures; it is personal because through it 
man is ordered to God and other human beings in an intimate 
communion of love. 6 Because natural law is written in the 
heart of man--that is, as proper to man's very nature--it 
bears an ontological and psychological preeminence with 
respect to the intellect and will, and their respective 
operations; consequently, natural law establishes in every 
human person an inexorable obligation to God and grounds a 
universal moral order which transcends cultural and 
5See Key-Text A, Commentary, especially note 105. 
6 For an explanation of Bonaventure's notion of persona, 
see note 25 of Key-Text B. 
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historical bounds. Finally, natural law bears an ontological 
priority over the written law inasmuch as the latter is 
rooted in and follows from the former. Hence, a consonance 
obtains between the interior and exterior law whereby the 
latter mirrors and clarifies the former. 7 
Key-Text C (De Perf. Evang., q. 4, a. 1, concl.}, 
concerns the cosmic significance of natural law; here 
natural law is said to be an impression of eternal law. All 
creatures are formed, preserved, and ordered to God 
according to eternal law; and by virtue of their being, as 
characterized by efficient, formal, and final causality, all 
creatures represent God in some way. 8 
With respect to man, we learned that the human soul for 
Bonaventure is ordered directly to God as its originative, 
exemplary, and final Cause. In virtue of this immediate 
ordination to God, the human person bears an inviolable 
dignity which is irreducible to any finite good. Further, 
the soul--a substance in itself composed of form and 
(spiritual} matter--is the act and entelechia of the body; 9 
7See Key-Text B, Commentary. Since natural law imposes 
personal obligation, the external law carries the force of 
personal obligation to the extent that it is rooted in, and 
accords with, natural law. 
8 See Key-Text C, Commentary. 
9See Key-Text A, note 2, where St. Bonaventure (1) 
asserts that the human soul is a substance in itself 
composed of form and (spiritual} matter, and (2) argues that 
the component of spiritual matter is required to account for 
the soul's individuality and mutability. While the soul for 
Bonaventure is the entelechia of the body, it is not the 
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hence the body is subordinate to the soul; indeed, the 
visible universe is {proximately) ordered to the human soul 
which, in turn, is {immediately) ordered to God. This cosmic 
hierarchy is established according to the eternal law of 
God. 10 
Complementing the immediate ordination of his soul to 
God, man is also indirectly ordered to God through the 
mediation of the corporeal world insofar as it is recognized 
in its metaphysical significance as a likeness of God as 
origin, exemplar, and end of all creation. This recognition 
is achieved by the light of natural law, which Bonaventure 
describes as a similitude of eternal law impressed upon 
man's soul. As such, natural law signifies eternal law which 
is present to the mind but not directly known therein. The 
whole visible universe thus indirectly leads man to God by 
way of natural law. In this sense, natural law is understood 
as both immanent {intrinsic) and transcendent to man since 
its scope extends to all beings and the knowledge of all 
beings . 11 
form of the body; rather, the body of man for St. 
Bonaventure possesses its own proper form which is naturally 
subordinate to the soul. 
10See Key-Text C, Commentary, especially notes 19-23. 
11see Key-Text C, Commentary, especially notes 25-29. 
Natural law possesses a transcendent aspect insofar as it 
orients man {according to knowledge and love) beyond his own 
being towards other beings and ultimately towards God. On 
the intrinsic and transcendent aspects of natural law, see 
Key-Text B, note 34, and Key-Text A, note 40. 
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Within the human mind itself, we learned that natural 
law as habitus per naturalem originem is situated in the 
most intimate and supreme locus of the mind--namely, the 
memory. It is here that the eternal law radiates and 
interfaces with natural law as its created impression; and 
by virtue of this causal interplay of light between eternal 
law and natural law, man is united with the eternity of God. 
That natural law is the medium by which man refers the 
cosmos to God becomes clear since natural law serves (1) as 
the central point of unity among the powers and operations 
of the mind and (2) as the intimate and supreme point of 
communion between the soul and God. 12 
The significance of natural law as innate is further 
revealed in Bonaventure's doctrine of the genetic unity of 
the tripartite mind, whereby the structure and operations of 
the mind image the relations among the Trinity of Divine 
Persons--Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Accordingly, the 
memory, which is analogous to the Father, serves as the 
radical and terminating principle of the human intellect. 
Here, the role of natural law is seen in its corresponding 
modes of essence (as proper to memory) , knowledge (proper to 
intellect and analogous to the Son), and operation (proper. 
to the conjunction of intellect and will and analogous to 
the Holy Spirit), in constituting the tripartite mind of man 
and directing its operations in an organically unified 
12see Key-Text c, Commentary, notes 35-51. 
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manner. 13 
Finally, natural law, precisely as a habitus per 
naturalem originem is a kind of ratio seminalis which, as 
indelibly impressed upon man's soul, serves as the 
regulative principle according to which man becomes what he 
is--namely, an image of God born with the capacity for union 
with and conformity to God. As a sort of ratio seminalis of 
human nature, natural law is that metaphysical principle by 
which human nature is constituted and regulated in its 
natural operations; for natural law is itself the abiding 
impression (impressio) of eternal law; and eternal law is 
that ordo by which human (indeed, each and every) nature is 
formed, rectified, and perfected. In this respect, natural 
law is innate in the most profound sense of the term since 
it represents the essential definition, core, and inner 
limit of man's being . 14 
Natural law for St. Bonaventure can thus be summed up 
quite literally as man's raison d'etre; for natural law is 
that metaphysical, epistemological, and moral principle by 
which the human person is rightly ordered to God, to 
himself, and to other creatures through knowledge and love. 
Inasmuch as the light of God is interiorly present to man, 
not only as the principle of his being, but as the principle 
of all his knowledge, natural law knowledge for Bonaventure 
13 See Key-Text C, Commentary, notes 52-61. 
14See Key-Text C, Commentary, notes 62-67. 
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is primarily innate and transcendent in orientation and, 
secondarily, acquired and worldly in scope. 
II. St. Thomas 
In our contextual introduction to Key-Text A (In IV 
Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, resp.: "Utrum habere plures uxores 
sit contra legem naturae"), we cited passages in the 
Commentary on the Sentences where St. Thomas identifies 
natural law with either (1) man's nature, (2) a operative 
power, (3) the product or operation of such a power, or (4) 
precepts or principles. Taken as man's nature, natural law 
is understood as implanted (indita) by God. Insofar as the 
term indita implies a relationship of an item to a causal 
principle, natural law--qua nature--is not simply intrinsic 
to man, but bears reference to something outside of man--
namely, God. 15 
Taken as an operative power of man, natural law is 
understood as natural and innate to man; as natural, natural 
law (qua natural power) is understood as bearing a certain 
correspondence or suitability to human nature or form; as 
"innate," natural law (qua operative power) is understood 
here as intrinsic (or proper) to human nature. 16 
Taken as a product or operation of an operative power, 
15 In this connection, see Key-Text A, Proximate 
Contexts #f and #c. 
16See Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #a, #d, and #e, 
and note 35. 
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natural law is understood as inborn (innata) or (naturally) 
implanted (inseruit) in man. 17 As such, natural law is said 
to be natural inasmuch as whatever is caused by a principle 
of [some] nature is said to be "natural" to that nature . 18 
Finally, taken as precepts, dictates, or principles, 
natural law is said to be innate (innata) to practical 
reason, 19 connatural to man (connaturales homini), 20 and 
implanted (indita or inseruit) either (i) [by God] in 
natural cognition, 21 (ii) in reason itself, 22 (iii) 
(inseruit) by an innate power, 23 or (iv) [by God] in the 
constitution of human nature. 24 At this point in our study, 
however, the meanings of these various expressions (innate, 
connatural, implanted) was not yet made clear. 
Next, we turned directly to the key-text itself. 
Looking at the general form and direction of St. Thomas' 
response, we noted that he opens his discussion with an 
exposition of his theory of nature. Next, he introduces his 
teaching on natural law which is clearly an extension of his 
17See Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #b, #c, and #e. 
18See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #e. 
19See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #b. 
20See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #b. 
21See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #c. 
22See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #d. 
23 See key-Text A, Proximate Context #e. 
24See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #f. 
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doctrine of nature. Only then does he proceed to the moral 
issue at hand; and the solution he offers is squarely set in 
terms of his opening discussion on nature and natural law. 
We thus concluded that St. Thomas' moral doctrine has as its 
basis the natural law, which itself issues from his doctrine 
of nature--specifically human nature. 
What, then, is St. Thomas' doctrine of nature as 
explicated in his Commentary Qil the Sentences? We summed up 
his teaching in the following five points: (1) natura is 
that intrinsic principle by which a creature is determined 
in its proper actions and directed in those actions towards 
its proper end; 25 (2) insofar as it is an impression 
(impressio) divinely implanted (divinitus indita) in 
creatures, natura signifies for St. Thomas an ordination to 
God as its extrinsic cause; (3) creatures, according to 
their proper natures, are ordered to God as their ultimate 
end and good; (4) this ordination to God involves the 
mediation (causal relationships) of creatures to one 
another; 26 (5) the perfection (perfectio) of a creature is 
understood in two ways: (a) with respect to a thing's 
operation suitable to its form; (b) with respect to the 
union of a creature with the ultimate perfecting end of its 
being (esse) . 21 
25See Key-Text A, section [1], and notes 24-25. 
26See Key-Text A, notes 29-31. 
27 See Key-Text A, note 32. 
After viewing St. Thomas' doctrine on nature in 
general, we next looked at his notion of human nature qua 
specifically intellectual. By virtue of his intellectual 
nature, man has the capacity to discern--through sensible 
experience28 --causal relationships in the world and thus 
trace secondary principles to their first principles; 29 
likewise, inasmuch as he naturally tends to his end 
according to reason, man is able to refer secondary ends 
(goods) back to God as his ultimate end (or good) . 30 
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In Key-Text A, then, St. Thomas identifies knowledge 
and appetite as the principles of action proper to creatures 
which participate in cognition; but further, he explicitly 
identifies natural law in man with the conceptio which is 
naturally implanted in him ("lex ergo naturalis nihil est 
aliud quam conceptio homini naturaliter indita") . 31 
What can be said of the nature and derivation of the 
naturalis conceptio? Our investigation revealed that it is 
not a knowledge simply of man's end; rather it is a complex 
knowledge which involves knowledge of (1) determinate goods 
(human persons and other creatures existing in the sensible 
universe), (2) man's actions as flowing from his own nature 
(generic and specific) as concerned with (3) the conunon end 
280n this, see Key-Text A, note 64. 
29 See Key-Text A, note 30. 
30See Key-Text A, section [3] and note 31. 
31See Key-Text A, section [4] . 
366 
or indeterminate good. This complex knowledge is the moral 
norm by which we discern what we must do (gy,Q agenda 
discernimus) . 32 Taken precisely as an operation and 
immanent effect of the vis cognoscitiva as its efficient 
cause, the naturalis conceptio is understood by St. Thomas 
as innata or naturaliter indita. 33 Taken as precisely as a 
knowledge, the naturalis conceptio is (1) both divinely and 
naturally implanted in man, and (2) innate; 34 but further, 
inasmuch as its contents are constituted by material objects 
acting as content-determining-causes, the naturalis 
conceptio is (3) acquired from the senses. 35 
In order to understand how the naturalis conceptio is 
considered by St. Thomas to be at once innate, divinely and 
naturally implanted, and acquired, we investigated how the 
naturalis conceptio is produced. Through sensible 
experience, man acquires knowledge of human persons (as well 
as other creatures) ; according to the knowledge of these 
other existents, man acquires some knowledge of his own 
operations, powers, and nature in relation to those 
creatures; and from the knowledge of himself in relation to 
32See Key-Text A, note 10; see notes 45-46 concerning 
moral good and evil in terms of rectitude (or the lack 
thereof) of the will with respect to the ultimate end as 
known. 
33See Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #b and #e, and 
sections [1] and [4] . 
34For references, see notes 19 through 24 above._ 
35See Key-Text A, notes 61-62. 
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those creatures--precisely as known, desired, and loved--he 
attains knowledge of what "good" is. Thus, from the combined 
knowledge of {1) other creatures {human and subhuman), {2) 
the knower's own nature and operations in relation to those 
creatures as desired, and {3) what "good" is, the naturalis 
conceptio is constituted. 36 
From our analysis of the production of the naturalis 
conceptio we came to understand how natural law knowledge is 
at once innate, divinely and naturally implanted, and 
acquired. First, one's own nature and operative powers are 
{a) efficient causes of natural law knowledge {#a, 34-37 and 
49 above) and, to some extent, {b) content-determining-
causes of such knowledge {{#b, #c and #f and notes 68-69 
above); hence, inasmuch as human nature--taken precisely as 
{a) the efficient cause and {b) a content-determining-cause 
of natural law knowledge--is divinely impressed upon man, 
natural law knowledge is said to be divinely impressed in 
man. 37 Secondly, one's natural operations serve to some 
extent as content-determining-causes of natural law 
knowledge; hence, inasmuch as one's natural operations--
taken precisely as content-determining-causes of natural law 
knowledge--are produced by man's own natural powers, natural 
law knowledge is understood as naturally implanted or innate 
36See Key-Text A, notes 65-69. 
37See Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #a #b, #c and #f, 
and notes 34-37, 49, 68-69. 
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in man. 38 Thirdly, one's own natural operations, powers, 
and nature, are known only reflectively through the 
knowledge of sensible creatures; and since the knowledge of 
such creatures is itself acquired only through sensible 
experience, the whole of natural law knowledge--as 
constituted by both its intrinsic and extrinsic content-
determining-causes- -is an acquired knowledge. Hence,-
properly speaking, natural law knowledge for St. Thomas is 
an acquired knowledge; only in a qualified sense is such 
knowledge considered as innate or naturally or divinely 
implanted in man. 
In our contextual introduction to Key-Text B (Summa 
Theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 2, resp.: "Utrum sit in nobis 
aliqua lex naturalis"), we reviewed St. Thomas' later 
teaching on human cognition. Corresponding to man's natural 
constitution--namely, a spiritual soul as form united to a 
body--the proper object of the human intellect is a quiddity 
or nature existing in corporeal matter. Thus, human 
knowledge for St. Thomas is derived from, determined by, and 
oriented towards the sensible world of actually existing 
creatures. Human knowledge thus depends upon two proximate 
causes: (1) the cognitive powers (external and internal 
senses; the agent and recipient intellects) as efficient 
cause of cognition; (2) sensible existents (human and 
subhuman natures) as content-determining-causes of 
38See Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #d, #e and [4] . 
369 
cognition. 39 
We next considered St. Thomas' notion of participation 
as applied to his doctrine of natural law. Natural law, he 
tells us, "is nothing other than a participation in the 
rational creature of eternal law; "40 as this concise 
definition indicates, three main factors are involved in 
natural law participation--namely, (1) eternal law, -(2) 
natural law, and (3) man {qua rational creature). The first 
factor, eternal law, is the unparticipated exemplar cause 
which exists independently, subsistently, and perfectly in 
the mind of God. Eternal law is present to the multiplicity 
of men through natural law in a restricted and determined 
manner. The third factor, man, is the individual participant 
{finite, mutable, and imperfect) which receives natural law, 
and through which he participates in eternal law; as a 
result of this participation, man is perfected as a moral 
{intellectual and volitional) agent. The second factor, 
natural law, is the participated-in-perfection which--
derived from eternal law through efficient causality--is 
actually present in each particular human being. Thus, 
natural law is (1) that by which eternal law is present in 
each human being, (2) that which eternal law has in common 
39See Key-Text B, Remote Context #a. 
40See Key-Text B, note 32 above for the Latin. See also 
Key-Text A, notes 34-37 and section [2]; in Key-Text A, 
however, the rubric of participation is used only indirectly 
with respect to natural law. 
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with each human being qua participant, and (3) that by which 
men are (univocally} like one another as moral agents and 
(analogously} like God as intellectual and volitional 
Agent. 41 As revealed through the course of our study, 
natural law participation pertains to (1) knowledge, (2) 
human nature and its activity, and (3) man's perfection 
through his actual relationships with creatures and God. 
We then presented an overview of St. Thomas' teachings 
on divine providence, eternal law, and natura, 42 which can 
be summed up as follows: 
1. Divine providence consists of (1) the plan of the 
order of things pre-ordained towards an end and (b} the 
execution of this order, which is called government. 43 
2. Eternal law is the plan of divine providence by 
which God directs all acts and movements of creatures 
towards their proper ends. 44 
3. All creatures are subject to eternal law according 
to their inherent natures impressed upon them by God. 45 
4. Hence, man, who also is a creature of God, is said 
to participate in eternal law according to his own divinely 
impressed nature; this participation in eternal law is 
41See Key-Text B, Remote Context #b. 
42 See Key-Text B, Remote Context #c. 
43See Key-Text B, notes 33-35. 
44See Key-Text B, note 36. 
45See Key-Text B, notes 36-37. 
nothing other than natural law--as it pertains to human 
nature and natural activity. 46 
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We next reviewed St. Thomas' theory of natural 
appetency. Here, it was noted that every nature (qua active 
potency) and every natural power possesses a determinate 
tendency towards certain operations and goods; thus man, by 
virtue of his hylemorphic nature and operative powers, 
possesses a multiplicity of determinate tendencies 
(vegetative, sensitive, and rational) towards certain 
operations and goods. These different tendencies are 
hierarchically ordered to one another so that a 
corresponding hierarchy of human goods is established; 
according to such an ordination, the natural activities of 
man are directed towards a unifying end--namely, the 
knowledge and love of God. 47 
In the key-text itself, St. Thomas addresses the 
question, "Utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis"; and in 
his respondeo, he states that the rational creature 
participates in Eternal Law not simply through natural 
inclination, but in a more excellent manner--namely, by 
discerning what is good and evil, and governing himself and 
others according to the light of natural reason; this light 
is an impression in us of the Divine Light. This twofold 
participation in Eternal Law by the rational creature is 
46See Key-Text B, notes 40-41. 
47See Key-Text B, Remote Context #d, and notes 42-63. 
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called natural law. 
In our commentary on this key-text, we noted that 
natural law, as equated with human nature itself (including 
its operative powers), is tantamount to man's natural 
capacity or aptitude for attaining his proper end. However, 
inasmuch as a human person must attain his perfection 
through actual involvement with other sensible existents, 
natural law--in the full sense of the term--pertains to a 
human nature in its operations of knowing and willing vis-a-
vis other existents in the sensible world. 48 
In this connection, St. Thomas reiterates elsewhere in 
the Summa Theologiae that first principles of practical 
reason are naturally known (naturaliter cognita) inasmuch 
as: (1) they are derived from both (a) extrinsic content-
determining-causes of knowledge (namely, sensible existents) 
and (b) intrinsic efficient causes (primarily the light of 
natural reason) ; 49 (2) by virtue of the natural light which 
is divinely impressed upon him, man possesses the innate 
ability or capacity to recognize causal relationships in the 
sensible world, understand the meaning of an end, discern 
what is good and evil, and subsequently order his activities 
towards an end. 5° Further, natural law principles are said 
48See Key-Text B, note 68-75. 
49See Key-Text B, notes 76-87. 
50See Key-Text B, Proximate Context, [2] and [3] and 
notes 80-85. See also Key-Text A, Proximate Context #a. 
to be "natural" to man and "naturally known" inasmuch as 
they bear a correspondence to his natural inclination 
towards certain goods as known. 51 
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How are we to understand this correspondence between 
natural inclinations for certain goods and the correlative 
natural law precept? Closer study revealed that knowledge of 
an object as good implies the knowledge of that object 
precisely as desirable {by virtue of the inherent goodness 
of the actual object itself which influences the natural 
desire in the subject}; hence, natural law knowledge, which 
concerns the regulation of man's actions with respect to the 
end, must involve (through reflective knowledge upon man's 
actual desires for certain goods} the knowledge of his 
natural inclination (i.e., his will} for the end. 52 
We next studied St. Thomas' notion of rectitude by 
which man's activities are properly ordered towards his end 
(i.e., the knowledge and love of God}: while reason is 
rectified through conformity to the natural inclination for 
the ultimate end (as apprehended by reason and proposed to 
the will}, the will is rectified through conformity to 
reason regarding the proper means towards that end. It is 
this double ordination of reason and will with respect to 
(1) the end, and (2) things ordered to the end {i.e, means}, 
that explains the derivation of natural law precepts; for a 
51See Key-Text B, notes 88-92. 
52See Key-Text B, notes 93-104. 
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natural law precept implies a relation of means to a natural 
end, inasmuch as something is perceived as being necessary 
to that end.s3 Accordingly, insofar as (1) one's own 
natural inclinations serve as content-determining-causes of 
natural law knowledge, and (2) man has the capacity or 
ability to acquire natural law knowledge--according to the 
knowledge of his natural inclinations with respect to human 
goods--knowledge of natural law is said to be naturally 
implanted or innate. s4 
In view of our above analysis, we came to understand 
(1) how knowledge of natural law precepts is (a} (properly 
speaking} acquired and (b} (in a qualified sense} naturally 
implanted or innate, (2) how natural law knowledge is 
"natural" to man and "naturally known," and (3) how activity 
in accord with natural law knowledge is "natural" to man. In 
this connection, we called attention to St. Thomas' double 
application of the term impressio with respect to (1) human 
nature and (2) human knowledge.ss First, inasmuch as man's 
own nature (including its operative powers) is directly 
implanted in or impressed upon him by God, natural law .(as 
identified with human nature) is God-given--that is, 
received from an extrinsic cause; of course, inasmuch as the 
operations which flow from man's God-given natural powers 
s3 See Key-Text B, notes 105-117. 
s4See Key-Text B, notes 41, 70-71, and 78. 
55See Key-Text B, notes 118-122. 
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are intrinsic to man, natural law is understood as innate or 
inborn. 56 Secondly, inasmuch as the knowledge of human 
nature (taken precisely as an active potency in its concrete 
circumstances) is indirectly impressed upon his intellect by 
God through the medium of actually existing (human and 
subhuman) natures (as known in and through the actual 
context of sensible experience), natural law knowledge is 
(properly) understood by St. Thomas as a naturally acquired 
knowledge. 57 
III. Differences in Thought 
At times, both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas identify 
natural law with the nature of man and his natural powers. 
To this extent, both thinkers speak of natural law as 
divinely impressed (impressa), implanted (indita), or innate 
(innata), in man. With regard to natural law knowledge, St. 
Thomas agrees with St. Bonaventure that natural law 
principles are innate--precisely inasmuch as (a) all human 
cognition is efficiently caused by the natural light of 
reason and (b) by virtue of this natural light, man 
possesses the capacity to discern what is good and evil. 
Further, St. Bonaventure agrees with St. Thomas that natural 
56See Key-Text B, Remote Contexts #c and #d; see note 
57 below. For an explanation of the term innata, see Key-
Text A, note 13. 
57See Key-Text B, notes 119-121. See Key-Text B, notes 
41, 70-71, and 78 regarding natural law knowledge as-innate-
-in a qualified sense. 
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law principles are acquired--to the extent that natural law 
pertains to the sensibly derived knowledge of material 
creatures. But what can be said of their differences 
concerning natural law knowledge as innate? 
A thorough answer to the above question would require 
an extensive examination of their underlying philosophical 
and theological differences; 58 suffice it, however, to 
enumerate a few fundamental differences between their 
accounts of human nature and human knowledge; for their 
doctrines of human nature have direct bearing upon their 
respective epistemologies--which, in turn, account for their 
different views of natural law knowledge as innate. 
1. For St. Bonaventure, the soul of man is a substance 
in itself, constituted by its own (spiritual) matter and 
substantial form; likewise, the body of man is a substance 
in itself, constituted by its own matter and substantial 
form. Hence, while the body is naturally subordinate to the 
soul, the soul is not the substantial form of the body, and 
58According to Gilson (La Philosophie de St. 
Bonaventure, 345-46), the fundamental differences between 
the "Christian Platonism" of St. Bonaventure and the 
"Christian Aristotelianism" of St. Thomas can be traced to a 
difference of opinion which St. Thomas identifies as 
follows: "· .. in tribus eadem opinionum diversitas invenitur: 
scilicet in eductione formarum in esse, in acquisitione 
virtutum et in acquisitione scientiarum." De Veritate, q. 
11, a. 1, resp. (XXII, 349b). See also De Virt., q. un., a. 
8, resp. For a comprehensive explication of the underlying 
theological and philosophical differences between St. 
Bonaventure and St. Thomas, see Frederick Charles Herx, "The 
Problem of Illumination in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas 
Aquinas: During the Period 1250-1259" (Ph.D. diss., Notre 
Dame, 1961) . 
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thus possesses a certain independence from the body in its 
proper operations. Accordingly, the operative powers of the 
soul (the intellect and will) are consubstantial with the 
soul and likewise enjoy a certain independence from the body 
in their respective operations. 59 By extension, then, the 
human soul enjoys a certain independence from the corporeal 
world in its movements and activities. 
For St. Thomas, the soul is not a complete substance in 
itself, but rather the substantial form of the body which 
requires the latter as its material principle; together the 
soul and body constitute a single substantial unity--the 
human compositum. Hence the relationship between the soul 
and body for St. Thomas is much more integral and crucial. 
Accordingly, the operative faculties of the soul (the 
intellect and will) require to a greater extent the bodily 
faculties (notably the external and internal senses) in 
order to perform their operations (intellection and 
volition) . 6° Consequently, the corporeal world plays a more 
important role in the operations of the human soul for St. 
Thomas than for St. Bonaventure. In this connection, let us 
consider the differences between their theories of 
knowledge. 
2. According to St. Bonaventure, man's intellect is a 
tabula rasa only with respect to the knowledge of corporeal 
59See Key-Text A, Remote Context #a. 
60See Key-Text B, Remote Context #c. 
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creatures; consequently, he requires sensible experience in 
order to acquire knowledge of the sensible world; further, 
knowledge of the extrinsic world is required inasmuch as, by 
virtue of such knowledge, man is led inwardly to consider 
the existence and nature of his own spiritual soul. But 
having turned within, man--without recourse to phantasms--is 
able to know his own soul in the divine light which shines 
from within his soul. 61 
For St. Thomas, not only is sensible experience 
required for the knowledge of corporeal creatures, but even 
the knowledge of one's own soul (excepting supernatural 
revelation) depends upon phantasms as derived from sensible 
experience; and when man (naturally) attains to some 
knowledge of himself, it is only with reference to sensible 
creatures, and simply by the light of his own intellect. 62 
This epistemological contrast between St. Bonaventure and 
St. Thomas is played out in their respective theories on 
abstraction. 
3. For Bonaventure, abstraction involves an 
intellectual judgment whereby the sensible species of 
sensibly known creatures enter the mind and are understood 
in the radiance of the eternal reasons which shines from 
within the soul; accordingly, the mind is led inwardly from 
61See Key-Text A, Remote Context #a. 
62 See Key-Text A, notes 64-69; Key-Text B, Remote 
Context #a and note 33. 
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the knowledge of temporal and mutable creatures to the 
knowledge of their eternal and immutable Source of being. 
Let us note in this connection three corollary points: (a) 
knowledge of God is directly inf erred from the knowledge of 
creatures; (b) this inference (what St. Bonaventure refers 
to as a reductio or resolutio) from creature to God is based 
primarily upon the sacramental significance which every 
creature bears toward God as its exemplar; (c) there follows 
an additional reductio where the intelligible species (now 
known in the light of the eternal reasons) is referred back 
to the sensible object. 63 
For St. Thomas abstraction and judgment represent two 
distinct levels of actuations (#a and #b) . Abstraction 
occurs when the agent intellect uses the phantasm (as 
efficiently produced by the internal senses, and whose 
content is produced by the actual extramental existents) to 
63 See Key-Text A, remote context #a, especially notes 
26-28. See also Gilson, La Philosophie de St. Bonaventure, 
321. With respect to the reductio of the intellect back to 
particular objects, Leo Sweeney suggests that St. 
Bonaventure's epistemology may be a representationalism 
inasmuch he sets up an analogy between the triune God and 
human epistemology: "Bonaventure does, then, set up a 
parallel of the Father and Son as parent and offspring, but 
this parallel apparently works only if the 'similitude,' 
which is distinct from the sensible object, is known first 
and then leads the knower to the object itself. If so, such 
an epistemology is representational: the similitude or 
image, which re-presents the object, is known before the 
object itself, which thereafter becomes known." Christian 
Philosophy, 557-58. Such an interpretation accords with 
Bonaventure's metaphysics of exemplarism (see Key-Text A, 
note 33 and Appendix D) and his notion of human nature as a 
compositum of two substances--body and soul. 
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produce the actuation #a in the recipient intellect; at this 
level of actuation, the intellect becomes entitatively, but 
non-cognitively, its extramental object through the 
intelligible species (whose content-determining-cause is the 
extramental object); then, with the recipient intellect, the 
agent intellect produces the actuation #b which is the 
awareness of the object to which the intellect is conformed; 
in this actuation #b (awareness), the extramental object is 
directly known through the intelligible species to which the 
recipient intellect is conformed. 64 Judgment represents a 
further kind of intellectual actuation #b where assent is 
given that the object known is such or is not such. Thus, 
while judgment for St. Thomas involves abstraction, 
abstraction is not identical with judgment. 
Let us underscore three important implications which 
St. Thomas' theory of abstraction entail: simply by the 
natural light of the intellect, (a) the extramental object 
is directly known as it actually exists in the sensible 
world--without any immediate reference to God; (b) the 
knower knows himself secondarily and only according to his 
knowledge of sensible creatures; (c) knowledge of Gqd is 
arrived at only through further consideration of creatures 
(including the knower himself) as they actually exist in the 
64The intelligible species for St. Thomas is itself 
known only upon further consideration and by inference. See 
Key-Text B, Remote Context #a, especially notes 11-21. 
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world. 65 
4. According to his illumination theory and 
corresponding theory of abstraction, knowledge of natural 
law for Bonaventure is truly innate; for even the knowledge 
of creatures, which is derived from the senses, involves a 
reductio to the knowledge of the eternal principles which 
illumine, move, and direct the soul from within. Indeed, the 
illumination of these eternal principles, by which man is 
directed in all knowledge and activity, radiates from the 
core of his being ("Solus enim Deus propter summam 
simplicitatem et spiritualitatem illabitur animae, ita quod 
secundum veritatem est in anima et intimior animae quam ipsa 
sibi") . 66 Simply put, the epistemological aspect of natural 
law for St. Bonaventure involves the ordination of relative 
being to absolute Being; and inasmuch as the divine presence 
illumines the mind from within, the mind's reduction or 
resolution of relative being to the esse divinum gyg actus 
purus 67 follows an interior course. Hence, natural law 
knowledge is innate for St. Bonaventure in the most profound 
sense of the word. 
According to St. Thomas' theory of knowledge, the human 
intellect is measured, not by the interior light of God, but 
65 See Key-Text A, notes 24-33. 
66See Key-Text A, notes 77-78, 91 and 105. 
67See Key-Text A, note 33 and Appendix D. 
by the things created by Him. 68 By the sufficiency of his 
own natural light, man recognizes causal relationships in 
the sensible world, understands the meaning of an end, 
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discerns what is good and evil, and can subsequently order 
his activities towards that end. For this reason, St. Thomas 
asserts that the first principles of the intellect (both 
speculative and practical) are derived from the knowledge of 
extramental existents: "cognitio principiorum provenit nobis 
ex sensu"; "principia indemonstrabilia cognoscimus 
abstrahendo a singularibus". 69 For St. Thomas too, natural 
law involves the ordination of relative being to absolute 
Being; nevertheless, this ordination is not discovered by 
divine illumination from within the soul, but from the 
acquired knowledge of human natures. (one's own and others') 
as they actually exist in the concrete world. Thus, for St. 
Thomas, natural law knowledge is an acquired knowledge. 
In sum, because the human soul for St. Bonaventure is a 
substance in itself which enjoys a certain independence from 
the body, knowledge of sensible creatures through 
abstraction is ancillary to the soul's knowledge of itself 
68See Key-Text B, note 20. 
69See Key-Text B, notes 79 and 82 respectively. Thus, 
when we say that (1) St. Thomas' moral philosophy is an 
expression of the natural law, (2) that his doctrine of 
natural law is based upon his doctrine of nature, (3) that 
his doctrine of nature is rooted in his metaphysics and 
corresponding epistemology, it must be understood that all 
these related sciences (metaphysics, epistemology, and 
ethics) are derived from, pertain to, made true and -
validated by, man's actual experience in the concrete world. 
and God through an interior divine illumination; 
accordingly, natural law knowledge for Bonaventure is 
fundamentally innate inasmuch as it is (1) primarily 
dependent upon divine illumination and (2) secondarily 
dependent upon knowledge of sensible creatures through 
abstraction. 
For St. Thomas, however, man exists as a substantial 
unity of soul and body whereby the soul depends upon the 
bodily senses for the natural acquisition of knowledge--
including the knowledge of itself and God. Consequently, 
natural law knowledge for St. Thomas is a wholly acquired 
knowledge inasmuch as all human knowledge is naturally 
acquired through the bodily senses. 
IV. Points of Clarification 
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In our investigation of natural law a-s innate, we have 
considered St. Thomas' related teachings on human nature, 
knowledge, providence, law, rectitude, the good, perfection, 
and free-will. Let us now articulate a few of these 
doctrines vis-a-vis certain contemporary interpretations of 
St. Thomas as noted in our introduction. 70 
1. St. Thomas does not limit the {speculative} science 
of metaphysics--which pertains to beings as they actually 
exist in the real world--to the trappings of formal 
70The following statements as articulated below are 
also in line with the teachings of St. Bonaventure--even 
though his doctrines of human nature and knowledge are in 
many respects different from those of St. Thomas. 
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logic; 71 nor does he consider a human nature merely as a 
term of logic; rather, a human nature for him is an actually 
existing human person who possesses natural inclinations to 
certain actions and goals. Correspondingly, natural moral 
law concerns the knowledge of such human natures taken 
precisely in their teleological significance; hence, for St. 
Thomas, moral implications do, in fact, follow according to 
what human natures actually are. 72 
There is no warrant, then, for interpreting natural 
law--as understood by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, at 
least--as resting upon a merely logical definition of human 
nature--from which "one cannot validly derive an 'ought' 
from an 'is.'" Indeed, the charge that the Thomistic 
doctrine of natural law rests upon the so-called 
"naturalistic fallacy" is itself based upon the fallacy of 
confusing speculative knowledge with the limitations of 
71Regarding St. Thomas' understanding of metaphysics as 
extending to the consideration of matter and motion, see In 
Boeth. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, resp.; concerning his awareness 
that mathematics prescinds from the consideration of final 
causality, motion and operation, see In III Sent., d. 27, q. 
1, a. 4, ad 11; In Boeth. ~ Trin., q. 5, a. 4, ad 7; with 
regard to St. Thomas' criticism of certain ancient 
philosophers who, because of their restrictive terms of 
intelligibility, were unable to speak of final causes, see 
De Veritate, q. 5, a. 2, resp. 
72 For example, because, say, David Hume is a man, he 
ought to be truthful. With regard to Bonaventure's notions 
of nature and natural law, see Key-Text A, notes 33, 82, 91, 
105; Key-Text C, notes 63-68. On St. Thomas' notions of 
nature and natural law, see Key-Text B, Remote Context #c. 
formal logic. 73 
2. Since the notion of good is derived from the 
knowledge of one's human nature with respect to actual 
beings, first principles of practical reason (natural law 
principles) are formed according to the speculative 
knowledge of those real relationships. 74 As we have 
noted, 75 the practical intellect for St. Thomas is the 
speculative intellect extended to the consideration of 
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730n this, see Robert B. Ashmore, "Aquinas and Ethical 
Naturalism," The New Scholasticism 49 (1975), 76-86. The 
"naturalistic fallacy" indictment against natural law 
appears to be rooted in a rationalistic conception of being 
(and a corresponding narrow view of the role of ratio 
speculativa) . Consider, for example, John Finnis' 
rationalistic approach to being and his treatment of the 
uncaused cause: "The explanation of its existing can only be 
this: that the uncaused causing state of affairs includes, 
as a prerequisite to its existing, a state of affairs that 
exists because of what it is, i.e. because it is what it is. 
It will be convenient to l.abel this last-mentioned state of 
affairs D. In the case of all states of affairs except D, we 
can describe the state of affairs, say what it is, without 
knowing that it is (i.e. without knowing whether it is an 
existing state of affairs). But, of D the argument requires 
us to say that what it is is all that it requires·to exist." 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, 387. In this same 
rationalistic vein, see Germain Grisez' approach to the 
existence of God in Beyond the New Theism (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 36-84. In view of 
such rationalistic accounts of the uncaused cause, it is no 
wonder that Finnis' and Grisez' interpretation of St. Thomas 
is problematic and controversial. For a critique of the 
rationalistic approach to God as divorced from the tradition 
of realism, see John Edwin Gurr, The Principle of Sufficient 
Reason in Some Scholastic Systems: 1750-1900 (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1959). 
74 See Bonaventure, Key-Text A, Remote Contexts #a-b, 
and Commentary; St. Thomas, Key-Text B, Commentary. See 
notes 69 above and 88 below. 
75See Key-Text B, note 78. 
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action. Indeed, St. Thomas clearly affirms that counsel 
(consilium} is an act proper to the speculative intellect 
with respect to human activities (agibilia} . 76 There is no 
reason, then, for construing a dualism from the distinction 
made betweeen the operations of the speculative intellect 
and practical intellect; man has but one mind. 
3. The first principles of natural law for St. Thomas 
are not merely "prescriptive" as Germaine Grisez asserts; 77 
rather, St. Thomas identifies these moral principles as 
commands (praecepta} . 78 Nor does St. Thomas consider law 
(lex} as mere "advice." Rather law, for St. Thomas, "is a 
rule and measure of acts whereby man is induced to act or is 
restrained from acting--for lex is derived from ligare, 
76See ST I-II, q. 57, a. 6, resp., (VII, 370a}: "Circa 
agibilia autem humana tres actus rationis inveniuntur: 
quorum primus est consiliari, secundum iudicare, tertius est 
praecipere. Primi autem duo respondent actibus intellectus 
speculativi qui sunt inquirere et iudicare: nam consilium 
inquisitio quaedam est." See note 78 below for the 
continuation of this passage. 
77See our Introduction, note 44, and Key-Text B, note 
113; the term "prescriptive" as used by Grisez evidently 
refers to that which is advisable or recommended--and not 
what is commanded with imperative force. 
78As clarified in note 76 above, the office of 
"prescription" which Germain Grisez assigns to the practical 
intellect is, according to St. Thomas, proper to the 
speculative reason. It is the role of practical reason, not 
merely to offer counsel or advise, but to command 
(praecipere}. See fil I-II, q. 57, a. 6, resp. (VII, 370b}: 
"Sed tertius actus [i.e, praecipere] proprius est practici 
intellectus, inquantum est operativus: non enim ratio habet 
praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt." See Key-
Text B, note 96. It is evident, then, that St. Thomas knows 
the difference between counsel and command when he 
identifies the first principles of natural law as praecepta. 
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because it binds one to act. "79 Hence, the precepts 
(praecepta) of natural law (lex) are for St. Thomas not 
simply helpful suggestions for "the art of successful 
living. 1180 
79ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1, resp. (VII, 199a): " ... lex 
quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum quam 
inducitur aliquis ad agendum vel ab agendo retrahitur: 
dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad agendum. -" Note 
that this definition of law serves as the opening statement 
to his treatise on law (ST I-II, qq. 90-97), and thus must 
be taken as primary and foundational. In his discussion on 
the etymology of the term lex ("Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural 
Law Ethicist?," 55), however, Vernon Bourke makes no mention 
of this definition; see our Introduction, note 37. 
80See ST I-II, q. 99, aa. 1 and 5. Common to Grisez, 
Finnis, Boyle, Bourke, Owens, et al, is a certain approach 
to the moral life which one can describe in a word as 
insipid--proper to the dream-world one finds in Charles 
Schultz' popularized "Gospel According to Charlie Brown." 
Take, for example, Bourke's interpretation of St. Thomas 
regarding fornication ("Is Aquinas a Natural Law Ethicist?," 
62): "In effect, Thomas concludes that fornication is 
immoral, not so much because God dislikes it as because God 
sees that it is not g suitable and success-promoting 
activity for man [italics added]." In this connection, F. J. 
Thonnard speaks of a certain "egotist and bourgeois" 
approach to the moral life which "is well portrayed in the 
following 'Portrait of an Epicurean' [Martha, Le Poeme de 
Lucrece. morale, religion, science, 7]: "Who has not met, 
even today, a practical sage, unknowingly epicurean, 
moderated in his tastes, virtuous without great moral 
ambition, anxious to live well? He aims to keep body, spirit 
and soul healthy; he only indulges in pleasures which leave 
no regrets, in opinions which are undisturbing; he watches 
his own passions and flees those of others. If he does not 
allow himself to be tempted by positions and honors, it is 
due to fear of taking a risk or of being beaten in a 
contest. Of good humor, polished, more or less a friend of 
science, he is content with current information. Without 
being disturbed by metaphysical problems, he has long ago 
placed God so high and distant that he has nothing to hope 
for, and nothing to fear. With regard to the future life, he 
has, so to speak, effaced it from his soul and does not 
consider death except to decently resign himself to it some 
day. In the meantime, he disposes his life with a timid 
prudence, and does not go abroad among men except within the 
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4. Inasmuch as the natural inclinations of man are 
hierarchically ordered towards an ultimate end (namely, the 
knowledge and love of God), there is a corresponding 
complexity of human goods which are hierarchically ordered 
towards that one ultimate end. Thus, friendship, for 
example, is not an irreducible good-in-itself; rather, true 
or right friendship is rooted in the love of God and· ordered 
towards the love of God. Indeed, sin (moral evil) consists 
precisely in the love of any finite good as an end-in-
itself. Thus, as opposed to the opinions of Finnis, Grisez, 
and Boyle, human goods for St. Thomas are commensurable and 
reducible to one ultimate good--namely God. 81 
5. While moral judgments are guided by right reason, 
right reason is itself made "right" by virtue of the 
dictates of natural law--as acquired from the knowledge of 
human persons as they actually exist in the world. Hence, 
Vernon Bourke's assertion that St. Thomas' moral philosophy 
is not based upon natural law cannot be reasonably 
maintained; indeed, Bourke's assertion is flatly 
contradicted by St. Thomas' own words: "· .. omnia moralia 
circle of his friends where he can enjoy the sentiments 
which he inspires and those which he approves. His egoism is 
noble and delicate and has seen that benevolence is the 
charm of life whether one is its object or whether one is 
benevolent to others." A Short History of Philosophy, 161. 
81See Bonaventure, Key-Text B, Commentary; St. Thomas, 
Key-Text B, Remote Context #d. Regarding Finnis, Grisez, and 
Boyle, see our Introduction, notes 41-54. 
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praecepta legis sunt de lege naturae. "82 
6. While free will is a .sing gy_g. non of the moral 
dimension of man, the objective moral order is not 
established by free choice; rather, a human act is 
instantiated as moral or immoral by virtue of free 
deliberation in conformity with or against the objective 
moral order--as established by the Author of human nature. 
Thus, contrary to the opinion of Joseph Owens, the starting 
point of the moral order for St. Thomas does not begin with 
human choice, nor is the moral order man-man. 83 
V. A Final Comment 
A final word must be said with respect to the opinion 
(as maintained by Bourke, Owens, Finnis, et al) that nature 
has no direct bearing on ethics, or that metaphysical 
reflection is only an appendage to ethics. For St. 
Bonaventure and St. Thomas, the concerns of metaphysics, 
epistemology, and ethics are in themselves different; 
nevertheless, these sciences are not unrelated. Why? because 
each philosophical discipline is a distinct--but not 
isolated--aspect of but one intelligible world in which man 
82ST I-II, q. 100, a. 1, sed contra (VII, 206a). See 
Bonaventure, Key-Text A, Commentary; St. Thomas, Key-Text B, 
Commentary; regarding Vernon Bourke, see our Introduction, 
notes 37-38. 
83See St. Bonaventure, Key-Text A, Remote Context #b 
and Commentary; St. Thomas, Key-Text B, Commentary. See our 
Introduction, notes 39-40. 
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finds himself inexorably immersed. 84 Perhaps the most 
clear-cut example of the interrelation between metaphysics, 
epistemology, ethics, and the real world in which man lives 
his life with other persons is offered by Jean-Paul Sartre. 
According to him there is no human nature because there is 
no God to conceive it; and because there is no God, 
everything is permissible. 85 Or for another example, 
consider the practical ideology embraced by Benito 
Mussolini: 
In Germany relativism is an exceedingly daring and 
subversive theoretical construction (perhaps Germany's 
84See Bonaventure, Key-Text A, note 33 and Commentary; 
St. Thomas, Key-Text A, Commentary; Key-Text B, Remote 
Contexts #a-d. For a discussion on St. Bonaventure's 
division of sciences, see John F. Quinn, "The Moral 
Philosophy of St. Bonaventure," 39-41; see also Leo Sweeney, 
"Christian Philosophy in Augustine and Bonaventure," 278-
308. Aquinas discusses the division of sciences at length In 
Boeth. de Trin., q. 5, aa. 1-4. 
85Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, tr. 
Philip Mairet (Brooklyn: Haskell House Publishers, 1977), 
29: "If man, as the existentialist conceives him, is 
indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only 
afterward will he be something, and he himself will have 
made what he will be. Thus, there is ho human nature, since 
there is no God to conceive it." Ib;i.d., 33: "The 
existentialist ... finds it extremely embarrassing that God 
does not exist, for there disappears with Him all 
possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. 
There can no longer be any good g priori, since there in no 
infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is 
nowhere written that 'the good' exists, that one must be 
honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane 
where there are only men. Dostoevski once wrote 'If God did 
not exist, everything would be permitted;' and that, for 
existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed 
permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence 
forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either 
within or outside himself." 
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philosophical revenge which may herald the military 
revenge}. In Italy, relativism is simply a fact .... 
Everything I have said and done is these last years is 
relativism by intuition .... If relativism signifies 
contempt for fixed categories and men who claim to be 
the bearers of an objective, immortal truth ... then 
there is nothing more relativistic than Fascist 
attitudes and activity .... From the fact that all 
ideologies are of equal value, that all ideologies are 
mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that 
everybody has the right to create for himself his own 
ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the 
energy of which he is capable. 86 
86Benito Mussolini, Diuturna, 374-77. Quoted from 
Helmut Kuhn, Freedom Forgotten and Remembered (Chapel Hill, 
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1943}, 17-18. In 
more recent times, the United States Supreme Court has 
adopted a similar position to that of Mussolini's. 
Interpreting the meaning of liberty (as protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment}, the Court states: "At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 
(1992} . One might ask Benito Mussolini and the modern 
American Supreme Court Justice (l} what precisely is a 
right, and (2} what is the foundation of a right? If 
everyone "has the right" to create his own meaning or 
ideology, then apparently everyone has the "right" to define 
his own concept of "right" and "to attempt to enforce it 
with all the energy of which he is capable." Such a notion 
of 11 right 11 --as evidently rooted in force--appears to have 
entered into American jurisprudence principally through the 
influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes. See John C. Ford, "The 
Fundamentals of Holmes' Juristic Philosophy," Fordham Law 
Review 11, (1942}, 255-78. According to Holmes (257}: "[a 
right] is merely the hypostasis of the prophesied fact and 
an empty phrase. So we get up the empty substratum g right, 
to pretend to account for the fact that the courts will act 
in a certain way .... " Ibid., 264: "When it comes to the 
development of a corpus juris the ultimate question is what 
do the dominant forces of the community want and do they 
want it hard enough to disregard whatever inhibitions may 
stand in the way." Ibid., 271: "It seems to me clear that 
the ultima ratio, not only regum, but of private persons, is 
force, and that at the bottom of all private relations, 
however tempered by sympathy and all the social feelings, is 
a justifiable [?] self-preference. If a man is on a plank in 
the deep sea which will only float one, and a stranger lays 
hold of it, he will thrust him off if he can. When the state 
finds itself in a similar position, it does the same thing." 
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For both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, however, the 
consistent philosophical reasoning is just the reverse of 
Sartre's and Mussolini's--namely, since (as experience 
teaches us) there are actually existing human natures in the 
world, we know God exists; and because God exists, not 
everything is permissible; many actions are obligatory; and 
certain activities are absolutely proscribed. Now, if human 
nature were different from what it actually is, there would 
certainly be different practical consequences. This bond 
between human nature and practical living was not lost on a 
certain unelected personage who up until recently wielded 
substantial power in directing public policy in this nation. 
She states: 
Let us be willing to remold society by redefining what 
it means to be a human being in the twentieth century, 
moving into a new millennium. 87 
St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, however, do not 
consider human nature as redefinable--i.e., remoldable. 88 
Rather, for them, each and every human being possesses an 
87Hillary Rodham Clinton; cited in Michael Kelly, 
"Hillary Rodham Clinton and the Politics of Virtue," New 
York Times Magazine, 23 May 1993, 25. 
88 Inasmuch as Hillary Clinton exhorts us to "be willing 
to remold society," her motive in "redefining what it means 
to be a human being" is evidently not to better articulate 
in words what a human being actually is, but rather to 
attempt to alter the nature of human beings to be what they 
are not. On the question of human nature as mutable, see 
Michael Crowe, "Human Nature- - Immutable or Mutable?,-.. The 
Irish Theological Quarterly 30 (1963), 204-229. 
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inalienable nature, divinely constituted (i.e, defined), by 
which they exist as an imago Dei, and are ordained for God. 
Accordingly, each and every human being possesses an 
inviolable dignity; and it is only to the extent that such a 
dignity is recognized and defended that the social order can 
properly exist. In the wake of the bloodiest century in 
human history, the attempt to redefine "what it means to be 
a human being" has proven to be a hideous tragedy for untold 
millions; instead, what is becoming urgently clear, even 
among academics, is the need to rediscover what it already 
means to be a human being. Such a rediscovery, of course, 
demands the commitment to know the real world as it actually 
is. To this end the natural law doctrines of St. Bonaventure 
and St. Thomas provide a beacon of light. However, to be 
properly appreciated, their teachings on natural law must be 
studied according to their own terms of intelligibility89 
and within the larger context of their respective 
philosophical-theological positions. 
89St. Bonaventure's view of intelligibility is summed 
up as follows: "Si igitur non ens non potest intelligi nisi 
per ens, et ens in potentia, non nisi per ens in actu; et 
esse nominat ipsum purum actus entis: esse igitur est quod 
primo cadit in intellectu, et illud esse est quod est purus 
actus." Itin., V, 3 (V, 308b); see Key-Text A, notes 33 and 
86 and Appendix D. For St. Thomas, "intellectus autem 
humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est 
quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens." fil I, 
q. 84, a. 7, resp. (V, 325b); see Key-Text B, notes -8, 70, 
and 117. 
APPENDIX A 
CHRONOLOGY OF PETER LOMBARD'S LIFE AND WRITINGS 
Date 
1095 
1130-1134? 
1134 
1134-1138 
1139-1141 
1144-1145 
1147, April 
1148, March 
1153-1158 
Born at Lumellogno (Novara) 
Studied at Bologna or possibly Vercelli 
Arrived at Paris, received licentia docendi 
Taught in the school of Notre Dame 
Commentarium in psalmos davidicos (PL 191, 
55-1296) 1 
Collectanea in omnes J2...... Pauli Apostoi 
epistolas (PL 191, 1297-1696; PL 192, 9-520) 
Became canon of Notre Dame while in minor 
orders 
Took part in the Paris commission of Eugene 
III (to examime writings of Gilbert de la 
Porree) 
Participated in the Council of Reims 
(concerning errors attributed to Gilbert de 
la Porree) 
Sententiarum libri guatuor (Grottaferrata, 
1971-1981, 2 vols.) 2 
1The precise date of this composition is uncertain. 
Ignatius Brady states that this gloss "must have been 
written immediately after Lombard's arrival at Paris [1134], 
for there is no influence evident of the anonymous Summa 
Sententiarum (c. 1137-38) ." Cf. Ignatius Brady's article on 
Peter Lombard in New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. XI, (N. Y.: 
McGraw-Hill Co., 1967), 221-22. Philippe Delhaye writes 
that, in addition to some twenty sermons, "le professeur 
parisien a laisse ses gloses scripturaires et tout d'abord 
le Commentaire sur les psaumes compose sans doute avant 
1138." Philippe Delhaye, Pierre Lombard sa vie ses oeuvres 
sa morale, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1961), 19-20. For a listing of 
Peter Lombard sermons written around this time, see J. De 
Ghellinck, "Le Mouvement theologique du XIIe siecle," 
Dictionnare .d§. theologie catholigue, (2nd ed., Bruges, 
1948), t. 12, col. 1961-62. 
2While scholars are uncertain as to the precise date of 
composition, Delhaye cites 1153 to 1158 as the certain 
limits within which this work must have been written. See 
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1154 Possibly journeyed to Rome with Bishop 
Theobald 
1156 Became one of the archdeacons of Paris 
395 
1159 Elected Bishop of Paris; consecrated June 29 
1160, Aug. 21 Died at Paris, August 21 
Delhaye, Pierre Lombard, 23; also see De Ghellinck, "Le 
Mouvement theologique," 216, 288; D. Van Den Eynde, "Essai 
chronologique sur l'oeuvre litteraire de Pierre Lombard," in 
Miscellanea Lombardiana (Novara, 1957), 57-58. 
APPENDIX B 
CHRONOLOGY OF SAINT BONAVENTURE'S LIFE AND WRITINGS1 
Date 
1217 
1235 
1242-1243 
1248 
1250 
1250-1255 
1253-1257 
Born at Bagnoregio, Italy 
Arrived at Paris as student of arts 
Master of arts, entered Franciscan Order 
baccalareus biblicus 
baccalareus sententiarius 
Commentarius in gµatuor libros Sententiarum 
Petri Lombardi 2 
Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae3 
1Listed here are the works most pertinent to our study. 
For a complete listing of Bonaventure's writings, see 
Etienne Gilson, La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure (Paris: 
J. Vrin, 1943), 36; Thomas Reist, Saint Bonaventure as g 
Biblical Commentator (Lanham, MD.: University Press of 
America, 1985), 12-13. 
2The chronology of Bonaventure's early works is not 
established with any certainty. While Longpre suggests that 
the Commentary could have been later redacted, Brady 
maintains the final redaction was begun in the latter half 
of 1252 after Bonaventure had finished his classroom 
commentary as a baccalaureus sententiarius. Cf. Ephrem 
Longpre, "Saint Bonaventure," Dictionnaire d'histoire et de 
geographie ecclestiastigues, IX (Paris: Librairie Letouzey 
et Ane, 1937), col. 749; Ignatius Brady, "The Writings of 
Saint Bonaventure Regarding the Franciscan Order," in San 
Bonaventura Maestro Q,i ·Vita Francescan § di Sapienza 
Christian, 75 (vol. I, 1975), 90. 
3While it is commonly agreed that Bonaventure began 
writing his Commentarium in Evangelium Lucam in 1248, the 
work probably did not achieve its final form until many 
years later. While some scholars place the dating of the 
final redaction as late as the mid-1260's, Bougerol and 
Reist both argue for the years 1254-5 to 1257 during the 
time when Bonaventure was regent master. For a discussion of 
pertinent research on the dating of this commentary, see J. 
Bougerol, "Chronologia Sancti Bonaventurae," in£..... 
Bonaventura 1274-1974, II, (Grottaferrata, 1972-1974), 15; 
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1255 
1255-1256 
1257, Feb. 
Oct. 
1259 
1273 
1274, May 
Jul. 
1482, Apr. 
1487, May 
15 
15 
14 
397 
Received licentia docendi and taught in the 
School of Minors as magister sententiarum; 
acting regent master of theology 
Ouaestiones disputatae de perf ectione 
evangelica, De scientia Christi, De mysterio 
Trinitatis4 
Elected Minister General 
Granted full faculty status as master at 
Paris 
Brevilogµium, De Reductione artium ad 
theologiam, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, 
Lignum vitae, De triplici via 
Made cardinal by Gregory X 
Collationes in Hexaemeron 
Retired from off ice of Minister General 
Died at Lyons during the council 
Canonized by Sixtus IV 
Made Doctor of the Church by Sixtus V 
Reist, Saint Bonaventure, 68-70. 
4Although written in the same period, the precise 
chronology of this trilogy is uncertain. See Ignatius Brady, 
"The Opera Omnia of St. Bonaventure Revisited," in Thomas 
and Bonaventure. A Septicentenary Commemoration, Proceedings 
of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 48 
(1974}, 53-54. With regard to the dating of the Breviloguium 
and De Reductione artium ad theologium, see B. Distilbrink, 
Bonaventurae Scripta. Authentica. dubia vel spuria c·ritica 
recensita (Roma, 1975}, 4, 9-10. 
APPENDIX C 
CHRONOLOGY OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS' LIFE AND WRITINGS1 
Date 
1224 or 1225 
1230-1239 
1239-1244 
1244, April 
May 
1245, Autumn 
1248, Summer 
1251 
1252-1254 
1254-1256 
1256-1259 
1259-1268 
1265/6 
1269-1272 
Born in castle of Roccasecca near Naples 
Received elementary education at Monte 
Casino; read Gregory, Jerome, Augustine 
Undergraduate at University of Naples 
Entered Dominican Order in Naples 
Abducted on journey; attempted seduction at 
Montesangiovanni; taken to Roccasecca and 
imprisoned for about a year by mother 
Allowed to return to Dominican Order 
Went to Paris for Novitiate and study 
Accompanied St. Albert to Cologne 
Ordained priest at Cologne 
Returned to Paris; lectured on the 
Scriptures as Baccalaureus Biblicus 
Lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard 
as Baccalaureus Sententiarius; received 
Licentiate and became Magister of theology 
in 1256; Scripta super libros Sententiarum 
Petri Lombardi, De ente gt_ essentia written 
De principiis naturae written by 1256 
Teaches at Paris; De Veritate, Quaestiones 
guodlibetales 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, In Boethium 
de Hebdomadibus and In Boethium de 
Trinitate written during this period 
Teaches in Italy (at Naples,. Orvieto, Rome, 
Viterbo); Summa contra Gentiles, De 
potentia and various commentaries on 
Aristotle composed during this time 
Begins writing Summa Theologiae 
Teaches at Paris; engaged in controversy 
with the Averroists; various commentaries 
on Aristotle; Summa Theologiae, pars prima, 
1 For a documentation of chronology, see Ignatius 
Eschmann, A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works, in Etienne 
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New 
York: Random House, 1956), 381-430; James Wieshiepl, Friar 
Thomas D'Aguino: His Life, Thought, and Works (New York: 
Doubleday, 1974), 351-63. 
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1272-1274 
1274, mid-Feb 
late-Feb 
March 7 
prima secundae and secundae secundae 
completed by 1272 
399 
Teaches at Naples; Summa Theologiae, ters 
~ completed in 1273; breakdown, 
interruption of writing 
Set out for Council of Lyons, injured head 
at Borgonuovo 
brought by donkey to Fossanova 
died Wednesday morning at Fossanova 
APPENDIX D 
THE SCIENCE OF METAPHYSICS 
ACCORDING TO ST. BONAVENTURE 
Metaphysics for St. Bonaventure is the science of 
essences qua essence. While other sciences (such as 
mathematics and physics) deal in some way with essences, 
metaphysics alone attends directly to the hidden differences 
within them ("ad quidditatum differentias occultas 
considerandas") . 1 These differences are sixfold: substance 
and accident, universal and particular, potency and act, one 
and many, simple and composite, cause and caused. 2 From the 
study of [these differences within] created and particular 
substances, the metaphysician rises to the consideration of 
the universal and uncreated substance and to the very notion 
of [First] Being as the origin, exemplar, and end of all 
things. Although philosophers of nature also study the 
origin of things, and moral philosophers are concerned with 
the final end of things, the metaphysician alone considers 
1 See Hex., IV, 6 (V, 349b). 
2 Ibid., IV, 7 (V, 350a): "Secundum quidditatum 
differentias occultas fit divisio sex modis ad praesens: in 
substantiam et accidens, in universale et particulare, in 
potentiam et actum, in unum et multa, in simplex et 
compositium, in causam et in causatum." 
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the First Being as Exemplary cause of all creatures. 3 St. 
Bonaventure sums up the domain of metaphysics as follows: 
Our whole metaphysics is concerned with emanation, 
exemplarism, and the final end of things--namely, to be 
enlightened by spiritual rays and to return to the 
Highest [Being] . 4 
St. Bonaventure identifies the Supreme Being as purus 
actus entis, 5 and also as illa lux aeterna which is the 
3 See Hex., I, 13 (V, 33lb): "Metaphysicus autem ... 
[assurgit] ex consideratione principiorum substantiae 
creatae et particularis ad universalem et increatam et ad 
illud esse ut habet rationem principii, medii et finis 
ultimi .... Sed considerat illud esse in ratione omnia 
exemplantis, cum nullo communicat et verus est 
metaphysicus." Concerning the reduction of relative being to 
absolute Being, see ibid., IV, 7; V, 28; X, 17. Cf. 
Aristotle, Metapysica, VIII, 8. 
4Hex., I, 17 (V, 332): Haec est tota nostra 
metaphysica: de emanatione, de exemplaritate, de 
consummatione, scilicet illuminari per radios spirituales et 
reduci ad summum. Et sic eris verus metaphysicus." The term 
summum refers here to God as Supreme Being Who is also the 
foundation and end of all knowledge; indeed, being is the 
mark of all that is knowable. See ibid., X, 18 (V, 379b): 
"Hae igitur speculationes ordinis, originis et completionis 
ducunt ad illud esse primum, quod repraesentant omnes 
creaturae. Hoc enim nomen scriptum est in omnibus rebus; et 
sunt hae conditiones entis, super quas fundantur certissimae 
illationes. Unde dixit ille: 'Prima rerum creatarum omnium 
est esse;' sed ego dico: prima rerum intellectualium est 
esse primum." See Key-Text A, note 33; see also De reduct. 
artium, n. 4 (V, 320-21). 
5See Key-Text A, note 33. Bonaventure's meaning of 
purus actus entis or esse in actu should not be confused, 
however, with St. Thomas' notion of existentia. Regarding 
Bonaventure's use of the term esse, see George Klubertanz, 
"Esse and Existere in St. Bonaventure," Medieval Studies 8 
(1946)' 169-88. 
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exemplar of all things created. 6 Further, creatures for 
Bonaventure are constituted by light7 ; and the process by 
which creatures and God are known by man are described in 
terms of light. 8 Evidently, then, to be real for St. 
Bonaventure is to be light. 
6 Hex., VI, 6 (361a): 11 ••• illa lux aeterna est exemplar 
omnium, et quod mens elevat, ut mens aliorum nobilium 
philosophorum antiqorum, ad hoc pervenit." In .I Sent., d. 
17, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6 (II, 412b): "Lux enim spiritualis, quae 
Deus est, cum sit simplicissima .... " 
7See Key-Text A, note 76. 
8 See notes 4 and 6 above; see also Hex., IV, 1-5 (V, 
349) and ibid., V, 22 (V, 375b). On the primacy of light in 
Bonaventure's doctrine, see E. Gilson, La philosophie Q.§. 
saint Bonaventure, Ch. IX: "Les corps inanimes. Lalumiere"; 
Ch. XII: "L'illumination intellectuelle"; Ch. XIII: 
"L'illumination morale." See also L. Sweeney, "Christian 
Philosophy in Augustine and Bonaventure," in Essays Honoring 
Allan ;e,_,_ Wolters, ed. W. Frank and G. Etzkorn (St. 
Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1985), 307 and 
his note 73. 
Bonaventure's metaphysics is itself an extension of his 
trinitarian theology. In this regard, see Jacques Bougerol, 
"L'aspect spirituel de la speculation bonaventurienne," 
Antonianum 52 (1977), 695-701; Ewert Cousins, "God as 
Dynamic in Bonaventure and Contemporary Thought," 
Proceedings of the ACPA 48 (1974), 136-48; Zachary Hayes, 
"Christology and Metaphysics in the Thought of Bonaventure," 
Journal of Religion 58 (1978), 82-96; "The Meaning of 
Convenientia in the Metaphysics of St. Bonaventure, rr 
Franciscan Studies 34 (1974), 74-100. 
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